CIHM 

Microfiche 

Series 

(■Monographs) 


ICIMH 

Collection  de 
microfiches 
(monographies) 


Canadian  Instituta  for  Historical  Microraproductiona  /  Inatitut  Canadian  da  microraproductiona  historiquas 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes  /  Notes  techniques  et  bibliographlques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best  original 
copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this  copy  which 
may  be  bibliographically  unique,  which  may  alter  any  of 
the  images  in  the  reproduction,  or  which  may 
significantly  change  the  usual  method  of  filming  are 
checked  below. 


\A 


Coloured  covers  / 
Couverture  de  couleur 


□  Covers  damaged  / 
Couverture  endommagte 

□  Covers  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Couverture  restaur^e  et/ou  pellicula 

I   Cover  title  missing  /  Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

I  Coloured  maps  /  Cartes  g^ographiques  en  couleur 

r^f  Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)  / 
I — I   Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 

I      I   Cotoured  plates  and/or  illustrattons/ 


Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 

Bound  with  other  material  / 
Reli6  avec  d'autres  documents 


D 
D 


D 


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within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these  have  been 
omitted  from  filming  /  II  se  peut  que  certaines  pages 
blanches  ajout^es  lors  d'une  restauration 
apparaissent  dans  le  texte,  mais,  lorsque  cela  6tait 
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Addittonal  comments  / 
Commentaires  suppMmentaires: 


L'Institut  a  microfilm*  le  meilleur  exemplaire  qu'il  lui  a 
6t6  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details  de  cet  exem- 
plaire qui  sont  peut-dtre  uniques  du  point  de  vue  bibli- 
ographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier  une  image  reproduite, 
ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une  modiffcation  dans  la  m6tho- 
de  nomnale  de  filmage  sont  indk]ute  ci-dessous. 

I I  Coloured  pages  /  Pages  de  couleur 

I I   Pages  damaged  /  Pages  endommagdes 

□   Pages  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Pages  restaurtes  et/ou  pellicul^es 

Q  Pages  discotoured,  stained  or  foxed  / 
Pages  d^colortes,  tachetdes  ou  piques 

I     I  Pages  detached  /  Pages  d^tach^s 

|_/]  Showthrough/ Transparence 

□  Quality  of  print  varies  / 
Quality  inhale  de  I'impresston 

Includes  supplementary  material  / 
Comprend  du  materiel  suppl^mentaire 

Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  .rrata  slips, 
tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  totalement  ou 
partiellement  obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'enata,  une 
pelure,  etc.,  ont  M  film^s  k  nouveau  de  fa^on  h 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  possible. 

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discok)uratk>ns  are  filmed  twk:e  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  s'opposant  ayant  des 
colorations  variables  ou  des  decolorations  sont 
film«es  deux  fois  afin  d'obtenir  la  meilleure  image 
possible. 


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of  tha  original  eopy  and  in  kaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  sp«cif icationa. 


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beginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad  or  illustrated  impraa- 
sion.  or  tha  back  covar  whan  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copiaa  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impree- 
sion.  and  anding  on  the  laat  paga  with  a  printed 
or  illuetrated  impreeaiOii. 


The  laat  recorded  freme  on  eech  microfiche 
shsH  contain  tha  symbel  ^^  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUEO"t.  or  tha  symbol  V  (meaning  "END  ). 
whichever  applies. 

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different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  lerge  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  SKposura  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  comer,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bonom,  as  many  frames  aa 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


L'axamplaira  film*  fut  reproduit  grice  i  la 
ginirositi  do: 

Stauffer  Library 
Quaan's  Ihilvarsl^ 

Las  images  suivantas  ont  *t*  raproduitas  svcc  la 
plus  grand  soin,  eompta  tanu  da  I  ^  condition  at 
da  la  nattet*  da  I'eKempiaira  film*,  at  •n 
conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrst  do 
nimege. 

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papier  eat  ImprimAa  sent  filmte  an  commandant 
par  la  premier  plat  at  an  terminant  soit  par  la 
darnlAre  paga  qui  comporta  una  ampraints 
d'impression  ou  d'illustrstion,  soit  par  la  second 
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la  demiare  pege  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

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dami*re  imege  do  cheque  microfiche,  salon  la 
cas:  la  symbols  -^>  signifie  "A  8UIVRE".  la 
symbole  ▼  signifie  "FIN  ". 

Les  cartea.  planches,  tableaux,  etc..  pauvant  «tra 
filmto  A  dee  taux  da  reduction  diff«rents. 
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reproduit  en  un  soul  clich*.  il  est  film*  *  partir 
da  I'angle  sup*rieur  gauche,  do  gauche  k  droite. 
et  do  haut  en  baa.  w  prenant  la  nombra 
d'imagea  nAcassaira.  Las  diegrammes  suivsnts 
illustrent  la  mAthede. 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

MKIOCOPV   MSOWTION   TtST   CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


A 


^IPPLIED  IIVMSr    I 

1653   East    Moin   Stmt 

(716)  «2  -  0300  -  Phon. 
(716)  2Sa  -  5989  -  r<i> 


APOLOGETICS 


VOLUME  I. 


FUNDAMENTAL 


APOLOGETICS 


OR 


THE    RATIONAL    VINDICATION    OF 
CHRISTIANITY 


FRANCIS  R.  BEATTIE,  B.D.,  Ph.a..,  D.D.,  LL.D. 

Fhofessor  or  Apologktics  and  Systematic  Theology  in  the  Presbyterian  Theo- 
logical Seminary  of  Kentucky;  Author  op  "  Radical  Criticism," 
"The  Presbvtbriam  Standards,"  Etc.,  Etc. 


With  an  Introduction 


BENJAMIN  B.  WARFIELD,  D.  D.,  LL.  D. 

Professor  of  Systematic  Theology  in  the  Theological  Seminary  at  Princeton, 

New  Jersey 


I       THREE  VOLUMES 

VOLUME  I. 
FUNDAMENTAL  APOLOGETICS 


RICHMOND,  VA. 
The  Pkesbvterian  Committee  of  Publication 


"BTiiovSss 


Copyrighted  by 

Thi  Pusbytmian  Committbx  of  Pubucation 

R.  E.  Maoill,  Stcrttary 

1903 


Pkiktid  by 
Whittbt  ft  SHirriHON 

RiCNMOMO,  Va. 


5  b 


TO 

Ay  TPntfe 

WHOSB  CHUMNO  FKBSBNCB  AND  PATIENT  lUVICB 
UOHTKNBD  MANY  HOURS  OF  LABOK 

THIS  VOLUME 

IS  AFFECTIONATBLY  D!-'DICATBD 


7o;^''io 


■■ 


"And  be  ready  always  to  give  a  reason  for  the  hope  that  is  in  you 
with  meekness  and  fear."— The  Apostle  Peter. 

"And  in  the  defence  and  confirmation  of  the  gospel,  knowing  that  I 
am  set  for  the  defence  of  the  gospel."— The  Apostle  Pauu 

"Hold  that  fast  which  thou  hast,  that  no  man  take  thy  crown."— The 
Afostu:  John. 

"A  double-minded  man  is  unstable  in  all  his  ways."— The  Afostlk 
James. 


PREFACE. 


THIS  treatise  seeks  to  give  a  somewhat  complete 
account  of  the  rational  grounds  upon  which  the 
Christian  system  securely  rests.  Christianity  proclaims  a 
changeless  gospel  to  an  ever-changfing  world.  This  implies 
that  its  message  and  its  vindication  must  be  wisely  adapted 
to  constantly  changing  conditions.  And  this  being  the  case, 
the  task  of  Apologetics  is  ceaseless,  and  its  service  is  ever 
needed. 

While  we  place  a  very  high  value  upon  Apologetics  in  its 
own  proper  sphere,  we  are  careful  not  to  overrate  the  service 
it  can  render.  Christianity  in  its  essence  does  not  stand  or 
fall,  is  not  made  or  unmade,  by  the  effectiveness  of  any 
apologetic  proposed  for  it.  In  the  last  analysis,  the  Christian 
system  is  its  own  best  vindication,  for  the  reason,  mainly, 
that  the  foundations  of  Christianity  lie  deeper  than  any 
apologetic  on  its  behalf  can  go.  Apologetics  neither  plans 
nor  lays  thest  foundations ;  it  can  only  exhibit  their  inherent 
stre  igth  and  abiding  security.  Nor  must  it  be  supposed  that 
Apologetics  is  able  to  construct  the  contents  of  the  Christian 
religion;  these  are  provided  in  the  gracious  revelation  of 
the  redeeming  activity  of  God,  as  it  is  working  out  its  divine 
purpose  among  men  all  along  the  ages.  Still  less  must  we 
expect  that  Apologetics  can  convert  a  single  soul ;  only  the 
gospel  of  the  grace  of  God  can  effect  this.  But  when  all 
this  is  said,  it  is  still  true  that,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
case,  Apologetics  must  ever  retain  its  most  important  place 
and  task.    It  is  bound  to  present  to  each  succeeding  age  the 


8 


PREFACE. 


most  effective  vindication  it  can  of  the  rational  validity,  of 
the  divine  redeeming  reality,  and  of  the  unique  supernatural 
character  of  Christianity. 

The  fact  just  stated  provides,  in  part  at  least,  a  reason  for 
the  publication  of  another  treatise  upon  a  subject  whose 
literature  is  already  extensive  and  valuable.  At  the  same 
time,  another  word  of  justification  for  sending  forth  a 
treatise  like  this  may  be  uttered.  It  can  hardly  be  ciid  that 
we  have  in  our  own  English  tongue  a  work  which  fully 
covers  the  whole  wide  field  of  Apologetics.  We  have  v^■± 
treatises  from  German  sources,  but  these,  even  when  well 
translated,  do  not  suitably  meet  the  needs  of  the  average 
English-speaking  student.  In  addition,  while  we  have  from 
the  pens  of  English  writers  very  many  most  excellent  trea- 
tises on  natural  theology,  theism,  the  philosophy  of  religion, 
and  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  there  is  not,  so  far  as  we 
are  aware,  a  single  comprehensive  treatise  from  such  a 
source,  which  binds  the  entire  defence  and  vindication  of 
Christianity  into  a  well-orga.iized  whole,  so  as  thereby  to 
present  what  may  be  properly  called  a  scientific  system  of 
Apologetics.  This  treatise  ventures  to  supply  this  need,  but 
with  what  success  the  reader  must  be  the  final  judge. 

The  general  plan  and  view-point  of  the  treatise  may  be 
merely  indicated.  It  proposes  to  organize,  according  to  the 
inner  nature  of  Christianity,  as  the  only  truly  redemptive 
religion,  the  whole  materials  of  its  defence  and  vindication. 
It  makes  an  attempt  to  exhibit,  in  a  somewhat  scientific  way, 
a  complete  apologetic  for  the  Christian  system,  drawn  from 
its  inner  nature,  as  the  only  redeeming  religion. 

As  thus  regarded,  Christianity  may  be  construed  in  three 
well-defined  relations.    First,  its  philosophical  foundations 


PREFACE.  9 

are  to  be  carefully  examined;  secondly,  its  historicity  and 
divine  authority  must  be  taken  fully  into  account;  and, 
thirdly,  its  practical  restilts  in  the  world,  in  relation  to  the 
pressing  problems  of  thought  and  life  among  men,  must  be 
diligently  considered.  From  these  three  view-points  we 
derive  the  three  main  branches  of  Apologetics.  They  may 
be  termed  Fundamental,  Christian,  and  Applied  Apologetics, 
respectively.  The  first  leads  us  to  construe  Christianity 
mainly  in  relation  to  its  underlying  philosophy;  the  second 
calls  upon  us  to  interpret  Christianity  in  the  light  of  its 
unique  redemptive  history;  while  the  third  bids  us  test  the 
Christian  system  by  means  of  its  splendid  fruitage  in  the 
world.  These  three  branches  of  Apologetics  are  closely 
related  to  each  other;  yet  they  are  so  well  defined,  in  a 
logical  way  at  least,  that  each  merits  separate  treatment. 
Hence  emerges  the  plan  for  the  three  volumes  of  this 
treatise.  The  present  volume  is  the  first,  and  it  deals  entirely 
with  Fundamental  or  Philosophical  Apologetics.  Therein 
the  underlying  philosc^phy  involved  in  Christianity  is  to  be 
vindicated. 

Not  much  need  now  be  said  concerning  the  general  stand- 
point of  this  treatise,  as  this  can  be  best  gathered  by  the 
careful  reader  from  the  discussion  itself.  In  philosophy  it 
stands  firmly  on  the  ground  of  rational  realism,  as  against 
both  materialism  and  idealism.  As  to  its  epistemolog^,  it 
holds,  against  empiricism  and  skepticism,  to  the  rationality 
of  human  cognition.  In  its  philosophy  of  religion,  it 
maintains  a  definite  vital  theism,  over  'nst  deism  and 
pantheism.  In  regard  to  Christianity,  .  asserts  a  well- 
defined  supernaturalism,  against  all  types  of  naturalism.  As 
to  the  essence  of  Christianity,  it  finds  this  in  the  redeeming 


liniliiifc 


lO 


PREFACE. 


activity  of  God,  mediated  in  the  world  by  Jesus  Christ,  and 
administered  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  as  against  all  other  systems 
of  religion.  As  to  its  doctrinal  standpoint,  it  rests  confi- 
dently on  the  basis  of  the  hi  toric  Reformed  system.  And 
in  its  temper,  it  seeks  to  cherish,  over  against  a  hopeless 
pessimism,  a  hopeful  meliorism,  which  believes  that  things 
are  getting  better,  and  that  the  world  is  surely  moving  on 
towards  that  welcome  day  when  the  eternal  sun  of  optimism 
shall  brightly  shine  in  a  cloudless  sky.  Such  is  the  stand- 
point of  this  treatise. 

Some  care  has  been  taken  to  make  this  work  useful  to  the 
average  English-speaking  student,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
supply  some  aid  to  any  who  may  wish  to  pursue  their 
reading  more  widely  in  this  inviting  field.  To  this  end,  a 
partial  bibliography  is  given  in  connection  with  each  chapter. 
This  bibliography  in  no  case  claims  to  be  complete.  It 
simply  gives  the  titles  of  a  few  of  the  books  easily  accessible 
to  the  average  English  reader.  It  is  hoped,  however,  that 
this  bibliography  may  in  each  case  serve  a  useful  purpose. 
A  well-digested  table  of  contents  is  affixed  to  each  chapter, 
to  further  aid  the  student  in  grasping  the  discussions  con- 
tained therein.    An  index  is  added  at  the  end  of  the  volume. 

Professor  Benjamin  B.  Warfield,  D.  D.,  LL.  D.,  of  the 
Theological  Seminary  at  Princeton,  N.  J.,  has  been  kind 
enough  o  accede  to  the  author's  request  to  write  an  Intro- 
duction for  the  treatise,  which  greatly  enhances  its  value. 
For  this  splendid  service  the  reader  will  no  doubt  be  deeply 
grateful,  as  the  author  is  truly  thankful. 

The  other  two  volumes  are  in  course  of  preparation,  and 
will  be  issued  without  undue  d»lay.  The  three  volumes 
rpprescnt,  in  their  own  way,  the  results  of  twenty  years  of 


PREFACE. 


II 


reading  and  lection  upon  these  themes,  fifteen  of  which 
have  been  devoted  to  teaching  these  topics  in  the  theologfical 
class-room.  Tf  there  really  be  any  need  for  such  a  treatise, 
it  is  humbly  .v>ped  that  this  may  to  some  extent  supply  this 
need,  and  be  useful  as  a  sort  of  hand-book  in  Apologetics. 
Above  all,  if  it  shall  do  anything  to  make  it  plain  that 
Christianity  has  philosophical  validity,  historic  reality,  and 
redemptive  sufficiency,  the  author  will  be  more  than 
rewarded  for  all  his  labors.  May  the  Head  of  the  Church 
accept  it,  and  grant  it  some  measure  of  usefulness ! 

Francis  R.  Beattie. 

Louisville,  Ky.    1903. 


rifl 


"Hear,  O  Israel:  the  Lord  our  God  is  our  Lord."— Deut.  vi.  4. 

"God  is  a  Spirit:  and  they  that  worship  him  must  worship  him  in 
spirit  and  in  truth."— ^  oh  n  iv.  24. 

"The  heavens  declare  the  glory  of  God,  and  the  firmament  sheweth 
his  handiwork." — Psa.  xix.  i. 

"Lift  up  your  eyes  on  high,  and  behold  who  hath  created  these 
things,  that  bringeth  out  their  host  by  number:  he  calleth  them  all  by 
names  by  the  greatness  of  his  migh'.,  for  that  he  is  strong  in  power; 
not  one  faileth."— Isaiah  xl.  26. 

"Canst  thou  by  searching  find  out  God?  canst  thou  find  out  the 
Almighty  unto  perfection?" — ^Job  xi.  7. 

"Whither  shall  I  go  from  thy  Spirit?  or  whither  shall  I  flee  from 
thy  presence?" — Psa.  cxxxix.  7. 

"God  is  a  Spirit,  infinite,  eternal,  and  unchangeable,  in  his  being, 
wisdom,  power,  holiness,  justice,  goodness,  and  truth." — Shoktu  Cati- 

CHtSM,  QUES.  4. 


CONTENTS. 

VOLUME  I. 
FUNDAMENTAL  APOLOGETICS. 

Pagb. 

TbxPrkfacs, 7 

Thi  Table  of  Contents, 13 

An  Intkoduction  by  the  Rev.  Pbofessor  Benjamin  B.  Wak- 

riELD,  D.  D.,  LL.  D 19 

INTRODUCTION. 

CHAPTER  I. 
The  Spheee,  the  Scope  and  the  Spibit  of  Apologetics,  .        3$ 

CHAPTER  II. 
The  Definition,  the  Aiu  and  the  Natube  of  Afologetics,  48 

CHAPTER  III. 
The  Place,  the  Method  and  the  Divisions  of  Apologetics,  63 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Apologetics  and  the  Theoby  of  Knowledge,       ....        76 

CHAPTER  V. 
Apologehcs  and  the  Philosophy  of  Belief,        .       .       .       .        g6 


W^^ 


14  CONTENTS. 

THE  FIRST  PART. 

FUNDAMENTAL  OR  PHILOSOPHICAL  APOLO- 
GETICS. 

CHAPTER  I.  p,,. 

The  Meaning,  the  Definition  and  the  Divisions  of  Funda- 
mental Apologetics, 113 

THE  FIRST  DIVISION. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THEISM. 

THE  FIRST  SECTION. 

CHAPTER  II. 
The  Nature  of  Reugious  and  Theistic  Belief,        ...       135 

THE  SECOND  SECTION. 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Origin  of  Reugious  and  Theistic  Belief:  The  Fetich- 

istic  Theory, 139 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Origin  of  Religious  and  Theistic  Belief:  Naturism  and 

Animism, 156 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Origin  of  Religious  and  Theistic  Belief  :  Spiritism  and 

Ancestorism, 169 

CHAPTER  VI. 
The  Origin  of  Religious  and  Theistic  Belief  :  Henotheism,  .       183 


CONTENTS.  15 

CHAPTER  VII.  p*„^ 

The  Obigin  of  Religious  and  Theistic  Belief  :  The  Function 

OF  Reasoning  or  Inference, i9S 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  Origin  of  Religious  and  Theistic  Belief:   Idealistic 

Evolution, 209 

CHAPTER  IX. 

The  Origin  of  Reugious  and  Theistic  Belief  :  The  Function 

OF  Revelation, 222 

CHAPTER  X. 

The  Origin  of  Reugious  and  Theistic  Belief  :  The  Accepted 

Theory, 234 

THE  SECOND  DIVISION. 

THE  ONTOLOGY  OF  THEISM. 

THE  FIRST  SECTION. 
THE   EXISTENCE   OF   GOD. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Introductory  Topics, 249 

CHAPTER  II. 

The    Psychical    Argument:     Proof    fro  .    the    Autopistic 

Nature  of  Theistic  Belief, 262 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Psychical  Argument  :   Proof  from  the  Idea  of  a  Neces- 
sary Being, 274 


i6  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IV.  p^ 

Tai  Psychical  Pioors :  Pioop  FsOi^  the  Idea  of  iNnNrrv,     .       ago 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Psychical  ?>oofs  :  Proof  from  the  Principle  ok  Intel- 

L".ENCE, 304 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Cosmical  Proofs:  Causation  and  the  Proof  from  Cosmic 

Origin, 316 

CHAPTER  VII. 
The  Cosmic \l  Proofs:  Proof  from  Cosmic  Progress,     .       .       335 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
The  Cosmical  Proof.<:  ;  Pjumv  from  Cosmic  C  ^er,     ...       347 

CHAPTER  IX. 
The  Cosy     <>.  Proofs  :  Proof  from  Cosmic  Design,   .       .       .       3G0 

CHAPTER  X. 

The  Moral  Proofs  :  Moral  Theory  :   Proof  from  the  Icea  of 

Right, 382 

CHAPTER  XI. 

The  Mokal  Proofs  :  Proof  from  the  Fact  of  Obligation  and 

THE  Idea  of  the  Good, 395 

CHAPTER  XII. 
The  Moral  Proofs  :  Proof  from  History, 409 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
The  Kantian  CRinasM,  and  a  Summary  of  Theism,     .       .       418 


CONTENTS.  17 

THE  ONTOLOGY  OF  THEISM. 

THE  SECOND  SECTION. 

THE  ANTITHEISTIC  THEORIES. 

CHAPTER  I.  rKc 

Atbeism  :  Statxmint  and  Cuncisii, 4.^1 

CHAPTER  II. 
Semi-Materiaush  :   Statement  and  OuTiasu ,        ...       445 

CHAPTER  III. 
Pure  MATEioAusif:  Statement, 459 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Pure  Materialism  :   Criticism, 4^9 

CHAPTER  V. 

PSYCHOU'GICAL  MaTEP'ALISM:    STATEMENT  AND  CRITICISM,  .  484 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Materialistic  Evolution  :  Statement  and  Criticism,  .       497 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Positivism  :   Statement  and  Criticism, S09 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
AcNosTiasM:    Statement,     . S^i 


■ 


l8  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IX.  p^o^ 

AcNosTiasM:  Ctmasu,        ........       531 

CHAPTER  X. 
Deism  and  Rationausm  :  Statement  and  CuTiasM,       .       .       545 

CHAPTER  XI. 
Pantheism:    Statement, 558 

CHAPTER  XII. 
Pantheism:    CRrriasM, 569 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Pessimism  and  the  Pioblbm  op  Eva:   Statement  and  Criti- 

asM, 581 

The  Index Sj^ 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


By  benjamin  B.  WARFIELD,  D.  D.,  LL.  D. 

IT  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  respond  to  Dr.  Beattie's 
request  that  I  shall  say  a  few  words  by  way  of  intro- 
duction to  his  comprehensive  work  on  Apologetics.  I  am 
purposely  laying  stress  on  the  comprehensiveness  of  the 
work.  It  is  always  a  satisfaction  to  have  placed  in  our  hands 
a  treatise  on  one  of  the  theological  disciplines,  which  de- 
velops with  serenity  and  sanity  its  entire  content.  In  the 
case  of  Apologetics,  however,  such  an  achievement  is  par- 
ticularly to  be  welcomed.  We  have  had  many  apologies; 
perhaps  no  branch  of  scientific  theology  has  been  more 
fruitful  during  the  past  two  centuries.  But  we  have  had 
comparatively  few  surveys  of  the  whole  field  of  Apologetics. 
Perhaps  Dr.  Beattie's  is  the  first  to  be  produced  by  an 
American  Presbyterian. 

The  fact  is,  despite  the  richness  of  our  apologetical 
literature.  Apologetics  has  been  treated  very  much  like  a 
step-child  in  the  theological  household.  The  encyclopaedists 
have  seemed  scarcely  to  know  what  to  do  with  it.  They 
have  with  difficulty  been  persuaded  to  allow  it  a  place  among 
the  theological  disciplines  at  all.  And,  when  forced  to 
recognize  it,  they  have  been  very  prone  to  thrust  it  away 
into  some  odd  comer,  where  it  could  hide  its  diminished  head 
behind  the  skirts  of  some  of  its  more  esteemed  sisters. 

This  widespread  misprision  of  Apologetics  has  been 
greatly  fostered  by  the  influence  of  two  opposite  (if  they  be 
indeed  opposite)  tendencies  of  thought,  which  have  very 
deeply  affected  the  thinking  even  of  theologians  who  are  in 
principle  antagonistic  to  them.  I  mean  Rationalism  and 
Mysticism.     To  Rationalistn,  of  course,  Apologetics  were 


ao 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


,' 


an  inanity;  to  Mysticism,  an  impertinence.  Wherever, 
therefore,  RationaHstic  presuppositions  have  intruded,  there 
proportionately  the  validity  of  Apologetics  has  been  ques- 
tioned. Wherever  mystical  sentiment  has  seeped  in,  there 
the  utility  of  Apologetics  has  been  more  or  less  distrusted. 
At  the  present  moment,  the  Rationalistic  tendency  is  perhaps 
most  active  in  the  churches  in  the  form  given  it  by  Albrecht 
Ritschl.  In  this  form  it  strikes  at  the  very  roots  of  Apolo- 
getics by  the  distinction  it  erects  between  religious  and 
theoretical  knowledge.  Where  religion  is  supposed  to  seek 
and  find  expression  only  in  value-judgments — the  subjective 
product  of  the  human  soul  in  its  struggle  after  personal 
freedom — and  thus  to  stand  out  of  all  relation  with  theo- 
retical knowledge,  there,  obviously,  there  is  no  place  for  a 
vindication  of  Christian  faith  to  reason  and  no  possibility  of 
Apologetics.  In  a  somewhat  odd  parallelism  to  this(though, 
perhaps,  it  is  not  so  odd,  after  all)  the  mystical  tendency  is 
showing  itself  in  our  day  most  markedly  in  a  widespread 
inclination  to  decline  Apologetics  in  favor  of  the  so-called 
testimonium  Spiritus  Sancti.  The  convictions  of  the 
Christian  man,  we  are  told,  are  not  the  product  of  reasons 
addressed  to  his  intellect,  but  are  the  immediate  creation  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  in  his  heart.  Therefore,  it  is  intimated,  we 
can  not  only  do  very  well  without  these  reasons,  but  it  is 
something  very  like  sacrilege  to  attend  to  them.  Apolo- 
getics, accordingly,  is  not  merely  useless,  but  may  even 
become  noxious,  because  tending  to  substitute  a  barren 
intellectual  ism  for  a  vital  faith. 

We  need  not  much  disturb  ourselves  over  such  utterances 
when  they  are  the  expression,  as  they  often  are  in  our 
modern  church,  of  the  intellectual  distress  of  those  whose 
own  Apologetic  has  proved  too  weak  to  withstand  the  Ra- 
tionalistic as>  ailt,  and  who  are  fain,  therefore,  to  take  refuge 
from  the  oppressive  rationalism  of  their  understandings  in 
an  empty  irrationalism  of  the  heart.  In  these  cases  the 
extremes  have  met,  and  the  %vould-be  mystic  preser\'es 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


21 


nothing  but  his  dialect  to  distinguish  him  from  the  Ritschlite 
rationalist.  What  he  needs  for  his  cure  is  clearly  not  less 
Apologetics,  but  more  Apologetics — lacking  which  he  must 
ever  remain  of  a  "double  mind,"  clingfing  with  the  despera- 
tion of  a  drowning  man  to  a  faith  on  which  his  own  intellect 
has  passed  the  sentence  of  irrationality.  The  case  is  very 
diflferent,  however,  when  we  encounter  very  much  the  same 
forms  of  speech  on  the  lips  of  heroes  of  the  faith,  who 
depreciate  Apologetics  because  they  feel  no  need  of  "rea- 
sons" to  ground  a  faith  which  they  are  sure  they  have 
received  immediately  from  God.  Apologetics,  they  say,  will 
iitfver  make  a  Christian.  Ch  stians  are  made  by  the  creative 
Spirit  alone.  And  when  God  Almighty  has  implanted  faith 
in  the  heart,  we  shall  not  require  to  seek  for  "reasons"  to 
ground  our  conviction  of  the  truth  of  the  Christian  religion. 
We  have  tasted  and  seen,  and  we  know  of  ourselves  that 
it  is  from  God.  Thus,  the  sturdiest  belief  joins  hands 
with  unbelief  to  disparage  the  defences  of  the  Christian 
religion. 

Dr.  Abraham  Kuyper,  one  of  the  really  great  theologians 
of  our  time,  is  a  very  striking  instance  of  thinkers  of  this 
tendency.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  Dr.  Kuyper  would 
abolish  Apologetics  altogether.  He  has  written  an  Encyclo- 
padia  of  Sacred  Theology,  and  in  it  he  gives  a  place  to 
ApoiogeticR  ii-^ong  the  other  disciplines.  But  how  subordi- 
nate a  place ;  And  in  what  a  curtailed  form !  Hidden  away 
as  a  subdivision  of  a  subdivision  of  what  Dr.  Kuyper  calls 
the  "Dogmatological  Group"  of  disciplines  (which  corres- 
ponds roughly  to  what  most  encyclopaedists  call  "Systematic 
Theology"),  one  has  to  search  for  it  before  he  finds  it,  ar  . 
when  he  finds  it,  he  discovers  that  its  function  is  confir  d 
closely,  we  might  almost  say  jealously,  to  the  narrow  task 
of  defending  developed  Christianity  against  philosophy, 
falsely  so  called.  After  the  contents  of  Christianity  have 
been  set  forth  thetically  in  Dogmatics  and  Ethics,  it  finds 
itself,  it  seems,  in  a  three  fold  conflict.    This  is  waged  with 


22 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


i 


a  pseudo-Christianity,  a  pseudo-religion,  and  a  pseudo- 
philosophy.  Three  antithetic  dogmatological  disciplines  are 
therefore  requisite — Polemics,  Elenchtics  and  Apologetics, 
corresponding,  respectively,  to  heterodoxy,  paganism,  phil- 
osophy. The  least  of  these  is  Apologetics,  which  concerns 
itself  only  with  the  distinctively  philosophical  assault  on 
Christianity.  Meanwhile,  as  for  Christianity  itself,  it  has 
remained  up  to  this  t.">int — let  us  say  it  frankly — ^the  great 
Assumption.  The  work  of  the  exegete,  the  historian,  the 
systematist,  has  all  hung,  so  to  speak,  in  the  air;  not  until 
all  their  labor  is  accomplished  do  they  pause  to  wipe  their 
streaming  brows  and  ask  whether  they  have  been  dealing 
with  realities,  or  perchance  with  fancies  only. 

Naturally  it  is  not  thus  that  Dr.  Kuyper  represents  it  to 
himself.  He  supposes  that  all  these  workers  have  through- 
out wrought  in  faith.  But  >u  seems  not  quite  able  to  conceal 
from  himself  that  they  have  not  justified  that  faith,  and  that 
some  may  think  their  procedure  itself,  therefore,  unjustified, 
if  not  unjustifiable.  He  distributes  the  departments  of 
theological  science  into  four  groups,  corresponding  roughly 
with  the  Exegetical,  Historical,  Systematic  and  Practical 
disciplines  which  the  majority  of  encyclopaedists  erect, 
although  for  reasons  of  his  own,  very  interestingly  set  forth, 
he  prefers  to  call  them,  respectively,  the  Bibliological,  Eccle- 
siological,  Dogmatological  and  Diaconiological  groups  of 
disciplines.  Now,  when  he  comes  to  discuss  the  contents  of 
these  groups  in  detail,  he  betrays  a  feeling  that  something  is 
lucking  at  the  l)eginning.  "Before  dealing  separately  with 
the  four  groups  of  departments  of  study  into  which  theology 
is  divided,"  he  says,*  "we  must  give  a  brief  resume  from 
the  second  part  of  this  Encyclopadia,  of  how  the  subject 
arrives  at  the  first  group.  Logical  order  demands  that  the 
first  group  bring  you  to  the  point  where  the  second  begins, 
that  the  second  open  the  way  for  the  third,  and  that  the  third 
introduce  you  to  the  fourth.  But  no  other  precedes  the  first 
^  Encychptedie  dcr  Hcilige  Godgeteerdheid,  Deel  III.,  p.  4  sq. 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


23 


group,  and  it  is  accordingly  in  place  here  to  indicate  how  we 
arrive  at  the  first  group."    Just  so,  surely! 

Dr.  Kuyper  proceeds  to  point  out  that  the  subject  of 
theology  is  the  human  consciousness;  that  in  this  con- 
sciousness there  is  implanted  a  sensus  divinitatis,  a  semen 
religionis,  which  impels  it  to  seek  after  the  knowledge  of 
God ;  that  in  the  sinner  this  action  is  renewed  and  quickened 
by  the  palingenesis:,  through  which  the  subject  is  opened  for 
the  reception  of  the  special  revelation  of  God  made  first  by 
deed,  culminating  in  the  Incarnation,  and  then  by  word, 
centering  in  the  Scriptures.  Thus,  by  the  testimoniu,n 
Spiritus  Sancti,  the  subject  is  put  in  possession  of  the  revela- 
tion of  God  embodied  in  the  Scriptures,  and  is  able  to 
proceed  to  explicate  its  contents  through  the  several  disci- 
plines of  theological  science.  Now,  what  is  it  that  Dr. 
Kuyper  has  done  here  except  outline  a  very  considerable— 
though  certainly  not  a  complete — Apologetics,  which  must 
precede  and  prepare  the  way  for  the  "Bibliological  Group" 
of  theological  departments?  We  must,  it  seems,  vindicate 
the  existence  of  a  sensus  divinitatis  in  man  capable  of 
producing  a  natural  theology  independently  of  special  reve- 
lation ;  and  then  the  reality  of  a  special  revelation  in  deed 
and  word ;  and  as  well,  the  reality  of  a  supernatural  prepa- 
ration of  the  heart  of  man  to  receive  it;  before  we  can 
proceed  to  the  study  of  theologfy  at  all,  as  Dr.  Kuyper  has 
outlined  it.  With  these  things  at  least  we  must,  then,  con- 
fessedly, reckon  at  the  outset;  and  to  reckon  with  these 
things  is  to  enter  deeply  into  Apologetics. 

As  the  case  really  stands,  we  must  say  even  more.  Despite 
the  attractiveness  of  Dr.  Kuyper's  distribution  of  the 
departments  of  theological  science,  we  cannot  think  it  an 
improvement  upon  the  ordinary  schema.  It  appears  to  us  a 
mistake  to  derive,  as  he  does,  the  principium  divisionis  from 
the  Holy  Scriptures.  The  Scriptures,  after  all,  are  not  the 
object  of  theolog}',  but  only  its  source ;  and  the  principium 
divisionis  in  this  science,  too,  must  be  taken,  as  Dr.  Kuyper 


M 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


I 


himself  argues,*  from  the  object.  Now,  the  object  of 
theology,  as  Dr.  Kuyper  has  often  justly  insisted,  is  the 
cctypal  knowledge  of  God.  This  knowledge  of  God  is 
deposited  for  us  in  the  Scriptures,  and  must  needs  be  drawn 
out  of  them — ^hence  "Exegetical  Theology."  It  has  been 
derived  from  the  Scriptures  by  divers  portions  and  in  divers 
manners,  for  the  life  of  the  Church  through  the  ages,  and 
its  gradual  assimilation  must  needs  be  traced  in  i*^s  effects 
on  the  life  of  the  Christian  world — hence  "Historical  The- 
ology." It  is  capable  of  statement  in  a  systematized  thetical 
form — hence  "Systematic  Theology."  And,  so  drawn  out 
from  Scripture,  so  assimilated  in  the  Church's  growth,  so 
organized  into  a  system,  it  is  to  be  made  available  for  life — 
hence  "Practical  Theology."  But  certainly,  before  we  draw 
it  from  the  Scriptures,  we  must  assure  ourselves  that  there 
is  a  knowledge  of  God  in  the  Scriptures.  And,  before  we 
do  that,  we  must  assure  ourselves  that  there  is  a  knowledge 
of  God  in  the  world.  And,  before  we  do  that,  we  must 
assure  ourselves  that  a  knowledge  of  God  is  possible  for 
man.  And,  before  we  do  that,  we  must  assure  ourselves  that 
there  is  a  God  to  know.  Thus,  we  inevitably  work  back  to 
first  principles.  And,  in  working  thus  back  to  first  princi- 
ples, we  exhibit  the  indispensability  of  an  "Apologetical 
Theology,"  which  of  necessity  holds  the  place  of  the  first 
among  the  five  essential  theological  disciplines. 

It  is  easy,  of  course,  to  say  that  a  Christian  man  must  take 
his  standpoint  not  above  the  Scriptures,  but  in  the  Scrip- 
tures. He  very  certainly  must.  But  surely  he  must  first 
have  Scriptures,  authenticated  to  him  as  such,  before  he  can 
take  his  standpoint  in  them.  It  is  equally  easy  to  o^j  that 
Christianity  is  attained,  not  by  demonstrations,  but  by  a  new 
birth.  Nothing  could  be  more  true.  But  neither  could  any- 
thing be  more  unjustified  than  the  inferences  that  are  drawn 
from  this  truth  for  the  discrediting  of  Apologetics.  It 
certainly  is  not  in  the  power  of  all  the  demonstrations  in  the 

'  Encyclopedia,  E.  T.,  p.  629. 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


25 


world  to  make  a  Chris',  ar.  Paul  may  ola».t  and  Apollos 
water ;  it  is  God  alone  who  gives  the  increase.  But  it  does 
not  seem  to  follow  that  Paul  would  as  well,  therefore,  not 
plant,  and  Apollos  as  well  not  water.  Faith  is  the  gift  of 
God;  but  it  does  not  in  the  least  follow  that  the  faith  that 
God  gives  is  an  irrational  faith,  that  is,  a  faith  without 
grounds  in  right  reason.  It  is  beyond  all  question  only  the 
prepared  heart  that  can  fitly  respond  to  the  "reasons" ;  but 
how  can  even  a  prepared  heart  respond,  when  there  are  no 
"reasons"  to  draw  out  its  action?  One  might  as  well  say 
that  photography  is  independent  of  light,  because  no  light 
can  make  an  impression  unless  the  plate  is  prepared  to 
receive  it.  The  Holy  Spirit  does  not  work  a  blind,  an 
ungrounded  faith  in  the  heart.  What  is  supplied  by  his 
creative  energy  in  working  faith  is  not  a  ready-made  faith, 
rooted  in  nothing,  and  clinging  without  reason  to  its  object ; 
nor  yet  new  grounds  of  belief  in  the  object  presented ;  but 
just  a  new  ability  of  the  heart  to  respond  to  the  grounds  of 
faith,  sufficient  in  themselves,  already  present  to  the  under- 
standing. We  believe  in  Christ  because  it  is  rational  to 
believe  in  him,  not  though  it  be  irrational.  Accordingly, 
our  Reformed  fathers  always  posited  in  the  production  of 
faith  the  presence  of  the  "argttmentum  propter  quod  credo," 
as  well  as  the  "principium  seu  causa  efUciens  a  quo  ad  cre- 
dendum  adducor."  That  is  to  say,  for  the  birth  of  faith  in 
the  soul,  it  is  just  as  essential  that  grounds  of  faith  should 
be  present  to  the  mind  as  that  the  Giver  of  faith  should  act 
creatively  upon  the  heart. 

We  are  not  absurdly  arguing  that  Apologetics  has  in  itself 
the  power  to  make  a  man  a  Christian  or  to  conquer  the  world 
to  Christ.  Only  the  Spirit  of  Life  can  communicate  life  to  a 
dead  soul,  or  can  convict  the  world  in  respect  of  sin,  and  of 
righteousness,  and  of  judgment.  But  we  are  arguing  that 
faith  is,  in  all  its  exercises  alike,  a  form  of  conviction,  and 
is,  therefore,  necessarily  grounded  in  evidence.  And  we  are 
arguing  that  evidence  accordingly  has  its  part  to  play  in  the 


a6 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


conversion  of  the  soul ;  and  that  the  S3rstematicaHy  organized 
evidence  which  we  call  Apologetics  similarly  has  its  part  to 
play  in  the  Christianizing  of  the  world.  And  we  are  arguing 
that  this  part  is  not  a  small  part;  nor  is  it  a  merely  sub- 
sidiary part ;  nor  yet  a  merely  defensive  part — ^as  if  the  one 
end  of  Apologetics  were  to  protect  an  isolated  body  of 
Christians  from  annoyance  from  the  surrounding  world,  or 
to  aid  the  distracted  Christian  to  bring  his  head  into  har- 
mony with  his  heart.  The  part  that  Apologetics  has  to  play 
in  the  Christianizing  of  the  world  is  rather  a  primary  part, 
and  it  is  a  conquering  part.  It  is  the  distinction  of  Chris- 
tianity that  it  has  come  into  the  world  clothed  with  the 
mission  to  reason  its  way  to  its  dominion.  Other  religions 
may  appeal  to  the  sword,  or  seek  some  other  way  to  propa- 
gate themselves.  Christianity  makes  its  appeal  1  right 
reason,  and  stands  out  among  all  religions,  therefore,  as 
distinctively  "the  Apologetic  religion."  It  is  solely  by  rea- 
soning that  it  has  come  thus  far  on  its  way  to  its  kingship. 
And  it  is  solely  by  reasoning  that  it  will  put  all  its  enemies 
under  its  feet.  Face  to  face  with  the  tremendous  energy 
of  thought  and  the  incredible  fertility  in  assault  which 
characterizes  the  world  in  its  anti-Christian  manifestation, 
Christianity  finds  its  task  in  thinking  itself  thoroughly 
through,  and  in  organizing,  not  its  defence  only,  but  also  its 
attack.  It  stands  calmly  over  against  the  world  with  its 
credentials  in  its  hands,  and  fears  no  contention  of  men.    * 

It  is  a  standing  matter  of  surprise  to  us  that  the  brilliant 
school  of  Christian  thinkers,  on  whose  attitude  towards 
Apologetics  we  have  been  animadverting,  should  be  tempted 
to  make  little  of  Apologetics.  When  we  read,  for  instance, 
the  beautiful  exposition  of  the  relation  of  sin  and  regene- 
ration to  science  which  Dr.  Kuyper  has  given  us  in  his 
Encyclopedia,  we  cannot  understand  why  he  does  not 
magnify,  instead  of  minifying,  the  value  of  Apologetics. 
Perhaps?  the  explan.itinn  is  to  be  found  in  a  tendency  to  make 
too  absolute  the  contrast  between  the  "two  kinds  of  science" 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


37 


— ^that  which  is  the  product  of  the  thought  of  sinful  man  in 
his  state  of  nature,  and  that  which  is  the  prod^ci  of  man 
under  the  influence  of  the  regenerating  grace  of  God.  There 
certainly  do  exist  these  "two  kinds  of  men"  in  the  world — 
men  under  the  unbroken  sway  of  sin,  and  men  who  have 
been  brought  under  the  power  of  the  palingenesis.  And  the 
product  of  the  intellection  of  these  "two  kinds  of  men"  will 
certainly  g^ve  us  "two  kinds  of  science."  But  the  difference 
between  the  two  is,  after  all,  not  accurately  described  as  a 
diflFerence  in  kind — gradus  non  mutant  speciem.  Sin  has 
not  destroyed  or  altered  in  its  essential  nature  any  one  of 
man's  faculties,  although — since  it  corrupts  homo  totus — it 
has  affected  the  operation  of  them  all.  The  depraved  man 
neither  thinks,  nor  feels,  nor  wills  as  he  ought;  and  the 
products  of  his  action  as  a  scientific  thinker  cannot  possibly 
escape  the  influence  of  this  everywhere  operative  destructive 
power ;  although,  as  Dr.  Kuyper  lucidly  points  out,  they  are 
affected  in  different  degrees  in  the  several  "sciences,"  in 
accordance  with  the  nature  of  their  objects  and  the  rank  of 
the  human  faculties  engaged  in  their  structure.  Neverthe- 
less, there  is  question  here  of  perfection  of  performance, 
rather  than  of  kind.  It  is  "science"  that  is  produced  by  the 
subject  held  under  sin,  even  though  imperfect  science — fall- 
ing away  from  the  ideal  here,  there  and  elsewhere,  on 
account  of  all  sorts  of  deflecting  influences  entering  in  at  all 
points  of  the  process.  The  science  gf  sinful  man  is  thus  a 
substantive  part  of  the  abstract  science  produced  by  the  ideal 
subject,  the  general  human  consciousness,  though  a  less 
valuable  part  than  it  would  be  without  sin. 

It  is  well  that  it  is  so ;  for  otherwise  there  would  be  no 
"science"  attainable  by  man  at  all.  For  regeneration  is  not, 
in  the  first  instance,  the  removal  of  sin :  the  regenerated  man 
remains  a  sinner.  Only  after  his  sanctification  has  become 
complete  can  the  contrast  between  him  and  the  unregenerate 
sinner  become  absolute :  not  until  then,  in  any  case,  cnuld 
there  be  thought  to  exist  an  absolute  contrast  between  his 


28 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


intellection  and  that  of  the  sinner.  In  the  meantime,  the 
regenerated  man  remains  a  sinner;  no  new  faculties  have 
been  inserted  into  him  by  regeneration ;  and  the  old  faculties, 
common  to  man  in  all  his  states,  have  been  only  in  some 
measure  restored  to  their  proper  functioning.  He  is  in  no 
condition,  therefore,  to  produce  a  "science"  differing  in  kind 
from  that  produced  by  sinful  man;  the  science  of  palin- 
genesis is  only  a  part  of  the  science  of  sinful  humanity, 
though  no  doubt  its  best  part ;  and  only  along  with  it  can  it 
enter  as  a  constituent  part  into  that  ideal  science  which  the 
composite  human  subject  is  producing  in  its  endless  effort 
to  embrace  in  mental  grasp  the  ideal  object,  that  is  to  say, 
all  that  is.  Even  if  the  palingenesis  had  completed  its  work, 
indeed,  and  those  under  its  sway  had  become  "perfect,"  it 
may  be  doubted  whether  the  contrast  between  the  science 
produced  by  the  two  classes  of  men  could  be  treated  as 
absolute.  Sinful  and  sinless  men  are,  after  all,  both  men; 
and  being  both  men,  are  fundamentally  alike  and  know  fun- 
damentally alike.  Ideally  there  is  but  one  "science,"  the 
subject  of  which  is  the  human  spirit,  and  the  object  all  that 
is.  J.I'??.nwhile,  as  things  are,  the  human  spirit  attains  to 
this  science  only  in  part  and  by  slow  accretions,  won  through 
many  partial  and  erroneous  constructions.  Men  of  all  sorts 
and  of  all  grades  work  side  by  side  at  the  common  task,  and 
the  common  edifice  grows  under  their  hands  into  ever  fuller 
and  truer  outlines.  As  Dr.  Kuyper  finely  says  himself,*  in 
the  conflict  of  perceptions  and  opinions,  those  of  the 
strongest  energy  and  clearest  thought  finally  prevail.  Why 
is  not  the  palingenesis  to  be  conceived  simply  as  preparing 
the  stronger  and  clearer  spirits  whose  thought  always  finally 
prevails?  It  is  not  a  different  kind  of  science  that  they  are 
producing.  It  is  not  even  the  same  kind  of  science,  but  as 
part  of  a  different  edifice  of  truth.  Through  them  merely 
the  better  scientific  outlook,  and  the  better  scientific  product, 
are  striving  in  conflict  with  the  outlook  and  product  of 
'Encyclop.,  etc.,  E.  T.,  p.  151. 


i 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


29 


fellow-workers,  to  get  built  into  the  one  great  edifice  of 
truth  ascertained,  which  is  rising  slowly  because  of  sin,  but 
surely  because  of  palingenesis. 

Only  in  the  Divine  mind,  of  course,  does  science  lie  per- 
fect— the  perfect  comprehension  of  all  that  is  in  its  organic 
completeness.  In  the  mind  of  perfected  humanity,  the 
perfected  ectypal  science  shall  at  length  lie.  In  the  mind  of 
sinful  humanity,  struggling  here  below,  there  can  lie  only  a 
partial  and  broken  reflection  of  the  object,  a  reflection  which 
is  rather  a  deflection.  The  task  of  science  is,  therefore,  not 
merely  quantitative,  but  qualitative;  the  edifice  must  be 
built  up  to  its  completion,  and  the  deflection  induced  by  sin 
must  be  corrected.  This  cannot  be  accomplished  by  sinful 
man.  But  he  makes  the  effort  continuously,  and  is  continu- 
ously attaining  his  measure  of  success — a  success  that  varies 
inversely  with  the  rank  of  the  sciences.  The  entrance  of 
regeneration  prepares  men  to  build  better  and  ever  more 
truly  as  the  effects  of  regeneration  increase  intensively  and 
extensively.  The  end  will  come  only  when  the  regenerated 
universe  becomes  the  well-comprehended  object  of  the 
science  of  the  regenerated  race.  It  would  seem,  then,  a 
grave  mistake  to  separate  the  men  of  the  palingenesis  from 
the  race,  a  part  of  which  they  are,  and  which  is  itself  the 
object  of  the  palingenesis.  And  no  mistake  could  be  greater 
than  to  lead  them  to  decline  to  bring  their  principles  into 
conf  ict  with  those  of  the  unregenerate  in  the  prosecution  of 
the  common  task  of  man.  It  is  the  better  science  that  ever 
in  the  end  wins  the  victory;  and  palingenetic  science  is  the 
better  science,  and  to  it  belongs  the  victory.  How  shall  it 
win  its  victory,  however,  if  it  declines  the  conflict?  In  the 
ordinance  of  God,  it  is  only  in  and  through  this  conflict  that 
the  edifice  of  truth  is  to  rise  steadily  onwards  to  its  per- 
fecting. 

In  the  fact  thus  brought  out,  the  ultimate  vindication  of 
the  supreme  importance  of  Apologetics  lies,  and  as  well  the 
vindication  of  its  supreme  utility.    In  the  prosecution  of  the 


30 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


I\ 


tasks  of  Apologetics,  virc  see  the  palingenesis  at  work  on  the 
science  of  man  at  its  highest  point.  And  here,  too,  the  "man 
of  stronger  and  purer  thought" — even  though  that  he  has  it 
is  of  God  alone — "will  prevail  in  the  end."  The  task  of  the 
Christian  is  surely  to  urge  "his  stronger  and  purer  thought" 
continuously,  and  in  all  its  details,  upon  the  attention  of 
men.  It  is  not  true  that  he  cannot  soundly  prove  his  posi- 
tion. It  is  not  true  that  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  is 
subjective  merely,  and  is  incapable  of  validation  in  the  forum 
of  pure  reason.  It  is  not  true  that  the  arguments  adduced 
for  the  support  of  the  foundations  of  the  Christian  religion 
lack  objective  validity.  It  is  not  even  true  that  the  minds  of 
sinful  men  are  inaccessible  to  the  "evidences,"  though,  in 
the  sense  of  the  proverb,  "convinced  against  their  will,"  they 
may  "remain  of  the  same  opinion  still."  All  minds  are  of 
the  same  essential  structure;  and  the  less  illuminated  will 
not  be  able  permanently  to  resist  or  gainsay  the  determina- 
tions of  the  more  illuminated.  The  Christian,  by  virtue  of 
the  palingenesis  working  in  him,  stands  undoubtedly  on  an 
indefinitely  higher  plane  of  thought  than  that  occupied  by 
sinful  man  as  such.  And  he  must  not  decline,  but  use  and 
press  the  advantage  which  God  has  thus  given  him.  He 
must  insist,  nnd  insist  again,  that  his  determinations,  and 
not  those  of  the  unilluminated,  must  be  built  into  the  slowly 
rising  fabric  of  human  science.  Thus  will  he  serve,  if  not 
obviously  his  own  generation,  yet  truly  all  the  generations  of 
men.  We  may  assure  ourselves  from  the  outset  that  the 
palingenesis  shall  ultimately  conquer  to  itself  the  whole  race 
and  all  its  products;  and  we  may  equally  assure  ourselves 
that  its  gradually  increasing  power  will  show  itself  only  as 
the  result  of  conflict  in  the  free  intercourse  of  men. 

Thinking  thus  of  Apologetics  and  of  its  task,  it  is  natural 
that  we  should  feel  little  sympathy  with  the  representation 
sometimes  heard,  to  the  effect  that  Apologetics  concerns 
itself  only  with  "the  minimum  of  Christianity."  What  is 
"the  minimum  of  Christianity"?    And  what  business  ha& 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


31 


Apologetics  with  "the  minimum  of  Christianity"?    What 
Apologetics  has  to  do  with  is  certainly  not  any  "minimum," 
but  just  Christianity  itself,  whatever  that  may  prove  to  be. 
Its  function  is  not  to  vindicate  for  us  the  least  that  we  can 
get  along  with,  and  yet  manage  to  call  ourselves  Christians; 
but  to  validate  the  Christian  "view  of  the  world,"  with  all 
that  is  contained  in  the  Christian  "view  of  the  world,"  for 
the  science  of  men.    It  must  not  be  permitted  to  sink  into  an 
"apology"  for  the  Christian  religion,  in  the  vulgar  sense  of 
that  word,  which  makes  it  much  the  synonym  of  an  "ex- 
cuse" ;  and  much  less  into  an  "apology"  for  what  is  at  best 
an  "apology  for  the  Christian  religion" — ^possibly  nothing 
more  than  "a  couple  of  starved  and  hunger-bitten  dogmas," 
which  for  the  purposes  of  the  moment  we  may  choose  to 
identify  with  "the  essence  of  Christianity."    The  function 
of  Apologetics  is  not  performed  until  it  has  placed  in  our 
hands  God,  Religion,  Christianity  and  the  Bible,  and  said  to 
us,  Now  go  on  and  explicate  these  fundamental  facts  in  all 
their  contents.    When  men  speak  of  "the  Apologetical  mini- 
mum," we  cannot  help  suspecting  that  they  have  for  the 
moment  lost  sight  of  Apologetics  itself  altogether,  and  are 
thinking  rather  of  some  specific  "Apology"  which  they 
judge  might  usefully  be  launched  in  the  behalf  of  Christi- 
anity, in  the  conditions  of  thought  for  the  moment  obtaining. 
If  such  an  "Apology"  were  identifiable  with  "Apologetics," 
we  might  well  sympathize  with  those  who  consider  Apolo- 
getics a  department  of  "Practical  Theology,"  and  it  is 
doubtless  because  they  do  not  rise  above  such  a  conception 
of  it  that  many  encyclopzedists  have  so  classified  it.    But  the 
Apologetics  with  which  we  are  concerned  is  a  much  more 
fundamental,  a  much  more  comprehensive  and  a  much  more 
objective  thing.    It  does  not  concern  itself  with  how  this 
man  or  that  may  best  be  approached  to  induce  him  to  make  a 
beginning  of  Christian  living,  or  how  this  age  or  that  may 
most  easily  be  brought  to  give  a  hearing  to  the  Christian 
cor  ception  of  the  world.    It  concerns  itself  with  the  solid 


32 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


M 


objective  establishment,  after  a  fashion  valid  for  all  normally 
working  minds  and  for  all  ages  of  the  world  in  its  develop- 
ing thought,  of  those  great  basal  facts  which  constitute  the 
Christian  religion;  or,  better,  which  embody  in  the  concrete 
the  entire  knowledge  of  God  accessible  to  men,  and  which, 
therefore,  need  only  explication  by  means  of  the  further 
theological  disciplines  in  order  to  lay  openly  before  the  eye: 
of  men  the  entirety  of  the  knowledge  of  God  within  their 
reach. 

It  is  because  Dr.  Beattie's  treatise  conceives  Apologetics 
after  this  fundamental,  comprehensive  and  objective  fashion, 
and  develops  its  contents  from  that  point  of  view,  that  we 
accord  it  our  heartiest  welcome. 


i 


[IM 


A  TREATISE  ON  APOLOGETICS 


INTRODUCTION 


'i 


"Who  hath  put  wisdom  in  the  inward  parts?  Or  who  hath  given 
understanding  to  the  heart?"— Job  xxviii.  36. 

"Whom,  therefore,  ye  ignorantly  worship,  him  declare  I  unto  you." — 
Acts  xvii.  23. 

"That  they  should  seek  the  Lord,  if  haply  they  might  feel  after  him, 
and  find  him,  though  he  be  not  far  from  every  one  of  us." — Acts  xvii.  37. 

"For  in  him  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being." — Acts  xvii.  28. 

"For  the  invisible  things  of  him  [God]  from  the  creation  of  the  world 
are  clearly  seen,  being  understood  by  the  things  that  are  made,  even  his 
eternal  power  and  Godhead." — Romans  i.  20. 


APOLOGETICS. 


INTRODUCTION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  SCOPE,  THE  SPHERE  AND  THE  SPIRIT  OF  APOLO- 
GETICS. 

Contents. 

Apologetics  the  Previous  Questioti  of  Christianity.— Raises  Profound 
Problems.— Their  Solution  Vital.— An  Age-long  Conflict.— The  Divine 
Redeeming  Activity.— Its  Vindication  Required.— The  Mode  of  Defence 
Varies.— Must  be  Adjusted  to  Modern  Thought.— The  Spirit  of  Apolo- 
getics.—Needs  a  Wide  Outlook.— Must  be  Candid  and  Fair.— Without 
Bigotry  or  Prejudice.— With  Earnestness  and  Reverence.— Its  Aim  to 
be  Practical.- Its  True  Function. 

Literature. 
Ebrard's  Apologetics,  Vol.  I.  Introduction.— H.  B.  Smith's  Apolo- 
getics, Chap.  I.— Bruce's  Apologetics,  Chap.  I.— Macgregor's  Apology  of 
the  Christian  Religion.  Chap.  I.— SchaflPs  Theological  Propedeutic— 
Articles  on  Apologetics  in  the  Schaff-Herzog  Encyclopedia  of  Religious 
Knowledge,  in  McClintock  and  Strong's  Cyclopedia,  in  Johnston's  Uni- 
versal Cyclopedia,  and  in  the  Britannica  Encyclopedia.  Some  works 
on  Apologetics  less  accessible  to  the  ordinary  reader  may  be  merely 
mentioned:  Planck.— P.  E.  Muller.— Frank.— Stein.— Sack.— Von  Drey. 
— Schleiermacher.— Delitzsch.— Baumstark.— Dorner.— Hirzel.— Sieffert. 
—Stinn.—Luthardt.—Riggenbach.—Dusterdieck.—Ritschl.— Kaftan.  At 
the  beginning  of  their  treatises  these  authors  discuss  the  questions  dealt 
with  in  this  chapter.  In  Orr's  Christian  View  of  God  and  the  World 
there  are  some  useful  hints. 

I.  The  Scope  of  Apologetics.     §  i. 

J  •  A  POLOGETICS  is  concerned  with  the  previous  ques- 
£\.  tions  of  Christianity.  It  is  that  important  branch 
of  theological  inquiry  which  investigates  the  great  questions 
which  lie  at  the  very  foundations  of  the  Christian  system. 
It  even  ventures,  at  times,  into  the  very  heart  of  that  system, 
and  undertakes  to  unfold  its  inner  reasonableness  and  suffi- 
ciency. 


36 


APOLOGETICS. 


i  I 


E    i 


I 


The  questions  which  thus  come  before  it  are  many  and 
varied,  and  they  urgently  press  for  satisfactory  answers.  In 
seeking  to  supply  these  answers,  Apologetics  has  to  deal 
with  the  intelligible  grounds  of  the  Christian  religion,  and  it 
has  to  consider  the  varied  evidences  which  provide  its 
rational  vindication.  In  rendering  this  useful  service,  it 
finds  itself  face  to  face  with  philosophical,  historical,  ethical 
and  religious  problems  of  the  deepest  import. 

2.  It  has  to  make  earnest  inquiry  regarding  the  existence 
and  nature  of  God,  and  concerning  the  constitution  and 
destiny  of  man.  It  has  to  grapple  with  many  perplexing 
problems  which  are  involved  in  the  relations  of  God  to  man 
and  th»  universe.  The  questions  of  what  knowledge  man 
can  o*  n  concerning  God,  and  of  how  far  God  can  make 
himselt  known  to  man,  have  also  to  be  considered.  The 
claim  which  the  sacred  Scriptures  make  to  set  forth  a  special 
message  from  God  must  be  examined  with  care.  In  this 
connection  Apologetics  has  to  make  good  the  complete  his- 
toricity of  these  Scriptures,  and  at  the  same  time  to  vindicate 
their  divine  authority. 

It  has  also  to  deal  with  Jesus  Christ,  and  it  is  called  upon 
to  give  some  satisfactory  account  of  his  unique  personality, 
and  of  his  most  remarkable  historical  career.  His  wonderful 
influence  on  human  affairs,  as  seen  in  the  history  of  the 
Christian  church,  in  the  personal  experience  of  its  members, 
and  in  its  splendid  fruitage  in  modem  civilization,  calls  for 
careful  study.  Nor  can  Apologetics  be  indifferent  to  the 
dark  facts  of  moral  evil  as  it  appears  in  its  various  degrading 
aspects  in  the  world.  Of  this  it  must  give  some  reasonable 
account,  and  it  dare  not  overlook  the  far-reaching  issues  of 
immortality  for  man.  The  abiding  moral  relations  between 
God  and  man,  and  man's  proper  place  in  the  scale  of  existing 
things,  must  be  seriously  pondered. 

3.  And  are  not  these  momentous  questions?  They  are 
not  merely  theoretical  speculations  far  removed  from  the 
affairs  of  men,  but  thf.y  arc  pregnant  with  vital  practical 


THE  SCOPE  OF  APOLOGETICS.  n 

meaning  for  this  life,  and  with  vast  import  for  that  which 

is  to  come.    If  knowledge  has  any  relation  to  the  activity  of 

men,  and  if  belief  has  any  bearing  upon  their  conduct,  then 

the  questions  to  be  considered  a-  d  settled  by  Apologetics  are 

of  profound  interest  and  of  vital  meaning.    They  cannot  be 

set  aside  in  a  hurried  way,  nor  is  a  superficial  treatment  of 

them  likely  to  oe  satisfactory.    Is  Christianity  true  ?    Has  it 

claims  upon  my  attention  which  I  dare  not  disregard,  save 

at  my  peril  ?    Is  there  a  supreme  and  perfect  Being  who  has 

made  me,  and  still  upholds  me  and  all  things  else  in  the 

world?    Am  I  endowed  with  a  moral  and  religious  nature, 

by  means  of  which  I  find  myself  placed  in  definite  relations 

of  responsibility  to  a  moral  ruler  who  is  over  me?    Am  I  so 

constantly  and  completely  dependent  upon  this  ruler  that,  by 

no  possible  effort  of  mine,  can  I  shake  myself  free  from  his 

oversight  and  control?     Is  the  Bible  not  only  true  and 

excellent  as  a  matter  of  fact,  but  does  it  also  unfold  a  divine 

revelation  of  the  holiness  and  love,  of  the  power  and  saving 

grace,  of  Gk)d  in  Christ,  over  against  the  sin  and  woe  of 

men?    Is  the  gospel  messaj   ,  with  its  divine  and  gracious 

remedy  for  this  ?in  and  wue,  really  needed  by  men?     Is 

there  proper  ground  for  confidently  accepting  what  the  Bible 

says  regarding  the  salvation  which  is  in  Christ,  and  are 

there  good  reasons  why  men  should  act  upon  the  warnings 

and  invitation  of  the  gospel  ?    Above  all,  is  there  a  future 

state  of  reward  and  punishment,  wherein  the  issues  of  this 

life  will  have  their  proper  fruition,  and  is  a  personal  interest 

in  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  necessary  for  the  present  and 

eternal  welfare  of  men? 

4.  To  ask  tiiese  questions  is  to  reveal  the  tremendous 
import  of  the  issues  which  are  wrapped  in  Christianity, 
for  each  one  of  them  is  freighted  with  the  deepest  signifi- 
cance. Christianity  is  either  everyth-  -'  for  mankind,  or 
ncthing.  It  is  either  the  highest  certainty  or  the  greatest 
delusion.  If  it  be  a  hoary  superstition,  from  which  advanc- 
ing modern  thought  is  slowly  but  surely  delivering  us,  we 


38 


APOLOGETICS. 


il 


ought  to  examine  very  carefully  the  grounds  upon  which 
such  a  conclusion  rests,  lest  we  be  found  acting  hastily,  and 
heedlessly  casting  away  the  pearl  of  greatest  price.  While 
this  demand  of  modem  thought  cannot  be  ignored,  yet  it 
should  not  be  too  readily  conceded,  lest  we  be  found  guilty 
of  treating  with  contempt  those  priceless  realities  of  the 
Christian  faith  which  have  long  had  such  an  abiding  place 
in  the  living  experience  and  dying  hopes  of  multitudes  oi 
men  and  women.  A  persistent  delusion  should  at  least  be 
treated  with  consideration  and  respect. 

But  if  Christianity  be  everything  for  mankind,  it  is  im- 
portant for  every  man  to  be  able  to  give  a  good  reason  for 
the  hope  that  is  in  him  in  regard  to  the  eternal  verities  of  the 
Christian  faith.    To  accept  these  verities  in  an  unthinking 
way,  or  to  receive  them  simply  on  authority,  is  not  enough 
for  an  intelligent  and  stable  faith  in  these  restless  times.    If 
our  Christian  heritage  be  a  treasure  of  unspeakable  value  for 
us,  we  should  examine  carefully  whether  its  rational,  his- 
torical, moral  and  religious  titles  are  valid  and  complete. 
The  task  of  Apologetics  is  not  so  much  to  draw  up  these 
titles,  as  to  exhibit  them  in  an  orderly  and  intelligible  way. 
A  clear  head,  a  brave  heart  and  a  strong  hand  are  needed 
for  this  task.    To  make  good  the  title  which  reason  and 
conscience,  as  well  as  heart  and  life,  unite  in  giving  to  the 
reality,  validity  and  adequacy  of  the  Christian  verities,  is  an 
undertaking  of  widest  scope  and  deepest  moment.     One 
cannot  but  ask,  earnestly  though  not  hopelessly,  Who  is 
sufficient  for  such  a  task? 

II.  The  Sphere  of  Apologetics.    §  2. 

In  a  preliminary  way,  the  precise  point  of  departure  for 
Apologetics  may  now  be  indicated.  This  leads  to  the  deepest 
view  of  the  sphere  of  Apologetics,  and  raises  inquiry  as  to  its 
fundamental  source.  In  making  this  inquiry,  the  underlying 
conditions  which  render  the  service  of  Apologetics  to  Chris- 


i 


THE  SCOPE  OF  APOLOGETICS.  39 

tianity  necessary  will  be  unfolded.  The  setting  forth  of 
these  fundamental  conditions  will  make  it  plam  that  the 
service  thus  rendered  is  neither  needless  nor  optional,  but 
essential  and  necessary.  It  will  be  made  evident  that  there 
are  deep  and  abiding  conditions  that  pertain  to  the  very 
nature  of  Christianity,  which  constitute  the  fundamental 
sphere  wherein  the  genesis  of  Apologetics  is  to  be  found. 
These  conditions  form  its  point  of  departure  and  constitute 

its  real  source. 

I.  These  underlying  conditions  are  involved  in  that  deep- 
seated  and  age-long  connict  between  good  and  evil  going  on 
in  the  universe.    They  are  conditions  which  really  grow  out 
of  this  conflict.    In  the  universe  there  are  operative  two 
principles  or  agencies,  which  are  sometimes  conceived  of  as 
two  kingdoms,  or  sets  of  organized  forces.    They  are  now, 
and  long  have  been,  in  truceless  antagonism  against  each 
other.    These  antagonistic  principles,  or  sets  of  agencies,  are 
denoted  by  various  terms.    Sometimes  the  symbols  of  light 
and  darkness  are  used  to  denote  them.    Again,  they  are 
called  good  and  evil,  truth  and  error,  right  and  wrong,  sin 
and  holiness.    As  the  universe  now  subsists,  as  an  object  of 
reflection,  there  is  observed  in  it  a  deeply  seated  dualism, 
wherein  opposing  forces  are  in  irrepressible  opposition. 
The  Persian,  the  Hindoo,  and  the  Norse  forms  of  express- 
ing this  dualism  are  undoubted  witnesses  to  this  incessant 
conflict.    In  certain  philosophical  systems,  like  Gnosticism, 
and  in  pagan  forms  of  demon  worship,  there  are  evidences 
of  the  same  inveterate  contest.    With  this  conflict  Christi- 
anity is  directly  and  vitally  concerned.    The  very  re- son  for 
Christianity,  to  a  large  extent,  lies  in  the  fact  of  this  conflict, 
for  it  is  the  very  evils  which  give  rise  to  it  that  Christianity 
proposes  to  remedy  or  conquer.    These  evils,  however,  are 
not  inherent  in  the  universe  at  its  deepest  roots;  they  arc 
rather  abnormal  and  destructive  agencies  with  which  Chris- 
tianity proposes  to  deal.    Apologetics  undertakes  to  plead 
the  cause  of  Christianity  in  this  conflict. 


40 


APOLOGETICS. 


!    I 


Hi 


The  profound  question  of  the  origfin  and  precise  nature  of 
those  evil  and  destructive  agencies  with  which  Christianity 
finds  itself  in  conflict  is  not  now  formally  raised.  The  fact 
that  thif  deadly  conflict  exists  s  simply  assumed,  as  the 
sphere  in  which  Christianity  finds  her  appointed  mission. 
Light  and  darkness,  truth  and  error,  good  and  evil,  right 
and  wrong,  sin  and  holiness,  are  in  such  inherent  opposition 
that  peace  between  them  is  not  possible,  sav>  by  the  defeat 
of  the  one  and  the  victory  of  the  other.  Light  can  have  no 
fellowship  with  darkness,  and  good  can  have  no  agreement 
with  evil.  In  the  last  analysis,  the  real  function  of  Apolo- 
getics is  to  vindicate  Christianity,  and  to  exhibit  her 
defensive  and  offensive  resources  for  this  conflict. 

2.  In  this  same  sphere  there  are  also  evidences  that  a 
divine  redeeming  activity  is  silently,  but  surely,  at  work. 
For  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  Christianity  is  not  to  be 
conceived  of  as  merely  a  principle  or  set  of  agencies,  which 
is  well  able  to  hold  its  own  against  the  opposing  forces  of 
evil  in  the  universe.  It  is  rather  to  be  thought  of  as  a  set  of 
redeeming  and  restoring  agencies,  with  ability  not  only  to 
defeat  and  destroy  evil,  but  also  to  conserve  and  construct 
the  good.  Ever  since  the  introduction  of  moral  evil  into  the 
current  of  human  history,  there  are  evidences,  not  only  of 
persistent  conflict,  but  also  of  a  potent  redeeming  and  restor- 
ing activity.  As  the  conflict  continues  from  age  to  age, 
ti.ere  are  indications  in  the  onward  march  of  Christianity 
that  the  victory  is  declaring  itself  more  and  more  plainly  in 
favor  of  truth  and  righteousness.  There  seems  to  be  a 
far-off  glorious  goal,  where  the  light  shines  undimmed  by 
the  darkness;  near  by  that  goal  there  stands  a  noble 
palace,  where  truth  and  goodness  are  enthroned ;  beside  that 
palace  there  is  a  splendid  temple,  whose  walls  and  pillars  are 
righteousness ;  and  in  that  temple  there  is  a  shrine  of  holi- 
ness, on  whose  altar  the  pure  fires  of  devotion  ever  bum. 
Christianity  has  her  face  towards  that  goal ;  and,  with  her 
heart  full  of  faith  and  hope,  amid  the  moral  conflict  of  the 


THE  SCOPE  OF  APOLOGETICS. 


41 


ages,  she  leads  the  universe,  by  the  persistent  power  of  he- 
redeeming  agencies,  towards  that  glorious  goal. 

This  divine  redeeming  activity  resident  in  Christianity 
must  be  taken  into  account  as  we  seek  to  get  our  deeper 
view  of  the  real  sphere  of  Apologetics.  This  activity  has 
appeared  in  the  world  in  various  historic  forms,  culminating 
in  Christianity,  but  the  redeeming  activity  itself  has  always 
been  essentially  the  same.  This  makes  the  conflict  not 
merely  a  contest  from  without,  but  a  restoration  of  the 
good  and  a  subjugation  of  the  evil  from  within.  It  is  an 
overcoming  evil  with  good.  The  Evangel  which  Christi- 
anity proclaims  represents  this  redeeming  activity,  and 
Apologetics  is  commissioned  and  prepared  to  vindicate 
Christianity  as  adequate  for  her  task. 

3.  From  all  this,  it  follows  that  the  task  of  Apologetics  is 
not  self-imposed,  but  arises  naturally  from  the  nature  of  the 
case.  The  conflict  already  described  is  a  persistent  fact,  and 
Christianity  is  committed  to  her  long  and  arduous  campaign. 
If  the  serpent  is  bruising  the  heel  of  the  woman's  seed,  the 
seed  of  the  woman  will,  in  the  end,  surely  bruise  the  serpent's 
head.  In  this  moral  warfare  Apologetics  vindicates  the 
ability  of  Christianity  to  conquer  in  due  time.  Even  though 
it  be  true  that  the  redeeming  activity  operative  through  the 
gospel  in  the  world  is,  in  a  sense,  its  own  effective  advocate 
and  valiant  defender,  yet  the  exposition  of  the  resources  of 
Christianity  for  her  divine  mission  made  by  Apologetics  is 
of  great  value  Evidences  of  this  value  have  appeared  in  all 
the  periods  of  this  conflict.  The  redeeming  activity  of  God 
in  the  world,  as  it  appeared  in  Old  Testament  times,  in  the 
hands  of  the  prophets,  is  sometimes  consciously,  and  often 
unconsciously,  a  distinctively  apologetical  service.  In  like 
manner  the  apologies  of  apostolic  and  patristic  ages  were 
well  fitted  to  serve  the  same  purpose.  These  apologies  were 
not  the  redeeming  activities  themselves,  yet  they  served  to 
vindicate  and  exhibit  these  redemptive  acttivities.  The  same 
is  true  in  modem  times.    The  gospel,  which  is  the  heart  of 


42 


APOLOGETICS. 


I: 


*  i 


1^ 


'I 


Christianity,  exerts  its  renovating  and  subduing  agency  in 
the  world,  and,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case.  Apologetics 
finds  its  call  to  exhibit  Christianity  in  a  defensive  and 
vindicatory  way. 

4.  It  is  evident,  also,  that  the  mode  in  which  Apologetics 
shall  undertake  and  best  discharge  its  task  will  vary  from 
age  to  age.  As  already  indicated,  the  redeeming  activity  is 
always  essentially  the  same,  but  the  circumstances  in  which 
it  is  exhibited  are  subject  to  change.  This  naturally  requires 
that  Apologetics  should  be  prepared  to  show  how  fully 
Christianity  is  qualified  for  every  emergency  in  the  conflict. 
Hence  Apologetics  must  be  ever  watchful  and  ready  to 
discern  the  signs  of  the  times.  In  this  service,  to  be  fore- 
warned is  often  to  be  forearmed.  The  assault  may  now  be 
at  one  point,  and  again  at  another.  Hence,  Apologetics 
must  be  always  alert,  and  ready  for  the  foe  at  every  turn; 
for  the  defences  of  one  age  may  not  suit  another,  and  the 
vindication  which  served  at  one  time  may  not  be  sufficient 
for  another. 

In  our  own  age,  when  the  service  of  Apologetics  is  greatly 
enlarged,  and  its  resources  so  fully  drawn  on,  it  is  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  have  the  methods  and  materials  of 
apologetical  service  carefully  adapted  to  our  own  restless 
and  inquiring  age.  We  do  no  injustice  to  the  Apologetics 
of  a  century  ago,  when  we  say  that  it  scarcely  serves  the 
demands  of  the  present  day,  though  it  nobly  served  the  needs 
of  the  day  in  which  its  service  was  called  for.  But  in  our 
own  age  new  phases  of  the  conflict  have  emerged,  and  a 
fresh  setting  of  the  defences  is  needed,  and  additional  forms 
of  vindication  may  be  required.  The  Apologetics  which  was 
effective  against  the  deism,  materialism  and  rationalism  of  a 
century  ago,  may  not  be  altogether  effective  against  the 
monistic  philosophy,  the  evolutionary  science,  and  the  his- 
torical criticism  of  current  times.  Hence  an  extension  of  the 
lines,  and  a  recasting  of  the  materials  of  Apologetics,  is  a 
service  which  presses  upon  modern  apologetical  activity,  in 


THE  SCOPE  OF  APOLOGETICS. 


43 


order  that  it  may  render  as  useful  a  service  in  the  newer 
conditions  as  it  did  in  the  older. 

5.  It  is  proper  to  add,  even  at  this  early  stage  of  the 
discussion,  that  the  sphere  of  Apologetics  is  not  fully  appre- 
hended until  it  undertakes  to  so  present  the  vindication  of 
Christianity  as  to  supply  a  valid  defence  against  every 
possible  assault.  As  the  real  nature  of  the  moral  conflict 
going  on  in  the  universe  is  more  fully  understood,  and  as  the 
true  genius  and  inner  resources  of  Christianity  are  more  and 
more  adequately  exhibited,  it  will  be  shown,  in  ever  increas- 
ing degree,  what  the  sphere  of  Apologetics  is.  The  result 
will  surely  be  that  just  as  Christianity  represents  an  all- 
conquering  and  ever-renovating  spiritual  activity  in  the 
world,  so  will  Apologetics  undertake  to  exhibit  its  ability  to 
present  a  rationally  complete  defence  and  vindication  of 
Christianity.  With  no  lower  an  ambition  should  modem 
Apologetics  be  content. 


III.  The  Spirit  of  Apologetics.    §  3. 

It  is  important  that  Apologetics  should  possess  the  right 
temper  for  its  work,  so  this  opening  chapter  may  properly 
conclude  with  some  remarks  upon  the  true  apologetical 
spirit.  It  is  well  to  catch  the  best  spirit  at  the  outset  of  our 
work,  for  the  temper  in  which  we  commend  Christianity  to 
others  often  does  more  than  anything  else  to  win  them.  In 
general,  no  sentiment  inconsistent  with  the  mind  of  Christ, 
or  the  spirit  of  the  gospel,  should  ever  enter  into  Apologetics. 

I.  Apologetics  should  be  calm  and  elevated  in  spirit. 
There  should  be  no  bitterness  in  its  tone,  nor  should  it  ever 
be  unkind.  It  should  be  firm,  yet  gentle ;  always  alert,  yet 
never  hasty.  If  called  to  repel  attacks  that  are  bitter  and 
unjust,  it  should  never  lose  its  temper,  but  ever  maintain  a 
serene  spirit  and  exhibit  a  calm  self-possession.  Apologetics 
should  ever  keep  in  mind  that  to  rule  its  own  spirit  is  better 
than  to  take  a  city.    Such  a  spirit  will  give  strength  to  the 


I 


:ii 


I 


f 


44 


APOLOGETICS. 


I 


service  it  renders,  and  afford  it  satisfaction  in  that  service; 
for  it  is  humiliating  to  lose  temper,  even  in  the  defence  of  a 
good  cause. 

So,  also,  the  spirit  of  Apologetics  should  be  elevated,  and 
maintain  true  dignity  and  nobility.  Only  by  this  elevated 
spirit  can  it  obtain  a  wide  outlook  over  its  extensive  field, 
and  secure  that  comprehensive  view  of  its  work  which  is 
necessary.  If  Apologetics  is  to  vindicate  Christianity  at 
every  point,  it  must  not  be  content  to  take  narrow  views,  or 
spend  its  strength  on  unimportant  details.  It  should  rather, 
in  the  noblest  manner  possible,  engage  itself  with  the  main 
defences.  In  a  well-balanced  way,  and  with  nobility  and 
elevation  of  mind.  Apologetics  should  look  at  all  the  lines 
of  assault  and  defence,  and,  with  a  brave  spirit  and  hopeful 
temper,  address  itself  to  its  work.  A  wide  outlook,  an 
elevated  temper,  and  a  strong,  manly  grasp  of  its  task,  is 
what  Apologetics  needs  at  this  time. 

2.  In  spirit.  Apologetics  should  be  candid  and  impartial. 
It  ought  not  to  play  the  part  of  a  mere  advocate  or  special 
pleader,  nor  should  it  enter  upon  its  task  in  an  apologetic 
way,  as  if  it  thought  that  Christianity  rested  on  somewhat 
insecure  foundations.  It  should  rather  seek  to  exhibit,  in  a 
fair  and  judicial  way,  the  rational  grounds,  the  historical 
facts,  and  the  experimental  realities  upon  which  Christianity 
securely  rests.  Nothing  will  be  gained  by  unfair  advocacy 
of  a  good  cause,  nor  by  taking  any  undue  advantage  of  an 
antagonist.  The  candor  and  directness  of  the  Scripture 
narratives,  and  especially  of  our  Lord  himself,  may  well  be 
heeded  by  Apologetics.  No  defence  that  is  not  founded  on 
sound  reason,  even  though  it  may  silence  an  adversary  for  a 
time,  is  ever  likely  to  do  Christianity  much  permanent  good. 
Christianity,  as  the  cause  of  truth  and  righteousness,  needs 
no  doubtful  defences,  and  care  should  be  taken  that  her  good 
cause  does  not  suffer  from  unfair  advocacy.  Apologetics  is 
not  .^n  attorney  or  special  pleader  serv^ing  for  a  fee,  but 
rather  a  judge,  seeking  to  render  a  just  and  candid  verdict. 


THE  SCOPE  OF  APOLOGETICS. 


45 


3.  In  the  spirit  of  Apologetics  there  should  be  no  bigotry 
nor  prejudice.  The  spirit  of  the  bigot  is  bad,  and  the  temper 
of  prejudice  may  be  hurtful.  There  may  be  the  bigotry  of 
the  reason  and  the  prejudice  of  the  heart  arrayed  against 
Christianity,  still  the  Apologetic  for  Christianity  should  not 
cherish  narrow  bigotry  or  perverting  prejudice.  If  it  does, 
it  may  not  see  things  at  quite  the  right  angle,  and  by  an 
intolerant  spirit  may  wound  Christianity  in  the  house  of  its 
friends.  If  the  opponents  of  Christianity  have  anything  to 
say,  and  say  it  in  a  courteous  way.  Apologetics  should 
patiently  listen  and  faithfully  seek  to  make  reply.  To  abuse 
these  opponents  is  not  to  answer  their  objections,  and  to  call 
hard  names  does  not  serve  to  refute  error.  If  the  attack  on 
Christianity  be  bold,  impudent  and  blasphemous,  silence  may 
be  the  golden  response  which  Apologetics  ought  to  make. 
Only  in  rare  and  extreme  cases  should  Apologetics  be  cutting 
and  sarcastic,  answering  a  fool  according  to  his  folly. 
Patience  is  usually  power  for  Apologetics. 

It  should  be  added  that  when  we  exhort  Apologetics  to  be 
free  from  bigotry  and  prejudice,  it  does  not  mean  that  we 
are  to  cast  away  that  splendid  heritage  of  religious  truth  of 
which  this  age  is  the  heir.  In  no  case  are  we  to  cast  this 
away  at  the  bidding  of  the  skeptical  opponent  of  Christi- 
anity. Apologetics  holds  this  heritage  most  dear,  and  will 
allow  no  rude  hand  to  take  it  away.  Still,  we  hold  it,  not 
only  as  a  heritage,  but  as  truth  which  can  be  defended 
without  intolerance  or  bigotry. 

4.  Apologetics  must  cherish  an  earnest  and  reverent  spirit. 
The  subjects  with  which  Apologetics  deals  are  the  noblest 
about  which  the  human  mind  can  be  engaged,  and  the  issues 
involved  in  Christianity  are  of  immense  import.  No  flippant 
temper,  no  irreverent  spirit,  no  half-hearted  manner,  are  in 
harmony  with  the  discussions  in  which  Apologetics  must 
engage.  These  discussions  are  concerned  with  the  great 
problems  of  God,  of  the  world,  of  man,  of  the  relations  of 
the  universe  and  man  to  God,  of  revelation  and  miracles,  of 


i: 


mm 


46 


APOLOGETICS. 


I 


U\ 


sin  and  redemption,  of  Jesus  Christ  and  his  career,  of  a 
future  state,  and  of  rewards  and  penalties  therein.  Turely 
Apologetics  shall  feel  that  it  is  in  the  presence  of  majestic 
realities,  and  realize  that  the  place  where  it  stands  is  holy 
ground.  The  assault  may  often  be  made  in  a  frivolous 
spirit,  or  with  a  sneering  tone,  and  the  temptation  to  make 
reply  in  the  same  spirit  may  often  be  strong.  But  it  is 
usually  best  to  treat  all  questions,  that  are  worthy  of  treat- 
ment at  all  by  Apologetics,  in  an  earnest  and  reverent  way. 
If  the  objections  do  not  deserve  such  a  treatment,  it  will 
usually  be  best  to  pass  them  over-  in  silence.  In  presenting 
the  positive  strength  of  the  grounds  for  accepting  Christi- 
anity, thorough  work  is  needed  at  the  present  day,  for  the 
controversy  often  is  concerning  the  very  foundations  of 
Christianity,  rather  than  regarding  the  superstructure  itself. 
Such  being  the  case.  Apologetics  must  gird  on  its  whole 
armor,  and  take  its  best  weapons.  Strenuous  effort,  earnest 
purpose,  and  profound  reverence  must  mark  modem  Apolo- 
getics, if  it  is  to  serve  its  day  in  a  virile  and  heroic  manner. 
-  Apologetics  must  always  be  conducted  in  a  very  prac- 
tical spirit.  It  is  not  to  enter  upon  its  defence,  and  debate 
merely  for  the  sake  of  the  discussions  which  arise.  The 
service  which  it  renders  is  not  simply  a  speculative  one.  The 
apologetical  arena  is  not  a  mere  intellectual  amphitheatre, 
where  the  contestants  meet  for  a  exhibition  of  their  skill  in 
controversy;  it  is  rather  a  battlefield,  where  the  contest  is 
serious,  and  the  issues  of  the  conflict  are  weighty.  Apolo- 
getics thus  seeks  an  end  beyond  itself  in  the  defence  and 
vindication  of  the  Christian  system.  As  the  task  of  Apolo- 
getics in  pleading  the  cause  of  Christianity  grows  out  of  the 
conflict  with  evil  in  which  she  is  engaged,  that  task  partakes 
of  the  nature  of  that  conflict,  and  it  calls  for  a  practical 
performance  of  the  duty  thereby  imposed.  Apo  ogetics  does 
not  exhibit  Christianity  on  dress  parade  or  P;,nting  a  sham 
battle;  it  ratlier  presents  her  in  campaign  LTvice,  or  on  the 
battlefield  in  actual  conflict  with  real  foes. 


["P 


THE  SCOPE  OF  APOLOGETICS. 


47 


This  does  not  mean  that  men  are  made  Christians  by 
Apologetics,  or  that  it  is  the  real  spiritual  agent  in  gaining 
victories  over  evil.  The  gospel  of  the  grace  of  God,  and  the 
energy  of  the  Spirit  of  life,  alone  secure  these  results.  But 
Apologetics  renders  useful  service  in  removing  stumbling 
blocks  out  of  the  way,  in  showing  the  inadequacy  of  the 
proposed  substitutes  for  Christianity,  and  in  exhibiting  the 
reasonableness  and  sufficiency  of  the  Christian  religion. 

6.  Apologetics  should  be  courageous,  and  never  forget  its 
true  function.  It  has  no  excuse  to  make  for  Christianity, 
but  a  brave  and  heroic  defence.  It  is  to  be  animated  by  the 
spirit  of  the  martyr  and  the  hero.  While  the  antagonist  is 
always  to  be  treated  with  courtesy,  yet  he  is  to  be  con- 
fronted boldly  and  bravely.  Christianity,  in  one  sense, 
needs  no  apology,  for  in  the  last  analysis  the  Christian 
system  is  independent  of  Apologetics.  The  real  foundations 
of  the  Christian  system  lie  deeper  than  the  results  of  Apolo- 
getics, but  the  service  it  renders  is  none  the  less  valuable  on 
this  account.  It  exhibits  the  stability  of  these  foundations, 
and  enables  us  in  various  ways  to  test  their  security.  With 
a  brave  heart,  and  with  its  eye  ever  steadily  fixed  on  its  true 
function,  Apologetics  seeks  to  do  her  noble  duty.  The 
Mount  Zion  of  the  Christian  system  rests  securely  upo.:  the 
enduring  foundation  of  the  redeeming  activity  of  God  in 
Christ  by  the  Spirit,  seeking  to  remedy  and  conquer  the  evil 
that  is  in  the  world.  But  Apologetics  takes  us  by  the  hand 
as  we  "walk  about  Zion,  and  go  round  about  her,"  and  as  we 
"tell  the  towers  thereof,"  and  "mark  well  her  bulwarks,  and 
consider  her  palaces,  that  we  may  tell  it  to  the  generation 
following."  "For  this  God  is  our  God  for  ever  and  ever; 
he  will  be  our  guide  even  unto  death."(Psalm  xlviii.  12-14.) 


CHAPTER  II. 
THE  DEFINITION,  THE  AIM  AND  THE  NATURE  OF 

apologetics. 
Contents. 

The  Meaning  of  the  Term. — Ajxilogy  and  Apologetics.— The  Usage 
of  the  Term.— Qassic. —  New  Testament. —  Patristic— Scholastic- 
Modern.— Definition. — Defective  Definitions. — The  Accepted  Definition. 
—The  Aim  of  Apologetics.— Defence.— Vindication.— Refutation.— The 
Nature  of  Apologetical  Service. — Controversy. — Exposition. — Criticism. 
—Must  take  into  Account  the  Fact  of  Sin. 

LmsATtntE. 
The  Encyclopaedia  articles  noted  in  Chap,  i.,  especially  that  in  the 
Schaff-Herzog.— Also  the  German  treatises  named  in  the  same  chapter, 
with  the  addition  of  Lechler. — Ebrnrd's  Apologetics,  Vol.  I.  In.roduc- 
tion.— H.  B.  Smith's  Apologetics,  Chap.  II. — Crooks  and  Hurst's  Theo- 
logical  Encyclopedia  and  Methodology,  pp.  435-437. — Cave's  Introduc- 
tton  to  Theology,  pp.  506-533.— Bruce's  Apologetics,  Chap.  II. — Shedd's 
History  of  Doctrine,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  103-316. — Frank's  System  of  Christian 
Certainty,  pp.  18-35. — Hodge's  Outlines  of  Theology,  pp.  19,  30. — Van 
Oosterzee's  Christian  Dogmatics,  pp.  75-238. — Foster's  Systematic  The- 
ology, pp.  3^31.— Th*  Presbyterian  Quarterly,  Vol.  IV.,  pp.  337-37a 

I.  The  Meaning  of  the  Term.    §  4. 

THE  term  Apologetics  is  closely  related  to  apology. 
They  are  both  derived  from  the  Greek  anoioria,  which 
means  a  defence  or  a  pleading.  The  Greek  verb  oTrokoftot, 
as  used  in  the  middle  voice,  means  to  defend  ourself,  or  to 
plead  one's  own  cause.  To  make  a  plea  in  self-defence,  or 
to  present  a  vindication  against  certain  charges,  is  the  precise 
meaning  of  the  word.  The  word  apology  was  used  exclu- 
sively in  early  times,  but  it  did  not  convey  the  idea  of  excuse, 
palliation  or  making  amends  for  some  injury  done.  It 
rather  denoted  a  plea  or  vindication.  The  plea  of  an  attor- 
ney in  the  court-room  is,  in  this  primary  sense,  an  apology 
for  the  cause  or  client.  The  advocacy  of  any  set  of  opinions, 
either  by  speech  or  pen,  is  really  an  apologetical  service. 


i  I 

I 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  APOLOGETICS.        49 

1.  The  term  Apologetics,  however,  has  come  into  vogue 
only  in  recent  times,  and  is  now  used  in  a  technical  sense,  to 
denote  the  science  of  apology,  or  of  defence  and  vindication. 
In  general,  this  applies  to  any  sort  of  pleading  or  vindication, 
such  as  that  of  the  court-room,  or  as  that  of  the  public 
vindication  or  advocacy  of  any  cause.  Apologetics  is  thus 
the  science  of  pleading,  or  advocacy,  or  vindication  in  gen- 
eral. It  covers  the  whole  ground  of  the  exposition  of  the 
principles  of  effective  pleading,  and  of  the  art  of  applying 
these  principles  in  any  given  case. 

2.  Apologetics  in  relation  to  religion  is  the  advocacy  of 
the  cause  of  religion  in  general,  whereby  the  religious  view 
of  man  and  the  universe  is  unfolded.  Then,  Christian 
Apologetics  is  the  science  of  pleading  the  cause  of  Christi- 
anity, or  of  vindicating  the  claims  and  contents  of  the 
Christian  system.  An  apology  is  a  specific  defence  against 
some  definite  asaault.  Apologetics,  however,  is  the  science 
of  all  the  defences,  the  vindication  of  Christianity  from 
every  possible  assault.  Apologetics  for  the  Christian  system 
is  the  science  of  the  presentation  of  the  whole  plea  for 
Christianity  in  such  a  way  as  to  fortify  it  from  all  attacks, 
and  to  effectively  commend  it  to  the  minds  and  hearts  of 
men.  Christian  Apologetics  is  the  organized  defence  and 
the  systematic  vindication  of  the  whole  area  of  the  Christian 
system.  It  is  not  merely  defence  at  one  point;  it  is  the 
science  of  all  the  defences. 

II.  The  Usage  of  the  Term.    §  5. 

To  trace  the  usage  of  the  term  would  require  the  writing 
of  a  history  of  Apologetics.  This  cannot  be  attempted  here, 
but  a  few  remarks  may  be  of  some  interest  and  value,  for 
the  term  apology  is  found  in  frequent  and  continuous  usage, 
although  the  technical  term.  Apologetics,  has  come  into  use 
only  in  comparatively  recent  times. 

I.  In  classic  Grefk,  Xenophon  uses  the  term  apology,  in 

4 


w^am 


so 


APOLOGETICS. 


ii 


ifF' 


his  Memorabilia,  Chapter  IV.,  several  times.  He  employs 
it  when  presenting  his  noble  defence  of  his  master,  Socrates, 
against  the  several  charges  which  were  made  in  reference  to 
his  teaching.  Here  Xenophon  not  only  defends  Socrates 
against  the  charges  of  impiety,  of  corrupting  the  youth,  and 
of  introducing  new  deities,  but  he  also  vindicates,  in  various 
effective  ways,  his  master  as  one  of  the  noblest  and  best  of 
men.  This  defence  and  vindication  is  Xenophon's  apology 
for  Socrates. 

2.  In  the  New  Testament  the  Greek  word  for  apology 
occurs  several  times.  In  Acts  xxii.  i,  and  in  Phil.  i.  7,  it  is 
translated  "defence" ;  but  in  Acts  xxv.  8,  and  i  Cor.  ix.  3, 
it  is  rendered  by  the  word  "answer."  The  meaning  is  the 
same,  however,  in  all  of  these  passages,  for  the  Greek  word 
is  identical  in  them.  If  a  man  makes  answer  Tor  himself, 
his  procedure  is  a  defence,  and  when  a  man  makes  a  defence 
his  doing  so  may  be  regarded  as  a  reply  or  answer  to  some 
charges  made  against  him.  Stephen's  splendid  defence  of 
himself,  of  his  Master,  and  of  the  gospel  cause,  recorded  in 
Acts  vii.,  is  very  properly  called  his  apology.  When  Paul 
said,  in  Phil.  i.  17,  that  he  was  set  for  the  defence  of  the 
gospel,  he  distinctly  announces  that  he  held  an  apologetic 
attitude  towards  that  gospel.  It  is  thus  evident  that  the 
function  of  Apologetics  in  relation  to  the  Christian  system 
has  a  well-defined  scriptural  basis.  In  the  Scriptures  there 
are  various  apologies;  and,  by  inference,  Apologetics,  as 
the  science  of  these  apologies,  has  also  a  biblical  foundation. 

3.  During  patristic  times,  as  is  evident  from  the  writings 
of  the  Apostolic  and  early  Greek  and  Latin  Fathers,  much 
apologetical  work  was  done.  From  Eusebius,  the  Church 
historian,  we  learn  that  Aristides,  Quadratus,  and  others 
whose  writings  have  perished,  wrote  defences  of  Christi- 
anity. Justin  Martyr,  Tatian,  Athenagoras  and  Hermas, 
whose  writings  have  survived  in  whole  or  in  part,  also  did 
much  of  the  same  useful  work.  Justin  Martyr's  two  Apolo- 
gies, written  about  the  middle  of  the  second  century,  are 


L»»   «- 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  APOLOGETICS.        51 

important  and  valuable  works.  They  are  addressed  to  the 
Roman  Emperor,  and  they  first  make  an  able  defence  of 
Christianity  against  assaults  which,  from  pag^n  and  other 
sources,  had  been  made  against  it;  and  then  they  exliibit 
the  main  beliefs  and  practices  of  the  early  Christians. 

Clement  of  Alexandria  defended  Christianity  against  the 
pretensions  of  Greek  philosophy,  and  Origen  answered  the 
various  attacks  which  Celsus  made  upon  the  Christian  sys- 
tem. Tertullian  vindicated  Christianity  against  the  Gentiles 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Jews  on  the  other,  while  Athanasius 
wrote  against  Greek  paganism,  and  Cyril  replied  at  length 
to  Julian.    Augustine  also  wrote  an  Apology. 

4.  In  scholastic  times  there  was  little  apologetical  activity. 
The  energy  of  human  reason  during  this  period  was  devoted 
to  the  relations  between  philosoflhy  and  the  doctrines  of 
Christianity,  and  the  activity  of  men's  hands  was  engaged  in 
warlike  conflicts  with  the  followers  of  the  prophet  of  Mecca. 
Abelard  and  Aquinas  did  some  apologetical  work  towards 
the  close  of  the  scholastic  period. 

5.  After  the  Reformation  began  the  discussions  in  the 
sphere  of  religion  were  largely  polemic.  It  could  scarcely 
be  otherwise  in  the  circumstances.  But  about  a  century 
after  the  Reformation,  when  human  reason  began  to  realize 
its  freedom  in  various  ways,  serious  assaults  upon  the  Chris- 
tian system  began  to  be  made  from  several  quarters.  These 
were  promptly  met  by  suitable  apologies.  Lardner,  Stack- 
house,  Addison,  Butler  and  Paley  did  good  work  in  England, 
while  Pascal  and  Turretin  came  to  the  rescue  on  the  Conti- 
nent. It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  these  apologies 
were  always  definite  defences  against  specific  assaults.  They 
served  an  excellent  purpose,  but  they  did  not,  in  any  single 
case,  supply  a  complete  Apologetic.  Butler  came  nearest  to 
this  in  his  Analogy,  whose  principles  art  jy  no  means  out 
of  date  for  our  own  day.  There  were  many  noble  treatises 
on  natural  theology,  and  excellent  books  on  Christian  evi- 
dences, produced  in  this  age;  but  the  scope  of  Aixjlogetics 


52 


APOLOGETICS. 


was  not  clearly  conceived  during  the  last  century,  with  all 
its  apologetical  activity. 

6.  In  Germany,  about  the  same  time,  the  need  for  the 
defence  of  Christianity  also  arose,  largely  on  account  of  the 
advent  of  a  widespread  rationalism.  The  early  German 
treatises  were  mainly  apologies  also,  but  about  the  beginning 
of  this  century  more  systematic  treatises  of  an  apologetical 
nature  began  to  appear.  The  term  Apologetics  by  degrees 
came  into  general  use.  Planck  was  the  first  to  employ  it, 
about  1794;  but  it  was  only  by  slow  degrees  that  this  tech- 
nical term  came  to  be  generally  employed,  so  that  it  is  only 
about  a  generation  since  Apologetics  succeeded  in  obtaining 
its  rightful  place  in  the  theological  encyclopaedia.  Even  yet 
some  hesitate  to  give  it  a  separate  place. 


III.  The  Definition  of  Apologetics.    §  6. 

The  way  is  now  open  to  give  a  general  definition  of 
Apologetics.  The  precise  form  of  definition  to  be  adopted 
will  be  determined  by  the  view  taken  of  religion  in  general, 
and  of  the  Christian  religion  in  particular.  And,  in  framing 
the  definition,  it  may  be  best  not  to  make  any  clear  distinc- 
tion between  what  is  called  natural  and  revealed  religion, 
for  Christianity,  broadly  viewed  in  the  interests  of  Apolo- 
getics, really  includes  both.  All  that  is  insisted  on  at  this 
stage  is  that  the  Christian  religion  is  truly  divine  in  its 
nature,  and  that  it  is  the  only  adequate  religion  for  sinful 
men,  for  the  reason,  mainly,  that  it  is  the  only  one  which 
properly  and  effectively  represents  God's  redemptive  activity 
in  the  world. 

Aid  may  be  given  in  framing  a  definition  of  Apologetics 
by  briefly  noticing  some  of  the  defective  definitions  which 
have  been  proposed.  In  this  way  the  accepted  definition  may 
the  more  clearly  appear  to  be,  in  some  measure,  satisfactory. 
In  doing  so,  H.  B,  Smith  is  followed  in  part. 

I.  Schleiermacher  says,  in  substance,  that  "Apologetics  is 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  APOLOGETICS.        53 

a  preparatory  discipline,  having  to  do  with  the  fundamental 
principles  of  theology."  It  has  thus  to  do  with  all  the  ideas, 
truths  and  facts  which  logically  precede  or  historically  ante- 
date the  system  of  theology  proper.  There  is  not  a  little  that 
is  true  in  this  conception,  for  Apologetics  is  a  preparatory 
discipline  in  relation  to  theology.  But  this  definition  rather 
describes  its  place  in  relation  to  theology  proper  than  defines 
what  it  really  is.  In  addition,  it  gives  too  wide  a  sweep  for 
Apologetics,  and  includes  under  it  much  material  which 
belongs  to  Introduction.  Moreover,  it  scarcely  denotes  the 
specific  aim  of  Apologetics,  which  is  the  defence  and  vin- 
dication of  Christianity. 

2.  Hannell  takes  Apologetics  to  be  "the  science  of  the 
common  ground  of  the  church  and  theology."  On  this  rather 
curious  view  the  question  at  once  arises  as  to  what  is  this 
common  ground.  Till  this  is  clearly  answered,  one  cannot 
tell  what  the  materials  of  Apologetics  really  are.  If  the 
Scriptures  be  that  common  ground,  or  underlying  principle, 
then  Apologetics  is  the  science  of  the  Scriptures.  Or,  if 
Christ  be  made  the  common  ground,  then  it  is  the  science 
of  Christ.  Or,  again,  if  the  common  ground  be  the  creeds, 
then  it  is  the  science  of  the  creeds.  From  this  it  would 
appear  that  this  definition  is  rather  too  vague  to  be  of  much 
service.  And,  in  addition,  it  is  open  to  the  same  objection 
as  the  previous  definition,  in  that  it  gives  no  proper  place  to 
the  main  function  of  Apologetics  in  the  defence  and  vindi- 
cation of  Christianity. 

3.  Von  Drey  defines  Apologetics  as  "the  philosophy  of 
the  Christian  revelation  and  its  history."  From  this  view- 
point it  becomes  a  branch  of  philosophy  in  general,  and  of 
the  philosophy  of  religion  in  particular.  This  view  is  right, 
however,  in  giving  prominence  to  the  historical  character  of 
Christianity,  and  in  finding  the  philosophy  of  history  in  it. 
But  it  reduces  Apologetics  to  a  branch  of  the  philosophy  of 
religion,  whereas  the  philosophy  of  religion  is,  properly 
speaking,  a  branch  of  Apologetics.    And  it  is  perhaps  better 


54 


APOLOGETICS. 


to  avoid  the  use  of  the  word  philosophy  in  defining  Apolo- 
getics, since  it  may  more  properly  be  regarded  as  a  branch 
of  theological  science  than  as  a  department  of  philosophy. 

4.  Sack  describes  Apologetics  as  "that  branch  of  theology 
which  treats  of  the  ground  of  the  Christian  religion  as  divine 
fact."  According  to  this  view,  Christianity  is  held  to  be 
real  and  supernatural,  in  its  principles  or  ground,  and  the 
function  of  Apologetics  is  to  make  this  claim  good.  It 
further  prepares  the  way  for  dogmatics  or  systematic  the- 
ology. The  ideal  side  of  Christianity  is  treated  by  systematic 
theology,  and  the  real  side  by  Apologetics.  This  definition 
has  some  merits,  for  Apologetics  has,  as  part  of  its  task,  to 
make  good  the  divine  reality  of  Christianity.  Still,  U  is 
rather  one-sided  and  incomplete,  for  it  lays  exclusive  stress 
upon  the  historical  evidences,  and  leaves  little  place  for  the 
moral  and  other  lines  of  defence  and  vindication  which  have 
much  apologetic  value. 

5.  Lechler  gives  quite  another  turn  to  the  definition  when 
he  says  that  "Apologetics  is  the  scientific  proof  that  the 
Christian  religion  is  the  absolute  religion."  The  function  of 
Apologetics  is  to  exhibit  the  ordered  and  systematic  proof 
which  suffices  to  show  that  Christianity  is  the  only  adequate 
religion  for  men.  This  definition  points  in  the  right  direc- 
tion, and  yet  it  scarcely  supplies  what  is  now  needed.  The 
term  absolute  is  a  little  vague,  and  Apologetics  has  not  so 
much  to  show  that  Christianity  is  this  sort  of  a  religion  as 
to  make  out  its  reality  and  sufficiency.  Then,  Apologetics 
is  not  best  described  as  proof,  even  though  that  proof  be 
scientific  in  its  form.  It  is  rather  the  science  of  the  defence 
and  vindication  of  Christianity  as  the  divine  redemptive 
religion.  This  definition,  however,  signalizes  the  fact  that 
Apologetics  is  a  science  rather  than  a  philosophy,  and  this 
is  a  good  feature  of  it. 

6.  Baumstark  leads  us  a  further  step  in  the  right  direction 
when  he  says  that  "Apologetics  is  the  scientific  defence  of 
Christianity  as  the  absolute  religion."    This  definition  is 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  APOLOGETICS.        55 

nearer  the  mark  than  any  yet  given,  though  it  still  retains 
the  term,  absolute  religion.  But  it  has  the  merit  of  substi- 
tuting the  idea  of  defence  for  Lechler's  notion  of  proof.  It 
makes  the  main  function  of  Apologetics  to  be  the  scientific 
defence  of  the  Christian  system  in  general,  and  in  this  it  is 
so  far  correct.  But  it  would  have  come  still  nearer  the  mark 
if  it  had  said  "the  science  of  the  defence,"  instead  of  "the 
scientific  defence."  A  defence  at  a  single  point  may  be 
scientific,  yet  it  may  not  be  the  science  of  all  the  defences,  as 
Apologetics  now  claims  to  be. 

7.  Ebrard's  briefest  definition  is  to  the  eflFect  that  "Apolo- 
getics is  the  science  of  the  defence  of  Christianity."  This  is 
brief,  clear  and  pointed;  and  it  indicates,  better  than  any  of 
the  foregoing  definitions,  the  main  function  of  Apologetics. 
It  may  err  by  defect,  though  Ebrard,  in  his  exposition  of  his 
definition,  lays  stress  upon  the  vindication  of  Christianity, 
so  that  Apologetics  really  comes  to  be  the  science  of  the 
vindication  of  Christianity.  Thus  taken,  it  at  least  forms 
the  point  of  departure  for  a  correct  definition.  H.  B.  Smith 
agrees  with  this  view,  and  lays  stress  on  the  vindication  of 
Christianity. 

8.  Bruce,  in  theory,  practically  agrees  with  Ebrard,  and 
speaks  approvingly  of  his  general  positions.  But  he  is 
inclined  to  take  a  much  narrower  view  when  he  begins  to 
unfold  his  defensive  statements  of  Christianity.  "Apolo- 
getics is  a  preparer  of  the  way  of  faith,  an  aid  to  faith 
agamst  doubts  whencesoever  arising,  especially  such  as  are 
engendered  by  philosophy  and  science.  Its  specific  aim  is  to 
help  men  of  ingenuous  spirit  who,  while  assailed  by  such 
doubts,  are  morally  in  sympathy  with  believers." »  This 
view  of  the  central  function  of  Apologetics  is  scarcely 
adequate,  and  it  leads  almost  necessarily  to  a  constantly 
concessive  treatment  of  the  grounds  and  contents  of  the 
Christian  system.  And,  further,  Brace's  view  scarcely  gives 
scope  to  the  presentation  of  the  defences  as  a  whole  in  a 
scientific  way,  according  to  some  principle  inherent  in  the 
^Apologetics,  Introduction,  page  37. 


56 


APOLOGETICS. 


'  I 


: 

h 

I 


very  nature  of  Christianity.  It  makes  Apologetics  little 
more  tb-^n  a  series  of  varying  apologies.  And,  in  addition, 
instead  of  properly  defining  Apologetics,  it  indicates,  and 
that  correctly  enough,  the  homiletical  use  and  value  of 
Apologetics,  rather  than  gives  a  proper  definition  of  the 
science. 

9.  The  following  definition  is  the  one  which  underlies  this 
treatise:  Apologetics  is  that  branch  of  theological  science 
which  presents  a  systematic  defence  and  vindication  of  the 
reality  of  that  divine  redemptive  agency  which  is  resident  in, 
and  operative  through,  Christianity  upon  the  world.  This 
states  the  function  of  Apologetics  in  harmony  with  the  view 
already  presented  of  its  deeper  point  of  departure.*  In 
Christianity  there  is  a  divine  redemptive  activity  operative 
in  the  world;  for  the  Christian  religion  is  not  merely  a 
system  of  truths,  it  is  also  a  set  of  redemptive  agencies  or 
activities.  Apologetics  is  here  defined  in  such  a  way  as  to 
indicate  that  its  fundamental  aim  is  to  make  good  the  reality 
of  these  divine  redeeming  agencies  resident  in,  and  operative 
through,  Christianity.  This  view,  moreover,  enables  Apolo- 
getics to  deduce  its  principle  for  a  scientific  presentation  of 
all  the  defences  from  the  inherent  nature  of  Christianity, 
regarded  at  its  root  as  a  set  of  divine  renewing  activities 
operative  in  the  world.  this  there  may  be  some  gain  in 
clearness  and  in  compk .    .ess. 

As  a  further  definil  1,  somewhat  expository  of  the  one 
just  given,  and  as  presenting  more  fully  its  concrete  details. 
Apologetics  may  be  regarded  as  that  branch  of  theological 
science  which  presents  a  reasoned  defence  and  vindication 
of  the  essential  truth,  supernatural  origin,  divine  authority, 
and  inherent  sufficiency  of  the  Christian  system  of  doctrine, 
of  worship,  of  ethics,  and  of  redemption,  together  with  the 
systematic  refutation  of  all  opposing  systems.  These  two 
forms  of  the  definition  serve  to  determine  the  idea  of  that 
branch  of  theological  science  which  is  the  theme  of  this 
treatise.  The  former  indicates  its  point  of  departure  and 
'  Chapter  I.,  page  ao. 


.M 


ism 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  APOLOGETICS.        57 

inner  function.  The  latter  exhibits  its  task  more  in  detail, 
and  its  practical  function.  Taken  together,  they  serve  the 
theoretical  and  practical  ends  of  a  definition  of  the  Apolo- 
getics of  the  present  day. 


IV.  The  Aim  of  Apologetics.    §  7. 

Apologetics  deals  with  Christianity  from  a  certain  point 
of  view.  This  point  of  view  is  expressed  in  a  general  way 
by  the  definition  of  it  just  given.  An  exposition  of  this 
definition  will  serve  to  exhibit  more  fully  the  noble  aim  of 
this  branch  of  theological  science.  When  Apologetics 
understands  clearly  what  its  peculiar  task  is,  it  will  be  the 
better  able  to  proceed  with  its  performance.  From  the 
definition  proposed,  the  aim  of  Apologetics  is  threefold  in 
its  nature. 

I.  iLundertakes  to  defend  Christianity.  From  the  very 
nature  of  the~raser"it-i»^he  legitimate  dtffender-of  the 
Christian  system.  This  system  represents  the  divine  redeem- 
ing activity  operative  in  the  world,  and  it  is  natural  to  expect 
that  the  agencies  of  evil,  also  ever  active  in  the  world,  shall 
make  assaults  upon  Christianity.  It  is  the  professed  aim 
and  proper  function  of  Apologetics  to  ward  off  these 
assaults.  It  must  not  only  meet  these  attacks  in  detail,  but 
take  a  position  where  it  can  defend  the  citadel  of  Christianity 
from  every  attack.  And  it  may  sometimes  happenthat  the 
weapons  with  which  the  enemy  assaults  Christianity  are 
actually  captured  and  transformed  into  armor  of  defence 
for  it. 

No  attempt  is  made,  at  this  stage,  to  sketch  the  varied 
attacks  against  which  Apologetics  must  make  valiant  de- 
fence. The  attacks  may  be  made  upon  the  truthfulness  of 
the  doctrines,  and  reality  of  the  worship  of  the  Christian 
system,  or  upon  the  trustworthiness  of  its  ethical  system,  and 
the  potency  of  its  redemptive  scheme.  These  attacks  Apolo- 
getics must  resist  and  ward  off.     The  assaults  may  be 


■<m 


58 


APOLOGETICS. 


t 


'i     ; 


directed  against  the  supernatural  origin,  and  hence  against 
the  divine  authority  of  the  doctrines,  ritual,  ethics  and 
redemption  implied  in  Christianity.  These  assaults,  in  like 
manner,  are  to  be  boldly  met  and  bravely  resisted.  And, 
again,  the  inherent  adequacy  of  Christianity  to  be  a  suitable 
and  sufficient  religion  for  sinful  men,  in  the  matter  of  doc- 
trines, worship,  ethics  and  redemption,  may  be  called  in 
question.  If  so.  Apologetics  must  bear  in  mind  that  it  is  set 
ff  r  the  defence  of  Christianity.  And  the  lines  of  its  defence 
•  u^r  I  acompass  the  Christian  system  on  every  side,  in  order 
.iiat  Its  aim  may  be  properly  conceived,  and  its  duty  fully 
discharged. 

2.  Apologetics  also  aims  at  the  vindication  of  Christianity. 
Tt  not  only  meets  the  assailants  of  this  true  religion,  but  it 
fortifies  the  citadel  itself.  To  defeat  these  assailants  is  not 
enough,  for  this  defeat^might  only  exhibit  the  skill  and 
courage  of  the  defenders,  and  do  but  little  to  reveal  the 
inherent  sufficiency  of  the  Christian  system.  Hence  Apolo- 
getics proceeds  to  vindicate  Christianity,  as  the  adequate  and 
all-conquering  redemptive  activity  of  God  in  the  world. 
This  vigorous  aim  of  Apologetics  is  exceedingly  important 
and  serviceable.  The  truth,  the  divine  origin  and  authority, 
and  the  complete  adequacy  of  the  grounds  and  conteTns  of 
Christianity  are  to  be  unfolded  in  such  a  positive  and 
eflfective  way  that  its  inherent  power  and  glory  will  be  made 
manifest. 

This  opens  up  a  wide  field,  which  cannot  even  be  sketched 
here.  The  adequacy  of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world 
about  us,  of  man  as  part  of  the  world  and  with  definite 
relations  to  Aln  ighty  God,  is  to  be  fully  exhibited.  The 
Christian  doctrine  of  sin,  and  of  the  redemption  from  it 
provided  in  Christ,  together  with  all  the  excellencies  which 
centre  in  Jesus  Christ,  must  be  plainly  opened  up.  The  true 
natiire  of  the  Bible,  and  of  historic  Christianity,  as  well  as 
the  reality  of  the  religious  experience  of  the  Christian,  are 
to  be  unfolded  in  all  their  beauty  and  power.    To  this  noble 


'^'^^ 


■hhM 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  APOLOGETICS.        59 

task  of  vindication  Apologetics  is  committed,  and  its  fitness 
for  this  task  is  undoubted ;  so  it  may  bravely  do  its  duty. 

3.  The  fu'■|^J?'■  *™  o^  Apologetics  is  to  refute  opposing 
systems  and  theories,  i'his  iB  its  offensive  function.  Hav- 
ing repelledlhe  assaults  of  the  foe7ana~liaviiig  CxhiFited  the 
impregnable  nature  of  the  Christian  citadel,  the  final  service 
of  Apologetics  is  to  assail  the  opposing  systems,  and  to 
reveal  their  weakness  and  inconsistency.  For  this  purpose 
Apologetics  takes  the  open  field,  and  enters  on  a  vigorous 
campaign  against  the  foes  of  the  Christian  faith.  Not  only 
are  the  assaults  of  these  foes  to  be  met,  but  the  foes  them- 
selves are  to  be  driven  from  the  field.  Every  anti-theistic 
system,  and  all  anti-Christian  schemes,  are  to  be  carefully 
considered,  and  their  claims  and  pretensions  are  to  be  rigidly 
scrutinized.  As  the  children  of  Israel  were  commanded  to 
drive  out,  conquer  or  destroy  all  the  Canaanites  from  the 
land  of  promise,  so  Apologetics  is  commissioned  to  drive 
off,  conquer  or  destroy  all  the  opponents  of  Christianity  at 
the  present  day,  and  to  take  full  possession  of  the  promised 
land,  which  God's  redeeming  activity  in  the  world  pledges 
to  her.  Hence,  Apologetics  aims  to  defend  and  vindicate 
Christianity,  and  to  refute  opposing  systems. 


V.  The  Nature  of  Apologetics,    i  8. 

The  aim  of  Apologetics  largdv  determines  its  na!  ire,  so 
that  some  remarks  upon  tie  latt?  -  epic  may  very  properly 
conclude  this  chapter.  As  the  fui.cti m  of  Apologetics  really 
springs  from  the  conf  .  betw  en  light  and  darkness,  good 
and  evil,  in  the  world,  so,  in  its  very  nature,  Apologetics 
must  be  controversirl  and  polemic.  As  its  threefold  aim 
leads  to  defenc .;,  v  .-.dication  and  refutation,  so  its  contro- 
versial or  poler  ic  lature  emerges  on  these  same  lines. 

I.  In  n-^tnlogeti  al  service  there  is  an  element  of  contro- 
versy. Thir  feat'-;re  -f  this  ser^^ce  grows  out  of  the  assaults 
made  upon  Chri  tianity,  against  which  Apologetics  defends 


"^r 


HMi 


6o 


APOLOGETICS. 


Jt.     With  these  assailants  Apologetics  has  a  controversy 
which  will  not  be  content  without  victory.    The  controversy 
which  thus  arises  takes  many  forms.    Is  the  reality  of  the 
supernatural  factor  involved  in  the  Christian  system  ques- 
tioned, or  is  the  validity  of  the  redemptive  activity  of  God 
resident  in  Christianity  assailed;    then  Apologetics,  by  a 
vigorous  controversy,  makes  its  defence.    Is  the  historicity 
of  the  Old  and  New  Testament  records  impugned,  and  does 
a  destructive  historical  criticism  impair  the  authority  of 
.nese  records;  then  Apologetics  has  earnest  work  to  do  in 
making  a  proper  defence  at  this  point.    If  the  assailant  dons 
the  garb  of  the  philosopher,  and  in  a  learned  way  assails  the 
validity  of  the  grounds  upon  which  belief  in  God  rests,  or 
boldly  asserts  that  God  is  beyond  the  scope  of  human  know- 
ledge, or  presents  a  false  view  of  the  relation  between  God 
and  his  works,  then  Apologetics  must  enter  the  lists  of 
controversy,  and  resist  the  assault.    If  the  attack  approaches 
with    the  apparatus   of   the   scientist,    threatening,    with 
weapons  found  in  the  open  field  or  framed  in  the  laboratory, 
to  destroy  Christianity,  Apologetics  must  be  prepared  to 
drive  back  this  foe  with  the  weapons  of  a  true  and  reverent 
science.    And  if  these  invasion.s  planned  against  Christianity 
are  at  times  bold,  bitter  or  blasphemous,  then  Apologetics  is 
to  calmly  stand  its  ground,  and  repel  the  onslaught;  and  if 
at  times  it  seems  to  be  contending  in  a  losing  cause,  it  may 
simply  have  to  stand  still  and  see  the  salvation  of  God,  and 
when  It  least  expects  it,  its  wondering  eyes  may  behold  the 
horse  and  his  proud  rider  cast  into  the  sea. 

2.  Apologetical  service  has  in  it  the  factor  of  exposition 
This  feature  appears  as  the  vindication  of  the  Christian 
system  is  faithfully  conducted.  This  vindication  necessarily 
requires  thorough  exposition  of  the  grounds,  and,  to  some 
extent,  of  the  contents  of  tms  system.  This  opens  up  a  wide 
held  of  apologetic  activity.  The  Christian  idea  of  God,  as 
the  infinite  tri-personal  Spirit,  and  the  source  and  ground 
of  all  finite  things,  and  as  the  righteous  and  -racinus  moral 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  APOLOGETICS.        6i 

ruler,  whose  mighty  power  and  tender  mercy  are  over  all  his 
creatures  ,s  to  be  expounded  in  all  its  fulness  of  meaning. 
The  relation  of  God  to  his  works,  as  both  immanent  in  all 
thmgs  and  yet  transcendent  in  relation  to  all  finite  things 
must  be  fauhfully  set  forth.  Here  the  theistic  philosophy^^ 
domg  a  splendid  apologetical  service  at  the  present  day  in 
expoundmg  that  relation  of  God  to  the  universe  which  pro- 
vides a  r^l  and  rational  basis  for  the  redemptive  activity  of 
God  m  Christ  by  the  Spirit  which  Christianity  represents. 

nn  JT*    /T"*""^  '*'^''*^  ''  '"^^"^  by  Apologetics 
on  behalf  of  the  sacred  records  of  the  Chrfstia^sy!^  m 
Apologetics  opens  the  Bible,  and  lets  it  speak  for  itself.    As 

whT  th;""'  )"^'  ^'?"'"'  '""'"^  °^  '''^''  ^hich  happened 
when  the  nations  of  antiquity  were  young;  we  heT^its 
prophets,  with  great  solemnity,  speaking    as  they  were 

spell-bound  by  its  poetry,  as  it  sings,  in  lofty  strains  the 
praises  of  God  in  the  accents  of  heaven;  we  IJ^  hiar 
parables  and  proverbs  which  stand  unrivaHed  through  all  the 
ages;  and  above  all.  we  listen  to  the  stor,  of  the  trans! 
o«.dent  he  and  tragic  death  of  the  man  o/  NazaretMhe 
Saviour  of  sinners;  and  as  we  do  so.  we  are  compelled  to 
confess  that  this  wonderful  book  has  no  equal 

itsIL'trT'°^f "'  vindication  .f  Christianity  presents,  a. 
.  s  cen  ral.  peeriess  personage.  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  and  gives 
.ts  challenge  to  the  worid  to  produce  his  equal.  k!s  liff^ 
7^:J:'  ^,^^--te  and  formal  age;  hi,  teaching'^ 
different  in  all  respects  from  that  of  his  own  time;  his  Lrz\ 
hercsm.  so  marvellous  at  ever,  turn ;  his  death,  with  Si  h 
mystenou,  meaning;  hi,  resurrection  and  ascension,  with 

worldtr    ^ '"'"'""'  ^•'"'^  '°^^  '^-^  "^^  '"o  the 
worid.  all  combine  to  present  Christianity  to  the  worid  with 

an  apoogetic  that  i,  simply  invincible.    ChristianUy  vin^ 

cates  Itself  at  the  bar  of  reaK,n  and  before  the  tribunTof 

conscience.    It  commends  itself  a,  fully  satisfacto^to  the 

heart,  and  a,  potent  for  the  life  all  along  it,  pathway.    I   i! 


I 


! 


r. 


I 


62 


APOLOGETICS. 


found  to  be  like  the  godliness  which  it  commends,  profitable 
both  for  this  life  and  for  that  which  is  to  come. 

3.  In  its  nature,  Apologetics  has  also  an  element  of  criti- 
cism. This  is  the  polemic  aspect  of  Apologetics.  It  emerges 
when  the  refutation  of  opposing  systems  is  pursued.  This 
refutation  necessarily  leads  t  a  searching  criticism  of  all 
those  theories  and  schemes  which  profess  to  supply  the  place 
of  Christianity.  This  polemic  of  thorough  criticism  is  of 
much  value  in  our  own  time,  for  modem  thought  is  pro- 
posing many  substitutes  for  Christianity.  The  critique  of 
atheism  need  not  detain  Apologetics  long ;  for  there  are  no 
tribes  of  atheists,  and  few  individual  atheists  feel  absolutely 
secure  in  their  denial  of  God.  Then  materialism,  in  its 
scientific  and  philosophic  forms,  and  especially  in  the  view 
of  man  which  it  teaches,  must  be  carefully  criticised.  So, 
too,  pantheism,  in  its  various  idealistic,  monistic  and  evolu- 
tionary phases,  has  to  be  examined  with  the  utmost  diligence, 
for  it  is  subtle  and  seductive.  In  like  manner,  positivism  and 
agnosticism,  as  the  twin  brothers  of  a  certain  modem  type 
of  thought,  are  not  to  be  passed  over  without  minute  exami- 
nation. And  pessimism  must  have  its  mask  taken  from  it, 
and  false  moral  theories  m.ust  be  exposed.  Skeptic '  and 
naturalistic  theories  of  the  Scriptures,  of  the  Christ  of  his- 
tory, and  of  ihe  facts  of  Christianity  in  the  world,  arc  to  be 
put  into  the  witness-box  and  cross-questioned  by  Apolo- 
getics. In  addition,  rival  religions,  and  non-religious  social 
theories,  are  to  be  scanned  by  means  of  competent  criticism, 
and  tested  by  the  light  of  reason  and  experience.  Thus,  it 
will  appear  that  when  all  these  opposing  systems  are  weighed 
in  the  balances  of  Apologetic  criticism,  they  will  be  found 
wanting. 

Such  is  the  nature  of  Apologetics.  Blended  together,  and 
aiding  each  other  in  the  service  rendered  to  Christianity, 
there  will  be  controversy,  e.\position  and  criticism,  as  de- 
fence, vindication  and  refutation  proceed. 


r^j^H, 


1^ 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  PLACE,  THE  METHOD  AND  THE  DIVISIONS  OF 
APOLOGETICS. 

Contents. 

The  Place  of  Apologetics  as  a  Theological  Discipline.— Various 
Views.— With  Practical  Theology.— With  Exegetical  Theology.— With 
Systematic  Theology.— As  Fundamental  to  all  Disciplines.— The  Ac- 
cepted View.— The  Method  of  Apologetics.— The  Philosophical  or  Cos- 
mological.— The  Psychological  or  Anthropological.— The  Historical  or 
Bibliological.— The  Christological  and  Redemptive.— The  Theolo^cal 
and  Redemptive.— The  Accepted  View.— The  Divisions  of  Apologetics. 
—Various  Schemes.— The  Plan  Adopted  has  Three  Divisions— The 
First,  Fundamental  or  Philosophical  Apologetics.— The  Second,  Chris- 
tian or  Historical  Apologetics.— The  Third,  Applied  or  Practical  Apolo- 
getics. 

LiTERATURS. 

The  Encyclopaedia  articles  mentioned  in  former  ^.  ..pters,  especially 
that  in  McClintock  and  Strong  for  the  Place  and  Method  of  Apologetics. 
—Also  the  authors  named  in  these  chapters,  with  the  addition  of  Hagen- 
bach.  Pelt,  Kienlin  and  Kuyper.— SchaflE's  Theological  Propedeutic,  and 
H.  B.  Smith's  Apologetics,  Chap.  II.,  have  value  for  the  Divisions.— 
Cave's  Introduction  to  Theology,  pp.  509-5.12.- Warfield's  article  in  The 
Presbyterian  and  Reformed  Review.  Vol.  VII.,  p.  343.— Inaugural  Ad- 
dresses of  Professor  Hobson,  of  McCormiclc  Seminary,  and  of  Professor 
Greene,  of  Princeton  Seminary.— Pr«6y/*noH  Quarterly,  Vol.  IV.,  p. 
337— Consult  treatises  on  Theology  by  Calvin,  Hodge,  Thornwell,  Dab- 
ney,  Shedd,  Strong,  Van  Oosterzee.  Miley  and  Foster,  where,  in  the 
opening  chapters,  there  is  much  apolc^etical  material  treated  as  intro- 
ductory to  Systematic  Theology,  .nder  the  titles  of  Theism  and  Natural 
Theology. 

I.  The  Place  of  Apologetics.    §  9. 

IT  was  scarcely  to  be  expected  that,  so  loiig  as  the  defence 
and  vindication  of  Christianity  consisted  in  nothing 
more  tha"  separate  apologies  to  resist  specific  assaults. 
Apologetics  would  be  given  any  definite  place  in  theological 
science.  And  until  the  precise  function  of  AHogetics  was 
cleat  ly  conceived,  its  proper  place  in  relation  to  the  other 
theological  disciplines  could  not  very  well  be  understood. 


,  f 

I 


! 


r  \ 


64 


APOLOGETICS. 


In  addition,  the  fact  that  many  English  writers,  in  their 
defences  of  Christianity,  treated  Natural  Theology  and  the 
Christian  Evidences  quite  apart  from  each  other,  increased 
the  difficulty  of  making  any  claim  on  behalf  of  Apologetics 
for  a  place  of  its  own  in  the  circle  of  the  theological  sciences. 
But  so  scon  as  Apologetics  was  understood  to  be  the  science 
of  the  defence  and  vindication  of  Christianity,  in  that  it 
sought  to  unify  all  its  separate  apologies,  the  question  of  its 
rightful  place  beside  the  other  branches  of  theology  soon 
arose.  But,  even  after  the  question  was  raised,  it  was  not 
easily  answered  in  a  satisfactory  way.  For  some  time  there 
was  wide  diversity  of  opinion  upon  the  question,  and  it  can 
scarcely  be  regarded  as  entirely  settled  even  yet. 

1.  Some  make  it  a  division  of  Exegetical  Theology. 
Planck,  who  first  used  the  term  in  a  systematic  way,  so 
regarded  it.  This  certainly  seems  a  peculiar  view.  It  ap- 
pears to  have  been  determined  largely  by  the  fact  that  many 
of  the  objections  made  against  Christianity  arise  from  the 
Scriptures,  with  whose  interpretation  Exegetical  Theology 
is  concerned.  Taking  Exegetical  Theology  to  cover  ques- 
tions of  the  genuineness  and  authenticity  of  these  Scriptures, 
it  came  to  pass  that  Apologetics,  which  in  part  has  to  deal 
with  these  question?,  should  in  some  way  be  regarded  as  a 
part  of  Exegetical  Theology.  It  seems  quite  evident  that 
this  opinion  takes  too  limited  a  view  of  the  scope  of  Apolo- 
getics; for  while  it  is  true  that  some  of  the  assaults  upon 
Christianity  are  lodged  against  the  Scriptures,  yet  Apolo- 
getics is  much  broader  in  its  scope,  and  may  deserve  a 
distinct  place  of  its  own. 

2.  Others  place  Apologetics  with  Practical  Theology.  It 
thus  becomes  a  branch  of  Homiletics.  Delitzsch,  Diister- 
dieck  and  Kienlin  so  regard  it.  Sack  is  inclined  to  make  it 
consist  in  the  apologetic  treatment  of  Systematic  Theology 
by  the  preacher.  This  general  view  of  the  place  of  Apolo- 
getics is  based  upon  the  fact  that  the  preacher,  in  his  practical 
work,  inubt  at  times  deal  with  various  aspects  of  Christianity 


THE  METHOD  OF  APOLOGETICS.  65 

in  a  defensive  way.    This  being  the  case,  it  belongs  properly 
to  Practical  Theology.  b   v    ir=  tj 

There  is  some  force  in  this  claim,  from  one  point  of  view 
for  Apologetics  always  has  a  practical  end  before  it  in  the 
defence  and  vindication  of  Christianity;  and  the  preacher  is 
called  to  defend  its  reality  at  every  assailable  point.  It  does 
not  follow,  however,  that  Apologetics,  on  this  account, 
belongs  to  Practical  Theology,  any  more  than  Exegetical,  or 
Systematic  Theology  belongs  to  Practical  Theology,  because 
they  provide  some  of  the  materials  which  the  preacher  uses. 
Even  though  Apologetics  is  to  be  used  for  practical  ends  by 
the  preacher,  it  may  still  be  necessary  to  give  it  a  place  of  iti 
own  as  a  theological  discipline. 

3.  Many  writers  are  disposed  to  make  it  a  part  of  Syste- 
matic Theology.     According  to  this  view,  it  becomes  the 
mtroductory  division  of  Systematic  Theology.    Hagenbach 
leans  to  this  view.    Pelt  also  regards  it  as  having  to  deal 
with  the  first  principles  of  theology.    Domer  looks  upon  it 
as  the  first  part  of  Christian  Doctrine.    SchaflF  makes  it  the 
first  division  of  Systematic  Theology.    Cave,  in  a  somewhat 
confused  way,  places  Natural  Theology  as  an  introductory 
discipline,  and  then  makes  Apologetics  a  branch  of  Com- 
parative Theology,  to  be  known  as  Fundamental  Theology, 
in  contrast  with  Doctrinal  Theology.     Kuyper  gives  it  an 
obscure  place  under  Dogmatic  Theology.     Then,   many 
representative  theologians,   like  Calvin,   Hodge,   Dabney, 
Shedd,  Strong,  Foster  and  Miley,  deal  at  length  with  apolo^ 
getical  material  in  their  books  on  System    ic  Theology 
Nearly  tht  whole  of  the  first  volume  of  I      ge's  splendid 
treatise  deals  with  apologetical  topics,  and  many  pages  at 
the  beginning  of  the  other  treatises  mentioned  are  devoted 
to  the  same  themes.    This  mode  of  treatment  arose,  in  part 
from  the  fact  that  the  place  of  Apologetics  was  not  vtr^ 
clearly  defined  when  these  works  were  planned,  and  in  part 
from  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what  was  the  legitimate 
materials  of  Apologetics.    Then,  too,  the  fact  that  in  teach- 
s 


66 


APOLOGETICS. 


ij 


ing,  these  apologetical  topics  were  usually  handled  by  the 
same  preceptor  as  dealt  with  Systematic  Theology,  naturally 
threw  these  two  disciplines  into  intimate,  practical  relations 
with  each  other,  and  brought  them  forth  in  the  same 
treatises. 

If  Apologetics  is  not  to  have  a  separate  place,  its  most 
natural  affiliation  would  be  with  Systematic  Theology.  It 
would  then  stand  as  an  introductory,  or  preparatory  section, 
for  the  subject  of  Systematic  Theology,  broadly  viewed.  As 
the  case  now  stands,  this  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  the  best 
view.  It  somewhat  narrows  the  function  of  Apologetics, 
and  confines  it  almost  entirely  to  Systematic  Theology.  But 
it  has  also  to  deal  with  the  authenticity  and  divine  character 
of  the  holy  Scriptures,  and  this  brings  it  into  relations  with 
Exegetical  Theology.  Then,  too,  this  location  of  Apolo- 
getics v/ith  Systematic  Theology  unavoidably  burdens  the 
latter  subject  with  many  philosophical  and  bibliological 
questions,  which  should  be  discussed  and  settled  beforehand, 
so  that  Systematic  Theology  may  be  made  as  free  from 
speculation,  and  as  biblical  as  possible.  This  can~Be  best 
effected  by  giving  Apqlogfitigs  a  separate  j!iafit.ainong  the 
theological  rffsripljugg 

^Tl  may  be  best,  therefore,  to  give  Apologetics  a  place  of 
its  own,  and  to  regard  it  as  an  introductory  discipline  to  the 
whole  system  of  theology.  Schleiermacher  was  the  first  to 
announce  this  view.  Ebrard  adopts  it.  Warfield  also  gives 
Apologetics  this  fundamental  place,  and  so  do  many  other 
living  teachers.  This,  no  doubt,  is  the  best  view.  We  might 
agree  with  Pelt  in  making  it  deal  with  the  fundamental 
principles  of  theology,  if  the  term  theology  be  taken  in  its 
widest  sense.  Hagenbach  almost  comes  to  this  position 
when  he  says  that  the  other  branches  of  theology  must  be 
covered  before  Apologetics  can  do  its  work  fully,  ''his  is  a 
confession  that  Apologetics  holds  some  sort  of  relation  to  all 
these  branches  of  theology,  and  the  question  is  as  to  how 
this  relation  should  be  regarded. 


'     ! 


THE  METHOD  OF  APOLOGETICS.  67 

The  simple  view  is  to  regard  it  as  preliminary  to  all  the 
theological  disciplines.     It  is  the  fundamental  discipline 
which  underlies  and  has  relations  with  all  the  others,  and 
consequently,  it  stands  logically  first.     It  makes  good  the 
reality  of  the  existence  of  God,  and  exhibits  the  relations 
subsisting  between  God  and  his  works.    It  also  vindicates 
the  historical  accuracy  and  the  divine  authority  of  the  holy 
Scriptures,  and  makes  good  the  validity  of  the  divine 
redemptive  activities  resident  in  Christianity.     By  means 
of  the  service  it  thus  renders,  Exegetical  and  Systematic 
Theology  have  their  ground-work  provided,  and  Historical 
and  Practical  Theology  obtain  their  proper  support.    This 
gives  Apologetics  its  natural  place,  and  supplies  it  with  its 
proper  materials.    And  it  leaves  the  way  open  for  a  syste- 
matic treatment  of  it,  as  the  science  of  the  vindication  of 
Christianity. 

At  the  same  time.  Apologetics  has  points  of  close  con- 
tact with  Systematic  Theology,  and  there  is  force  in  the 
suggestion  of  Hagenbach  that  before  Apologetics  can  fully 
discharge  its  office,  the  other  branches  of  theology  must  have 
been  studied.  This  means  that  after  Exegetical,  Systematic 
and  Historical  Theology  have  fully  exhibited  the  inner 
nature  and  the  benefidal  eflfects  of  Christianity,  Apologetics 
IS  able  greatly  to  enrich  its  resources  for  the  vindication  of 
the  Christian  system.  This  might  be  termed  the  verification 
of  Christianity  and  the  crowning  service  of  Apologetics. 


11.  The  Method  of  Apologetics.    § 


ID. 


By  the  method  of  Apologetics  is  meant  the  starting  point 
of  the  investigation  it  conducts,  or  the  central  principle 
according  to  which  its  materials  are  arranged  and  its  dis- 
cussion IS  pursued.  It  is  very  evident  that  where  the 
material  is  so  vast  and  varied  as  is  that  of  Apologetics,  a 
proper  method  is  indispensable  to  a  systematic  treatmcnt'of 
the  whole  subject.     The  method  adopted  will  be  largely 


i  !' 


i 


i! 


6S 


APOLOGETICS. 


determined  by  the  conception  of  Christianity  which  is 
entertained,  and  by  the  view  taken  of  the  function  of  Apolo- 
getics in  relation  to  it.  For  the  present  discussion,  this 
point  has  been  practically  determined  already.*  From  this 
fundamental  position  the  discussion  of  the  method  of  Apolo- 
getics now  proceeds. 

1.  Some  pursue  what  may  be  termed  the  philosophical,  or 
costnological,  method  in  Apologetics.  Treatises  on  the 
Philosophy  of  Religion,  like  those  of  Pfleiderer  and  Caird, 
to  some  extent  represent  this  general  t}rpe  of  view.  Accord- 
ing to  it,  Apologetics  begins  with  the  existing  world  about 
us,  and  views  it  either  in  its  philosophical  principles  or  in 
its  cosmologfical  unity,  and  then  discovers  in  Christianity 
the  highest  metaphjrsics  and  the  truest  philosophy  of  the 
universe  about  us.  Pursuing  this  general  method,  the 
apologetic  for  Christianity  is  often  constructed  on  an 
elaborate  scale. 

As  an  aspect  of  apologetical  service,  this  is  quite  sound 
and  useful.  Christianity  is  the  best  phik>sophy  of  the 
universe.  But  this  view  of  apologetical  method  is  in  danger 
of  overlooking  the  concrete  historical  reality  of  Christianity, 
and  of  reducing  Apologetics  to  little  more  than  a  meta- 
physical scheme  or  a  system  of  philosophy.  Moreover,  this 
method  necessarily  gives  the  whole  treatment  too  much  of 
the  abstract  to  serve  the  best  ends. 

2.  Others  prefer  what  may  be  called  the  psychological  or 
anthropological  me*:hod.  Delitzsch  formally  adopts  this 
method,  and  the  writings  of  President  Edwards,  so  far  as 
they  are  apologetical,  have  the  same  feature.  If  this  view 
of  the  method  be  adopted,  the  point  of  departure  for  the 
disci  ision,  and  the  principle  for  the  development  of  Apolo- 
getics, is  found  in  the  nature  and  needs  of  mankind.  Man's 
nature  is  so  constituted,  anH  his  needs  are  of  such  a  charac- 
ter, that  some  provision  mi  e  discovered  to  fit  this  nature 
and  meet  these  needs.    Chn.     mity  is  found  to  fully  supply 

'  Oup.  I.,  Sec.  2,  dealing  with  the  Scope  of  Apologetics. 


THE  METHOD  OF  APOLOGETICS.  69 

what  is  required  for  this  purpose.  Apologetics,  pursuing 
this  method,  undertakes  to  show  how  Christianity  fulfils  this 
demand. 

This  view,  again,  is  in  a  measure  true;  and  so  far  it  is 
very  important.  Christianity  is  perfectly  suited  to  man's 
nature,  and  it  supplies  all  that  sinful  men  need  in  the  religion 
they  feel  they  require.  But  this  view  is  scarcely  deep 
enough;  for  Christianity  has  its  doctrine  of  God  and  of  the 
universe,  and  it  has  its  sacred  records  in  holy  Scripture. 
Apologetics  must  find  and  apply  its  central  principle  in  such 
a  way  as  to  organize  all  these,  as  well  as  its  anthropological 
factors,  into  a  complete  system. 

3.  Some  others  prefer  to  follow  the  historical  or  biWio- 
logical  method.    Writers  like  Paley  and  Rawlinson,  though 
they  do  not  announce  any  definite  principle,  are  practically 
following  this  method.    Recent  writers  who  lay  special  stress 
on  the  historical  evidences  in  general  also  belong  to  this 
class.    Here  the  external  evidences  of  Christianity  are  made 
prominent,  and  various  lines  of  reasonings  which  serve  to 
vindicate  the  historicity  of  the  sacred  Scriptures  and  of  the 
Christian  origins,  constitute  the  burden  of  Apologetics    The 
confirmation  of  the  biblical  history  from  profane  history  and 
from  the  monuments,  is  a  large  feature  in  the  working  out 
of  this  method.    Little  stress  is  laid  upon  the  philosophical 
side  of  the  case  for  Christianity.    The  main  contention  of 
Apologetics  is  to  show  that  the  Christian  system  is  essen- 
tially  true. 

This,  too.  is  a  very  important  part  of  apologetical  service, 
for  the  historicity  of  the  Christian  documents  is  to  be  made 
good  by  Apologetics.  But  this  view  of  its  method  hardly 
reaches  to  the  root  of  the  problem.  The  real  question  of 
Apologetics  relates  to  the  redemptive  activity  of  which  these 
records  speak;  for  Christianity  is  not  merely  historic  truth 
it  IS  also  a  divine  dynamic  in  the  worid.  Therefore  the 
principle  which  determines  the  apologetical  method  must  go 
beneath  the  historical  and  bibliological  aspects  of  Christi- 


70 


APOLOGETICS. 


'I    t 


iM! 


I 


41 
i- 

i  1 


anity,  though  that  same  principle  must  also  take  into  account 
the  historicity  of  the  Scripture  records. 

4.  In  more  recent  times  many  are  inclined  to  adopt  what 
may  be  described  as  the  Christological  and  redemptive 
method.  Bruce,  so  far  as  he  has  any  definite  method,  repre- 
sents this  view.  H.  B.  Smith  is  perhaps  a  better  type  of  it. 
Writers  like  Fairbaim  incline  more  or  less  definitely  to  this 
conception  of  apologetical  method.  This  view  is  often  pre- 
sented in  a  rather  vague  and  pretentious  way.  In  general,  it 
projects  Apologetics  from  the  person,  mission  and  activity 
of  Jesus  Christ,  and  it  finds  its  principle  for  the  distribution 
of  the  apologetical  material  in  the  redeeming  agencies  which 
proceed  from  Christ  into  the  world.  In  many  ways  this  is 
the  popular  view  in  our  day. 

There  is  much  in  this  view  to  be  commended.  It  gives  a 
proper  place  to  the  redemptive  aspect  of  Christianity.  It 
also  honors  the  person  and  activity  of  the  divine  Mediator 
and  Redeemer,  who  is  the  head  of  that  kingdom  of  light,  and 
truth,  and  holiness,  which  is  in  inevitable  conflict  with  the 
kingdom  of  darkness,  error  and  sin.  If  this  view  be  not 
confined  merely  to  the  historic  career  of  Jesus  Christ,  but  is 
taken  to  embrace  this  entire  redeeming  activity,  it  is  almost 
on  the  correct  gp-ound  in  regard  to  the  proper  apologetical 
method.  Its  only  defect,  in  the  hands  of  some  who  adopt  it, 
is  that  nearly  all  the  stress  is  laid  on  the  earthly  historic 
period  of  the  redeeming  activity  and  teaching  of  our  Lord. 

5.  There  remains,  therefore,  a  somewhat  deeper,  though 
not  entirely  diflferent,  view  to  take,  in  order  to  rightly  seize 
the  true  apologetical  method  at  its  deepest  root.  This 
method  may  be  denoted  by  the  term  theological  and  redemp- 
tive. This  view  of  the  method  or  principle  of  Apologetics  is 
in  harmony  with  the  position  already  taken  in  regard  to  the 
true  function  of  Apologetics  in  relation  to  Christianity. 
Christianity  represents  the  redeeming  activity  of  God  in  the 
world,  which  is  rendered  operative  through  Christ  by  the 
Holy  Spirit,  and  Apologetics  vindicates  the  Christian  system 


jtL 


THE  METHOD  OF  APOLOGETICS.  71 

from  this  deeper  point  of  view.  Hence  its  point  of  departure 
is  from  the  mission  of  Christianity  in  the  world,  and  the 
principle,  which  is  to  determine  its  proper  method,  roots 
itself  in  God  as  he  exercises  his  redeeming  agency  in  the 
world  and  in  conflict  with  evil.  The  relation  of  God  to  the 
world,  and  man's  knowledge  of  God  are  fundamental. 

Not  only  does  this  provide  us  with  the  deeper  view  of  a 
comprehensive  apologetical  method;  it  also  gives  proper 
place  to  what  is  sound  in  all  the  other  proposed  methods. 
These  start  from  the  world,  man,  the  Bible  and  Christ, 
respectively.  Now,  the  redeeming  activity  of  God  presup- 
poses a  certain  relation  between  him  and  the  world;  it 
discovers  in  Christianity  what  suits  and  supplies  man's  need; 
it  has  its  authentic  records  given  in  the  sacred  Scriptures, 
which  give  a  true  knowledge  of  God,  and  it  is  mediated 
through  Jesus  Christ.  This  theological  redemptive  principle, 
consequently,  supplies  the  best  method,  and  the  one,  there- 
fore, which  is  adopted  in  this  treatise. 


III.  The  Divisions  of  Apologetics.    §  11. 

The  divisions  of  Apologetics  relate  to  the  way  in  which 
its  mnterials  are  distributed  into  the  various  branches  of  the 
science,  in  order  to  its  logical  development  and  systematic 
discussion.  It  was  some  time  after  this  branch  of  theological 
science  began  to  take  definite  form  that  any  positive  attempt 
was  made  to  distribute  its  materials  in  a  logical  manner.  So 
long  as  Natural  Theology  and  the  Evidences  of  Christianity 
were  discussed  separately  by  apologists,  the  somewhat 
mechanical  division  of  the  materials  into  two  branches  pre- 
vailed ;  but  this  division  was  of  little  logical  value. 

The  distribution  of  the  materials  must  be  determined  by 
the  principle  already  announced  in  the  method  adopted.  If 
the  universe,  or  man,  or  the  Bible,  or  Christ,  or  God  and  his 
redeeming  activity,  be  the  point  of  departure  for  Apolo- 
getics, then  the  principle  of  the  division  of  its  materials  will 


7a 


APOLOGETICS. 


i 


V 


correspond  with  the  method  adopted.  In  this  treatise  the 
last  of  these  supplies  the  method  followed,  and  this  conse- 
quently gives  the  key  to  the  division  to  be  made.  It  may 
illumine  the  exposition  of  this  topic  to  note  swne  of  the 
proposed  plans  for  the  divisions  of  Apologetics. 

I.  Bruce  has  three  divisions:  First,  Theories  of  the 
Universe,  Christian  and  Anti-Christian;  secondly.  The 
Historical  Preparation  for  Christianity;  and  thirdly.  The 
Christian  Origins.  This  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  suffi- 
ciently comprehensive.  It  gives  no  adequate  place  for  the 
theistic  proofs,  and  it  does  not  exhibit  the  relation  of  Chris- 
tianity to  other  forms  of  religion  as  fully  as  it  should.  And 
it  scarcely  seems  proper  to  separate  the  historical  preparation 
for  Christianity  from  the  Christian  origins,  as  both  con- 
stitute the  historic  aspect  of  God's  redeeming  activity  in  the 
world. 

Cave  regards  Apologetics  as  Fundamental  Theology,  and 
makes  it  one  of  the  branches  of  Comparative  Theology.  He 
then  makes  four  divisions  of  it:  First,  Natural  Theology; 
secondly,  Ethnic  Theology ;  thirdly,  Biblical  Theology ;  and 
fourthly.  Ecclesiastical  Theology.  These  might  be  termed 
philosophical,  ethnic,  biblical,  and  ecclesiastical  apologetics, 
respectively.  This  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  really  practical 
division.  It  is  not  made  on  any  single  principle  which 
clearly  appears. 

Ebrard,  after  a  useful  introduction,  makes  two  main 
divisions,  with  various  subdivisions,  and  works  out  the 
whole  plan  so  as  to  include  most  of  the  apologetical  material : 
First,  The  eternal  contents  of  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
according  to  the  facts  of  nature  and  human  consciousness. 
This  is  opened  up  in  two  main  sections.  One  deals  with  the 
positive  development,  which  is  elaborated  at  great  length. 
The  other  considers  critically  some  of  the  leading  anti- 
theistic  schemes,  but  is  not  so  fully  wrought  out  as  the  other. 
Secondly,  Christianity  as  a  historic  fact,  in  its  organic  con- 
nection with  the  history  of  religfion.    This  division  is  broken 


THE  METHOD  OF  APOLOGETICS. 


73 


into  two  somewhat  unequal  sections.  One  contains  a  verj- 
complete  historical  survey  of  the  non-Christian  religions. 
The  other  gives  a  somewhat  brief  treatment  of  the  revelation 
of  God  set  forth  in  the  Christian  system. 

There  are  many  strong  features  about  Ebrard's  work.  Its 
treatment  of  the  facts  of  nature  and  man's  consciousness, 
and  its  exposition  of  the  theistic  proof  founded  thereon,  are 
very  thorough.  And  its  comprehensive  outline  of  compara- 
tive religion  is  one  of  its  strong  features.  But  it  is  not 
without  defects.  It  lays  stress  upon  the  purely  philosophical 
side  of  Apologetics,  and  scarcely  does  full  justice  to  the 
historical  materials  of  the  science.  And  relatively  too  much 
space  is  devoted  to  the  non-biblical  systems,  and  far  too  little 
to  the  revelation  of  God  which  Christianity  represents.  In 
spite  if  these  defects,  however,  Ebrard's  treatise  is  a  noble 
work. 

H.  B.  Smith  adopts  a  simple  threefold  division,  in  which 
he  is  substantially  followed  by  Foster  in  his  Systematic 
Theology.  First,  Fundamental  Apologetics,  in  which  the 
underlying  philosophical  questions  regarding  God,  man  and 
the  universe  are  treated.  Secondly,  Historical  Apologetics, 
which  deals  with  the  supernatural  in  histov'cal  iorm  is  it 
emerges  in  the  Christian  system,  especially  in  ;  ::  .-rcred 
records.  Thirdly,  Philosophical  Apologetics,  i-  ::vce  -i  n  is 
shown  that  Christianity  is  the  highest  ti;'C!'.  .ivm  rif.'  (iiui! 
solution  of  the  problems  of  existence. 

This  comes  very  nearly  up  to  the  require tn'r.ts  .■  a  good 
division.  The  only  defect  about  it  is  that  it  is  not  easy  to  see 
clearly  how  the  discussion  of  the  first  and  third  divisions  can 
always  be  kept  logically  separate.  In  both  cases  philosophi- 
cal inquiries  arise.  These  regard  the  same  matters  from 
only  slightly  different  view-points,  so  that  confusion  or 
repetition  is  almost  sure  to  arise.  On  this  account,  Ebrard's 
twofold  division  has  some  advantages.  In  the  first,  philo- 
sophical probffTiS  are  expounded;  and  in  the  second, 
historical  questions  are  considered.     Hence  there  is  little 


if 


.J  I 


\ 

! 


i 


74 


APOLOGETICS. 


danger  of  confusion.  By  a  combination  of  the  plans  of 
Ebrard  and  Smith,  a  workable  division  may  be  obtained. 

2.  The  plan  for  the  divi.  vn  and  distribution  of  the 
apologetical  material  adopted  in  this  treatise  may  now  be 
outlined.  This  plan  keeps  in  mind  the  true  function  of 
Apologetics  in  relation  to  Christianity.  It  is  also  determined 
by  the  method  already  adopted  in  this  chapter,  which 
provides  the  principle  by  which  the  division  is  to  be  effected. 
That  principle  is  the  redeeming  and  restoring  activity  of 
God  in  the  world  as  it  appears  in  Christianity.  This  implies 
a  certain  underlying  relation  of  God  to  the  world  and  man. 
It  also  exhibits  a  certain  definite  historical  form  in  the  world. 
And  it  is  face  to  face  witi:  the  various  problems  of  a  practical 
nature  with  which  Christianity  proposes  to  deal.  This  key 
to  the  division  of  the  material  opens  up  a  threefold  classifica- 
tion of  it. 

First,  there  is  fundamental  or  philosophical  Apologetics. 
This  is  concerned  mainly  with  three  problems,  God,  man  and 
the  world.  The  underlying  problem  involved  in  these  three 
refers  to  the  relation  between  them.  This  opens  up  impor- 
tant aspects  of  the  philosophy  of  religion,  and  the  exposition 
to  be  entered  on  under  this  division  covers  the  whole  field 
of  the  thcistic  discussion.  The  nature  and  origin  of  theistic 
belief,  the  rational  grounds  for  man's  knowledge  of,  and 
belief  in,  the  existence  of  God,  together  with  an  adequate 
criticism  of  all  the  anti-theistic  theories  constitutes  the 
burden  of  this  division.  In  the  conclusion  reached,  the 
organic  and  rational  relation  of  God  to  man  and  the  world 
is  to  be  carefully  educed. 

The  second  division  may  be  termed  Christian  or  historical 
Apologetics.  This  is  engaged  chiefly  with  the  historical 
nature  of  the  revela*"on  of  himself  which  God  has  given  in 
the  Christian  system  Here  his  redemptive  activity  resident 
in.  and  operative  upon,  the  world  through  Christianity, 
appears  in  historic  form;  and  its  real  historical  nature,  as 
well  as  its  true  divine  authority,  must  be  fully  vindicated. 


THE  METHOD  OF  APOLOGETICS. 


75 


And  its  sacred  documents  in  the  Sr-^otures  must  be  carefully 
considered  in  this  connection.  At»J  the  relation  between 
Christianity  and  the  various  other  religious  systems  has  to 
be  fully  understood.  . .  ce  the  inquiry  here  is  largely 
historical  in  its  nature,  u  mg  first  with  the  non-Christian 
systems,  and  afterwards  weaving  into  a  complete  whole  the 
evidences  of  Christianity  as  a  truly  redemptive  religion. 
This  division  gives  the  Bible,  Christ  and  redemption. 

The  third  division,  for  want  of  a  better  name,  may  be 
called  applied  or  practical  Apologetics.  In  this  division 
Christianity  is  viewed  in  its  relation  to  the  various  practical 
problems  with  which  it  has  to  deal  in  the  life  and  thought 
of  men.  Its  relation  to  modem  science  and  recent  social 
theories,  its  bearing  on  the  various  pressing  evils  which  rest 
on  men  in  the  world,  and  its  ability  to  adjust  itself  to  these 
and  provide  the  practical  and  effective  remedy  for  these  evils, 
are  to  be  unfolded  under  this  division.  Here  Christianity 
is  reaoy  to  meet  with  the  practical  test  of  its  ability  to  cope 
with  all  these  evils,  and  ofits  adequacy  to  effect  the  complete 
evangelization  of  the  world.  By  its  ability  to  do  this  Chris- 
tianity abundantly  vindicates  itself,  and  thereby  reveals  the 
undoubted  reality  of  the  divine  redemptive  agencies  which  it 
possesses.  This  practical  test  constitutes  the  verification  of 
Christianity,  as  competent  to  fulfil  its  divine  mission.  Thus 
the  task  opened  up  is  threefold.  The  philosophical  validity, 
the  historical  reality,  and  the  practical  efficiency  of  Chris- 
tianity are  to  be  shown.  This  gives  Philosophical,  Christian 
and  Applied  Apologetics  respectively. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
APOLOGETICS  AND  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


I  I 


Contents. 

The  Spiritua]  Principle  in  Man.— Body  and  Soul  Distinct— Different. 
—Yet  Gotely  Related.— Mode  Mysterious.— The  Powers  of  the  Spirit- 
ual Principle.— A  Misconception.— The  Mental  Faculties.— Their  Classi- 
fication.—Various  Plans.— The  Modem  Scheme.— The  Intellect— Sense- 
Perception.— Understanding  and  Reason. — The  Sensibility.— The  Appe- 
tites.—The  /affections  and  Emotions.— The  Will.— Its  Nature.— Free- 
dom.—The  Moral  Nature.— The  Religious  Activity.— The  Mode  of 
Knowledge.- Epistemology. —  Theories.— The  Empirical  and  Rational 
Contrasted  at  Three  Points.— The  Objects  of  Knowledge.— Knowledge 
Defined.— Its  Tests.— The  Objects  Sketched.— The  Reality  of  the  Sub- 
jective and  Objective  in  Knowledge. — Truth. 

Lttbiatuu. 
The  articles  on  Psychology  and  KnowUdge  in  the  Encyclopedias 
already  mentioned.— Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Lectmres  on  Metaphysics,  with 
J.  S.  Mill's  Examination  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Philosophy. — Kant's 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  with  Spencer's  First  Principles.— Dibnefi 
Sensualistic  Philosophy,  with  Bain's  Mental  and  Moral  Science.— yic- 
Cosh's  Intuitions,  with  Watson's  Kant  and  His  English  Cri/tcA- Trea- 
tises on  Psychology,  by  Bald«  '.n,  Davis,  James,  Porter,  McCosh,  Ladd. 
Sully,  Dewey,  Murray,  Hickok  and  Spencer— Green's  Prolegomena  to 
Ethics,  p.  13.— Harris*  Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism,  p.  44.— Ebrard's 
Apologetics,  Vol.  I.,  p,  35.— H.  B.  Smith's  Apologetics,  p.  46.— Bowne's 
Metaphysics,  p.  403,  and  his  Studies  in  Theism,  p.  9.— Diman's  The  The- 
istic  Argument,  p.  35.— Bowne's  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge.— 
Ladd's  Philosophy  of  Knowledge.—Sa.h»titr'i  Outlines  of  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Religion,  p.  277. 


1 

I 


4 


1 


AS  a  man's  philosophy  goes  far  to  determine  his  type  of 
theology,  so  the  theory  of  knowledge  he  adopts  will 
greatly  affect  his  Apologetics.  On  this  account.  Apologetics 
has  a  vital  interest  in  a  soimd  theory  of  knotvlcdge.  It 
would  be  an  initial  mistake  to  accept  an  epistemology  which 
leaves  the  Christian  system  without  a  rational  foundation, 
and  Ajwlogetics  without  any  constructive  materials.  Inquiry 
as  to  the  nature  and  powers  of  the  human  mind,  and  careful 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  yy 

scrutiny  of  the  conditions  and  bounds  of  the  knowledge  it 
may  acquire,  are  of  pressing  importance  for  Apologetics. 
Hence,  even  at  this  early  stage  in  these  discussions,  some 
preliminary  positions  must  be  understood  in  regard  to  the 
mind  of  man  and  its  powers  of  cognition.  Though  the 
thorough  discussion  of  these  questions  must  be  deferred  till 
Materialism  and  Agnosticism  are  reached,  yet  a  few  broad 
lines  of  safety  should  even  thus  early  be  marked  out. 

I.  The  Spiritual  Punciple  in  Man.    §  12. 

The  whole  personality  of  man  is  the  subject  of  religion. 
This  personality  is  complex.  It  is  composed  of  a  material 
organism,  which  is  called  the  body,  and  of  a  spiritual  prin- 
ciple,  which  is  known  as  the  mind  or  soul.  Though  related, 
these  t\vo  factors  are  essentially  distinct,  and  religion 
pertains  to  both.  From  this  it  follows  that  Apologetics 
cannot  be  indifferent  to  the  views  held  touching  either  of 
these  factors  in  man's  complex  constitution.  It  dare  not 
allow  materialism  to  exclude  the  spiritual  factor,  nor  can  it 
permit  idealism  to  do  injustice  to  the  material  element  in 
the  nature  of  man.  Nor  can  Apologetics  consent  to  accept 
any  theory  of  knowledge  which  closes  the  door  of  cognition 
against  the  supersensible,  and  thus  rules  out  the  knowledge 
of  God  on  the  part  of  man.  Above  all,  the  reality  of  the 
spiritual  factor  in  man  must  be  guarded  with  the  utmost 
care. 

I.  The  material  and  spiritual  factors  in  man  are  essen- 
tially distinct.  They  differ  in  their  nature,  and  are  unlike 
m  the  conditions  of  their  existence.  The  former  is  material 
substance;  the  latter  is  spiritual.  Both,  therefore,  have 
substantial  reality;  the  one,  that  of  an  organic  structure; 
the  other,  that  of  an  intelligent  principle.  Life  is  resident 
m  the  former,  and  thought  belongs  to  the  latter.  The 
organic  life  of  the  body  is  not  to  be  identified  with  mere 
physical  force,  nor  is  thought  to  be  confounded  with  the 


78 


APOLOGETICS. 


1 .1 


I 


« 


•  r 


I 


.1 

i 

V  i 

.'!» 

1    ^ 

li\ 


purely  vital  activities  of  the  body.  Consciousness  may 
involve  brain  movement,  but  brain  movement  is  not  identical 
with  consciousness.  Thought  processes  may  imply  an 
activity  of  the  nerve  system,  but  the  nerve  system  alone  does 
not  account  for  these  processes.  If  consciousness  and 
thought  processes  generally  have  not  their  seat  in  the  bodily 
organism,  there  must  be  another  factor  in  the  personality  of 
man  to  which  they  belong.  This  is  the  spiritual  factor  in 
man ;  and  the  reality  of  this  factor  is  now  insisted  on  in  the 
interests  of  Apologetics. 

2.  Not  only  are  these  factors  distinct  in  man;  they  are 
also  different  in  their  nature.  This  difference  has  already 
been  denoted  by  the  terms  material  and  spiritual.  The 
bodily  organism  belongs  to  one  category  of  being,  the 
spiritual  principle  to  another.  The  body  is  directly  con- 
cerned with  organic,  or  vital,  functions;  the  soul  exhibits 
intellectual,  moral,  emotional  and  volitional  activities.  As 
spiritual,  the  soul  is  not  subject  to  the  conditions  of  material 
existence,  nor  can  physical  predicates  be  applied  to  it.  Its 
nature  is  spiritual  and  personal,  and  its  activities  are 
psychical  and  rational.  This  position  Apologetics  earnestly 
maintains  in  the  interests  of  religion. 

3.  Though  the  body  and  soul  in  man  are  distinct  and 
different,  yet  they  are  most  intimately  related.  In  order  to 
the  completeness  of  the  human  personality  both  are  required. 
Though  the  seat  of  personality  may  be  located  in  the  soul, 
yei  the  body  is  necessary  to  the  fulness  of  that  personality. 
So  far  as  continued  existence  in  this  earthly  state  is  con- 
cerned, the  union  between  them  must  abide.  If  the  bond 
binding  them  together  is  broken,  ihe  organic  condition  of 
the  body  dissolves,  and  the  spiritual  pi  nciple  no  longer  finds 
its  proper  abode  on  earth.  The  fact  of  the  resurrection 
illustrates  the  intimate  relation  between  body  and  sou!,  and 
confirms  the  view  that  both  are  requisite  to  complete  pfr- 
sonality.  As  to  the  precise  nature  of  the  union  between 
them,  and  as  to  tlie  exact  mode  of  their  interaction,  not  very 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  79 

much  may  be  said.  It  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  me- 
diamcal  or  external;  it  may  rather  be  looked  upon  as 
dynamical  and  mternal.    To  say  this,  however,  is  to  do  little 

rnll.'".''''"  '\'  ^"^  °^  '^'"  P«^^"^'  ""i°".  and  of 
constant  interaction  between  them.    Few,  Jf  any,  now  would 

IZ  "m  "^^T'"^''  *he  soul  is  lodged  I  the  pineal 
gland.  Most  would.  ,„  some  sense,  cccept  Hamilton's  sug- 
gest on  that  the  soul  IS  in  proximate  relation  with  the  entife 
physical  orgamsm.  And  though  modem  physiological  in- 
vestigations in  relation  to  psychology  have  mad^  gr,^t 
advances  since  Hamilton's  day.  it  is  yet  true  that  psycholo^^ 
and  physiology  together  have  not  yet  been  able  to  lift  Z 
veil  from  that  mysterious  holy  of  holies  in  the  personali  y  of 
man,  wherein  nerve  excitation  is  translated  into  actual 

ZT\  ,f  r>  ""''  *^^"  *^*  --<=  moveml  up  to 
the  threshold  of  this  holy  of  holies,  but  it  cannot  lead  Into 

>ts  secret  chamber.     Yet  this  movement  seems  to  4  The 

necessary  antecedent  to  the  mental  affection  called  sensation. 

All  of  which  goes  to  show  how  intimately  the  two  factors 

to  both  soul  and  body.  Apologetics  is  bound  to  protect  the 
for  the  defence  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man. 

II.  The  Powers  of  the  Spiritual  Principle.    §  13. 

the^oTituTl'^  '' T  '°  "^  "'"^'^  '■"^'■^•"^  *he  powers  of 
the  spiritual  prinaple  m  man.    This  raises  the  question  of 

he  faculties  of  the  human  mind,  and  introduces  the  discus 

nhrhiaV^'-^.^H ''''"''''''-  ^'^  p^-"  -  ^-"''^s 

of  the  human  mind  denote  those  capacities  which  enable  it 
In  this  connection  >t  at  once  appears  that,  although  the 

ewllt:'"'''^'"  """  ''  '  ""'^'  y^'  its  activitifs  and 
ex,M;nences  are  quite  numerous  and  varied.    This  opens  ud 

-e  sphere  of  that  science  which  deals  with  the  facult's  oi 


80 


APOLOGETICS. 


t  II 


'IS 


.1' 


the  human  mind  and  their  various  operations.    The  facts  of 
consciousness  in  general  are  the  materials  of  psychology. 

1.  An  initial,  though  a  rather  superficial,  misconception 
has  to  be  guarded  against  at  the  outset.  It  is  sometimes 
supposed  that,  just  as  the  brain  has  its  various  real  divisions, 
so  the  mind  has  also  its  several  actual  sections.  In  this  way 
the  various  powers  of  the  human  mind  come  to  be  regarded 
as  separate  divisions  of  it  In  one  section  is  located  the 
memory,  in  another  the  imagination,  and  in  another  the 
conscience.  Certain  types  of  phrenology  of  materialistic 
tendencies,  and  some  recent  investigations  into  the  physio- 
logical antecedents  of  psychology,  may  have  fostered  this 
popular  error. 

It  need  scarcely  be  said  that  this  way  of  thinkii^  in  regard 
to  the  spiritual  principle  in  man,  and  of  its  various  powers 
and  capacities,  is  quite  superficial,  and  entirely  misleading. 
This  principle,  in  its  very  nature,  is  a  single,  indivisible, 
spiritual  unit,  incapable  of  any  kind  of  partition.  From  this 
it  follows  that  the  several  faculties  of  the  human  mind  are 
not  to  be  regarded  as  sections  of  it,  but  rather  as  modes  of 
its  unitary  activity.  For  it  must  not  be  concluded  that 
because  various  nerve  excitations  can  be  localized  in  certain 
sections  cf  the  brain,  the  sensations  associated  with  these 
excitations  must  also  be  located  in  diverse  departments  of 
the  mind.  The  entire  spiritual  principle  which  is  the  seat 
of  personality  in  man  is  involved  in  each  and  all  of  these 
activities.  Hence,  intellect  and  conscience  and  will,  per- 
ception and  memory  and  imagination,  do  not  denote  several 
diverse  sections  of  the  mind,  but  express  various  activities 
and  experiences  of  the  one  indivisible  spiritual  principle, 
which  is  the  subject  of  these  activities  and  experiences  in 
man. 

2.  Various  plans  for  the  classification  of  the  powers  of 
the  human  mind  have  been  proposed.  The  Gredcs.  in  their 
philosophy,  inclined  to  classify  the  materials  of  human 
knowledge,  rather  than  to  make  any  formal  division  of  the 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  8l 

ouSl  "^^'  'T''.'^  '"  •*'  ^*^*»"'"^'°"-    A«  *e  result 
of  this,  dialectics,  physics,  ethics  and  politics  appear  in  the 

wntings  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.     To  some  e^en     th! 

scholastic  philosophy  followed  the  leadership  of  the  Greeks 

m  this  matter.    The  earlier  Scottish  philosophy  adopt^a 

twofold  diviSion  of  the  mental  powers.    Reid  dLded  them 

mto  the  mental,  or  intellectual,  and  the  moral,  or  activ" 

powers.    This  .s  good  as  far  as  it  goes ;  but  it  places  the  wm 

under  the  active  or  moral  powers,  instead  of  ly  itself     sl 

W.  Hamilton  centered  his  type  of  the  Scottish  philosophy  in 

consciousness,    and    his   division    of   the    mental    ,^wers 

naturally  grew  out  of  his  analysis  of  consciousnesf  To 

some  extent.  Kant  follows  the  older  Scottish  school     He 

he  a5r;H°'f  T''"?':  '"^  "''''^'  °^  P^^^^'^''  reason.  But 
he  adds  the  faculty  of  judgment,  and  gives  prominence  to  it 
m  a  «>mewhat  j^uliar  way.  Other  older  modes  of  class  - 
hcation  cannot  be  noted. 

st/nti.?'  P'^*=''°^°«T  °^  '^'  Pr«^^"t  day  has  come  to  sub- 
2"  ml  agreement  .n  regard  to  the  classification  of  the 

cTassel  """"■  ''  '"  "°"  ""^">^  ^•^•^'^^  '"^^  ^hree 
The  first  division  includes  the  knowing  powers  and  is 
usually  called  the  intellect.  These  powers^arTcon^r^^  j" 
the  various  cognitive  activities  of  the  spiritual  princip^  .•" 
man,  and  the  result  of  the  operation  of  these  pOwer!  I 

u's:::;rrade"^  ^'^  '---^  --  ^^^-  -^-^^^ 

The  first  is  sense-perception,  by  means  of  which  the  human 

S'e"r   ttSt  1"  ^°  '''  ^"^"'^'  ^^"^'^  ^•'-"^^  ^  -- 

th  ru^tt        """""''""'  '"^''^  ''  ^"  ^^«=^'°"  °^  the  soul 
through  the  senses,   and  perception,   which   is  rather  an 

operation  of  the  mind  unifying  the  sensations  into  a  pe  cent 

proper,  have  to  be  considered.     The  result  here  fs  pre 

sentative  knowledge.  P 

understanding.    Th,s  ,s  the  discursive  faculty,  the  faculty 


ll 


82 


APOLOGETICS. 


of  comparison,  or  the  logical  faculty.  It  is  exercised  in 
comparison,  generalization  and  abstraction.  It  utilizes  the 
materials  given  in  sense-perception,  and  by  means  of  its 
laws,  or  categories,  it  unifies,  in  various  ways,  these 
materials.  Out  of  percepts  it  constructs  concepts,  and 
thus  transmutes  presentative  knowledge  into  representa- 
tive. 

The  third  subdivision  of  the  intellect  is  the  reason.  This 
is  that  capacity  of  the  spiritual  principle  by  which  it  relates 
itself  to  the  supersensible  realm  of  thought.  This  is  the 
mental  faculty  which  deals  with  principles  and  laws.  These 
laws  regulate  the  activity  of  the  spiritual  principle  of  human 
intelligence  in  the  supersensible  realm  of  pure  thought.  It 
deals  not  so  much  with  percepts,  or  concepts,  as  with 
rational  principles  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  cognition.  This 
is  a  very  important  activity. 

The  second  generaf  class  of  the  mental  powers  is  the 
feelings.  This  is  known  as  the  sensibility,  and  it  relates  to 
certain  experiences  of  the  soul  which  are  usually  associated 
with  the  exercise  of  the  knowing  powers.  On  this  account, 
various  forms  or  aspects  of  knowledge  produce  correspond- 
ing affections  in  the  sensibility.  These  affections  will  be 
weak  or  strong,  agreeable  or  disagreeable,  according  to  the 
character  of  the  exercise  of  the  knowing  powers  which 
condition  them.  Three  subdivisions  are  usually  made  in  this 
class  also. 

The  first  is  the  appetites.  These  are  the  lowest,  and  are, 
in  a  measure,  instinctive  and  spontaneous.  The  second  is 
the  afTections.  These  arc  hig^her,  and  they  denote  those 
feelings  of  like  and  dislike  which  pertain  to  the  sensibility. 
The  third  is  the  emotions.  These  are  the  highest,  and 
they  denote  those  aspirations  of  the  soul  which  reach  out 
beyond  it.  These  three  sulxlivisions  cannot  be  very  strictly 
separated,  and  there  runs  through  them  all  the  striving 
activity,  or  desire,  oiierative  in  the  spiritual  principle  in  man, 
viewed  as  sensibility.    Sonic  writers,  consequently,  call  these 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  83 

tiic  conatiye  powers,  meaning  thereby  to  prepare  the  way 
for  the  distinction  between  desire  and  will 

.Ji^'t!!^"^-  ^T'f  '^^'  °*  '^"^  ""'t*!  Po^«'«  «  the 
m.    This  ,s  the  faculty  of  choice,  or  of  volition,  or  of 

se  f-determmation.  If  the  sensibility  be  the  b^sis  of 
self-expression  ,n  man.  then  will  is  the  source  of  self- 
determination.     If  the  former  produces  desire,  the  latter 

r  'f""r;  '^  '^'  ^°""*'"  '^  ^°'""tary,  the  latter  is 
volitional.  Many  problems  arise  in  connection  with  this 
aspect  of  the  activity  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man.  The 
nature  of  volition,  the  relation  between  motives  and  voli- 
tions, and  the  great  question  of  the  freedom  of  man  in  his 
volitions  all  arise  here,  but  cannot  be  discussed.  It  can  only 
te  remarked  that,  in  the  interests  of  Apologetics,  the  utmost 
care  must  be  taken  not  to  adopt  a  psychology  which  leads  to 
a  mechamcal  theory  of  the  faculty  of  volition,  or  which 
would,  in  any  way.  invade  the  essential  freedom  of  the 
spiritual  principle  in  man. 

4j^Growing  out  of  these  three  general  classes  of  the  powers 
of  the  human  mind,  there  are  two  additional  aspects  of  the 
activity  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man  which  are  to  be 
mentioned  m  connection  with  Apologetics.  These  activities 
are  sometimes  ranked  along  with  the  intellect,  sensibility 
and  will ;  but  most  writers  are  now  inclined  to  regard  them 
not  as  different  classes  of  activities,  but  as  the  same  poweTs* 
exercised  in  other  spheres  and  upon  different  materials 
One  of  these  ,s  known  as  conscience,  or  the  moral  faculty 

lZVtf\      'f '*"'•  P""*='P'*^ '"  '"^"  ^'•^^'^^  '"  relation 
to  moral  facts  and  experiences.     Its  activity,  thus  vie-' ed 

implies  an  exercise  of  the  intellect,  the  sensibility.  an<i  the 

will.     This   activity   apprehends   moral   distinctions,    and 

announces  the  opposition  between  the  right  and  the  wrong 

It  also  asserts,  in  an  authoritative  way.  the  fact  of  mora! 

obligation   and  administers  approval  or  disapproval  as  the 

conduct  of  the  moral  agent  deserves.     This  uhole  area  of 

experience  and  activity  is  sometimes  called  man's  moral 


84  APOLOGETICS. 

nature;  still  in  it  we  have  intellect,  and  sensibility  and  will, 
engaged  with  morality. 

The  other  activity  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man  to  be 
noted  here  is  that  involved  in  religion.  Some  are  inclined  to 
place  the  religious  powers  in  a  class  of  their  own,  and  to 
speak  of  man's  religious  nature  and  powers  as  they  do  of  his 
intellectual.  So  far  as  the  objects  involved  in  these  activities 
are  concerned,  there  is  some  force  in  this  view.  But  when 
the  activity  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  itself  is  considered, 
it  scarcel\  eems  necessary  to  place  the  religfious  activities 
in  a  class  by  themselves.  It  may  be  sufficient  to  look  upon 
the  religions  activities  and  experiences  of  man  as  the  exercise 
of  his  various  powers  upon  the  highest  and  noblest  objects 
with  which  they  can  possibly  be  engaged.  Hence,  the 
religious  activity  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man  involves 
the  operation  of  the  knowing  powers,  the  experience  of  the 
sensibility,  the  exercise  of  the  conscience,  and  the  activity  of 
the  will,  upon  the  highest  obiects  with  which  they  have  to 
deal.  These  objects  are  the  facts,  the  truths,  and  the  expe- 
riences which  are  involved  in  the  knowledge  and  love,  the 
worship,  and  service  of  God. 

From  this,  it  is  evident  that  Apologetics  has  a  profound 
interest  in  a  sound  psychologfy,  which  shall  provide  a  secure 
rational  basis  for  religion  on  its  subjective  side,  as  grounded 
in  a  certain  activity  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man. 


III.  The  Mode  or  Method  of  Knowledge.    §  14. 

In  the  first  section  of  this  chapter  the  reality  of  the 
spiritual  principle  in  the  constitution  of  man  was  asserted, 
and  in  the  second  the  various  powers  or  capacities  of  this 
principle  were  indicated.  This  prepared  the  way  for  the 
consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  processes  implied  in  these 
activities  of  the  human  mind.  This  leads  to  a  much  deeper 
view  of  the  subject,  and  raises  profound  questions  which  are 
of  vital  importance.     The  inquiry  now  is  as  to  the  very 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  85 

possibility  of  a  true  knowledge  of  real  things,  and  as  to  the 
score  and  limits  of  this  knowledge. 

I.  In  the  preceding  section  the  discussion  moved  almost 
entirely  m  the  sphere  of  psychology;  in  this  section  it  passes 
on  to  the  realm  of  epistemology.    As  the  scene  is  changed 
so  the  problems  are  different.     As  psychology  deals  with 
what  may  be  called  the  natural  history  of  the  mental  powers 
and  their  operations,  so  epistemology  takes  up  what  is  really 
the  metaphysics  of  these  powers  and  of  their  operations.    So 
It  comes  to  pass  that  as  the  materials  of  psychology  are 
found  m  consciousness,  the  problems  of  epistemology  lie  in 
the  sphere  of  self-consciousness.    The  question  now  is  as  to 
the  possibility,  conditions  and  limitations  of  the  activity  of 
the  spiritual  principle  in  man.     This  is  a  question  which 
must  be  answered  chiefly  by  investigating  the  nature  of  that 
activity  at  its  root  in  self-consciousness,  as  the  unifying 
principle  of  that  activity.    Here  agnosticism,  with  its  denial 
of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  save  in  a  narrow  sphere,  and 
positivism  with  its  plea  for  the  relativity  of  all  human 
knowledge,  appear  on  the  scene.    So,  too,  empiricism  and 
Idealism  are  at  hand;  the  former  to  say  that  all  knowledge 
IS  determined  from  without,  and  the  latter  to  assert  that  it 
IS  altogether  constructed  from  within,  the  mind.    In  the  one 
case  the  nature  of  things  produces  the  laws  of  thought,  and 
m  the  other  the  laws  of  thought  produce  the  nature  of  things 
Are  we  shut  up  to  any  one  of  these  views  ?    Can  we  discover 
a  stable  and  balanced  theory  of  knowledge  amid  all  this 
confusion  ?    Surely  we  can. 

2.  Touching  this  problem,  two  opposite  types  of  view 
have  always  prevailed.  The  one  may  be  termed  the  empirical 
or  sensational,  and  the  other  the  rational  or  intuitional  For 
this  discussion  they  may  be  called  the  empirical  and  the 
rational  theories  of  cognition.  The  former  maintains  that 
all  knowledge  comes  from  without  the  mind.  It  begins  with 
and  IS  conditioned  by,  our  sensible  experiences.  The  other 
argues  that  the  mind,  or  spiritual  principle  in  man,  has 


MKIOCOPr  mOlUTION  TtST  CMAIT 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


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86 


APOLOGETICS. 


inherent  in  its  very  nature  certain  principles  which  it  brings 
to  experience.  These  principles  really  make  experience 
possible,  and  condition  it  in  a  definite  way.  These  opposing 
views  are  to  be  seen  in  all  ages,  and  between  them  there  has 
always  been  open  warfare.  This  appears  in  the  disputes 
between  Socrates  and  the  Sophists,  in  the  reasonings  of 
Plato  against  the  Heraclitics,  and  in  the  controversy  of 
Aristotle  with  the  Epicureans,  in  ancient  times.  In  modem 
speculation,  the  same  warfare  emerges  in  the  reasonings  of 
Leibnitz  against  Lorke,  of  Kant  against  Hume,  and  of  Mill 
against  Hamilton.  And  in  our  own  day  the  antagonism  is 
as  great  as  ever,  and  perhaps  more  clearly  defined,  between 
sensationalism  and  intuitionalism,  between  empiricism  and 
rationalism,  as  to  the  theory  of  knowledge. 

And  this  contest  is  in  progress  in  the  moral  sphere,  as  well 
as  in  the  intellectual.  The  question  as  to  whether  conscience 
is  an  original  factor  in  man's  nature,  or  the  product  of 
certain  of  his  experiences,  is  earnestly  debated.  The  inquiry 
into  the  nature  of  moral  distinctions,  so  as  to  discover 
whether  they  are  primitive  and  ultimate,  or  the  result  of 
some  simpler  factors,  such  as  pleasure  or  utility,  is  answered 
in  two  widely  different  ways.  The  same  debate  arises  also 
in  regard  to  the  nature  and  origin  of  theistic  belief.  Some 
contend  that  it  is  a  derived,  empirical  product,  and  others 
that  its  germ,  at  least,  is  native  with  the  spiritual  principle 
in  man.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  Apologetics  has  pro- 
found interests  at  stake  in  the  sphere  of  epistemology. 

3.  The  contrast  between  these  two  contending  views  may 
be  pretty  fully  brought  out  by  some  critical  comparison  at 
three  points.  The  result  of  this  critique  may  elucidate  and 
confirm  the  correct  doctrine. 

The  initial  point  of  contrast  is  found  in  the  diverse  views 
taken  of  the  human  mind  at  first,  and  prior  to  any  cognitive 
experiences.  Touching  this  point,  the  empirical  view  is  that 
the  mind  is  negative,  empty  and  passive  in  its  original  siate. 
It  13  at  first  like  a  sheet  of  blank  paper,  with  nothing  written 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  87 

upon  it,  and  not  even  any  ruled  lines  on  it,  by  which  the 
wntmg  IS  to  be  directed.  The  rational  doctrine  maintains 
that  the  human  mind,  at  .he  very  outset,  has  in  its  inner 
nature  certam  principles,  conditions  or  rules,  according  to 
which  the  spontaneity  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man  is 
determined  in  all  its  cognitions.  This  principle  is  active 
according  to  certain  rules  which  pertain  to  its  very  nature 
Prior  to  experience  it  may  be  like  a  sheet  of  blank  paper, 
with  nothing  actually  written  on  it;  but  the  ruled  lines  are 
there  already,  and  the  writing  of  experience  upon  it  must  be 
conformed  to  these  lines. 

That  the  rational  is  the  better  view  upon  this  point,  is 
evident  from  the  fact  that  only  on  its  ground  can  human 
knowledge  have  any  order  or  system  in  it.     Empiricism 
leaves  the  fabric  of  knowledge  in  confusion.    The  very  fact 
that  human  experience  exhibits  certain  great  uniformities 
plainly  implies  that  the  mind  is  not  at  first  entirely  blank 
colorless  and  passive.     Even  if  it  be  allowed,  as  Spencer 
contends,  that  the  law  of  heredity  accounts  for  those  ele- 
ments in  knowledge  that  are  universal  and  necessary   the 
question  would  still  press  as  to  how  it  comes  to  pass  that  the 
law  of  heredity  operates  so  uniformly  in  a  certain  way  if 
there  be  no  subjective  rule  according  to  which  its  activity  is 
determined.    Empiricism,  there  )re.  cannot  account  for  the 
universal  and  necessary  elements  in  knowledge,  and  even 
heredity  requires  a  subjective  rule  in  order  to  produce  the 
uniform  results  claimed  for  it. 

The  second  point  of  contrast  between  the  empirical  and 
rational  theories  of  knowledge  is  in  regard  to  the  genesis  of 
knowledge.  How  does  cognition  arise,  and  what  are  its 
initial  factors?  The  empiricist  says  that  all  knowledge 
comes  from  without,  and  enters  the  mind,  so  to  speak,  by  the 
avenue  of  the  senses.  Sensuous  experience  is  at  once  the 
occasion  and  the  source,  the  condition  and  the  origin  of 
knowledge.  The  rational  doctrine,  on  the  other  hand 
maintains  that  while  experience  may  be  the  occasion  o' 


I 


88 


APOLOGETICS. 


knowledge,  yet  the  mind  itself  always  makes  a  contribution 
to  the  origin  of  knowledge,  and  is,  in  a  sense,  its  source. 
The  mind  itself  brings  certain  laws  or  rules,  which  give 
form  to  cognition  at  the  very  first.  Even  in  sensation  this 
is  true,  for  single,  unrelated  sensations  are  not  knowledge. 
They  are  the  unrelated  materials  of  knowledge,  and  they 
become  knowledge  in  sense-perception  only  when  the  mind 
itself,  by  a  primitive  spontaneous  act,  binds  the  separate 
sensations  together  according  to  a  rule  inherent  in  the  mind. 
The  result  is  the  knowledge  of  some  external  object  as  a 
percept. 

The  view  here  vindicated  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  the 
traditional  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  which  is  commonly 
supposed  to  have  been  held  by  Descartes,  and  is  criticised  by 
Locke  in  the  first  book  of  his  Essay.  It  seems  more  than 
likely  that  Locke  exaggerated  the  Cartesian  philosophy  at 
this  point,  just  as  Cousin  exaggerated  Locke's  system  at 
several  points  in  his  celebrated  critique  of  the  Enqrlish 
philosopher.  In  both  cases  the  man  of  straw  was  s.  up, 
for  it  is  doubtful  if  any  reputable  philosopher  ever  held  the 
doctrine  of  innate  ideas  as  Locke  criticised  it,  and  there  is 
no  reason  to  believe  that  Cousin  rightly  understood  Locke 
at  all  the  points  of  his  criticism. 

All  that  is  contended  for,  on  behalf  of  the  rational  theory 
of  knowledge,  is  that  in  the  spiritual  principle  in  man,  and 
underlying  all  its  activities,  there  are  certain  rules  or  con- 
ditions of  cognition  which  are  spontaneously  brought  by  it 
to  the  beginnings  of  knowledge.  This  subjective  rule  is  the 
a  priori  factor  which  springs  from  the  mind  itself  and  con- 
ditions knowledge.  Leibnitz  against  Locke  suggests  the 
true  doctrine  when  he  says  that  the  mind  itself  precedes 
experience.  And  Kant  against  Hume  is  right  when  he  says 
that  experience  may  be  the  occasion,  but  is  not  the  sole 
source,  Oi  knowledge.  In  like  manner,  modern  thinkers 
who  insist  that  the  spiritual  principle  in  man  possesses  a 
spontaneous  activity  which  operates,  not  at  random,  but 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  89 

according  to  certain  rules  inherent  in  it.  are  clearly  in  pos- 
session of  the  key  to  a  sound  epistemology. 

The  third  point  of  contrast  between  empiricism  and 
rationahsm  remams.    This  relates  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  higher  and  more  complex  elements  of  knowledge  are 
constructed.    Touching  this  point,  the  empiricist  holds  that 
all  the  more  complex  forms  of  knowledge  are  elaborated  out 
of  the  simpler  lactors  which  come  by  the  senses.     This 
elaboration  takes  place  by  means  of  habit,  association  and 
trh  /J'k     u°"*.'"^  determining  subjective  factor  con- 
tributed by  the  mind  itself.    The  rational  theory  maintains 
that  to  every  advance  in  the  elaboration  of  knowledge,  and 
as  It  increases  in  complexity,  the  mind  always  supplies  the 
rules  and  princjles  by  which  this  progress  takes  place. 
These  rules  condition  and  unify  every  form  of  kno  Jedge 
to  which  the  mind  attains.    Just  as  the  initial  knowledge  of 
the  external  world  in  sense-perception  implies  an  activity  of 

Z  Z!:  T"T^  T''^'"^  *°  ^  '^^''  ^y  '"^^"^  °f  which 

the  solated  and  unrelated  elements  in  sensation  are  bound 

tS  of  T  '  "T'' '"  '"»^'''°"'  ^°'  •"  '^^  higher  opera- 
tions of  the  understanding,  the  activity  of  the  spiritual 
principle  in  man,  operating  according  to  the  categories  or 
rules  of  this  activity,  elaborate  and  unify  what  may  be 
termed  discursive  knowledge  into  a  systematic  v^.iole  in  the 
form  of  concepts.  And  so.  also,  in  the  exercise  of  reason 
this  same  activity  proceeds  to  unify,  according  to  certain 
niles  or  ideals,  the  supersensible  elements  of  human  know- 

^f  ^Tu  '"u  '  ""'^  ''■"  ^''^^''  ""'*■■«'  ^'here  concepts 
become  thoughts,  are  reached.  At  every  stage  the  sponta- 
neous activity  of  the  spiritual  principle  is  the  pedagoguTthat 
conducts  the  elaboranve  process  of  human  kn^^Iedge 
according  to  cert        nherent  rules.  ^ 

Did  space  permu.  .t  might  be  shown  that  the  same  is  true 
in  regard  to  the  moral  nature  and  experiences  of  the  spiritual 

>s  rejected,  for  the  reason  that  in  man's  moral  nature  certain 


I  f  r 


i  l, 

Hi 


90 


APOLOGETICS. 


principles  or  rules  must  be  presupposed,  in  order  to  explain 
the  nature  of  moral  distinctions  and  the  fact  of  moral 
obligation.  The  significance  of  all  this  will  appear  more 
clearly  when  the  nature  anjd  origin  of  theistic  and  religious 
belief  is  investigated.  Meantime,  the  foundations  of  a 
sound  epistemology  are  laid. 

IV.  The  Objects  of  Knozvledge.    §  15. 

It  now  remains  to  make  some  remarks  concerning  the 
things  actually  known.  This  inquiry  relates  to  the  objects 
which  the  spiritual  principle  in  man,  in  the  exercise  of  its 
various  powers,  can  apprehend,  with  full  assurance  that 
those  things  subsist  just  as  they  ire  apprehended.  To  put 
it  more  definitely.  Are  the  convictions  of  the  human  mind 
in  the  matter  of  knowledge  in  harmony  with  real  facts,  and 
what  are  the  real  facts  or  things  to  which  these  convictions 
stand  directly  related? 

I.  At  the  very  outset,  an  ambiguity  in  the  meaning  and 
usage  of  the  term,  knowledge,  meets  us.  Sometimes  the 
term  denotes  the  act,  or  mode  of  mental  activity  involved  in 
knowing.  To  have  knowledge  of  anything  thus  means  to 
exercise  the  mental  activity  involved  in  acquiring  knowledge 
in  any  sphere.  This  was  the  meaning  mainly  under  notice 
in  the  previous  section  of  this  chapter.  Again,  knowledge 
sometimes  denotes  the  result  of  the  activity  called  know- 
ledge. When  used  in  ihis  sense,  it  signifies  the  sum  of  things 
actually  known.  To  have  knowledge  thus,  means  to  have 
information  about  any  subject.  This  is  evidently  the  sense 
in  which  the  term  is  used  in  discussing  the  question  of  the 
objects  of  knowledge. 

The  discussions  of  this  entire  chapter  thus  bring  before  us 
three  main  topics.  In  the  second  section  the  inquiry  lay  in 
the  realm  of  psychology,  in  the  third  the  problems  arose  in 
the  sphere  of  epistemology,  and  now  the  investigations  open 
out  upon  the  field  of  ontology.    Are  there  real  objects  to  be 


^!l 


i*   ■ 
Is 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  91 

truly  known?  Can  there  be  a  true  correspondence  betwten 
real  things  and  the  activities  of  the  spiritual  and  intelligent 
principle  in  the  nature  of  man  ?  ^ 

2.  In  order  to  answer  this  question  with  any  degree  of 
accuracy,  it  is  necessary  to  define  more  clearly  than  has  yet 
been  done  what  knowledge  really  is.    This  is  no  easy  task 
In  making  an  attempt  to  do  this,  let  the  matter  be  put  in 
several  ways.    In  general,  knowledge  implies  a  relation;  a 

Object.     If  this  relation  be  founded  in  the  very  nature  of 
things,  then  it  is  real  knowledge.    If  there  be  a  real,  not  an 
arbitrary,  correspondence  between  the  knowing  subject  and 
the  object  known,  then  there  is  true  cognition.     Hence 
knowledge  may  be  defined  as  the  direct  apprehension  of 
reality.    In  this  apprehension  the  cognitive  capacity  of  the 
spiritual  principle  in  man  comes  into  direct  relation  with  the 
object  known,  and  there  arises  in  the  mind  the  full  assurance 
that  the  relation  thus  established  is  an  accurate  one,  by  which 
the  subjective  conviction  has  objective  validity.     To  vary 
the  statement  a  little,  knowledge  is  the  firm  inward  convic- 
tion that  percepts,  concepts,  or  thoughts,  are  in  rational 
correspondence  with  the  facts,  truths  or  the  realities  of 
things  which  are  related  to  the  mind  as  objects  of  know- 
ledge    A  descriptive  definition  like  this  is  valid  for  all  the 
fouTd  '"  '^''''^  ^^^  °^^'^^'  °^  knowledge  are  to  be 

3-  A  brief  allusion  to  the  tests  or  marks  of  true  knowledge 
niay  confirm  and  illumine  this  definition.     There  are  three 
chief  tests  or  criteria  of  true  knowledge.    The  first  is  self- 
evidence.     That  which  is  apprehended  clearly  in  its  own 
direct  light  may  be  regarded  as  real  knowledge.     In  other 
words  that  which  is  autopistic,  and  in  its  very  nature  carries 
conviction,  is  true  knowledge.    Truths  like  the  axioms  are 
matters  of  real  knowledge,  because  in  and  of  themselves  they 
compel  conviction.    A  second  test  of  knowledge  is  necessity 
This  means  that  what,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  must  be 


III 


93 


APOLOGETICS. 


iK 


accepted,  and  whose  acceptance  is  essential  to  the  validity  of 
other  accepted  convictions,  is  to  be  regarded  as  actual  know- 
ledge. This  is  what  may  be  termed  the  apodictic  feature  in 
certain  aspects  of  knowledge,  which  are  of  such  a  nature 
that  to  suppose  their  opposite  is  to  enter  on  the  pathway  to 
contradiction  and  absurdity.  The  third  test,  which  is  in  a 
sense  implied  in  the  two  already  stated,  is  universality. 
Facts  or  truths  which  are  held  by  all  men  in  all  ages  to  be 
true,  and  as  really  known,  constitute  genuine  knowledge. 
To  make  denial  of  the  reality  of  such  knowledge  is  to  enter 
the  highway  to  nescience  by  the  gateway  of  agnosticism. 

4.  In  regard  to  the  objects  of  knowledge,  it  may  be  said, 
generally,  that  whatever  is  directly  apprehended  by  any  of 
the  powers  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man  is  known.  All 
those  convictions  of  the  human  mind  which  are  autopistic, 
apodictic  and  universal  constitute  real  knowledge.  The 
objects  of  knowledge  thus  understood  are  usually  divided 
into  three  classes,  though  these  classes  are  not  to  be  too 
widely  separated  from  each  other.  The  first  class  includes 
the  objects  known  in  sense-perception.  This  class  implies 
the  reality  of  the  external  world  of  existing  things,  and  the 
rational  correlation  and  correspondence  of  the  mental  appre- 
hensions with  its  reality.  The  second  consists  in  the  facts  of 
consciousness.  This  class  implies  the  reality  of  the  spiritual 
principle  in  man,  and  the  possession  by  that  principle  of 
certain  experiences  of  whose  reality  it  is  impossible  to  doubt. 
The  third  class  of  the  objects  of  knowledge  is  found  in 
connection  with  the  rational  principles  or  inherent  rules  of 
the  ictivity  of  the  human  mind.  These  principles  which  are 
thus  involved  in  the  activity  of  the  human  mind  are  imme- 
diately apprehended  as  necessary  to  the  very  possibility  of 
knowledge  in  any  sphere.  Another  division  might  be 
adopted.  There  are  the  obj  "cts  of  intellect,  of  sensibility, 
of  will,  of  conscience,  and  of  the  religious  nature  in  man. 
In  all  these  cases  there  are  elements  of  knowledge  in  the 
strict  sense.    But  the  threefold  classification  of  the  objects 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  93 

of  knowledge  will  serve  present  purposes,  for  it  includes 
all. 

5-  A  profound  and  far-reaching  question  yet  remains. 
What  IS  tnith?    What  is  the  reality  which  is  immediately 
apprehended  in  that  knowledge  of  things  which  the  mind 
acquires?    Is  there  a  fixed  reality  in  the  external  world  of 
thmgs  which  forms  the  basis,  alike  in  the  intellectual  and 
moral  spheres,  of  a  real  correspondence  in  cognition  between 
the  immediate  apprehensions,  or  the  fixed  convictions  of  the 
mind,  and  the  reality  of  the  objects  known  thereby?     Is 
there  objective,  rational  and  moral  truth  which  is  ultimate  in 
Its  nature  ?    This  is  one  of  the  burning  questions  of  the  day 
and  we  must  be  careful  not  to  make  a  treaty  of  peace  with 
agnostic  skepticism  or  positivist  empiricism,  by  which  we 
unwittingly  cede  to  either  the  whole  territory  of  cognition 
Is  there  a  system  of  real  things  which  constitutes  the  fixed 
objects  of  knowledge?    And  does  the  spiritual  principle  in 
man,  in  the  exercise  of  iis  intelligent  activity,  come  into  real 
and  rational  correspondence  with  this  system  of  things? 
Does  the  intelligence  of  man  obtain  such  an  apprehension 
of  this  real  system  of  existing  things  that  its  apprehension 
has  objective  validity  as  knowledge?    Was  Socrates  or  the 
Sophists,  Plato  or  the  Heraclitics,  Aristotle  or  the  Epicu- 
reans right  in  their ->    r^    ^nd  for  our  day,  is  Descartes  or 
Condillac  Leibnitz  Kant  or  Hume.  Reid  or  Berke- 

ley Hamilton  or  L-   :,  cist  or  intuitionalist,  correct? 

The  answer  give  question  must  turn  largely  upon 

the  view  taken  of  uie  real  nature  of  the  external  world 
where  so  many  objects  of  knowledge  lie.  Shall  we  say,  with 
the  Idealist,  that  this  world  is  a  system  of  mere  relations 
dependent,  in  whole  or  in  part,  upon  the  process  of  cognition 
or  Its  constitution?  Or  shall  we  assert,  with  the  empiricist, 
that  things  in  the  external  world  are  not  a  system,  bu 
d  sconnected  units,  which  do  not  in  any  sense  constitme  a 

our  theory  of  knowledge.    According  to  the  former  view 


94 


APOLOGETICS. 


'H 


there  are  relations,  but  i;r>  real  things;  and,  on  the  latter 
theory,  there  are  real  things,  but  no  relations.  The  one 
hides  the  real  in  the  rational,  and  the  other  loses  the  rational 
in  the  real.  Both,  therefjre,  seem  to  be  one-sided  and 
incomplete,  though  there  is  a  truth  in  each. 

It  is  better  to  maintain  in  some  sense,  the  reality  and 
rationality  of  both  the  knowing  subject  and  the  objects 
known  in  cognition.  According  to  this  view,  the  external 
world,  as  an  object  of  knowledge,  is  neither  a  system  of  mere 
relations  nor  a  collection  of  unrelated  things.  It  is  rather  a 
system  of  related  things,  in  whose  very  nature  there  is 
reality  and  rationality.  According  to  this  view,  the  external 
world,  as  the  object  of  knowledge,  presents  a  rational  and  a 
real  unity  as  an  object  for  the  activity  of  the  spiritual  prin- 
ciple in  man.  This  activity  has  rational  rules  by  which  it  is 
determined,  and  in  cognition  this  activity  comes  into  real 
correspondence  with  the  external  world  as  a  system  of 
related  things.  To  put  it  briefly,  the  laws  of  thought  and 
the  laws  of  things  are  correlated  in  cognition,  and  this 
correlation  is  real  knowledge.  The  basis  for  this  correlation 
is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  world  of  related  things,  being 
rational  at  its  roots,  is  intelligible  as  an  object  of  knowledge 
for  the  principle  of  rational  intelligence  in  man.  There  is, 
therefore,  a  distant  kinship  between  the  subject  and  object, 
according  to  the  view  just  set  forth.  This  kinship  subsists 
between  the  spiritual  principle  in  man,  with  its  rules  of 
activity,  and  the  rational  unity  in  the  system  of  related 
things  in  the  world.  This  supplies  a  fixed  bond  between  the 
subject  and  object,  whereby  the  reality  of  things  and  the 
certainty  of  knowledge  can  be  maintained.  Hence,  there  is 
an  objective  truth  and  reality,  and  a  real  knowledge  of  this 
truth  and  reality  is  attainable. 

This  view  of  truth  and  knowledge  is  deemed  of  very  great 
value  to  subsequent  discussion  of  apologetical  questions.  It 
avoids  the  defects  of  idealism  and  agnosticism,  for  the 
spiritual  and  rational  principle  in  man  discovers  rather  than 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  95 

constructs  the  rational  system  or  unity  of  things  in  th. 

S;isr:Lrr;^°'" ''-  --^^^^^^^ 

positivism,  which  afford  no  possiL.e  bond  of  kinship  between 
the  subject  and  object  save  on  the  basis  of  mater  ah^m     It 
also  fully  meets  the  Ritschlian  denial  of  metanTy  1      Th 
may  be  termed  the  theory  of  rational  realisn.,  in  smuch  a' 
It  finds  in  rationality  the  basis  for  objective  trnth  ^!f  / 

for  the  scientific  knowledge  of  nature.    The  qnestioTof  the 


sri 


Uf 


CHAPTER  V. 
APOLOGETICS  AND  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  BELIEF. 


'  •■> 


U  ! 


Contents. 

Nature  of  Belief.— Belief  and  Faith. — Their  General  and  Special 
Senses. — Taken  in  Wide  Sense. — Knowledge  and  Beiief  Compared. — 
Knowledge  and  Belief  not  Contradictory. — But  Reciprocal. — Grounds  of 
Belief.— Evidence,  its  Ground  and  Measure.— Subjective  and  Objective 
Grounds  of  Belief. — Two  Gasses  of  each.— Knowledge  and  Belief 
Oosely  Related.— The  Objects  of  Belief.— Many  and  Varied.— In  Ordi- 
nary Life. — In  Matters  of  History. — Information  Based  on  Testimony. — 
In  the  Hypotheses  of  Science. — Fact  and  Theory. — in  Matters  of  Re- 
ligion.— Apologetic  Service. 

Literature. 
The  articles  on  E  '.'.ef.  Faith,  and  Evidence  in  the  Encyclopxdias 
already  named. — Also  '  ;  treatises  on  Psychology  noted  in  the  last 
chapter. — Butler's  Analogy,  Chap.  I. — Bowne's  Studies  in  Theism,  Chap. 
II. — Luthardt's  Fundamental  Truths  of  Christianity,  Chap.  VI. — ^Jevon's 
The  Principles  of  Science,  Chap.  X. — Frank's  System  of  Christian  Cer- 
tainty, Part  II.,  Sees,  i  and  2.— Kaftan'  ^he  Truth  of  the  Christian 
Religion,  Chap.  IV. — Balfour's  The  Foundations  of  Belief,  Parts  I.  and 
II. — Principal  Caird's  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chaps.  I.  and  II. — 
And  his  Fundamental  Ideas  of  Christianity,  Vol.  I.,  Chap.  II. — Eraser's 
Philosophy  of  Theism,  Vol.  I.,  Chap.  V.— Lindsay's  Recent  Advances  in 
the  Theistic  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  XI. — Edward  Caird's  The 
Evolution  of  Religion. — ^James'  The  Will  to  Believe.  In  the  writings 
of  the  Common  Sense  School  of  Philosophy,  and  in  the  treatises  of  those 
who  are  in  sympathy  with  the  Faith  Philosophy  of  Jacobi,  there  are 
some  useful  hints  for  the  subject  of  this  chapter. 


KNOWLEDGE  and  belief  are  closely  related.  In  many 
of  the  convictions  of  the  human  mind  they  are  blended, 
and  they  both  imply  some  of  the  same  conditions  of  mental 
activity.  To  some  extent,  therefore,  the  discussions  of  the 
last  chapter  laid  the  foundation  for  *br  .-positions  to  be 
made  in  this  one.  In  that  chapter  the  rea.ity  of  the  spiritual 
principle  in  man  was  asserted,  and  the  nature  of  the  powers 
of  that  principle  was  explained.  In  addition,  the  soundness 
of  the  rational,  ?.i  against  the  empirical  theory  of  knowledge. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  BELIEF  57 

tained,  not  onlv  thaf  ti,-      •        ,  *     ^*  ^^^  "lain- 

and  rational    I'^tall^^^^  P"-'P'«  '"  -n  is  real 

related  to  thii  pl^e  i^  tiorr.t  ^^ '  d^'  ^^ 
at  its  root.  This  view  of  th.rllT'  I  "^^  ^"'^  "*'°"a' 
subject  and  ob  ect '  n  rl    V       °" '"^^'^''"^  ^t^««"  the 

which  brings  them  ntoT;  "  ''°"'"  ^  ^^^•°"^'  ''^"d, 
ledge.    Thfs  samTCd  f  J^'-^P^^^--  in  true  know-' 

activity  caned  beUen:i:,Zr''''''''  "  '""^  '"^"^' 
I.  The  Nature  of  Belief.    §  j^ 

Often  us«,  i«X^:,7  So"t;tT  '5'"^'  '""  '^' 
"yn-ological  meaning  is'J°,^Z  hlv  "'™"°"  " 
identical.  And  in  nrHi„,,  ™™"'.  ""ey  are  practically 
any  wc,,.,.l"^: -tZ -^. -o.  -yo  dUcove^: 
shade  of  difference  in  th«.v  *  t'^^''^  '^  any 

effect  that  l^hefLote^theT'"'"'^  '"'  ""^^'  ''  '^  *°  ^''^ 
i'-plies  trust  in  pet^  aLTX :r^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  ?\^ 
in  their  friends.    But  this  di.Hn.!  '    ""^  ^^^^  ^^'^^ 

'ar  as  the  „sa^  ^Tyttt  Sr"'  ""  *"  ""'"'^  '« 

Both  belief  and  /oil/,  are  osed  in  a  irenml  ,„J  ■ 
^K.    In  a ^„„r»;  sense,  they  de^riran  thl       .'  '?'^'"' 

tS'-actf r:  ■; "-  -^  -""  th- hCr..:' 

.-.nds!  ™ssrsa"„s:^:;:"r  "^-  °"  '-""'" 

assnmes  „any  ,„™s.     To  a  la  ge  e4j,tT"' "t " 
emerges  in  the  discnssion,  of  thi  chapt"r       '  ' 

"  -*';"  and  trusted  as  Savion'r  and  J^r^ltiXS 


i 


98 


APOLOGETICS. 


( , 


and  rest  upon  Christ  alone  for  salvation.  Hence,  we  find  in 
the  Scriptures  that  to  believe  in  Christ,  and  to  have  faith  in 
him,  signify  the  same  activity  of  the  soul.  The  truths  of  the 
gospel  are  believed  to  be  true,  and  Jesus  Christ  is  confided 
in  for  salvation. 

In  the  discussions  of  this  chaptei  the  term  is  used  m 
the  wider  sense,  to  include  all  forms  of  the  faith  activity  of 
the  human  mind.  It  may  be  better  to  use  the  term  belief 
rather  than  faith,  for  the  latter  word  has,  in  popular  religious 
usage,  come  specially  to  denote  saving  faith  in  Christ.  The 
term  belief  will,  therefore,  be  uniformly  used  in  this  chapter 
to  cover  that  wide  field  of  mental  activity  by  means  of  which 
certain  convictions  or  persuasions  are  reached  in  an  indirect 
or  mediate  way.  This  raises  the  problem  of  the  philosophy 
of  belief  in  its  widest  sense. 

2.  Perhaps  the  nature  of  belief,  as  a  mental  activity,  can 
be  best  understood  by  putting  it  in  contrast  with  knowledge. 
If  knowledge  be  the  direct  apprehension  of  the  truth  or 
reality  of  its  object,  belief  is  the  indirect  or  mediate  appre- 
hension of  its  object.  If  knowledge  be  conviction  of  the 
truth,  as  it  shines  in  its  own  light,  belief  is  persuasion  of  the 
truth  as  it  is  seen  in  the  light  of  proper  evidence.  If  know- 
ledge produces  complete  certainty,  belief  is  content  with 
probability  of  greater  or  less  deg^ree.  In  the  case  of 
knowledge,  its  grounds  are,  so  to  speak,  in  itself,  and  compel 
acceptance  by  all  minds  so  soon  as  apprehended ;  in  the  case 
of  belief,  its  grounds  He,  as  it  were,  outside  of  itself,  and  do 
not  necessarily  produce  conviction  in  every  mind.  The 
axioms  of  mathematics  illustrate  the  former,  and  the 
molecular  theory  of  matter  the  latter.  The  a.xioms  are 
known  to  be  true  in  thtir  own  nature;  but  the  molecular 
theory  may  or  may  not  be  believed  in,  since  it  is  not  the 
theory  itself,  but  the  evidence  for  it.  which  induces  belief  in 
it.  Hence,  belief  mav  be  defined  as  mental  assent  or  con- 
viction, founded  upon  evidence.  It  is  the  persuasion,  more 
or  less  assured,  of  the  truth  of  anything,  resting  upon 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  BELIEF.  ^ 

belie::  :::^  :£: ;:  ^^^^  -^  -  p^fess . 

grounds  for  knowledge  are  InH  '  i^.  ^^'''''^-  '^^' 
what  may  be  called  o^^^^^f^^^^^^^  ^T^'  -^  have 
belief  are  not  necessarily  good  for  aLinH,  '^^^°""^^  ^°'- 

have  only  more  or  less  of  ?"bjecHveva™dhv  V  "''  '"^'^ 
th  s  validitv  mav  h*.  n.,.*       ■'^"^^  validity.    For  one  mind 

not  be  r  strife  'Sf"'^'"'''  ""'  '°''  ^"°^''"  «'  may 
measure^f  S  and  ha";  ^r^''  ^'^^  ^""^^"^^  '«  '^- 
firmer  will  be  theiS  5n  J  ''r^""  *'*^  ^^'^^"^^  ^"^^ 
is  evidence  it  is  no         ,   TH"^  '^^'  '^^  «^'"°""d  o^  btaef 

ratioXrounVs  It  rZr  *''*  !:"°"'*^'^^  '^  ^-°'^  ^^ 
ledge  the  Znd  of  the'  '"'""  V'^'* '"  ^'^'^ ''''  ^^  •^"°«^- 
appfehensrand  t  oC^^^^^^  ^^^  ^'^'^  '"^"*^' 

itself;  while  in  thfcase'^f  l^HeT^V"  '^T^'^^"^'^" 
respondence  does  f^n^ul      ^        ^  ^""""^  °^  this  cor- 

-^thin/ihth  hT :  ;"xt ir^irt" '""' '"  ^" 

>' lation  to  it     It  i,  «r„  ^    .     '    ^''"^'^  ^^^^  3"  internal, 
stiltdel'r^^Tt.Tl^''""*  """^^  *°  '"^•^e  this  point 


W 


1' 

i 

fi 

!  ■' 


';u 


lOO 


APOLOGETICS. 


3.  It  thus  becomes  evident  that  knowledge  and  belief  are 
in  no  sense  to  be  regarded  as  contradictory  of  each  other. 
To  say  that  we  may  believe  what  is  devoid  of  evidence,  or 
irrational,  is  absurd.  Both  are  valid  rational  activities  of 
the  spiritual  principle  in  man;  and  both  lead  to  legitimate 
convictions  of  the  truth  or  reality  of  their  respective  objects. 
Hence,  they  are  reciprocal,  and  mutually  support  each  other. 
A  fatal  mistake  is  made  if  they  are  regarded  as  in  any  sort 
of  inherent  conflict.  Belief  rests  on  evidence,  and  evidence, 
in  turn,  is  a  matter  of  knowledge,  and  knowledge  implies  a 
primary  belief  in  the  reliability  of  the  faculties  involved  in 
it.  And  this  clearly  shows  that  they  are  so  closely  related 
as  to  be  reciprocal  and  complementary.  It  may  also  be 
admitted  that  what  to  one  person  is  an  object  of  knowledge, 
may  to  another  be  a  matter  of  belief.  The  knowledge  of  an 
expert  in  chemistry,  working  in  the  laboratory,  may  be  a 
matter  of  belief  to  the  amateur  who  reads  the  writings  of 
the  expert,  and  accepts  the  information  as  true  on  the 
evidence  given  by  the  expert.  In  a  certain  sense,  it  can  be 
truly  said  that  we  know  when  we  believe,  and  that  we  believe 
when  we  know.    In  all  spheres  of  mental  activity  this  is  true. 

II.  The  Grounds  of  Belief.    §  17. 

1.  It  has  just  been  shown  that  crndcnce  is  the  ground  and 
measure  of  belief.  A  few  things  must  now  be  said  in  regard 
to  its  nature  and  functions.  As  already  indicated,  beliet 
includes  a  very  wide  area  of  the  activity  of  the  spiritual 
principle  in  man;  and  from  this  it  follows  that  evidence 
assumes  a  great  variety  of  forms.  And  since  so  many  phases 
of  the  activities  of  men  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life  are  at 
root  of  the  nature  of  belief,  the  inquiry  concerning  evidence 
as  the  ground  of  belief  has  also  an  exceedingly  practical 
bearing  upon  life.  In  matters  of  business  and  social  life,  as 
well  as  in  every  branch  of  scientific  inquiry,  belief  has  a  large 
place,  while  the  whole  fabric  of  history,  and  the  entire  pro- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  BELIEF.  joi 

S  o  'huma    ,T  T  '^"'"'"'^^  '^'  ^'"'^  ^"'  ^he  main 

•  need.Tr  f  .     T'  "°  '^^'  '^'^^""'  «^  ^^e  basis  of  benTf 
needs  careful  understanding  at  the  outset 

rl.tfi    ?•'  ^"r^P''  "°'  P°'''''''=  t°  '"^ke  any  clearly  logical 
classification  of  the  eroundt  nf  Iv.i,-f        i  •  j      .     'o&»cai 

Which  Justify  rationV'^t^r-     ::er;^^^^^^^^^^^ 

grounds  of  belief  would  require  an  inventory  of  all  our 
knowle^e  for  knowledge  really  supplies  the  evidence  upon 
which  belief  erects  its  edifice  of  rational  convictions 
For  practical  purposes,  the  grounds  of  belief  are  to  be 

evidence.    The  one  set  consists  in  certain  facts  or  feelines 

hat  he  within  the  soul;  the  other  in  certain  facts  or  etnt 

m  the  outward  world  of  nature  and  human  life.    The  former 

obiLt"  This"'^"'^'^  ^^""'^  °^  ^'^^^'  -^  ^«  '-- 
andtnother  f  T'  T  ""^  °^  '"'^^""  ^^'"^ '"  ^^e  mind, 
and  another  found  without  it.    Each  of  these,  in  turn  some 

what  naturally  divides  itself  into  two  closely  relaSdas^ 
This  gives  four  main  divisions  of  the  grounds  of  belief 

comem^'  '  "'        '''"'  ■'  '''^^''''"''  ^"d  consists  in  the 
contents  c  ccsaousncss.    This  class  is  very  comprehensive 
and  includes  all  the  varied  facts  of  the  conscious  exSces 

l-rectly  and  they  constitute  a  large  part  of  our  true  know- 

X'ri:  ceT  '•''"';•  '''"•  ^" '''  ^^°""^  °^  ^'^-"-r; 

experiences,  viewed  as  evidence,  various  beliefs  are  more  or 
ess  confidently  entertained  by  the  human  mind.    FrTn  the 
it    wth^rrT,'""^^"^  '"  -se-pcrception.  men 
external  world.    From  the  facts  of  consciousness  implied  in 
the  activity  of  man's  moral  nature,  belief  in  the  real  ty  of 


h 


m 


I  :- 


i    • 


I  i  : 


,m:; 


I 

I   : 

Hi 


if 


ftl 


li 


102 


APOLOGETICS. 


moral  principles,  if  not  in  a  moral  ruler,  is  induced.  So,  in 
other  well-defined  phases  of  consciousness,  there  is  supplied 
internal  and  undoubted  evidence,  which  forms  the  secure 
grounds  of  many  valid  beliefs.  The  veracity  of  conscious- 
ness is  pledged  to  their  rational  validity. 

b.  The  second  kind  of  evidence  is  also  subjective,  and  is 
more  subtle,  and  not  so  easily  described.  It  consists  in  what 
may  be  termed  the  ground  of  the  native  spontaneous  beliefs 
of  the  soul.  It  embraces  those  various  subtle  forms  of 
instinctive  feeling  which  are  found  in  the  human  mind,  as 
firmly  rooted  convictions  therein.  These  grounds  of  belief 
seem  to  lie  deeper  even  than  the  facts  of  consciousness,  and 
from  them  spring  those  primitive  beliefs  which  seem  to  be 
the  spontaneous  expression  of  man's  nature.  These  are 
sometimes  described  as  the  intuitive  factors  in  man's  con- 
stitution. They  are  spontaneous,  instinctive  feelings,  in 
which  there  is  involved,  in  some  way,  a  conviction  of  the 
rt  ■  >f  the  objects  to  which  these  beliefs  relate.  The 
instni..iive  conviction  that  our  faculties  do  not  systematically 
delude  or  deceive  us,  our  own  conviction  that  we  have  a 
real  existence,  our  belief  in  the  validity  of  space  and  time, 
and,  in  a  sense,  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  God,  illustrate 
this  class  of  the  grounds  of  belief.  These  things  must  be 
believed  in,  else  all  knowledge  and  belief  is  groundless.  So, 
also,  in  ordinary  life,  many  things  are  believed  in  and  acted 
on  in  an  apparently  instinctive  way.  There  is  firm  belief 
exercised ;  and  though  reason,  and  even  consciousness,  may 
not  clearly  reveal  the  grounds  of  the  belief,  yet  it  is  instinc- 
tively felt  that  the  belief  is  not  devoid  of  rational  grounds. 
Many  such  beliefs  underlie  the  complex  fabric  of  human 
life,  and  if  an  analysis  of  their  ground  be  made,  it  will  be 
found  to  be  some  instinctive  feeling  within  the  soul.  At  this 
point  the  question  as  to  how  much  of  this  instinctive  feeling 
is  native  to  the  mind,  and  how  much  of  it  is  the  product  of 
habit  and  heredity  is  not  now  raised.  The  fact  that  these 
feelings  form  the  grounds  of  not  a  few  valid  theoretical,  and 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  BELIEF.  103 

second  class  o   evidence  grounding  certain  beliefs. 

n,n~  k"^  f  °^  ^^^  «^'"°""^s  of  belief  is  objective  and 

Zect  t^tL  e  .^  r'  ^''■''  '^  '"^^"^  ^"'"^  "-^^l  thing,  or 
of  nhl     ?  ""'  '"°'''^-    These  lie  under  our  powers 

annr  r!, T'  '"^  '"  ^^^*  ^^"^«  ^^^  ^nown.^     Tbey  aTe 
apprehended  as  rc=I.  and  they  constitute  the  materials  of  the 

some  rational  explanation  of  thom  t^  *i.- 
hy^theses  and  theories  Trelol^-J.  and  ^elLrS 
m  proportion  to  the  force  and  pertinency  of  the  ev idenci  bv 
which  they  are  supported.  Thus,  in  allLnches  o  fdenc/ 
the  facts  are  known,  and  form  the  grounds  upon  whTch 
various  hypotheses  are  founded  These  htJ^S 
believed  in    n«^  ,  u        """"^u.      inese  hypotheses  are 

evidence  ^hev  L  '^'^  "'"  '^^^^^^'^  "^^hlished  on 

evidence    they  become  assured   truths  of   science      The 

to  a^i  for  th'      ^r''''''°"'  ^^  '  -ell-grounded  theory 
to  account  for  these  facts,  is  believed  in.     So  with  th. 

J.  The  fourth  branch  of  evidence  is  also  objective,  and  is 
very  comprehens  ve.     In  eeneral    it  m.„  u     1  , 

valifl  nr  rrij.M    u  general,  it  may  be  designated  as 

valid  or  reliable  human  testimony.    This  testimony  assumes 

it  c.'iIt:sS?„':Jrpt^V;:.1;t  ■':  -«  "---^.y  .he  stne.  no^on  of 
the  facts  of  nl.ure  whi/h  h!  '^  '  ^*.  "  """^  *''*'  observation  of 
.ion  of  thelc  Let,  in^'nt  i^r"""  ""*  "'^  '"•'*'"=''«^  ^  'PP-"- 


fVli 


I     : 


104 


.'APOLOGETICS. 


many  forms,  and  it  provides  the  evidential  ground  for  a 
great  multiplicity  of  beliefs.  If  this  testimony  be  reliable,  it 
constitutes  knowledge,  and  it  becomes  the  basis  of  belief  in 
many  things.  The  whole  function  of  evidence  in  the  courts 
of  law  illustrates  this  phase  of  belief.  Evidence  given  in 
court  by  witnesses,  to  have  value,  must  be  matters  of  their 
own  knowledge,  while  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused 
is  of  the  nature  of  a  belief  founded  upon  this  evidence.  This 
belief  is  based  on  the  evidence,  and  is  expressed  in  the 
verdict. 

The  same  is  true  regarding  all  history  which  records  past 
events,  and  of  the  reports  of  the  happenings  of  our  own  day. 
The  testimony  of  the  eye-witnesses  of  these  events  is  the 
ground  on  which  thousands  of  things  are  believed.  If  that 
testimony  is  reliable,  the  belief  is  well  founded.  And  what 
is  true  of  secular  history  is  also  true  of  the  sacred  Scriptures, 
and  in  particular  of  the  gospel  narratives.  We  believe  the 
things  therein  recorded  because  the  testimony  of  the  men 
who  gave  the  record  is  that  of  trustworthy  and  capable 
witnesses.  To  refuse  belief  of  the  gospel  records  on  this 
ground,  is  to  take  a  position  which  makes  all  history  im- 
possible. Here  belief  plays  an  important  part  in  Christian 
Apologetics,  and  its  validity  is,  at  this  early  stage,  so  far 
vindicated. 

It  should  also  be  kept  in  mind  that  vast  areas  of  what 
passes  for  scientific  knowledge  is  neither  more  nor  less  than 
a  collection  of  authentic  beliefs.  As  the  knowledge  of  the 
various  sciences  is  obtained  largely  from  text-books,  th< 
testimony  of  the  author  is  real'y  the  ground  upon  which  that 
knowledge  res,ts.  In  such  cases  much  of  the  information 
which  the  student  acquires  in  physics,  .;hemistry,  biology, 
geology  and  astronomy  is  of  the  nature  of  belief. 

From  this  sketch  of  the  grounds  of  belief,  it  again  appears 
that  knowledge  and  belief  are  intimately  related.  The 
evidence  which  supplies  the  basis  of  belief  must  be,  as  far  as 
possible,  a  matter  of  knowledge,  in  some  of  the  general 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  BELIEF.  105 

forms  just  sketched.    And  vast  masses  of  information  which" 
often  pass  for  knowledge  are  only  reliable  beliefs.    wS 
the  evidence  ,s  strong,  the  beliefs  reach  a  high  degree  of 
probab,hty ;  and.  for  the  practical  purposes  of  life,  thfy^ay 
^rve  the  ends  of  knowledge.     All  of  which    hows  "he 

IfZ^:^      u'"  '"'  '^y  '•'"'  ^*  "^""^  that  a  certain  event 
happened  a  thousand  years  ago.  or  a  thousand  miles  away 

:;:trSid^i;^-''--"--^---^He:::s 

Moreover,  it  is  evident  that  in  all  the  spheres  of  the 
ac.v.ty  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man,  knowledg^  and 

r^  oi^eHT  :  ^°''  '""  ^'^'^  "^'^^^'  -hich  m^ust  b^ 
recognized  ahke  by  science  and  philosophy;  and  in  religion 
they  have  also  claims  which  must  not  be  ignored.  Thev 
cannot  be  divorced  in  any  sphere  without  serious  injury  to 
many  vital  human  interests.  Hence,  science,  philosophy  and 
religion  have  equa  interests  in  the  vindication  of  the  cLms 

tno   .i"  T       "^^'''  """t^'"  '^"'Ss  are  matters  of 

knc^vledge  and  certain  other  things  are  of  the  nature  of 
beliefs,  and  bo  h  are  legitimate  activities  of  the  powers  of 
the  human  soul.  Hence,  science,  philosophy  and  theolo^ 
have  no  reason  to  quarrel,  or  be  jealous  of  each  other.    TrS 

carTful'tol;  '';^"°'''^'  ^"'  ^''""^  ''^«''°-'  -'^h  being 
uJnl  n  "^^P  ^r  ""  '^^  °^^"  bounds,  are  not  to  be  looked 
upon  as  in  any  mherent  or  necessary  conflict  with  each  other. 

III.  The  Objects  of  Belief.    §  18. 

brold'  '^T^  f  ""1"  "''  '^^'''''  °^  ^^^'^  !•«  •«  exceedingly 
knowled  J.  'T"  '^''""'"  *'^^^  °^j^««  ^"d  those  of 

may  fade  away  m  the  vista  of  slender  probability.    As  the 

of  bllief  tr       ;     '*■'  """"ediately  known,  so  the  objects 
Of  behef  are  greater  m  number  than  those  of  knowledge. 


106 


APOLOGETICS. 


**. 


And  as  the  objects  of  knowledge  give  rise  to  well-defined 
certainty,  so  the  objects  of  bel:;f  have  every  degree  of 
probability,  from  the  highest  moral  certainty  down  to  the 
very  lowest  probability.  In  general,  the  things  believed  are 
all  the  objects  of  those  mental  persuasions  which  are  taken 
to  be  more  or  less  probable,  according  to  the  convincing 
nature  of  the  evidence  upon  which  they  are  founded. 

I.  In  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life  many  of  the  objects  of 
belief  are  to  be  found.  These  are  things  which  are  not,  and 
perhaps  cannot  be,  certainly  known,  yet  they  are  matters  of 
assured  rational  belief.  In  business,  all  plans  and  enterprises 
which  look  to  the  future  are  matters  of  belief.  Confiding 
in  the  experience  of  the  past,  as  ground  of  action  for  the 
future,  men  make  their  business  plans,  and  in  doing  so  belief 
plays  a  large  part.  Take  belief  away,  and  the  whole  fabric 
of  commercial  life  would  fall  to  pieces.  In  the  home  circle, 
and  in  the  relations  of  social  life,  the  same  is  try;  The 
things  which  often  lead  men  to  action  are  nothing  uijre  than 
beliefs.  If  men  were  to  wait  till  they  had  positive  know- 
ledge, they  would  seldom  act  in  these  spheres,  and  the  bonds 
which  bind  home  and  society  together  would  become  very 
slender.  Men  really  know  much  less,  and  believe  much  more 
than  they  often  think.  They  often  act  with  confidence  upon 
what  is  simply  belief.  Hence,  the  greater  part  of  man's 
activity  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life  flows  from  belief. 
The  certainty  of  these  matters  is  in  proportion  to  the 
clearness  and  consistency  of  the  evidence.  And,  in  this 
connection,  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  if  men  act  on  such 
grounds  in  ordinary  secular  affairs,  they  ought  to  be  ready 
to  act  consistently  with  this  principle  in  the  concerns  of 
religion.  If  assured  probability  be  the  acknowledged  guide 
of  action  in  secular  affairs,  it  should  also  be  admitted  as 
valid  and  sufficient  in  matters  of  religion.  Many  who  reject 
religion  on  this  ground  are  glaringly  inconsistent. 

2.  L   all  forms  of  historical  information  there  is  another 
large     ass  of  the  objects  of  belief.    By  means  of  testimony. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  BELIEF.  107 

ZZ  °'  !?' 7"'"*='  ^«  '^^"^  «l«»t  the  events  whi^h  trans- 
entertained.     All  our  information  concemine  the  oa«;f  u 

aclma„«  J.h  pis*  ':'"'  °'  '■'"°'^'  -^  »"  "-• 
rests  nn  f.c*-  passing  events  in  our  own  time  which 

rests  on  testimony,  are  of  the  nature  of  belief.    This  is  also 

uZVr  '''''''  "^'^'^  -'^*«  *°  the  future  Relyng 
upon  the  permanency,  under  God,  of  the  existing  order  of 
«^.ngs  men  entertain  certain  beliefs,  more  or  less  securely 

object  of  knowledge,  but  it  may  be  the  object  of  belief 

S'LrirrVndr";"'  ""^'  ''-''-y  ^"^^'  -^^^  of 
to  the  ftr  "'^°"  '"  '"'"^"  ^^P---  ^-king 

oAl'J  T^  °^  *'''  °^J''*^  °^  "^"^f  "«  within  the  circle 
of  the  several  saences.    In  what  is  usually  called  scientTfic 

theTlt/InS  rT''  ^'"^  '^  "^""  *°  distinguish^Jw^t 
the^ac/j  and  the  theones  involved  in  it;  and  there  is  also 
need  to  make  sure  that  what  are  regarded  as  sc  entTfi    fSs 

whTfs  irelv  !    '  "  "^r''^  '^  "  '^^^'  ^"d  «t  other  times 

What  ,s  mere  y  a  more  or  less  reasonable  theory  to  account 

or  he  facts  is  tacitly  assumed  to  be  as  real  or  c^ain Tthe 

facts  It  proposes  to  explain.    True  scientific  facts  are  real 

XThef  V""".'  "'"^  ^'^°"^^'  °^  hypotheses  con 
wTlw  tha?'  "V''^°^J■^^t^  o^  belief.    A  little  reflection 
nltZntl      uri  '"'■'■'"'  ^'^"tific  information  is 

evtenfe     Th    rn.^  f '  T'  ''  '"^  ^^'="-'>^  ^^""ded  on 
M  '"^'  '"^^te  to  the  various  hypotheses 

the  e \    '  r^"'^  '"  ^"P'^'"  «^tain  facts.     OnTy  when 
b™*  o£  «.e„ce.  and  scores  of  il,„s,ra.io„s  c^uM  £ 


Pi 


li' 


loS 


APOLOGETICS. 


adduced  from  physics,  chemistry,  biology,  geology,  astron- 
omy and  anthropology  at  the  present  day.  Even  in 
psychology  and  ethics  the  facts  and  the  theories  must  be 
very  carefully  distinguished;  and  in  the  sphere  of  religious 
experience  the  same  exhortation  is  not  to  be  ignored.  The 
variable  factor  in  these  sciences  is  that  of  theory,  to  which 
belief  relates.  The  facts  rightly  apprehended  are  the  perma- 
nent factor,  while  the  theories  to  account  for  the  facts  are 
constantly  changing,  and  only  a  few  theories,  from  time  to 
time,  become  the  established  truths  of  science.  It  thus 
appears  that  the  function  of  belief  in  the  realm  of  science 
is  very  large,  and  its  objects  in  this  realm  are  very  many. 
Nor  is  there  any  essential  difference  between  science  and 
religion  in  regard  to  the  function  of  belief.  Both  rightly 
use  it,  as  both  possess  a  basis  of  fact  which  is  known. 

4.  In  matters  of  religion  belief  has  a  large  place,  and 
consequently  many  of  its  objects  lie  in  this  sphere.     In 
religion  certain  things  are  known,  and  on  these  many 
assured  beliefs  rest.    The  belief  in  God,  in  the  future  state, 
and  in  the  reality  of  spiritual  things,  alike  illustrate  this. 
In  connection  with  these  beliefs.  Apologetics  renders  a 
useful  service  in  unfolding  their  rational  grounds.    So,  also, 
the  contents  of  divine  revelation,  the  earthly  career  of  Jesus 
Christ,  and  the  reality  of  the  power  of  the  gospel  to  save 
from  sin,  are  objects  of  belief  resting  on  evidence.     Con- 
cerning these  questions,  Apologetics  undertakes  to  vindicate 
the  grounds  of  these  beliefs.     In  like  manner  many  valid 
objects  of  belief  are   found   in   the   reality   of   religious 
experience,  in  the  blessings  it  bestows  upon  the  individuals, 
and  in  its  excellent  fruitage  in  the  world.     Here,  again, 
Apologetics  will  find  occasion  to  utilize  belief,  and  to  exhibit 
the  reasonable  grounds  of  Christianity.    As  a  comprehensive 
theory  to  solve  the  manifold  problems  of  man  and  the 
universe,  of  thought  and  things,  of  sin  and  its  remedy, 
Christianity  makes  its  claim  to  be  adequate  and  sufficient, 
and  thus,  in  the  broadest  possible  way,  Christianity  becomes, 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  BELII  F.  ,09 

in  its  totality,  an  object  of  rational  belief     On.     ,    . 

how  important  an  activir„f  ,^     ^  '""'  «"''  ">  "">«' 
WW  is  and  to"  vTtk  °I*' '"'"'■^  """"f"  '<•  ™n 

«rju«  „  .0  Siij -r  tr--^.'  -- 

exhib,-,  these  greeds  in  a  sc"S  ^a^l  ^TJTs" 

the  vindication  of  the  Christian  system 

This  completes  introductory  matters.  Definition  and 
description  of  Apologetics  have  been  given.  The  7eorv  of 
knowledge  and  the  philosophy  of  beliff  have  been  sketched 

rolled"  TH-r  ""1  ^•""""^  ""''  '^  ""^^  our  feet  twe 
IZ  \  nu  '"'  '^'  ''^y-  0"^  t^^k  now  is  to  vindicate 
and  verify  Christianity  as  a  divine  redemptive  reli^on 


1 1 


'I  i  .:i! 


"I  will  assuredly  reach  truth,  if  I  only  fix  my  attention  sufficiently 
on  all  the  things  I  conceive  perfectly." — Descartes. 

"My  certainty  of  .ality  is  simply  my  consciousness  of  knowing; 
which,  whether  I  attend  to  it  or  not,  is  essential  to  every  act  of 
knowledge."— Habsis. 

"All  knowledge  rests  ultimately  on  faith.  I  must  at  last  believe  in 
my  own  sou.',  and  in  the  perceptions  of  my  own  soul."— Luthabdt. 

"Knowledge  and  faith  cannot  be  severed  from  one  another,  like  the 
bulkheads  in  a  ship,  the  first  of  which  may  be  crushed  in,  while  the 
other  still  keeps  the  vessel  afloat."— Robinson. 

"We  can  rationally  believe  that  a  thing  is,  without  knowing  how  or 
why  it  is.  It  is  enough  fc.  the  true  dignity  of  man,  as  a  rational 
creature,  that  he  is  not  called  upon  by  his  Creator  to  believe  without 
knowledge,  to  receive  as  true  propositions  which  convey  no  meaning  to 
his  mind." — Hooge. 

"A  man  is  but  what  he  knoweth.  The  mind  itself  is  but  4n  accident 
of  knowledge;   for  knowled--  is  the  double  of  that  which  is."— Bacon. 

"By  faith  we  understand  that  the  worlds  were  framed  by  God."— 
Epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 


THE   FIRST  PART 


FT^NDAMENTAL  OR  PHILOSOPHICAL 
APOLOGETICS 


1M 


ifi 


II 


I 


i 


"O  God,  my  soul  is  restless  till  it  rests  in  thee !"— Augustine. 

"A  little  philosophy  inclineth  a  man's  mind  to  atheism,  but  depth  in 
philosophy  bringeth  men's  minds  about  to  religion."— Bacon. 

"Intelligence  stands  first  in  the  order  of  existence." — Hamilton. 

"If  education  be  not  already  preceded  by  an  innate  consciousness  of 
God,  as  an  operative  predisposition,  there  would  be  nothing  for  educa- 
tion and  culture  to  act  upon." — Nitzsch. 

"We  see  before  we  know  that  we  have  eyes,  but  when  this  is  known, 
we  perceive  that  we  must  have  preexisted  in  order  to  enable  us  to  see." 

— COLEBIDGE. 

"To  think  of  God  is  to  be  certain  of  his  existence."— Luthasdt. 

"God  is  the  most  certain  fact  of  objective  knowledge."— Bowne, 

"Tradition  can  perpetuate  only  what  has  already  been  originated."— 
Paiton. 

"Cogitable  existence  cannot  be  produced  out  of  incogitable."— Mab- 

TINEAU. 

"Agnosticism  in  philosophy  involves  agnosticism  in  religion."— 
Strong. 


THE  FIRST  PART. 
FUNDAMENTAL  APOLOGETICS. 

CHAPTER  I 

ft,  ■  •  Contents 

-Used  in  Two  Senses.-Wide  SensV  m  7 1  ***=''"'"«  of  the  Term. 
;.ons  of  this  Usage.-Spec^  Sen LlrS  r^T^  *°  **«»'^r-I"ustrT- 
Relauo.,  to  the  Cosmos  -Th<^The7h1l-S  !!'•'' 7»"°'^  °f  ^od  and  His 
-Theism.-Deism.-Panthe^,:ilDet  °^'''^'    B«is  for  Christianity 

I^epart„re.-P.,ehoC  SVh2L"^S=^^^---^  P"'-  S 
Tii»  A  »•  Literature, 

"9.-Flinfs   Theisn,.  ChVps    I     HP     ""','"''""0"  *o   Theology,  p. 

H.  B  Smith's  ^^oto'"irt  fch  n  t"""/'"""^  ""  ^'^^^-•- 
o«rf  Cr^c*  Philosophy,  Chan    11     n-        P"  i.— Coclcer's   Christianity, 

Chap  I  Bowne/  ^/^S  /J ^  rS^'^^k''*"''''  '^^*«'"-' 
Chnst^n  Theism.  Chap.  I.lRedfordV  r*'  ^??"''  ^-Thomson's 
II.,     Chap.     I._Tullocl^s     r/,«;l     chJ     T    ^r'^"'*   ^'"''    P'rt 

^K^ion,  Vol.  I.,  Chap'^  S;,S^,''-   "r'^''  ^^''   ^'^''  ^^""'''on  of 
Chap.I._Lindsay's^c««/wIar.    •    xf*'''**^  ''^  ^'•«''«.   Vol.  I 
Dabne/s  n..,^,  cTap^llS: ''*  ?^"''^ '"'•''''^''My,  6hap.  I  _ 


§  19. 


I.  Preliminary. 
8  •  ■  "'I""'=-    Th.  >|,l,cr,  01  th.  optralion  of  >his 


^M 


114 


APOLOGETICS. 


I  J 


[ 


y 


"ii 


m ' 


I  I 


activity  is,  first  of  all,  in  the  souls  of  men,  and  then,  through 
them,  it  has  its  influence  on  the  world.  This  is  the  under- 
lying conception  of  the  Christian  system  which  is  carried 
with  us  rough  this  discussion.  Christianity  is  at  once  a 
system  truths  to  be  known,  and  a  set  of  redeeming 
agencies  to  be  experienced.  It  is  revealed  truth  and  divine 
energy,  and  these  two  factors  are  closely  related.  The  truth 
reveals  and  expresses  the  energy,  and  the  energy,  in  turn, 
is  experienced  through  the  reception  of  the  truth.  It  thus 
appears  that  Christianity  involves  both  a  doctrine  and  a  life. 
This  life  is  realized  through  Christ  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and 
the  doctrine  implied  in  the  life  is  found  in  Holy  Scripture. 
This  is  the  general  view  of  Christianity  here  adopted. 

2.  The  conception  of  the  Christian  religion  just  sketched 
not  only  presupposes  the  existence  of  God.  but  also  assumes 
that  certain  organic  relations  must  subsist  between  God  and 
the  world,  which  is  the  sphere  of  his  redeeming  activity.  If 
God  through  the  ages  is  conducting  the  movements  of  this 
activity  in  the  world,  he  must  of  necessity  sustain  certain 
intimate  relations  with  the  world  in  general,  and  with  man 
in  particular.  If  God  be  not  in  vital  contact  with  his 
creatures,  the  conditions  for  the  exercise  of  his  redeeming 
activity  are  wanting.  This  makes  it  plain  that  atheism  and 
materialism  are  niadequate.  because  they  deny  the  existence 
of  the  agent  in  this  activity.  It  is  equally  clear  that  both 
deism  and  pantheism  cannot  supply  the  ground  for  the 
operation  of  the  divine  redemptive  activity  resident  in 
Christianity,  because  they  hnth  misconstrue  the  relation  of 
God  to  his  works.  We  are  thus  led  to  the  conclusion  that 
Christian  theism  is  more  adequate,  since  it  announces  such 
relations  between  God.  man  and  the  universe  as  provide  an 
ample  basis  for  the  unimpeded  exercise  f)f  the  redemiUive 
aspects  of  Christianity.  This  Iwing  the  case,  there  at  once 
arises  the  ratiordl  deinand  for  a  proper  exposition  of  the 
Christian  pliil  <sophy  of  these  three  facts,  .ind  of  the  relations 
subsisting  between  them. 


FUNDAMENTAL  APOLOGETICS.  ,,5 

■s  the  red«mi„g  aot^.-itv  of  Go,l  i^,,  V      ,  """■ 

where  moral  evTl  i,  o~™i  e^     "h     ,"        ',""'  *'  'P^ere 
000  and  .he  .or,.,  ToeT';!,  aa^ t''  ^^  ^'S 

ffir  tK«  ,  s"Jn.     inis  title  IS  correct  onlv  so  fnr 

Christianitv     rZ!  ^^'^  '^''^^'^^  ^^af^res  of 

..niverse.  and  &d ■*;"„•„'„'  '^^^  ZT""'"'  "" 

( f)rtrin»»  nf  ♦!,„  .      t  I        .  '"iiici  iiiaii  as  a  so  a 

" ■   "^'^  ■■""^^''^  term  ic  denote  the  first  great 


ii6 


APOLOGETICS. 


division  of  Apologetics.  Theism  seeks  to  make  good,  on 
grounds  of  reason,  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  God.  It 
also  has  its  doctrine  of  the  world  and  man.  It  further  gives 
a  very  careful  exposition  of  the  relations  between  them. 
Theism  proper  covers  the  positive  side  of  the  discussions, 
and  the  anti-theistic  theories  constitute  the  negative  side. 
Under  the  general  title  of  theism  and  the  anti-theistic 
theories,  the  problems  of  fundamental  Apologetics  are  now 
to  be  expounded.    The  result  will  be  a  theistic  philosophy. 


II.  The  Meaning  and  Scope  of  Theism.    §  20. 

The  term  theism,  derived  from  the  Greek,  (?«oc,  has  now 
its  well-defined  meaning  and  usag^.  Though  the  word  from 
which  it  is  derived  is  simply  a  name  for  some  divine  being, 
yet  the  term  theism  has  come  to  denote  a  certain  view  of 
the  world  in  its  relation  to  God.  Theism  is  at  once  a  certain 
doctrine  of  God,  and  a  definite  theory  of  his  relation  to  the 
world  and  man. 

I.  In  the  discussions  of  the  philosophy  of  religion,  the 
term  theism  is  used  in  two  widely  different  senses.  A  brief 
explanation  of  each  of  these  may  remove  some  confusion, 
and  make  plain  that  aspect  of  theism  which  forms  the 
philosophical  basis  of  Christianity. 

a.  Theism  is  sometimes  used  to  denote  any  theory  which 
puts  mind  before  matter.  Any  view  of  the  world  which 
seeks  .0  explain  it  from  a  rational  or  spiritual  principle, 
rather  than  from  a  materialistic,  is  regarded  as  a  thristic 
theory.  Such  a  theory  strongly  asserts  the  priority  of 
spiritual  forms  of  being,  and  proceeds  to  explain  the  material 
from  the  spiritual.  In  the  broad  sense  this  may  be  termed 
speculative  or  metaphysical  theism.  It  is  really  a  philosophy 
of  all  existence  on  the  basis  of  mind  or  spirit. 

This  aspect  of  theism  excludes  the  polytheistic  idea  of 
God.  for  it  asserts  a  unitary  spiritual  principle  as  the 
explanation  of  the  world.    This  view  of  theism  is  also  the 


FUNDAMENTAL  APOLOGETICS  i  ,7 

by  S,ax^rora,  1  I     '"""'^  "'  intelligence  announced 
of  deily  farTS  1,         f ''  "  "*  '"•  '■™  'o  a  doctrine 

h^  ideal  theon^    ,1°  "'"°',"'»*  'orms  the  cnlmination  of 
'iisiueaitneory,  the  cosmo bgy  of  Aristotli.  ^uu  u       .■ 
of  a  world-tormm  o-j  .        ,j     ""«ot]e,  wiih  its  notion 

«oved.  atf^nr.^r,  -Tb*  ^^«x"  r 

fo      unner  of  thaf  ^f  d  i  v^icero,  which  js  the 

.hoihrratnrf  rr-  '^^^-^^  -«-.  appear, 
the  Lnothei'tic  ",a1^  oTzT"  """"''  '^"*''»"'-  '" 
n-anis.,  and  ta  t%  otpT  rZdi"  ^'"^  ''* 
further  examples  of  spLw^  U„t  ,t''"^  *'  ''"" 

Against    atheism    and    matPn-ilUr.,     *u 

i'»  »y«en,  of  revealed  ZhIZ  lu  ^'TrlT  '"'" 
agencies.  **^  °*  redeeming 

b.  The  .em,  theism  has  con,e  in  recent  years  ,„  have  a 


il 


j 

f  I 


ri 


m 


ii8 


APOLOGETICS. 


more  definite  technical  signification.  According  to  its 
modem  usage,  it  denotes  not  merely  a  theory  of  the  universe 
which  puts  mind  prior  to  matter,  but  rather  the  doctrine  of 
one  personal  God,  who  sustains  certain  well-defined  relations 
with  the  universe.  According  to  this  view  theism  is  a 
clearly-conceived  doctrine,  and  it  is  the  function  of  funda- 
mental Apologetics  to  uphold  and  expound  this  doctrine. 
For  the  philosophical  basis  of  Christianity,  it  is  not  enough 
to  have  a  theory  which  places  mind,  in  a  general  way  before 
matter.  It  is  needful  to  vmdicate  the  reality  of  one  infinite 
personal  God,  who  is  in  vital  relations  with  his  creatures  in 
the  cosmos. 

Like  the  wider  view  of  theism,  this  technical  meaning  of 
it  also  excludes  polytheism,  atheism  and  materialism.  And, 
in  addition,  it  is  also  opposed  to  deism  and  pantheism,  both 
of  which  have  defective  views  of  the  relation  between  God 
and  the  universe.  Deism  frankly  admits  the  existence  of 
one  infinite  personal  God,  who  is  the  creator  of  the  world, 
and  who  has  endowed  it  with  all  its  potencies,  and  con- 
stituted it  according  to  its  laws  of  activity.  But  deism  of  all 
types  refuses  to  admit  that  God  has  now  any  immediate 
oversight  or  direct  control  of  the  universe.  He  simply  set 
the  cosmos  in  order  at  first,  and  initiated  its  operations,  and 
then  retired  from  all  direct  relations  with  it.  It  is  evident 
that  a  doctrine  such  as  this  does  not  provide  a  suitable 
rational  basis  for  Christianity. 

And  pa-nheism,  which  has  always  been  attractive  to 
speculative  minds,  goes  to  the  opposite  extreme.  Instead  of 
separating  God  and  the  cosmos,  pantheism  tends  to  identify 
them  in  some  way.  so  that  their  relation  is  regarded  as 
merely  internal,  instead  of  external,  as  with  deism.  More- 
over, pantheism  either  obscures  or  destroys  the  personality 
of  God;  and.  in  some  monistic  way.  it  either  loses  the 
cosmos  in  God.  or  hides  God  away  in  the  cosmos.  It  is 
evident  that  tins  conception  of  the  relation  of  God  to  his 
creatures  fails  to  supply  the  philosophical  ground  whicli 
Ciiristianity  reqi'ires. 


FUNDAMENTAL  APOLOGETICS.  119 

«nf  nri*""""'  '"  '^'  ''*=''"''"'  ^^"^«'  «^^l"des  both  deism 
and  pantheism,  mainly  on  the  ground  of  their  defectiV^ 

uXse     A:d"'"^°"   "'""'"^  ^^^^^"   ^^   -"h 
universe     As  deism  asserts  the  transcendence  of  God  and 

and  Ignores  his  transcendence.     But  theism,  in  a  carefully 

rTtontn^h    "^     "'    "''"^'^^^""y    --'"tains    that    God's 

Tt  is  th  !h"r'  ?f  °""  ™"^"^"*  -^  transcendent. 
1  his  1  the  theistic  philosophy  which  forms  the  abiding 
rational  basis  for  Christianity.  aoiaing 


III.  The  Definition  of  Theism. 


21. 


K„r  f  •    /-    .  ^^  't  IS  taken  to  be  simolv  tht- 

resul,  ,s  ,ha,  some  of  ,he  treatises  on  theism  a^^  rather 

rj:    ""'  "7  """">'  "'  ""™  "■*"«  -atura  7h»  ol 
and  the,sl,c  cosmology  in  a  carehtl  ami  complete  >vay     E^ 

'y  «sm"  h!™r  f ' '°  •'""'  '"^  '""'>'""«  •■»y  m 
s^n    t"e  anfnf  "^^^  very  properly  ,lis.inp,ishes  between 
fpecuiatne  and  Christian  theism. 

I.  A  glance  at  some  of  the  definitions  proposed  by  certain 
leading  writers  upon  the  su.ject  may  pave  the  Z  for  1  " 
nccepted  definition.     Tulloch   ( r/./L'  p.  '^o^  ^ays  t 
theism  .the  doctrine  of  one  almighty,  wLfnd  li  h^  w  ^ 

e  t"^^:-?:"^'  ^^'"  ^^"^'•^'  -^1  --t  essential  ele- 

mav  n  /i'V  "'"""  "  "^  ^'^'"^  ^^^'"«t  pantheism,  but  it 
may  not  be  best  to  define  God  as  merelv  will.  He  is  a 
Pe-„a1  being.    The  whole  idea  presented'by  this  d^fini  on 


'■l!|l 

'in 


I20 


APOLOGETICS. 


i    v 


is  rather  too  general,  and  it  announces  no  relation  of  God 
to  the  cosmos.  Luthardt  (Fundamental  Truths,  p.  22) 
suggests  the  single  idea  that  theism  is  the  doctrine  which 
regards  God  as  "the  principle  of  all  things."  As  the  starting 
point  of  a  definition  this  has  some  real  merit,  but  it  does  not 
clearly  distinguish  between  theism  and  pantheism  as  any 
proper  definition  should.  Miley  (Systematic  Theology, 
Vol.  I.,  p.  57)  says  that  "theism  means  the  existence  of  a 
personal  God,  Creator,  Preserver,  and  Ruler  of  all  things." 
This  is  evidently  rather  vague,  and  can  scarcely  be  regarded 
as  a  definition  in  the  strict  sense. 

Flint  (Theism,  p.  18)  defines  theism  as  "the  doctrine  that 
the  universe  owes  its  existence,  and  continuance  in  existence, 
to  the  reason  and  will  of  a  self-existent  Being,  who  is 
infinitely  powerful,  wise  and  good."    By  way  of  explanation, 
he  adds  that  "it  is  the  doctrine  that  nature  has  a  creator  and 
preserver,  the  nations  a  ruler,  and  men  a  Heavenly  Father 
and  Judge."    This  is  a  fairly  good  definition.    It  announces 
a  doctrine  of  God  and  a  theory  of  the  universe,  such  as 
theism  proposes  to  maintain.     It  may,  perhaps,  go  more 
fully  into  details  than  is  necessary,  yet  all  it  states  is  properly 
contained  in  theism.     In   his   secondary  definition   Flint 
possibly  goes  beyond  the  proper  contents  of  theism,  when  he 
introduces  the  idea  of  God  as  Father.    It  may  be  doubted 
whether  theism,  without  borrowing  from  revelation,  has 
this  factor  in  it.     That  Christian  theism  comes  to  possess 
this  idea  there  can  be  no  doubt,  but  it  may  be  going  too  far 
to  make  it  an  element  in  theism  as  the  philosophical  basis 
of  Christianity.    At  the  same  time,  we  would  be  very  careful 
not  to  conceive  of  theism  in  a  purely  abstract  way,  for  there 
is  evident  propriety  in  the  remark  of  Professor  Orr  (The 
Christian  Viexv  of  God  and  the  World,  p.  49),  to  the  effect 
that  "a  true  theism  should  be  a  living  and  not  a  barren  one." 
2.  The  following  definition  is  presented  to  set  forth  the 
idea  of  theism  suitable  for  fundamental  Apologetics :  Theism 
is  that  doctrine  concerning  the  origin  and  continued  exist- 


FUNDAMENTAL  APOLOGETICS 

explanation  of  thn  t>r^hi        .,       necessary  and  adequate 
solution.         ^        ^''^^'"''  '^'''^y  P'-'^^^ted  for  rational 

by  man  and  the  Lrirrenf        /  ^    ^  P'°'''''"' P^'^^"ted 

an  ever-active  Jd  And  T/"u  '"'^''^  ''^^  P°^^"'«t«  °f 
defined  natural  Tnd  n,nr".1  /"''''  '""°'^^^  ^^^^^'^  ^e" 
world.  Tt  e  rdado^s  !  f  ""'  '^'^^"^"  ^°^  ^"^  the 
so  that  God      bo'h  il  ^'  ?  T  '"*""^^  ^"^  '"^«--'' 

these  three  <:^^:Z{  .Z^ir^::^:^?',    "^^  '' 
progress  of  this  discussion        ^  ""'  '°  '""^  '"  ^^e 

profound  questions     Th.^J  y'°fi^e"cs,  but  also  raises  many 

three  ^actsUrrelatJ^^^T  ^rthS^^^^       ^^""^ 
God,  man  and  the  world.     Howis  cZ\    k         "'*'  "" 
How  far  is  he  inten,V.n.       Tl         ^  *°  ^  conceived? 
his  abidin/relat  on  Ir    '       .  ^°''  ^^'  "^^'^'^-     ^hat  is 
What  is  h^  ;Cn  tord"';V"^^      '^'^^^  '^  -"? 
world?    Has  man  thel        ,'      ^'^^'  ''  ^''  ^^'^*'°"  to  the 
with  GodT  Che  ari     "™'  "'°  '^^^'^'^^  ••^>^*-- 
through    speciar  reUaUon     To^if  tt""^',?^  ^^^ 
regarded,  and  how  is  it  related  to  cL  I   ^u    '^""^   *°   ^^ 
-de  of  God's  activity  L Ihe ^orM  ^      '""'^^  '^  ^"^^  '"'^''^ 

calLte^nStlwr  ^'^  '""^^  ^''^^  '^^  ^  ^  -e 
the  questio  s  Just  ;lr  In  addition  to 

•^ored.    Theoreiillv  Ihlu  ^'""^^T  u^  '^'^  """^^  "°^  ^e 
reference  to  thf       u,  '  "^  '"'^''*  ''^  discussed  without 

can   oT,:Ln  it'an?";-"^^  '''''''''''  '*  '""'^^  '^  -hat" 
explam  ,t  and  mdicate  its  place  in  the  world.    The 


■m 


:     .11 


M  1 


122 


APOLOGETICS. 


main  task  for  theism  in  connection  with  this  problem  is  to 
be  careful  to  vindicate  such  a  relation  between  God  and  his 
creatures  as  does  not  involve  God,  in  any  causal  way,  with 
the  production  of  moral  evil,  and  that  leaves  the  way  open 
for  the  free  play  of  those  redemptive  activities  of  God  which 
constitute  the  essential  principles  of  Christiainty.  An 
organic  relation  between  God  and  the  cosmos  is  announced 
in  theism,  and  fundamental  Apologetics  seeks  to  elucidate 
this  relation  in  such  a  way  as  to  provide  its  ample 
philosophy. 


N  ) 


IV.  The  Divisions  of  Theism.    §  22. 

I.  The  definition  of  theism  just  given  suggests  its  main 
divisions.  While  there  may  be  no  serious  difficulty  in 
arranging  the  materials  of  theism  in  an  orderly  way,  yet  it 
is  no  easy  task  to  decide  where  the  exposition  should  begin. 
Some  writers  commence  with  an  exposition  of  the  various 
proofs  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  make  this  the  main 
part  of  the  discussion.  Others  proceed  at  once  to  unfold 
the  theistic  significance  of  the  cosmos,  and  in  doing  so  have 
much  to  say  about  the  order  and  design  which  it  exhibits. 
This  gives  vwo  types  of  theistic  method.  In  neither  case  is 
much  attention  given  to  the  initial  question  of  the  nature 
and  origin  of  theistic  belief  on  its  subjective  side.  This, 
however,  is  perhaps  the  first  question  which  should  engage 
attention.  Ever  since  Kant's  day,  inquiry  into  the  origin, 
nature  and  limits  of  human  knowledge  is  of  primary  im- 
portance in  any  field.  In  the  field  of  theism  this  may  be 
specially  true.  To  reach  some  assured  conclusions  in  regard 
to  the  nature  and  origin  of  theistic  belief  may  be  of  interest 
in  itself,  and  of  value  for  the  discussions  which  are  to  follow. 
It  may  supply  an  experimental  basis  for  the  first  steps  in  the 
discussion,  and  aflford  a  good  foothold  against  agnosticism 
at  the  outset. 

2.  It  also  deserves  to  be  noted  that  write      in  theism  do 


FUNDAMENTAL  APOLOGETICS.  123 

not  always  distinguish  between  what  may  be  called  the 
subjecuve  and  obiective  aspects  of  theism.    Thi!  „!'  Z 
the  contrast  between  the  belief  in  God  as  it  lies  n  the"  nd 
and    he  existence  of  God  as  an  actual  fact  is  not  always 

God   is  tot;      T."  T  '''"^'  ^"'  ^'^^^  ^'^^  -'^t--  o' 
trod   IS  another.     The   former   is   mainly  a   question   in 

psychology,  and  the  latter  a  problem  in  ontologj  Though 
closely  related  as  a  matter  of  fact,  yet  it  ma>  conduce  to 
orderly  treatment  to  consider  them  separately.'  Ind  in  the 
o  der  of  the.  treatment,  it  may  be  natural  and  best  to  ^gt 
with  the  subjective  side.  ^ 

It  may  be  well  to  bear  in  mind,  also    that  the  w.Vl.r 

the  discussions  of  theism  to  some  extent.     If  God  be  the 

betf  thssur^'-^r^'"  "^  ^"'^^^^'-   -^  '^  -  t^  '^ 
behef  this  subject  ,s  related  to  that  object,  then  theism  and 

that  theism,  m  some  sense,  is  involved  in  all  religions,  yet 
the  fact  remains  that  the  question  of  the  nature  and  o  igfn 
of  religion,  and  that  of  theistic  belief,  can  scarcely  be  kC 
entirely  apart  in  this  discussion.  ^  ^ 

.J'l^'T'"^"'  """'"^'y  '"'■''^^t^^'  f'^t^^'^^n  the  subjective 
and  objective  aspects  of  theism  provides  the  key  ffr  the 

^r^:'  '^  '"^^^"^'-  ^'^^  «-t  d-ision  dUs  .  h 
theistic  belief  as  a  psychical  fact.  This  division  mav  be 
c  escribed  as  the  psychology  of  theism.  In  this  division  two 
chstmct  questions  arise.  One  relates  to  the  essent  ^  natur^ 
of  theistic  belief  and  the  other  to  its  origin.  The  former 
eads  to  an  analysis  of  that  belief,  and  the  1  tter  to  a„ 
exposition  of  its  genesis  and  growth 

the'VellitvTH'  "'"  ''""°"  "'  ^'^"^"'  ^"™^  ^"^"tion  to 
Zv  71  I        ''  ""^'^'"'  o^J^'^t  of  theistic  belief     This 

^^hich  the  human  mind  entertains?     I„  a  word,  Has  t^e 


III 


■m 


i   '  *  i 
t  * 


124 


APOLOGETICS. 


subjective  belief  in  God  objective  reality  as  fact?  This 
division  of  the  subject,  also,  naturally  falls  into  two  sections. 
In  the  first,  the  various  proofs  or  reasonings  which  show 
that  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  is  a  rational,  well- 
grounded  belief,  are  to  be  unfolded.  This  leads  to  the 
presentation  in  detail  of  the  theistic  arguments.  The  second 
section  of  this  division  undertakes  to  investigate  all  those 
schemes  which  either  deny  the  validity  of  the  theistic 
inference,  or  propose  some  substitute  for  it.  This  raises  the 
exter  ive  controversy  in  regard  to  the  anti-theistic  theories. 
Some  of  these  deny  the  main  positions  of  theism  altogether, 
others  propose  to  modify  these  positions,  and  still  others 
venture  to  propose  certain  substitutes  for  theism.  This 
whole  second  main  division  of  the  subject  may  be  termed 
the  ontology  of  theism,  inasmuch  as  it  has  to  do  with  the 
real  being  of  the  object  of  theistic  belief. 

The  psychology  and  ontology  of  theism  thus  await  dis- 
cussion. Under  the  former  the  nature  and  origin  of  theistic 
belief  are  to  be  considered,  and  under  the  latter  the  theistic 
proofs  and  the  anti-theistic  theories  are  to  engage  attention. 
To  the  survey  of  this  wide  field  we  at  once  proceed. 


THE  FIRST  DIVISION. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THEISM. 

THE  FIRST  SECTION. 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE  NATURE  OF  RELIGIOUS  AND  THEISTIC  BELIEF. 

p  ,.  .  COXTENTS. 

SidJ-SSr  DSL'^L^r-'n^-"'''*^-  -  *"*  subjective 
Kant-  Hegel.-  Goethe  1  MiH  -  aTrke      ^JT  •  ^•="*«^-Sp.noza.- 
Pfleiderer.-MuUer.-Kostlin-FosS.     r~,^''''"'™^'=''^^  -  C'i'd.- 
Cave.  -  Ritschl.  _  KuyZl^J,      ^■~^°''^"-~  Martineau.-Flint.- 
AdopteC-Coment,  oT^iel^tf  fiSr?'  ^^  Saussaye.- Definition 

sonalityof  Ma„.-Cognitiono  Deftv  R^"".  ^'°  '"'  ^''"''^  P"' 
pendence-Sense  of  Ob  gatio„     In^^^^^^        «  ^°<^-F«linK  of  De- 

of  the  Self-Revelation  of  S-xt'Te/^  r^^^  P™'''- 

sc.ousness.-A  Definite  Connatural  pi^  a^'"''  °^  '^^'"'^'^  Con- 
Element-The  Rational  PsXlo  J  ru'°o'  °'"'"^'  Empirical 
Terns  Innate  and  Intuitive  SoSeHrt  "^'  ^''''  ^°'  '^is.-The 
Three  Facts.-Theistic  P  Idic^fion  Tr^^^  I""  ^"^'""^  Stated.- 
by  Revelation.  ^'='»"fons.-The.stic  Hypothesis—Instruction 

Literature. 

^A^  r/,.«/.V  Argument,  Chap  XH  ^  "'  ^'''P-  "-^'•"^•'•^ 
/>««»wrt«.  Part  I.,  Chap  I  S"!?"  0°^'"««'*  CAm/,a„ 
Chap.  VI.-MiiIler's  TheOnJ'ZS'ru'*''''''^'''''''  ^'•"*'. 
■"■a/  /?W,-^,o„,  Chap.  Il.-Pfllfderer',  P  T""'  ^^'^^  ^-MflHer's  JVa«- 
Chap.  I.,  of  Vol.  liL-Stelrn  •  rl'  p  i''''"^*^  "^  ^"*^""''  Sec.  II.. 
Chap.  III.-Kello^..'s  ThTr  ^^'dence  of  Christian  Experience 

God  and  the  World,  Chap  m-cS  J'  J  7°" '  ^''"^"■'"'  ^•-«'  "^ 
IV.-Caird's  F^^rfa'J-J  ^7%^  T V/  ''^''^•'"•'  ^hap' 
^A.£ro/«„v,„,^  ;?,/,..,„  cC  jll  ^^"''T'''  Chap.  Ill.-Caird's 
Chap.  II.-De  La  Saussrve'=  J'  "^/-^W"  «  Encyclopaedia.  Div.  II 

VII.,  VIIL-Mlrtin  aT;;„Irr^^^^^  -"S""  "^  ^^"■^•-'  Chai 
«m.  Chap.  VIIL-Lang's  rt  ;i  ^^''':' ^^^P•  "-I-erach's  7A.- 
Tigert's  Theism.  "^'"^  "^  ^'^^sion.   Chap.   XVII.- 


1 


::!  : 

\ 

m 

i 

I 


r 


m  I 


I 


h 


126  APOLOGETICS. 

I.  The  Nature  of  Theistic  Belief.    §  2^. 

^-  ''jT^HEISTIC  belief  is  so  intimately  associated  with 
A  religion  that  some  account  of  the  latter  is  necessary 
to  understand  the  former.  It  may  be  assumed  that  religion 
is  a  persistent  fact  in  human  life,  and  a  constant  element  in 
the  history  of  mankind.  In  a  general  way,  religion  may  be 
said  to  consist  in  certain  beliefs  which  have  associated  with 
them  certain  ritual  and  other  acts.  The  present  inquiry  has 
to  do,  not  so  much  with  the  objects  of  these  beliefs,  as  with 
the  experiences  of  the  soul  involved  in  them.  Hence,  it  is  a 
certain  condition  of  the  soul  of  man,  rather  than  the  outward 
ceremonies  of  religion,  with  which  attention  is  now  to  be 
engaged.  In  a  word,  it  is  the  subjective,  rather  than  the 
objective,  side  of  religion  which  is  to  be  considered.  What, 
then,  is  religion  as  an  inward  experience  of  the  human  soul? 

It  is  not  easy  to  define  what  the  essential  nature  of  religion 
is.  The  derivation  of  the  term,  religion,  either  from 
rclcgerc,  "to  gather  up,"  or  from  religare,  "to  bind  back," 
does  not  go  very  far  in  giving  a  clear  idea  of  the  essence  of 
religion.  And  the  Greek  term,  Opr^axua,  which  really  means 
the  service  of  deity  in  general,  does  not  give  much  additional 
light,  as  it  is  used  in  the  New  Testament  by  Paul  and  James. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  interpretation  of  religion  on  the 
subjective  side  has  ah  the  difficulty  involved  in  any  psycho- 
logical inquiry,  and  it  is  also  invested  with  all  the  perplexities 
peculiar  to  religious  lielief.  .All  introspection  is  difficult: 
but  that  which  seeks  to  observe  and  interpret  the  religious 
experiences  of  the  human  soul  is  the  most  difficult  of  all. 

This  interpretation  is  all  the  more  difficult,  for  the  reason 
that  religious  belief,  as  it  now  ajipears  in  any  S(HiI,  is  more 
or  less  complex.  Its  simple,  primitive,  su'ijcctive  elements 
have  been  affected  by  many  influences  of  heredity,  tradition 
and  education,  so  that  it  now  Iwcomcs  very  hard  to  deter- 
mine what  in  it  is  native  to  the  soul,  and  what  is  the  product 
of  expcrieiice.    And  thii  ta-^k  is  made  sti!!  nsorc  pcq.lcxin- 


THE  NATURE  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       ,27 

would  give  the  same  account  o    u.         '"        '™'  '■''•^'°" 

2.  In  addition,   it  is  not  ea  ^-  t .    1      1 
religion  si^ouldb;  kept  in  vew     ■  ' ,  ;^^"^'^  ^"^^^  ^^Pe  of 
nature  proceeds.      VVe  have  tU  '"  '^".^'^^''t'^"  '"^o  Us 

Mohammedan   and  the   Ch ris tan 'rT'   ''^  •^""'''   ^'^^ 
among  men     Which  i!  ,,      "*'^"   "^''^'""^^   consciousness 

shoulJwe  see^r  1;;  X^^^^^^^^       ^J  ^rT'  ^ 
should  take  the  consciousness  of  t le  Chril  i  „  t!!  '"^  ''' 

Christians    there    is    t he    dtff  \         """""^  "'''"'"^' 

religion.  astC  i.    ;;:it   '  "'■■'■;  "  '°"'"'™  ■"  "" 

P'ay  all  the  con,pIex  powers  of  „,en      ll^ts  "T. 

..4ir;::,:~,;-~;:;;\:;*;;i;;: 


«      III 


I!. 


a 


ji 


s, 


128 


APOLOGETICS. 


ing  what  the  real  nature  of  it  is.  Those  definitions  which 
make  religion  consist  in  fear  or  selfish  dep-Vg  may  be  set  aside 
as  useless,  and  the  familiar  definition  that  religion  is  a  mode 
of  knowing  and  worshipping  God  need  only  be  noted. 

Spinoza  made   religion   consist   in   "the  love  of   God, 
founded  upon  a  knowledge  of  the  divine  perfections."    Kant 
said  that  "religion  is  the  recognition  of  all  our  duties  as  if 
they  were  divine  coi.imands."     Hegel's  brief  definition  is 
that  "religion  is  perfect  freedom,"  which  he  expands  into 
"the  relation  of  the  subjective  consciousness  to  God,  who  is 
Spirit."    Goethe  makes  religion  "a  feeling  of  reverence  for 
what  is  above,  around,  and  what  is  beneath  us."    Mill  says 
that  it  is  "a  craving  for  an  ide;    object."    Schleiermacher's 
well-known  definition  of  religion  is,  "The  absolute  feeling 
of  dependence."    J.  F.  Clarke  describes  religion  as  "the 
worship  and  service  by  man  of  invisible  powers,  believed 
to  be  like  himself,  yet  above  himself."     Principal  Caird 
regards  religion  as  "the  elevation  of  the  human  spirit  into 
union  with  the  divine."    Edward  Caird  looks  upon  it  as  an 
evolution,  whose  essence  consists  in  "a  conscious  relation 
of  God,"  who,  as  the  highest  unity,  is  the  "ultimate  pre- 
supposition of  consciousness."     Pfleideicr  gives  a  careful 
definition  to  the  eflfect  that  "the  kernel  of  religion  in  all  its 
forms,  is  that  reference  of  man's  life  to  the  world-governing 
power,  which  seeks  to  grow  into  union  with  it."    Martineau 
describes  religion  as  "a  belief  in  an  everliving  God ;  that  is, 
a  divine  mind  and  will  ruling  the  universe,  and  holding 
moral  relations  with  mankind." 

Muiler's  definition  of  religion  has  been  much  discussed. 
He  says  that  "religion  consists  in  the  perception  of  the 
infinite  under  such  manifestations  as  are  able  to  influence 
the  moral  conduct  of  men."  Kostlin,  in  a  very  good  article 
on  "Religion"  in  the  Schaff-Herzog  Encyclopedia,  says  that 
religion  means  "the  conscious  relation  of  man  and  God,  and 
the  expression  of  that  relation  in  human  conduct."  R.  V. 
Foster  gives  a  different  turn  to  the  definition  when  he  says 


THE  NATURE  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.      129 

o^worshi^^T?  '"'  "''^'°"  "^^  '^  ^^^"^^  -  ^he  spirit 
ot  worship  This  view  is  somewhat  in  harmony  with  the 
scriptural  idea  of  it.     FHnt  savs  thaf  "r^Ucr-  . 

belief  in  o  K^-  .  ^     ^^     rehgion  is  man's 

UMCcesaUe  to  his  senses,  but  not  indifferent  to  his  senli- 

»»e.hin,  h^e^^zr;e,^ll^/hS:rs^e?he^ 

c";  ™  '.'*r  °J  *^' P-P.ion  'upon  tt'e  Lt^e^T 

={tt^\ShCs;-?-i3 

rather    han  to  God.  is  the  fundamental  fact  in  LlTon' 

^mThinV    H°.  """""'  ''  '''  ^°°^'  '^  "-™i"n S; 

tTen     ulv^'    ,  '''"?"'^  *'^  *^°^'"°^'  ^'^^  ^o^'-os  being 
taken    subjectively   and    objectively."     This    means    fhl? 

is  "a  l»li,f  i!  .        "' ^,^="*^y'^  *"SS«ts  that  religion 

>»  follows:    "Rel^or^Us,  '\'"^'"'  ''."'"i'ion, 

h«.sion  of  his  „l?,ion  toTn  n  'L'"  ™" '  "^"- 

able  ,0  influence  his  deSny    o  whichT"'  "  ''°"'"' 
object,  together  with  the  S^  d    i  ^s  and  ''  "^T'"" 
.-.^  appt^hension  calls  forth,"  "^ThUira.rhkrFt't 
definition,  and  is  quite  contprehensive  '"' ' 

^:"Z  re>:!r  Z'the-Lt-irtJ  T'  '^ 

very  variously  conceived  by  diff      "  ^Z,     t^,  " 

w/».dTLh^U7o':;7:,  ::;^r  r  ri^ir  •  -' 


^<)i 


«30 


APOLOGETICS. 


between  him  and  some  superior  being  called  God.  This 
definition  presupposes  an  abiding  relation  between  man  and 
deity,  and  makes  religion,  on  the  subjective  side,  consist  in 
a  mode  of  man's  complex  activity.  It  pertains  to  the  whole 
personality  of  man,  and  embraces  the  entire  area  of  his 
activity.  This  agrees  with  what  was  said  in  the  Introduction 
of  this  treatise,  to  the  effect  that  religion  did  not  belong  to 
some  single  faculty  of  the  soul,  but  rather  consisted  in  the 
combined  activity  of  all  its  powers  in  relation  to  the  noblest 
objects  with  which  this  activity  can  possibly  be  exercised.* 
God  is  its  object,  man  is  its  subject;  and  religion  is  a 
complex  experience  growing  out  of  the  realization  of  this 
relation. 


JI.  The  Contents  of  Theistic  Belief.    %  24. 

1.  The  exposition  of  the  previous  section  has  opened  the 
way  for  the  analysis  of  theistic  belief  on  the  subjective  side. 
It  has  been  s  .own  that  this  belief  is  one  of  the  various 
phases  of  religious  belief.  As  it  appears  in  Christian  theism, 
it  is  more  clearly  defined  than  anywhere  else.  As  theism 
was  carefully  defined  in  a  former  chapter,  its  contents  are 
now  to  be  exhibited  as  clearly  as  possible.  What  does 
theistic  belief  imply  as  an  experience  in  the  human  soul? 
What  is  the  nature  of  the  idea  of  God  as  it  exists  in  the 
human  mind?  What  is  the  real  import  of  the  religious 
consciousness  involved  in  theistic  belief?  By  adapting  the 
definition  of  religious  belief  given  in  the  first  section  of  this 
chapter  to  the  topic  now  in  hand,  we  may  very  properly 
say  that  theistic  belief,  on  the  subjective  side,  is  a  mcde 
of  knowing,  Wieving,  feeling  and  acting  on  the  part  of  man. 
which  arises  from  a  realization  by  him  of  the  natural  and 
moral  relations  which  subsist  between  him  and  the  infinite 
personal  God,  whose  existence  and  constant  activity  theism 
asserts. 

'Introduction,  Chap.  IV. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.      131 

2.  It  is  assumed  that  the  experience  now  under  considera 
tion  invo  ves  the  exerri'<io  of  ,11  ♦u  ,  consiaera- 

an  analysis  of  the  contents  of  the  idea  nf  nJ       a     . 

intellectual  or  rational  factor  in  the  th..Ufi; 

sensible,  and  it  consists  essentially  in  tuL  „  •.•  , 
divinitv  T»,:e  ^  .u  .  °™"a"y  '"  the  cognition  of 
uivinity,     inis  means  that  in  the  idM  nf  n^^  •    iL    . 

cognitive  relations  with  S,d.  Ty  his  mea^  H  """   '"^° 

«..,ii  cApcnence  01  men,  viewed  P*n- 

erany,  seems  to  confirm  this  position.  Almo  t  insUnctifely 
men  assume  that  a  cognition  of  deity  is  a  fact  b  heh^ 
religious  consciousness,  and  in  the  common  yet  s  il' 

b^t  „I      .T    "'•  "°'  """''y  ^''^^  •"«"  know  that  God  i^ 

them  e  "  •  '"  •'''•'■  '''''''''  <=on«ciousness  they  find 
themselves  in  cognitive  relations  with  God.  Thus  there^s 
an  element  of  knowledge  in  this  experience 

This  tThf />r."  '"  '^''""^^  °'  '''''f '"  ^'^'^  «P«"«"ce. 
ihis  ,s  the  faith  factor  which  some  writers  make  verv 

crknowiT "";;  s;t  ^^^-^  ^^^  -iprLTrlti::^ 

tJetween  knowledge  and  belief  that  both  should  have  a  place 
m  theistic  consciousness.    Indeed,  it  may  not  be  t^  much 


i 
I 


I 


ii' 


132 


APOLOGETICS. 


'i! 


to  say  that  knowledge  and  belief  mingle  with  each  other  in 

it.    This  belief  is  not  merely  a  vague  impression  or  a  simple 

probability.     It  is  rather  a  rational  conviction  resting  on 

ample  evidence.    This  belief  may  be  regarded  in  two  aspects. 

It  may  be  looked  upon  as  an  instinctive  conviction  rising  up 

spontaneously  in  the  human  soul.    Those  who  hold  theistic 

belief  to  be  intuitive  in  the  sense  in  which  Jacobi  taught, 

illustrate  this  view  of  the  faith  factor  in  it.    In  the  deepest 

sense  this   factor  is   a   rational   belief.     Theistic   belief, 

however,  may  be  considered  in  another  light.    Belief  is,  as 

has  been  shown,  rational  conviction  based  on  evidence.* 

In  the  case  of  theistic  belief  there  are  many  undoubted  facts 

which  supply  valid  evidence  to  justify  belief  in  God.    The 

activity  of  the  human  mind  'n  making  the  inference  from 

this  evidence  is  of  the  nature  of  belief.     Both  of  these 

aspects  of  the  belief  are  properly  included  in  the  second 

factor  of  theistic  belief.    Care,  however,  muit  be  taken  not 

to  regard  this  as  a  distinct  God-consciousness.    It  is  rather 

that  experience  of  the  soul  which  is  implied  in  theistic  belief 

in  either  of  its  aspects  just  described. 

c.  Thirdly,  theistic  belief  includes  the  sense  of  natural 
dependence  on  God.  This  consists  in  an  affection  of  the 
sensibility,  and  supplies,  to  a  large  extent,  the  emotional 
element  in  religion.  Schleiernjacher  gives  this  factor  great 
prominence  in  his  system.  Some  regard  it  as  mainly  a  sense 
of  our  finiteness  over  against  the  infinite  one.  Others  look 
upon  it  as  the  natural  sense  -n'  dependence  which  the  creature 
properly  feels  towards  the  creator.  This  feeling  of  depend- 
ence, this  sense  of  finiteness,  this  feeling  after  God,  is 
undoubtedly  an  element  in  the  theistic  consciousness.  Closer 
analysis  might  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  this  feeling  is  to 
be  regarded  as  the  natural  concomitant  of  the  intellectual 
and  faith  factors  already  described.  Yet  in  the  con- 
sciousness itself  they  are  all  so  blended  as  to  be  inseparable, 

'  Introduction,  Chap.  V. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF       133 

makes  it  the  dominant  feature  of  theistic  heliVf     t/  • 
moral  law.  under  which  man  finds  h'm,f  I'd  the  2' 
sion  of  a  moral  nature  by  man     OutZT'     /        ^     ''" 

factor     .; .  ^:     T'^''  ''  ''^^  '"°'-«  distinctly  religious 

^Z'Jo^TT. '"  ^'^V'^"*-^"*'  -  impulse.  In  theTou 
which  prompts  it  to  give  homage  to  the  object  of  religious 

a^     of  I  :L'"f"^/;  "°"^'P  -P--es  itself  in    eS 

'vt  ch  promrto'^h      ""'°"''  "^^""^     ^he  sentiments 

he  eby'Tr7what  1     '  ""'"'  ?"'  *''  *="P"'^""  ^^"-^ 
inereoy,  are  what  appear  m  this  factor  of  theistic  belief 

This  instinctive  impulse  to   worship  some  ob£t  ^  s^ 

T::lrj  "".  ^'^^  '^  '"^^^  be'connden  ;"  g    de" 
as  an  abiding  factor  in  the  religious  consciousness     It  k 

he  native  tendency  to  reverence%ome  supe^  4tg     nd 

^niir  Thi!     t  ^-^'T'°"  '"  "rtain'^rites  aJ'cer". 
monies.     This  instinct  rea  y  involves  the  ott,-..  t    . 

^heistic  belief,  and  it  may  beUet^  ^t^^^^'li 

The  cognition  of  deity,  the  belief  in  God.  the  sense TnaS 

dependence,  and  the  feeling  of  moral  responsiWHtranTerd 

out  towards,  and  culminate  in,  sentiments  of  adorTdo^  and 

^I   hese Irt'  '°""'^  *'^  ^'"^  -"^^  -  the  obTeit  of 
all  these  othe.-  features  in  theistic  belief 

These,  then,  are  the  five  factors  which  constitute  the  main 


»34 


APOLOGETICS. 


it  i 


f! 


contents  of  theism  on  the  subjective  side.  They  are  all 
bound  together  in  the  unity  of  that  experience  of  which 
they  are  the  complex  expression,  and  are  separable  only  in 
the  way  of  logical  analysis  such  as  has  been  made.  It  is 
also  made  more  clearly  evident  than  ever  that  in  religious 
and  theistic  belief  all  the  powers  of  the  human  soul  are 
called  into  exercise. 

3.  A  profound  problem  now  comes  partly  into  view.  At 
this  stage  this  problem  is  merely  suggested,  but  it  must  be 
fully  considered  later  on  in  these  discussions.  That  problem 
consists  in  an  inquiry  as  to  how  far  the  theistic  consciousness 
in  man  involves  an  activity  on  the  part  of  God,  which  is  of 
the  nature  of  self-revelation.  This  is  a  question  of  deepest 
import.  At  present  it  is  merely  suggested  that  the  theistic 
experience  of  the  human  soul,  of  which  an  anlysis  has  just 
been  made,  may  imply,  as  its  abiding  background,  a  move- 
ment of  God  towards  man,  in  the  way  of  self-expression  or 
self-revelation.  Some  think  that  the  experience  of  man, 
in  his  theistic  consciousness,  may  be  his  response  to  the 
activity  of  God  in  self-revelation.  If  this  view  be  valid, 
then  a  revelation  of  God  in  the  soul  may,  in  the  last  analysis, 
be  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  the  complex  experience 
involved  in  that  consciousness.  The  relation  between  God 
and  man  which  theism  announces  provides  the  ground  for 
this  natural  revelation,  and  this  natural  revelation  would 
then  he  the  basis  and  the  pledge  of  a  supernatural  re  elation, 
such  as  iL  recorded  in  the  holy  Scriptures. 


III.  The  Precise  Nature  of  Theistic  Belief.    §  25. 

In  the  previous  section  the  constituent  factors  in  theistic 
belief  were  unfolded.  It  now  remains  to  consider  this  belief 
in  it  otality,  with  a  view  of  giving  a  careful  description 
of  its  essential  tv^nre  as  a  whole.  This  now  raises  the 
question  of  the  real  psychological  nature  of  the  belief  in 
God.    Here  a  few  simpic  remarks  must  suffice. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF       135 

good  deal  of  confusion  of  thought  and  no  little^bT^i' 
of  language.  In  regard  to  no  idea,  belief  or  priS7 
perhaps,  .s  this  more  evident  than  in'the  case  of  th^S  a 

.^  a  well  defired""^ ".'""  ^^"^^^  ''^'  ''^  ^'^^i  ^ 
s  a  well-defined  innate  idea   and  at  other  times  that  there 

analysis  of  he  previous  section  is  that  both  of  these  are 
«  reme  positions.  Against  the  view  that  the  tdef  ofUd 
1    oner  f  ""'''•''  "  '^''  '''''  ^^^^«  '^  -  theistic  experience 

It  is  argued  that  there  is  in  theistic  belief,  at  its  root  an 
abiding  connatural  factor,  which  is  not  the  proTct'  of 
experience,  but  is  rather  necessary  to  this  experien^  t  is 
no  asserted  therefore,  that  the  human  soul  aU  at  once  L 
a  clear  cognition  of  one  infinite  personal  G.d.  nor  isTfor  a 
moment  admitted  that  the  belief  in  God  s  entire  y  the 
product  of  some  process  of  experience.    It  is  sim^y  ma  „ 

down,  that  the  germinal  principles  of  theistic  belief  must 
be  presupposed  to  be  in  the  human  soul,  in  order  to  the 
validity  of  the  experiences  involved  in  theistic  b^Hef  > 

2.  The  analysis  made  further  sumes  that  theistic  belief 
m  Its  essential  nature,  is  not  a  merely  empirS  proSu  t 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  to  begin  with  experience  alone  rn^es  k 

wT t Utl:  ^b^^'f  ^° f  ?f  °"  °^  ^^''  -'^^'  ^^  -^-e 
theistic  in     ,r       ^"^  '^  '^'  ^"'  ^  "^^"d^d  as  non- 
of  Sh         m  "^*''"'  "''"™'  '^"^*'°"  »"  the  knowledge 
of  God  would  be  impossible.    As  the  empirical  theory  Ti 
knowledge  ,n  general  has  already  been  rejected   TrZrt 

nence.    In  this  experience  there  is  a  native  factor  which  Z 
•Introduction,  Chap.  IV. 


■4\i 


•f. 


136 


APOLOGETICS. 


I 


\> 


)  jiii 


ii  ill 


.1 


,! 


soul  itself  brings  to  the  occasion  upon  which  this  experience 
takes  definite  form  in  the  theistic  consciousness.  There  are, 
therefore,  two  factors  in  this  consciousness.  The  one  is 
original,  e  other  acquired;  the  one  intuitive,  the  other 
experimental;  the  one  connatural,  and  the  other  em- 
pirical. 

3.  In  these  discussions  it  may  be  well  to  avoid  the  frequent 
use  of  the  terms  innate  and  intuitive,  because  they  are 
somewhat  ambiguous,  and  are  at  times  misapplied.  The 
term  used  by  H.  B.  Smith  to  denote  the  truth  here  seems  a 
good  one,  when  he  speaks  of  the  connatural  knowledge  of 
God.  This  simply  means  that  in  the  very  constitution  of  the 
human  soul  there  are  the  elements  of  theistic  belief.  This 
does  not  imply  a  complete  knowledge  of  God,  but  only  the 
existence  in  the  soul  of  its  principles.  The  term  intuitive 
must  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  man  has  a  distinct  God- 
consciousness  as  he  has  an  immediate  self-consciousness. 
Yet,  again,  it  may  be  going  too  far  to  admit  H.  B.  Smith's 
position,  when  he  says  tb-\t  the  denial  of  the  existence  of 
God  does  not  involve  an  nl  solute  contradiction,  for  the 
reason  that  the  logical  outcome  of  the  connatural  theistic 
principles  in  the  human  soul  is  a  definite  theistic  conscious- 
ness on  the  occasion  of  experience.  This  is  simply  saying, 
in  a  round-about  way,  that  atheism  is  illogical;  and,  it 
might  be  added,  is  unnatural. 

4.  From  this  it  follows  that  if  man's  native  theistic 
endo\-ment  is  not  at  first  a  distinct  consciousness  of  God,  it 
will  require  certain  suitable  experiences  to  bring  this  endow- 
ment into  distinct  consciousness.  The  true  doctrine  thus 
emerges.  Man  is  so  constituted  by  his  Maker  that  he  comes, 
in  the  course  of  the  natural  development  of  the  native 
principles  of  his  soul,  to  attain  to  definite  belief  in  and  idea 
of  God,  and  to  realize  the  consciousness  which  theistic  belief 
involves.  As  the  powers  of  the  human  soul  unfold  their 
native  resources,  they  rise  to  the  apprehension  of  the  notion 
of  God  in  a  perfectly  natural  way.    In  this  process  both  the 


THE  NATURE  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.      137 

connatural  condition  in  tlie  soul  and  the  occasion  in  expe- 
rience are  involved.  The  universality  of  religious  belief, 
and  an  analysis  of  man's  constitution,  fully  confirm  this 
conclusion. 

5.  Three  striking  facts  How  from  the  contents  of  the 
theistic  consciousness.  The  first  is  the  power  man  has  to 
use  theistic  predicates.  How  comes  it  to  pass  that  untutored 
men  can  call  any  natural  or  artificial  objects  their  gods? 
This  seems  possible  only  on  the  supposition  of  the  reality 
of  the  connatural  factor  in  the  nature  of  man.  This  fact 
also  greatly  confirms  the  description  given  of  the  nature  of 
theistic  belief. 

The  second  of  these  facts  consists  in  the  ability  men 
possess  to  frame  the  theistic  hypothesis  of  the  universe. 
This  arises  from  reflection  upon  the  universe.  They  see  the 
starry  heavens  above,  and  the  fruitful  earth  below,  and 
observe  law,  order  and  design  in  the  cosmos,  and  these 
things  press  for  an  explanation.  Then  the  theistic  hypothe- 
sis is  brought  forward  as  the  best  solution  of  the  various 
problems  thereby  presented.  The  ability  to  make  and  use 
this  hypothesis  argues  for  the  reality  of  the  connatural 
theistic  factor  in  man's  constitution,  and  further  vmdicates 
the  exposition  of  the  theistic  consciousness  already  made. 

The  third  fact  is  the  most  significant  of  all.  It  consists 
in  the  capacity  to  receive  and  understand  a  special  revelation 
from  God.  This  fact  is  worthy  of  note  here,  and  will  come 
up  for  fuller  discussion  under  Christian  Apologetics.  The 
fact  that  man  can  receive  and  understand  the  things  set 
forth  in  the  Scriptures,  and  so  obtain  instruction  in  divine 
things  thereby,  is  possible  only  on  the  assumption  that  man's 
constitution  is  endowed  with  a  theistic  capacity.  There  is 
thus  a  certain  kinship  between  God  and  man,  so  that  man 
finds  himself  made  for  God;  and,  in  turn,  it  appears  that 
God  may  communicate  a  knowledge  of  himself  to  man  in 
some  special  way.  And  this  fact  still  further  confirms  the 
view  presented  of  the  nature  of  theistic  belief. 


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f 

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APOLOGETICS. 


These  three  facts,  taken  in  connection  with  the  analysis 
made  of  theistic  belief,  greatly  illumine  and  confirm  the 
definition  of  theism  given  some  time  ago.  It  was  asserted 
that  God  was  immanent,  as  well  as  transcendent,  in  relation 
to  the  universe.  This  means  that  he  is  always  in  contact 
with  the  cosmos  in  general,  and  with  man  in  particular. 
This  being  the  case,  the  door  is  open  for  both  the  natural 
and  supernatural  forms  of  revelation  on  the  part  of 
God  to  his  creature,  man.  This  position  will  be  repeatedly 
insisted  on. 


THE  SECOND  SECTION. 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  RELIGIOUS  AND  THEISTIC  BELIEF. 
THE  FETICHISTIC  THEORY. 

Contents. 

Religk)us  and  Theistic  Belief  Related—Burning  Questions  in  Apolo- 
getics-Problems  Difficult-Diversity  of  Method—Descriptive,  His- 
torical and  Psychological  Methods— All  Methods  Needed— The  Real 
Quiestion— Qassificationof  Theories.-Cocker— Patton— Plan  Adopted 
-Nine  Tueones— Superstition  and  the  Craft  of  Cunning  Men.-No 
Philosophical  Value-The  Fetichistic  Theory-Positivism  and  Natural 
Evo  ution.-Comte  and  Shultre— Term  Fetich  Defined— Its  Usage  and 
Application— Used  in  Two  Distinct  Senses-Its  Strict  Sense— Its 
f/'lf °'"^l""'P''''''*'*'"~^'"  Symbolism  of  the  Fetich— Wait*  and 
MuIIer— The  History  of  the  Case— The  Fetichistic  Theory  Explained. 
-Criticism  of  the  Theory— Not  Complete  at  this  Point—The  Theory 
«  Superf5c.al.-It  is  Historically  Defective.-Assumes  the  Rudest  to  be 
Difficui"  ^^"^'^^    ^^°^^^    ^'*""'    Evolution— A    Psychological 

LlIOtATUlE. 

The  Articles  on  Religion  and  FeHcUism  in  the  Encyclopaedias- 
Cockers  CArw/w».<y  and  Greek  Philosophy.  Chap.  Il.-Patton's  Sylla- 
bus  onThetsm.-J.  F.  Clarke's  The  Ten  Great  Religions,  Chap.  III- 
Flint  s  The,sm  Chap.  I.-Waitz'  Anthropology.  Vol.  I.-Miiller's  Origin 
and  Growth  of  Rehgion.  Chaps.  I.,  II-Tylor's  Primitive  Culture.  Vol. 
I.,  Chaps  VIII.-XI.-Pfleiderer's  Philosophy  of  Religion.  Vol.  Ill . 
S>ec.  1.,  Chap.  I.-Principal  Caird's  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  VIII 
-Edward  Caird-s  The  Evolution  of  Religion,  Vol.  I.,  Chap.  VI.-Fair- 
bairn  s  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Religion.  Chap.  I.-Van  Oosterzee's 
Chrisl'm  Dogmaties.  Part  I.,  Chap.  I.-Hodge's  Systematic  Theology. 
Vol.  I  Part  I.,  Chap.  I.-Miley's  Systematic  Theology.  Part  I.,  Chap.  I 
Sec.  II.-Schurman's  Belief  in  God.  Ch^p.  III.-Beattie's  Methods  of 
TAmm  Part  I.,  Chap.  I.-Kellogg's  The  Genesis  and  Growth  of  Re- 
/.gwn  Chap.  II.-Fiske's  Outlines  of  the  Cosmic  Philosophy.  Vol.  II , 
Part  III  Chap.  V.-W.  N.  Qarke's  Outlines  of  Christian  Theology. 
Introd.-Tylors  Anthropology.  Chap.  XIV— Tide's  Outlines  of  the 
Htstory   of   Religion.   Chap.    I— Ellinwood's    Oriental  Religions   and 

bZ^c^''  ^.'""t.Y!."-7^'*''"''  ^'"'"'"''^  °f  ^*^''^  o^d  Christian 
Belxef   Chap.  »— Kidd's  Social  EvoluHon.-Dt  La  Saussaye's  Manual 

"Lrt  S""'vv4.^''r'*'  ,^'^-  VI.-Quatrefage's  The  Human 
r£/n  v5xf  ■  T  -^^Iri?""'  Introduction  to  the  History  of  Religion. 
Chap,  XXV.— Iverach's  Theism,  Chap.  VIII. 


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if- 


3 


I 


J4O 


APOLOGETICS. 


I.  Preliminary.    §  26. 

1.  'T^HE  question  of  the  origin  of  religion  in  general, 

J.      and  the  problem  of  the  genesis  of  theistic  belief  in 
particular,  are  so  involved  in  each  other,  that  the  discussion 
of  the  one  necessarily  requires  some  consideration  of  the 
other.    It  is  evident  that  the  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  the 
belief  in  an  infinite  personal  God  roots  itself  in  the  much 
wider  question  of  the  beginnings  of  religion  among  men. 
The  question  now  is,  How  did  men  come  to  be  religious  at 
first?    How  is  it  that  all  the  tribes  of  mankind  have  some 
sort  of  religion  ?   Are  the  simple  and  crude  forms  of  religion 
the  earliest,  or  are  the  higher  and  purer  types  first  in  time? 
Are  the  lowest  and  degraded  religions  to  be  explained  as 
degenerations  from  the  noblest  and  best?    If  the  former  are 
first,  how  did  they  originate,  and  how  do  the  latter  arise 
from  them  ?    If  the  latter  are  eariiest,  what  is  their  genesis, 
and  how  are  the  degraded  forms  related  to  them?     In 
particular,  how  did  theistic  belief,  with  its  noble  view  of 
God  and  of  his  relation  to  his  works,  first  come  into  the 
possession  of  the  human  race? 

These  are  burning  questions  in  Apologetics  at  the  present 
day,  and  on  this  field  the  conflict  is  now  fiercely  waged.  The 
influence  of  the  evolutionary  philosophy,  and  of  the  his- 
torical method  of  investigation,  are  both  sensibly  felt  in  the 
sphere  of  religion.  This  has  led  to  a  renewed  discussion 
of  the  whole  subject  of  the  genesis  of  religious  and  theistic 
belief,  and  of  the  rites  and  ceremonies  associated  with  that 
belief.  The  mode  of  the  development  of  this  belief  has  also 
had  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of  modem  thought,  so  that 
the  older  views  scarcely  seem  to  fully  meet  the  conditions  of 
the  problem  in  its  new  form. 

2.  These  questions  are  confessedly  difficult.  The  difficulty 
arises  from  various  causes.  The  views  taken  of  religion 
differ.  The  question  as  to  whether  the  beliefs  in  the  mind, 
or  the  outward  rites  and  customs  of  religion,  are  to  have 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       141 

prominence  in  the  problem,   introduces  some  confusion. 

varies  SomHIt  7"'^'"'  f"""^^  '"  ''''  investigation 
vanes.  Some  take  for  granted  that  all  religious  systems  are 
purely  natural  products,  which  have  been  ^dual^r  evolved 
from  their  primitive  form.  This  is  one  extreme.  The  other 
«treme  is  to  assume  that  all  religion  originated  exclusively 

whSr  T^'f"  ''°'"  '^'  ^"^  *h^^  ^h«  degeneration 
^^n  worL  '"'"'''  '''  '''^'''^  'y''"^'  °f  ^he 

«ihanced  by  the  diversity  of  method  followed  in  their  study. 
There  are  at  least  three  general  methods  adopted  by  different 
methoT  T^"  '°"°"  ^'""^^  exclusively'the  LcripTe 

rvstems"  7  r  "'  '°"'*"'  '°  '*"^^  ^"'^  ^°'"P*'-«  the  various 
systems  as  they  exist  at  the  present  day,  or  as  they  are 

exhibited  in  their  sacred  books.    Little  attention  is  given 

0  the  histoncal  connections  of  the  various  religions,  or  to 

mr^'T.^T''  "''''°"'-  '^^°"^h  '^^'  "^hod  gives 
much  useful  information,  yet  it  does  not  go  very  far  toward, 
the  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  religion. 

Others  adopt  the  historical  method,  which  has  given  eood 
results  in  other  departments  of  inquiry.    This  method  Lks 
to  trace  back  the  various  religions  to  their  sources,  or  to 
follow  them  doH-n  from  their  distant  fountains  in  the  remote 
past.     This  method  has  certain  decided  advantages,  for  it 
^eks  to  a«:ertain  the  facts  in  their  historic  relatbns.    Yet 
the  practical  difficulty  with  this  method  lies  in  the  fact  that 
history  proper  leads  us  back  only  so  far,  but  does  not  enable 
us  to  reach  the  very  first  stages  of  religion  among  men. 
Sooner  or  later  we  come  to  a  prehistoric  period  in  almost 
every  case.    Even  if  the  aid  of  philology  and  archeology 
^  called  m    the  difficulty  is  not  entirely  removed,   for 
.nferencer-ih  this  field  are  always  more  or  less  unce^ain. 
The  historic  method,  therefore,  has  its  limitations. 

Still  others  rr-  itclined  to  deal  with  the,^  problem,  hy 
the  psychological  method.    In  this  case  the  individual,  rather 


!'i 


I  .' 


14a 


APOLOGETICS. 


than  the  race,  is  the  direct  subject  of  inspection.  The 
inquiry,  then,  is.  How  does  religious  and  theistic  belief 
arise  in  the  individual  soul?  This,  however,  makes  a 
diiHcult  problem.  Even  with  the  aid  of  the  careful  analysis 
of  theistic  belief  made  in  the  last  chapter,  the  difficulty  still 
presses,  because  the  belief  in  the  adult  reflective  mind  is 
complex,  and  it  is  not  easy  for  such  a  mind,  by  the  aid  of 
memory,  to  go  back  to  its  first  distinct  religious  impressions, 
and  to  explain  clearly  how  they  were  obtained.  Nor  is  the 
case  materially  helped  by  careful  observation  of  the  first 
religious  impressions  of  children,  either  in  pagan  or  Chris- 
tian lands.  No  one  has  ever  yet  been  able  to  give  a  very 
satisfactory  account  of  the  way  in  which  the  child-mind 
first  comes  to  entertain  the  idea  of  God,  and  to  have  certain 
religious  sentiments  associated  with  that  idea. 

4.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  no  single  method  can 
fully  solve  the  whole  problem,  but  that  advantage  should 
be  taken  of  them  all.  The  description  of  the  manifold 
phases  of  religion  is  useful,  the  study  of  the  historic  develop- 
ment of  different  religions  is  of  much  value,  and  the 
observation  of  the  rise  of  religious  belief  in  the  soul  is  of 
great  importance.  But  it  is  only  by  letting  the  light  shine 
from  all  quarters  upon  the  perplexing  problem  of  the  genesis 
of  religious  and  theistic  belief  that  trustworthy  conclusions 
may  be  reached.  Thus  we  have  the  problem  of  the  origin 
of  theistic  belief  in  the  individual  soul,  the  question  of  the 
genesis  of  that  belief  in  the  history  of  the  human  race,  and 
the  evidence  of  the  extant  religions  of  the  day,  to  consider. 
What  is  the  origin  of  religious  belief  in  the  human  soul? 
How  did  various  religious  institutions,  like  sacrifice  and 
worship,  first  arise?  How  has  the  race  come  to  possess  the 
idea  of  God?  In  particular,  how  did  men  first  come  to 
entertain  the  belief  that  there  exists  one  infinite  personal 
being  called  God,  who  is  over  all,  and  who  sustains  abiding 
natural  and  moral  relations  with  all  his  creatures?  Was 
there  e%'ef  a  time  when  religion  was  not  a  factor  in  the  life 


! 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       143 

of  the  race?  If,  historically,  religion  is  as  old  as  the  race, 
then  the  problem  of  its  genesis  comes  round  again  to  be  a 
question  of  its  origin  in  the  individual.  How  did  the  first 
man  come  to  be  religious  and  believe  in  God  ?  In  what  sense 
are  the  germinal  principles  of  theistic  belief  in  the  very 
constitution  of  man?  The  exposition  of  this  profound 
problem  requires  several  chapters. 

II.  The  Classification  of  Theories.    §  27. 

Various  schemes  for  the  classification  of  the  theories  to 
account  for  the  origin  of  religion  have  been  proposed.  Some 
make  two  main  classes.  One  includes  all  those  theories 
which  propose  a  purely  naturalistic  explanation,  and  the 
other  embraces  those  which  find  the  origin  of  religion  in 
some  form  of  supernatural  revelation.  This  plan  of  division 
can  hardly  be  regarded  as  satisfactory,  for  it  scarcely  does 
justice  to  the  psychological  aspects  of  the  problem 

I.  Cocker  arranges  the  theories  upon  this  subject  in  five 
Classes,  and  has  a  good  discussion  of  the  whole  subject  > 

some  phase  of  superstition,  which  arises  largely  from  a  fear 
of  invisible  and  superhuman  powers,  that  are  supposed  to 
operate  in  nature.  t-t^-w  w 

Secondly  theories  which  discover  its  genesis  in  a  process 
of  the  evolution  of  the  absolute,  according  to  which  the 

I'l^eTfTn  ."^"""'."^  '"  ^"'**  '""'"^^  ^"^"^"y  ""folds 
Thirdly,  theories  which  regard  the  1-ginnings  of  religion 

as  a  natura  and  moral  feeling,  which      of  the  nature  o^  an 

mstinctive  faith  or  intuition  of  the  s     1 
Fourthly    theories  which,  in  var   ..s  ways,  regard  the 

ongin  of  religion  as  the  outcome  of  the  spontaneous  app^r! 

that  the  necessary  ideas  of  human  reason,  ,«ch  as  those  of 

'  Christianity  and  Creek  Philosophy,  p.  55. 


j'lt; 


I 


e 


1) 


I 


144 


APOLOGETICS. 


infinity  and  causation,  coming  into  consciousness  over 
against  the  changing  world,  constitute  the  source  of  theistic 
belief. 

Fifthly,  theories  which  assert  that  religion  is  due  at  first 
to  some  form  of  external  revelation  from  God,  the  reception 
of  which  by  the  human  soul  explains  the  origin  of  religious 
and  theistic  belief. 

It  is  evident  that  the  problem  mainly  before  Cocker's 
mind  is  the  origin  of  theistic  belief  in  the  individual  soul, 
and  from  this  view-point  his  classification  seems  quite  com- 
plete. He  rejects  the  theories  of  the  first  three  classes,  and 
adopts  the  fourth  as  the  true  one.  At  the  same  time,  he 
couples  with  it  certain  elements  of  the  last  class,  and  thus 
gives  revelation  a  certain  place  in  the  solution  of  the 
problem. 

2.  Patton,  in  his  Syllabus  of  Theism,  gives  a  slightly 
different  scheme.  He  treats  of  the  theories  to  account  for 
the  genesis  of  theism  under  four  classes. 

Fiirv,  those  theories  which  involve  the  principle  of 
natural  development.  Under  this  class  several  subdivisions 
are  made. 

Secondly,  theories  which  find  the  genesis  of  theistic  belief 
in  outward  revelation  of  some  kind. 

Thirdly,  theories  which  find  the  beginnings  of  theistic 
belief  in  some  sort  of  inference  or  logical  process  of  the 
mind. 

Fourthly,  theories  which  regard  this  belief  as  the  outcome 
of  a  certain  form  of  intuition.  The  last  view,  rightly  under- 
stood, is  the  one  which  Patton  adopts;  and  he  argues  for 
it  with  much  force. 

3.  The  following  classification  slightly  modifies  and 
expands  those  just  outlined,  and  is  adopted  for  this  dis- 
cussion. 

First,  those  reasonings  which  seek  the  origin  of  religious 
and  theistic  belief  in  superstition,  the  cunning  or  craft  of 
men. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       145 

Secondly,  theories  which  deny  the  original  theistic  nature 
of  man,  and  find  the  origin  of  religion  in  fetichism. 

Thirdly,  those  schemes  which  discover  the  beginnings  of 
religion  m  naturism  or  animism. 

Fourthly,  somewhat  similar  speculations  which  regard 
spiritism  or  ancestorism  as  the  source  of  religion. 

Fifthly,  those  peculiar  intermediate  views  which  propose 
henotheism  as  the  starting  point  of  theistic  belief  in  con- 
nection with  the  infinite. 

Sixthly,  those  views  which  give  a  foremost  place  to  some 
mode  of  reasoning  or  reflection. 

Seve-thly,  the  speculative  proposals  of  idealistic  evolution 
to  account  for  the  origin  of  this  belief. 

Eighthly,  the  theory  which  proposes  outward  revelation 
from  God  as  the  source  of  theistic  belief. 

Ninthly,  the  accepted  doctrine,  which  may  be  termed  the 
rational,  intuitional  or  inspirational  theory.  This  theory  is 
outlined  in  harmony  with  the  view  taken  in  the  last  chapter 
touching  the  nature  of  theistic  belief. 

The  first  of  these  schemes  has  no  philosophic  value,  and 
may  be  dismissed  in  a  few  sentences.  The  next  four  will 
be  found  to  be  inadequate  solutions  of  the  problem.  In  the 
next  three  theories,  aspects  of  truth  will  be  found,  and  these 
must  be  carefully  educed.  The  last-named  view  will  be 
vindicated  as  the  true  doctrine  of  the  genesis  of  religious 
and  theistic  belief.  It  will  also  incorporate  what  is  true  in 
some  of  the  other  theories. 

4-  The  first  class  of  theories  is  associated  wi*'-;  a  mate- 
rialistic philosophy,  and  a  tliorough-going  skepticism  in 
regard  to  spiritual  forms  of  being.  It  is  as  old  as  Epicurus 
and  Lucretius,  and  as  new  as  the  latest  superficial  skepticism 
of  our  own  day.  It  denies  that  man's  nature  is  essentially 
religious,  and  then  seeks  to  give  some  purely  empirical 
explanation  of  the  way  in  which  religion,  as  a  universal  fact 
among  men.  at  first  arose.  There  are  several  shades  of 
10 


^l; 


inH 


i 


146 


APOLOGETICS. 


opinion  among  the  advocates  of  this  view  as  to  the  best 
«xplanation. 

Some  say  that  fear  or  dread  of  some  supposed  super- 
human powers  led  to  the  belief  in  deity  and  produced 
religion.  In  particular,  alarm  at  the  rough  moods  of  nature, 
and  the  experience  of  the  evils  which  befall  men  in  the  world' 
caused  them  by  degrees  to  believe  in  certain  supposed 
agencies  behind  them,  and  to  perform  certain  rites  with  a 
view  to  obtain  or  preserve  the  favor  of  these  agencies  or 
deities. 

This  theory  has  no  real  value,  for  the  reason,  mainly,  that 
fear  is  an  emotion  which  is  associated  with  some  belief  or 
conviction  already  entertained.  Hence,  before  reverential 
regard  or  superstitious  fear  could  have  arisen,  men  must 
already  have  had  some  sort  of  belief  in  these  superhuman 
powers  or  agents.  But  it  is  the  origin  of  this  very  belief  for 
which  search  is  now  instituted.  This  search  reveals  the 
fact  that  it  is  not  fear  which  produces  religious  belief,  but 
that  this  belief  rather  conditions  this  fear.  The  con- 
viction produces  the  emotion,  not  the  emotion  the  con- 
viction. 

5-  The  other  main  aspect  of  this  skeptical  theory  is  to  the 
effect  that  religion  arose  from  the  cunning  of  priests  and 
the  craft  of  rulers.  It  argues  that  these  classes  of  men 
planned  belief  in  the  deities  and  formulated  systems  of 
religion  among  men  for  purely  selfish  ends.  They  sought 
thereby  to  secure  and  retain  influence  and  authority  over 
men  for  their  own  personal  advantage.  To  this  end,  there- 
fore, they  invented  religion. 

This  view  is  also  entirely  superficial.  Before  priests  or 
rulers  could  have  had  any  such  influence  over  men  as  this 
theory  asserts,  it  must  be  presupposed  that  men  already 
possess  religious  convictions  and  sentiments.  Before  these 
cunning  priests  and  crafty  rulers  could  possibly  find  any 
point  of  contact  with  the  men  they  sought  to  influence,  these 
men  must  alre.idy  have  become  possessed  of  relii^ious  senti- 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       147 

ments.  The  question  now  under  consideration  relates  to  the 
origin  of  these  very  sentiments,  which  constitute  the  essence 
of  rehgion.  Thus,  it  turns  out  again  that  religion  makes 
priests  ^ssible,  instead  of  priests  having  produced  religion 
at  the  first.  And  civil  rulers  can  only  bring  religious 
influences  to  bear  upon  men  under  the  supposition  that  the 
men  under  them  already  possess  the  essential  elements  of 
religion  in  their  lives. 

III.  Statement  of  the  Fetichistic  Theory.    §  28. 

I.  In  general,  this  theory  finds  the  origin  of  religious  and 
theistic  belief  in  what  is  called  fetichism.    It  maintains  that 
man  at  first  was  non-theistic  and  non-religious,  and  it 
assumes  that  fetichism  is  the  lowest  form  of  religion 
From  It,  as  the  starting-point,  and  by  a  strictly  natural 
evolutionary  process,  all  phases  of  religious  belief,  culmi- 
nating in  definite  monotheism,  have  gradually  arisen.    The 
term  fetichism  is  used  in  vario-ts  senses,  and  not  a  little 
confusion  has  arisen  from  this     nbiguity.    And  the  precise 
relations  of  fetichism,  animism  and  naturism  are  by  no 
means  very  clearly  defined.     Nor  is  the  precise  place  of 
magic  and  taboo  in  relation  to  fetichism  yet  uniformly 
understood  among  writers  upon  this  theme. 

The  fetichistic  explanation  of  the  genesis  of  religion  is 
advocated  by  positivists  generally.  Comte  for  the  earlier 
and  Schultze  for  the  later  positivists,  advocated  this  theory' 
though  Schultze  was  prepared  to  admit  an  early  belief  in 
spirits  along  with  fetichism.  In  general,  this  theory  denies 
that  man  is  theistic  and  religious  in  his  very  consutution, 
and  It  maintains  that  religion  in  general,  and  the  belief  in 
God  m  particular,  grew  out  of  fetichism.  A  generation  or 
two  ago  many  were  content  to  hold  this  theory,  and  some 
were  its  earnest  advocates.  But  at  the  present  day  the 
priority  of  fetichism  has  been  seriously  questioned,  not  only 
by  Christian  apologists,  but  also  by  many  students  of 


#*f^ 


148 


APOLOGETICS. 


^ 


: 


religion  who  argue  on  merely  naturalistic  grounds  that  some 
other  form  of  religious  belief  antedated  fetichism. 

2   The  term  fetich  comes  from  the  Portuguese  feitico 
which,  m  turn,  is  connected  with  the  Latin  factitius    It  thus 
means  something  that  is  artificial,  or  made  by  the  skill  of 
man.    Whether  it  should  be  connected  with  the  word  fatum 
may  be  considered  doubtful.    Le  Brosse,  who  lived  about 
the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  was  the  first  to  use  the 
temi.    In  a  curious  old  book  he  describes  how  the  term 
fetttco,  from  which  fetich  is  derived,  was  applied  by  Portu- 
giiese  explorers  on  the  coast  of  West  Africa  to  certain 
objects  which  the  natives  of  that  region  regarded  with 
religious  veneration.    By  degrees  the  term  fetich  came  to 
denote  these  and  various  other  objects. 

3.  In  the  course  of  time  the  application  of  the  term  was 
extended,  until  at  the  present  day  its  usage  is  varied  and 
comprehensive.    Indeed,  in  the  popular  mind  fetichism  is 
often  taken  to  embrace  all  those  lower  forms  of  religious 
belief  and  worship  wherein  certain  natural  and  artificial 
objects  are  regarded  as  having  connected  with  them  certain 
superhuman  powers  for  good  or  evil.    The  term  thus  comes 
to  have  a  very  wide  application.    It  includes  not  onI>  various 
natural  or  artificial  material  objects  which  are  regarded  as 
m  some  sense  superhuman  or  divine,  and  possessed  of  some 
sort  of  magical  powers.    It  also  embraces  many  other  things 
such  as  bus  of  metal,  pieces  of  cloth,  and  locks  of  hair  as 
well  as  rehcs,  amulets  and  carved  images  of  all  sorts.     In 
addition,  various  animals,  birds  and  reptiles,  when  they 
become  objects  of  veneration,  and  even  the  heavenly  bodies 
when  they  are  worshipped,  are  called  fetiches.     This    of 
course,  is  a  rather  indefinite  use  of  the  term.     Strictly 
speaking,  the  fetich  is  any  natural  or  artificial  object  which 
ts  supposed  to  possess  some  magical  virtue,  in  bringing  good 
or  warding  off  evil,  and  which  consequently  is  held  in 
reverential  regard. 

4.  In  its  religious  applications  it  is  obvious  that  the  term 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       149 

is  used  in  two  distinct  senses.  In  a  wide  and  somewhat 
popular  sense  it  is  used  to  denote  all  those  objects  just 
mentioned  which  are  regarded  by  certain  men  with  religious 
veneration.  It  is  this  vague  usage  which  has  introduced 
confusion  into  the  discussion.  Properly  speaking,  the  term 
should  be  confined  to  the  worship  of  certain  tangible  inani- 
mate objects  in  nature,  or  to  certain  artificial  objects  made 
by  the  skill  of  man,  and  in  which  some  peculiar  magical 
virtues  reside.  Fetichism,  as  a  religious  scheme,  is  that 
phase  of  religious  belief  and  worship  which  implies  the 
veneration  of  these  objects  as  divine,  and  as  endowed  with 
magical  powers. 

In  this  strict  sense  it  is  distinct  from  animism,  naturism 
and  spiritism,  and  it  excludes  zoolatry  and  astrolatry  as  well, 
since  its  objects  are  simple  and  inanimate.  It  is  merely  a 
crude  form  of  idolatry,  coupled  with  the  belief  in  magic. 
At  times  it  scarcely  deserves  the  name  of  a  religion,  yet 
positivists  claim  that  it  is  the  fountain  of  all  religion. 

5.  A  perplexing  question  now  arises  in  regard  to  the 
proper  interpretation  of  the  religious  significance  of  the 
fetich.  How  are  these  various  objects  called  fetiches  to  be 
regarded?  In  what  sense  are  they  divine?  Do  they  point 
to  something  beyond  themselves?  What  is  the  import  of 
the  magical  virtue  which  is  supposed  to  reside  in  them  and 
to  be  exercised  by  them  ?  The  answer  given  to  these  queries 
will  evidently  aflfect  the  view  taken  of  the  fetichistic  theory 
touching  the  origin  of  religion  among  men.  The  result  is 
that  there  are  really  two  quite  distinct  opinions  upon  this 
point. 

The  one  opinion  is,  that  the  fetich,  as  a  tangible  object  of 
veneration,  is  the  goal  upon  which  the  worship  terminates. 
The  object  called  the  fetich  is  regarded  as  the  deity,  and  no 
symbolism  whatever  is  attached  to  it.  This  is  the  opinion 
held  by  the  thorough-going  positivists.  alike  of  earlier  and 
later  types.  They  earnestly  contend  that  there  is  nothing 
else  than  the  fetich  to  be  taken  into  account,  and  that  the 


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APOLOGETICS. 


worship  begins  and  ends  with  the  object  so  denoted.  In 
support  of  this  view,  facts  are  adduced  mainly  from  the 
lowest  types  of  paganism,  where  the  impressic-  of  the  divine 
has  almost  faded  from  the  consciousness  of  men. 

The  other  opinion  is  to  the  effect  that  the  object  called  the 
fetich  is  the  sign  or  symbol  of  the  divine.    The  fetich  is  not 
all  there  is,  nor  does  it  exist  for  itself  alone.    It  is  a  tangible 
or  visible  sign  of  that  which  is  intangible  or  invisible.    In 
Its  higher  forms  the  fetich  becomes  the  symbol  of  the  divine. 
Waitz  and  MuUer,  in  arguing  against  the  fetichisti"  theory, 
insist  strongly  upon  this  interpretation  of  the  fetich.    They 
maintain  that  among  pagan  peoples  generally  there  prevails 
a  conviction,  often  very  vague  indeed,  of  the  reality  of  the 
unseen  and  superhuman.    According  to  this  view,  the  fetich 
comes  to  r^jresent  something  beyond  the  object.     The 
testimony  of  Waitz  is  of  great  value  upon  this  point,  for  the 
reason  that  he  has  studied,  as  perhaps  few  others  have,  the 
religious  beliefs  and  practices  of  the  African  peoples,  upon 
which  the  positivists  chiefly  rely  in  support  of  their  views. 
He,  and  others  since  his  day,  assert  with  confidence  that 
even  among  the  degraded  tribes  of  Africa  there  exists  a 
generally  diffused,  though  often  vague,  impression  of  the 
reality  of  the  supernatural,  along  with  their  fetichistic  beliefs 
and  practices. 

6.  There  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  this  was  the  state 
of  the  case  when  the  objects  called  fetiches  first  came  to  be 
regarded  with  veneration.  This  is  not  inconsistent  with  the 
position  that  some  of  these  rude  peoples  in  Africa  or  the 
islands  of  the  sea  have  in  later  times  largely  lost  a  vivid 
sense  of  the  invisible  and  divine,  and  have  confined  their 
worship  entirely  to  the  object  known  as  the  fetich.  It  has 
simply  to  be  assumed  that  a  process  of  degradation,  of  which 
there  are  varied  evidences,  has  taken  place,  and  that  as  a 
result  the  original  symbolism  of  the  fetich  has  been  almost 
entirely  lost.  It  will  be  Sserved  in  this  connection  that  if 
this  be  true,  fctichism,  in  its  strict  sense,  cannot  have  been 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       151 

the  first  form  of  religion,  and  hence  not  the  source  of 
religious  belief. 

7.  It  only  remains  to  explain  a  little  more  clearly  how 
religious  and  theistic  belief  originated,  according  to  the 
theory  under  notice.  Since  different  authors  give  diverse 
details  of  explanation  regarding  this  problem,  only  general 
outlines  of  exposition  can  now  be  given.  The  central 
principle  of  the  theory  is  natural  evolution.  Its  starting 
point  is  the  lowest  phase  of  religious  belief  and  practice. 
This  is  assumed  to  be  fetichism.  This  marks  the  condition 
of  primitive  men  when  they  first  began  to  feel  the  religious 
impulse  moving  within  them.  Certain  natural  objects  round 
about  them  arrested  their  attention,  as  this  impulse  moved 
in  their  souls,  and  by  degrees  a  vague  sense  of  the  super- 
natural began  to  be  associated  with  these  objects.  Certain 
magical  powers  were  also  connected  with  them.  By  degrees 
men  began  to  suspect  that  there  was  some  peculiar  hurtful 
or  helpful  influences  in  these  objects,  so  that  they  gradually 
came  to  be  regarded  with  superstitious  fear.  The  conviction 
also  came  into  the  minds  of  these  early  men  that  the  powers 
supposed  to  be  exercised  by  these  objects  had  some  relation 
to  human  affairs  and  destiny. 

Then,  as  the  evolution  proceeded,  men  began  to  extend 
the  scope  of  the  term  fetich,  and  to  apply  it  to  various  other 
objects.  Under  this  impulse  these  other  objects  were 
endowed  with  magical  powers  and  regarded  as  fetiches.  By 
this  means  fetichism  virtually  became  a  system  of  polythe- 
istic idolatry.  It  next  came  to  pass  that  a  belief  in  souls  or 
spirits  arose,  to  account  for  these  magical  powers  in  the 
fetiches,  and  by  this  means  mythology  in  general,  and  ances- 
tor worship  in  particular,  are  accounted  for.  Thus,  step  by 
step,  according  to  this  theory,  by  reason  of  an  impulse  in 
primitive  men,  and  by  the  influence  of  environment  without 
them,  religion  was  gradually  elevated  and  purified,  till  at 
length  monotheistic  belief,  witii  its  appropriate  modes  of 
worship,  was  evolved  from  its  lowly  origin  in  fetichism. 


,•  I  ■ 


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152 


APOLOGETICS. 


In  this  way  simple  rcverencf  for  certain  natural  or  artificial 
objects,  wtth  which  so.ne  magical  or  superhuman  powers 
were  somehow  associaiei,  developed  into  the  cruder  forms 
of  polytheism;  and  these,  in  turn,  passed  on  into  the  great 
mythologies.  These,  agpi.  oushed  their  way  slowly  up- 
wards, till  at  last  Judu.  rn  ....,  Christianity  appeared.  The 
process  throughout  is  .  :f,.M>..ic  evolution,  and  the  result 
IS  the  derivation  of  h.  'si.  bel-  f  from  fetichism. 

IV.  Criticise  of  :!<r  Theot ;.    §  29. 
Extended  criticism  o "  u.h  the..-    ^    ...unt  for  the  origin 

hL  T"i'  '"^'""''  '"  '"•''"  ■  -"''•-  '"^^  the  reason  thafit 
has  httle  eflFective  advocacy  at  de  .resent  day,  and  partly 

bemuse  the  critical  re  ew  0.  .,  .equent  theories  will! 
indirectly  at  least,  serve  to  refute  the  ietichistic  theory  The 
points  of  criticism  now  made  rei.te  mainly  to  those  phases 
of  this  theory  that  pertain  to  the  origin  of  religious  belief, 
rather  than  to  its  development. 

I.  The  latest  researches  into  the  question  of  the  origin 
and  growth  of  religion,  made  by  eminent  men,  go  far  to 
sliow  that  the  fetichistic  theory  is  supcrfidai  and  inadequate. 
These  researches  fully  justify  the  suspicion  that  fetichism 
may  not  have  been  the  earliest  form  of  religion.     Indeed, 
hey  make  it  reasonable  to  believe  that  prior  to  fetichism 
some  other  form  of  religion  was  extant  among  men.    Some 
say  that  this  earlier  form  was  animism,  others  naturism, 
others  spiritism    and  still   others   argue  for  a  primitive 
mono  heism.    If  any  of  these  views  be  made  good,  the  claim 
of  fetichism  to  priority  is  overthrown.     Muller.   in  his 
elaborate  review  of  the  religions  of  India;    Ebrard,  in   lis 
comprehensive  exposition  of  the  religions  of  savage  and 
civilized  peoples;    Waitz,  in  his  exhaustive  survey  of  the 
religious  customs  of  many  African  tribes;  Pfleiderer,  in  his 
profound  philosophic  critique  of  the  question  of  primitive 
rehgion;   Spencer,  in  his  earnest  advocacy  of  ancestorism; 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       153 

Tylor,  in  his  elaborate  study  of  the  whole  subject;  Lang  in 
a  careful  review  of  the  beginnings  of  religion,  and  Jevons, 
who  makes  ,t  pretty  clear  that  Le  Brosse  misunderstood  the 
facts  concerning  the  tribes  of  West  Africa,  all  argue  against 
the  priority  of  fetichism  in  religion.  Even  though  these 
writers  diflFer  widely  in  regard  to  their  own  positive  views 
still,  negatively,  as  against  fetichism,  they  are  all  at  one.' 
Those  who  take  still  higher  ground,  and  argue  for  a  primi- 
tive monotheism,  are  able  at  the  present  time  to  adduce 
strong  evidence  for  their  position.  They  can  at  least  show 
that  their  conclusions  are  not  unreasonable.  It  may  be 
safely  said,  therefore,  that  the  fetichistic  theory  is  now 
practically  abandoned  by  the  leading  scholars  in  this  field 

2.  The  fetichistic  theory  largely  misses  the  mark.    Even 
if  It  were  shown  t.    be  historically  true  thnt  the  first  men 
did  venerate  the  objects  called  fetiches,  this  would  not  go 
very  far  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  religion   for 
the  reason  that  tiie  real  question  relates  to  the  origin  of  the 
impulse  towards  thi.^  veneration  in  these  men.     Even  if 
men  m  the  earliest  times  came  to  regard  these  objects  as  in 
some  sense  divine,  and  as  possessing  certain  magical  powers 
the  question  at  once  arises  as  to  how  it  came  to  pass  that 
these  men  were  able  to  exercise  the  impulse  which  led  them 
to  associate  the  idea  of  deity  with  these  objects.    Thi;  on 
the  psychological  side  at  least,  is  the  real  question  involved 
m  the  origin  of  religious  belief,  and  the  fetichistic  theory 
really  assumes  that  primitive  men  possessed  and  used  the 
notion  of  deity  in  order  to  attain  to  fetichism.     Spencer, 
Muller  and  Tylor  use  this  point  against  the  positivi.ts  with 
great  effect. 

3.  The  fetichistic  theory  assumes  that  the  lowest  form  of 
religion  was  necessarily  the  earliest  in  time.  This  is  <  le  01 
the  main  implications  of  a  purely  evolutionary  theory.  T!ie 
rudest  and  simplest  forms  of  existence  must  b(  first.  . vid 
the  more  complex  and  purer  come  from  these,  by  aii  entirely 
natural  process.     Fetichism  is  assumed  to  be  the  <im[  iest 


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»54 


APOLOGETICS. 


form  of  religion,  and  the  more  complex  forms  must  have 
come  from  it.  Bu<  this  assumption  is  really  not  sustained 
by  the  history  of  civilization  in  general,  nor  by  the  history 
of  religion  in  particular.  This  history  shows  that  degenera- 
tion has  often  taken  place,  especially  in  the  case  of  religion. 
In  Egypt,  Babylonia,  Persia  and  India,  inscriptions  on  tombs 
and  temples,  and  the  literature  of  these  lands,  bear  undoubted 
testimony  to  the  fact  that  decline  has  often  taken  place  in 
religion.  Just  in  proportion  as  ;  s  is  true,  fetichism  must 
abandon  its  claim  to  priority,  for  instead  of  the  rudest  being 
first  in  time,  it  may  be  the  result  of  degeneration  in  .later 
days.  Mere  crudeness  in  form  does  not  pro"e  priority  in 
time. 

4.  Naturalistic  evolution  may  not  be  true  in  the  sphere  of 
religion.    Even  if  that  hypothesis  were  true  in  the  organic 
realm,  it  would  still  have  to  be  established  by  its  own 
appropriate  evidence  in  the  case  of  religion.     This  can 
scarcely  be  said  to  have  been  accomplished  as  yet.    Hence, 
■he  fetichistic  theory  for  the  origi..  of  religion  can  have  no 
greater  logical  validity  than  natural  evolution  has  scientific 
truth  in  the  sphere  of  religion.    In  addition,  it  may  be  proper 
to  remark,  that  even  if  it  be  made  out  that  evolution  is  true 
in  this  sphere,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  its  actual 
operation  this  principle  has  a  twofold  movement.     If  in 
certain  cases  there  may  t^  progress  from  the  simple  to  the 
comple.\,  there  may  in  other  cases  be  decline  from  the  purer 
to  the  cruder  forms  of  religious  belief.    This  twofold  move- 
ment is  fully  confirmed  by  history,  and  most  evolutionists 
now  admit  it.     Thus  there  is  advance  in  Judaism  and 
Christianity,  and  degeneration  in  the  pagan  systems  gen- 
erally.    If  this  be  true,  fetichism  is  not  necessarily  the 
primitive  type  of  religion.    It  may  rather  be  a  decline  fron- 
a  purer  type,  and  consequently  its  claim  to  be  the  source  of 
all  religions  cannot  be  confidently  maintained,  even  on  the 
supposition  of  the  truth  of  evolution  in  the  sphere  of 
religion. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       155 

5.  The  fetichistic  theory  has  to  face  a  serious  psycho- 
logical dimcully.    The  question  is  as  to  how  the  first  men 
were  able  to  call  any  material  object  a  god.     The  object 
called  a  fetich  is  one  thing,  and  the  notion  of  deity  is  another. 
A  piece  of  wood,  a  bit  of  a  bone,  a  pebble,  a  carved  image, 
or  anything  else  which  is  regarded  as  a  fetich,  belongs  to 
one  category  of  existence,  and  the  notion  of  deity  pertains 
to  another.    The  question,  now,  is  as  to  how  untutored  men, 
away  back  in  the  dawn  of  religious  experience,  were  able 
to  associate  these  two  things,  and  thus  call  the  object  a  god, 
and  endow  it  with  divine  or  magical  powers.    The  fetichistic 
theory  assumes  that  primitive  men  did  this.    Now,  how  was 
this  possible,  unless  it  be  assumed  that  these  early  men 
already  had  in  their  minds  the  notion  of  deity?    This  is  an 
initial  obstacle  in  the  way  of  this  theory.    It  is  bound  to 
surmount  this  obstacle,  for  the  real  question  is  as  to  the 
origin  of  the  very  idea  in  the  minds  of  primitive  men  which 
must  be  presupposed  in  order  to  the  possibility  of  fetichism. 
The  problem  thus  raised  is  to  be  co- sidered  in  the  light  of 
the  analysis  of  theistic  belief  made  m  the  last  chapter.    It 
was  there  explained  how  it  came  to  pass  that  man  is  nble  to 
apply  theistic  predicates  to  certain  natural  objects.    It  was 
shown  that  the  capacity  to  do  this  is  latent  in  man's 
constitution,  and  that,  in  the  last  analysis,  the  question  of 
the  origin  of  religion  and  theistic  belief  resolves  itself  into 
the  ques.ion  of  the  genesis  of  this  capacity  in  man.    We  are 
under   the   psychological    necessity   of   presupposing   that 
primitive  men  had  already  in  their  minds  the  notion  of  deity 
before  they  could  call  any  fetich  a  deity.    If  this  be  so,  then 
fetichism  cannot  be  the  fountain  whence  religion  springs. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  pretty  clfcar  that  theistic  belief 
conditions  fetichism  psychologically.    This  fact  effectually 
refutes  the  positivist  theory,  which  discovers  the  genesis 
of  religion  and  theism  in  fetichism. 


if 

ii 


i 


Mh 


Vi  . ... 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  RELIGIOUS  AND  THEISTIC  BELIEF. 
NATURISM  AND  ANIMISM. 

Contents. 

Same  Problem.— Another  Solution  Proposed.— Naturism  and  Anim- 
ism.—Naturisra,  Animism,  Spiritism  and  Ancestorism  Defined.— State- 
ment of  Naturism.—Pfleiderer.— Nature  in  a  Poetic  and  Mythical  A»- 
pect.— Naturistic  Mythology.— Origin  of  Religion  th-is  Explained.— Re- 
lation of  Morality.— The  Development  of  Religion.— Examination  of 
Naturism.— Same  Objections  as  Fetichism.— If  Fetichism  be  a  Degene- 
ration, so  may  Animism.— Naturism  may  not  Represent  Primitive 
Men.— The  Psychological  Difficulty.— Statement  of  Animism.— Its  Defi- 
nite Meaning.-Tylor  and  Tiele.-Belief  in  Souls.-Distinct  from 
Spiritism.— Origin  of  Religion  thus  Explained.— Examimition  of  Anim- 
ism.- Some  of  the  Same  Difficulties  as  Before.— Others  of  a  General 
Nature.— The  Weakness  of  the  Historical  Method.— Need  of  the  Psy- 
chological 

LrmATUBX. 
The  Encyclopedia  Articles  on  Naturitm  and  -^nimwm.— Pfleiderer"! 
Philosophy  of  Religion,  Vol.  I.,  Chap.  I.-Tiele's  Outlines  of  the  His- 
v?,,"/  ^''•""'''"'  ^'P-  I— Spencer's  Sociology.  Part  I.,  Chaps.  XXII.- 
XXIV.-Miiller's  Natural  Religion.  Chap.  VI.— Fiske's  Cosmic  Phil- 
osophy. Vol.  I.,  Part  III..  Ch»p.  V.-Kellogg's  Genesis  and  Growth  of 
Reltgton.  Chap.  II.— Lindsay's  Theistic  Philosophy  of  Religion.  Chap. 
III.— De  La  Saussaye's  Scititce  of  Religion.  Chap.  VI.— Menzie's  His- 
tory of  Religion.  Chap.  II.-Tylor'«  Primitive  Culture.  Chaps.  XI.- 
XVII.— Ung's  The  Afaking  cf  Religion.  Chap.  VIII.-Fairbairn's 
Studies  tn  the  Philosophy  of  Religion.  Chap.  I.-J.  Leighton  Wilson's 
H  estern  Africa,  Part  II.,  Chap.  XII. 

I.  Preliminary.    §  30. 

THE  problem  here  is  still  the  same.  How  did  men  first 
attaiti  to  the  conviction  of  the  divme?  How  did 
they  come  to  have  the  idea  of  Got!  in  their  minds?  What 
is  the  relation  between  the  simpler  and  the  more  complex 
forms  of  religious  belief  and  practice?  What  was  the  first 
form  of  this  belief,  and  what  has  been  the  law  of  its  historical 
development  among  men? 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.        157 

1.  In  the  last  chapter  one  answer  to  these  questions  was 
considered  and  found  defective.     Several  other  proposed 
solutions   of  a   somewhat   similar   nature   remain   to   be 
explained  and  examined.    These  solutions  are,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  very  closely  related,  and  may,  for  the  purpose  of 
orderly  discussion,  be  grouped  under  four  heads :  Naturism, 
Animism,    Spiritism   and   Ancestorism.      These   proposed 
theories  to  account  for  the  origin  of  religion  all  agree  in 
denymg  the  inherent  religiousness  of  primitive  men.    More- 
over, the  various  facts  with  which  these  theories  propose 
to  deal  are  so  blended  together  in  the  experience  of  men 
m  early  times,  that  a  strict  analysis  of  them,  even  into  these 
four  classes,  is  practically  impossible.    Nor  are  the  leading 
writers  upon  this  subject  at  all  agreed  as  to  how  these  four 
types  of  theory  ought  to  be  regarded  in  their  historic 
relations.    All  that  may  be  safely  affirmed  is  that  the  several 
principles  involved  in  these  four  theories  may  be  supposed 
to  have  had  something  to  do  with  the  genesis  of  religion 
among  men. 

It   is,   therefore,    mainly    for   the   purpose   of   definite 
discussion  that  this  fourfold  division  of  kindred  theories  is 
proposed.     1  liese  four  theories  form  a  group  of  two  pairs 
One  pair  will  be  discussed  in  this  chapter,  and  the  other  in 
the  next.    In  the  last  chapter  it  was  shown  that  fetichism  is 
simple  image  worship,  a  rude  form  of  idolatry  and  belief 
•n  magic.     It  is  now  to  be  explained  that  mturism  is  a 
sentiment  of  reverence  towards  nature  as  a  whole,  and 
veneration  for  certain  si>ecific  aspects  of  nature  in  particular- 
that  animism  is  that  somewhat  more  definite  view  of  nature 
whicl,     regards   it   as  animated   by   certain   activities,   or 
permeated  by  active  f.^rces  which  are  often  idealized  or 
personified;    that  stiritism  lays  stress  upon  the  primitive 
behcf  m  souls  or  spirits,  as  having  at  first  some  sort  of 
separate  existence,  and  also  as  capable  of  entering  into,  and 
possessing,  various  natural  objects;  and  that  'vucslomm  is 
a  development  from  spiritism,  by  means  of  which  primitive 


'■>. 


ml 


i 


X58 


APOLOGETICS. 


men  are  supposed  to  have  been  led  in  some  way  to  regard 
their  dead  ancestors  as  still  living,  and  as  worthy  of 
veneration.  Thus  we  have  to  examine  naturism,  animism, 
spiritism  and  ancestorism,  as  proposed  solutions  of  the 
problem  of  the  origin  of  religion  in  general,  pnd  of  theistic 
beliex  in  particular. 


;  ! 


ili 


II.  Statement  of  Naturism.     §  31. 

2.  The  leading  exponent  of  this  view  is  Pfleiderer,  and 
one  class  of  mythologists  agrees  in  the  main  with  him.  He 
argues  that  religion  cannot  have  had  its  beginnings,  either 
in  external  revelation  or  in  fetichism.  He  claims  that  we 
must  discover  its  origin  in  some  middle  view  lying  between 
these  extremes.  He  further  contends  that  this  middle  view 
can  be  neither  henotheism  nor  ancestorism,  because  these 
are  more  mature  forms  of  religious  belief.  Nor  can  it  even 
be  animism,  as  this  term  is  generally  understood.  He  rather 
finds  the  solution  of  this  difficult  problem  in  what  he  is 
pleased  to  call  naturism  which  may  be  looked  upon  as  the 
most  primitive  form  of  nature  worship.  In  the  main, 
Reville  agrees  with  Pfleiderer. 

It  is  not  easy  to  give  a  lucid  and  complete  statement  of 
this  theory  in  the  few  paragraphs  which  can  be  devoted  to 
it  here.  It  is  a  form  of  religious  consciousness  higher  than 
that  implied  in  fetichism,  and,  at  the  same  time,  not  so 
high  as  that  involved  in  animism.  In  general,  it  is  a  theory 
which  has  regard  to  nature  in  a  somewhat  ideal  or  poetic 
way.  It  argues  that  primitive  man,  at  the  very  outset  of 
his  career,  was  naturally  inclined  to  look  upon  certain 
processes  and  activities  of  nature  with  sentiments  of  awe 
or  reverence.  Just  as  fetichism  lays  hold  of  tangible  material 
objects  near  at  hand  with  reverential  regard,  so  naturism 
looks  abroad  upon  the  beautiful  world  all  around,  and  lifts 
it.  eyes  to  the  heavens  above,  and  views  the  varied  objects 
therein  presented  with  sentiments  of  veneration,  which  find 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.        159 

expression  in  acts  of  worship.    Thus  the  conditions  of  the 
first  dawnings  of  the  sense  of  the  divine  in  the  soul  are 
supposed  to  He  in  the  simple  half-poetic  and  half-mythical 
view  which  primitive  man   took  of  nature,   and   in  the 
corresponding  feelings  which  that  view  stirred  within  him 
The  somewhat  childlike  fancy  of  men,  when  the  race  was 
in  Its  infancy,  led  them  to  look  upon  nature  as  interpene- 
trated by  numberless  activities,  whose  varied  operations 
were  conceived  after  the  analogy  of  animal  life,  or  after  the 
manner  of  the  conscious  life  of  mankind.    These  activities 
as  seen  in  the  beautiful  world  about  them,  or  in  the  majesty 
of  the  heavens  above  them,  made  a  profound  impression 
upon  primitive  man.    By  degrees  these  activities,  by  a  sort 
of  mythical  process,  came  to  be  personified  in  an  almost 
unconscious  way.    Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  the  sun,  moon 
and  stars,  the  lightning,  the  thunder  and  the  storm,  and 
the  river,  the  mountain  and  the  sea,  were  clad  with  certain 
divine  qualities;  and,  in  turn,  they  stirred,  in  the  receptive 
souls  of  primitive  men,  those  sentiments  which  constituted 
the  beginnings  of  religious   feeling,   and  led  to  acts  of 
homape. 

In  this  way,  according  to  this  theory,  men  first  began  to 
believe  in  deity,  and  to  have  devout  experiences  in  their 
souls.    It  does  not  claim  that  man,  in  this  initial  stage  of 
religion,  had  a  well-defined  belief  in  deities,  existing  apart 
from  or  independenMy  of  nature.    At  first,  nature  and  the 
deity  were  blended  or  identified.     Yet  it  was  from  this 
view  of  nature,  or  from  what  may  be  termed  the  mythical 
conception  of  nature  deities,  that  the  original  gcds  of  all 
religions  took  their  rise.    And  it  is  in  the  reverence  borne 
towards  these  deities  that  the  beginnings  of  all  religious 
worship  are  to  be  discovered.     In  one  respect  this  belief 
and  worship  constitute  that   widely  prevalent  phase   of 
mythology  in  which  a  great  variety  of  striking  poetic  views 
of  nature  appear  in  the  form  of  the  nature  myths  of  all  sorts. 
Did  space  permit,  it  would  be  of  much  interest  to  give 


mm 

s 


' 


I 


i6o 


APOLOGETICS. 


concrete  illustrations  of  some  of  these  simple  mythical  views 
of  nature. 

3.  This  theory  further  contends  that  a  sense  of  moral 
obligation  among  primitive  men  gradually  grew  out  of  the 
feelings  of  mingled  awe  and  confidence,  and  from  the  desire 
to  be  in  harmony  with  these  nature  deities.  In  this  way 
the  origin  of  morality,  and  its  relation  to  religion,  is 
explained.  As  primitive  men  found  that  their  welfare  was 
conditioned  in  various  ways  upon  the  everchanging  moods 
of  nature,  so  they  became  the  subjects  of  an  impulse  to 
act  in  such  ways  towards  the  nature  deities  already  de- 
scribed as  would  be  for  their  best  interests.  Thus  the 
primitive  piety  connected  with  simple  mythical  naturism 
is  the  root  out  of  which  the  ethical  life  of  primitive  men 
grew. 

And  it  is  from  this  early  mythical  naturism  that  all 
religious  beliefs  and  practices  have  arisen.     Here  various 
writers  give  diflferent  explanations  of  the  mode  in  which 
this  development  has  been  effected.    Pfleiderer  says  that  the 
progress  which  has  taken  place  in  religion  has  moved  along 
three  main  lines  among  different  peoples.    The  result  is  the 
production  in  due  time  of  polytheism,  spiritism  and  heno- 
theism.    Pfleiderer  explains  at  length  the  mode  of  develop- 
ment in  each  of  these  cases.    He  also  announces  that  two 
principles  have  been  operative  in  the  growth  of  religion 
from  its  primal  roots  in  naturism.    The  one  consists  in  an 
intellectual  impulse  which  prompts  man  to  seek  a  rational 
understanding  of  nature ;  and  the  other  is  an  impulse,  partly 
ethical  and  partly  religious,  which  leads  to  suitable  senti- 
ments of  homage,  and  urges  to  appropriate  acts  of  worship. 
The  result  of  the  operation  of  these  two  impulses  was  the 
onward  progress  of  religion  in  the  experience  of  men.     In 
due   time,   through   various   intermediate   stages,    definite 
monotheism,  and  modes  of  worship  in  harmony  with  the 
belief  in  one  personal  deity,  originated  among  men. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       i6i 


III.  Examination  of  Naturism.    §  ^2. 

Some  of  the  points  made  against  the  fetichistic  theory 
in  the  last  chapter  are  also  effective  against  naturism. 
They  both  assume,  without  good  reason,  that  man  was  in 
a  non-religious  state  at  the  outset  of  his  career.  On  this 
account  they  are  both  inconsistent  with  the  analysis  of  man's 
religious  constitution  made  in  a  former  chapter.  Some 
additional  points  of  criticism  bearing  directly  on  the  natur- 
istic  theory  niay  enable  us  to  estimate  its  validity, 

I.  It  is  open  to  nearly  all  the  objections  made  against 
any  purely  naturalistic  explanation  of  the  origin  of  religion. 
Every  such  theory  proposes  to  find  the  conditions  of  the 
genesis  of  religion  from  without  man,  and  consequenUy  it 
does  injustice  to  certain  fundamental  factors  in  man's  con- 
stitution. If  that  constitution  be  inherently  non-religious, 
then  the  origin  of  belief  in  God,  and  the  beginnings  of 
religious  emotions  and  actions  can  only  be  of  the  nature  of 
a  kind  of  spontaneous  generation  in  the  human  soul,  accord- 
ing to  which  something  appears  in  the  consciousness  of 
man  whose  germs  even  were  not  to  be  found  in  his 
constitution. 

In  like  manner,  every  onward  movement  in  the  progress 
of  religion  must  be  accounted  for  on  the  supposition  that 
the  lower  stage  produced  the  higher  without  any  contribu- 
tion from  the  nature  of  man.    This  does  serious  injustice 
to  the  law  of  causation,  for  it  assumes  something  in  the 
effect  which  is  not  in  the  cause.    In  addition,  if  the  law  of 
natural  evolution  rules  in  this  sphere,  fetichism  has  certain 
logical  advantages.     Fetichism  is  professedly  the  lowest 
stage  of  religion,  so  that  naturism,  which  is  a  higher  form 
could  scarcely  be  the  primitive  phase  of  religion,   if  a 
thorougF-v  naturalistic  theory  v  hich  admits  of  no  degene- 
ration be  maintained. 

2.  If  naturism  admits  that  fetichism  is  a  degeneration 
from  some  higher  form  of  religion,  may  not  naturism  itself 


.-1^1 


I  .'•il 


l62 


APOLOGETICS. 


'*i  I 


*  i 


'I 


! 


also  be  the  result  of  a  decline  from  a  purer  stage  of  religious 
belief  and  practice?  The  frequency  with  which  survivals 
of  an  older  and  purer  form  of  religion  appear  in  naturism, 
as  well  as  in  other  lower  types  of  religious  belief,  rather 
points  to  this  conclusion.  If  this  be  admitted,  naturism  can 
scarcely  make  good  its  claim  to  be  the  primary  form  of 
religion,  wherein  men  first  came  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
divine.  The  facts  which  bear  this  out  are  to  be  found  in 
almost  every  form  of  religion  extant  among  pagan  peoples. 
The  fact  that  there  are  such  survivals  is  usually  admitted 
by  evolutionists.  These  survivals  may  be  either  relics  of  a 
lower  form,  or  remnants  of  a  higher  phase  of  religion.  In 
so  far  as  they  are  the  latter  they  testify  to  a  prior  and  a 
purer  type  of  religion  than  naturism  expresses. 

3.  This  theory  assumes  that,  when  it  discovers  the  early 
men  in  various  lands  who  began  to  look  upon  nature  in  a 
somewhat  mythical  way,  it  has  before  it  the  earliest  type 
of  the  human  race.     The  correctness  of  this  assumption 
may  be  seriously  questioned.    History,  tradition  and  archas- 
ology  carry  us  back  only  so  far.    A  long  pre-historic  period, 
^  in  all  probability,  preceded  the  stage  at  which  it  is  said  that 
*  naturism  appeared  historically.     During  this  period  great 
changes  may  have  taken  place  in  matters  of  religion.    There 
was  time  enough  for  men  to  have  risen  from  fetichsm  to 
naturism,  or  to  have  declined  from  a  primitive  monotheism 
to  naturism.    If  a  clear  case  cannot  be  made  out  for  the 
former  of  these  suppositions,  the  latter  becomes  the  more 
reasonable  hypothesis.     And,   as   a  matter  of   fact,   the 
primitive  man,  of  whom  these  naturistic  theories  all  make 
so  much,  is  largely  s  hypothetical  personage,  so  that  but 
little  can  be  certainly  known  concem-ng  him  by  purely 
scientific  inquiry.     In  addition,  much  oi  the  reasonings  in 
favor  of  naturism   implicitly  assume   that   the   religious 
phenomena  of  modern  pagan  peoples  represent  what  religion 
really  was  among  primitive  men.    The  illegitimacy  of  this 
procedure  is  self-evident. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       163 

4.  The  psychological  diMculty  noted  at  the  close  of  the 
last  chapter  reappears,  and  must  be  met  by  naturism.    Even 
>f  we  admit  that  naturism  was  the  first  outward  definite 
form  m  which  religion  appeared  among  men,  this  would 
scarcely  touch  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  religious  belief 
as  Its  psychological  side.    This,  after  all.  is  the  real  question, 
for  It  may  very  properly  be  asked  how  it  came  to  pass  that 
men  in  eariy  or  later  times  were  able  to  regard  natural 
objects  and  activities  as  having  certain  divine  qualities,  and 
as  worthy  of  religious  homage?    To  conceive  of  nature  as 
possessing  certain  vital  energies,  which  are  supposed  to  be 
in  analogy  with  the  activities  of  men,  does  not  go  to  the  roof 
of  the  problem.    The  real  question  is  as  to  how  it  came  to 
pass  that  primitive  men  were  able,  almost  unconsciously  it 
may  be.  to  regard  the  objects  and  processes  of  nature  as 
divine.    Hoxv  were  they  able  to  construe  nature  under  the 
category  of  divinity?    The  only  rational  reply  is  that  there 
IS  in  the  very  constitution  of  men  an  impulse  which  takes 
the  mitiative  in  bringing  the  consciousness  of  deity  into 
their  experience.     Experience  may  be  the  occasion  upon 
which  It  springs  into  consciousness,  but  the  concept  of  the 
divme  conditions  the  possibility  of  conceiving  of  nature  as 
divine.    The  concept  of  nature,  as  actuated  by  certain  forces. 
IS  one  thing,  and  the  idea  of  the  divine  is  another.    And 
the  possibility  of  uniting  these  in  human  consciousness  lies 
m  the  fact  that  the  mind  of  man  brings  the  idea  of  the  divine 
to  nature,  and  thus  renders  the  mythical  view  of  it  which 
naturism  expresses  possible.    This  being  the  case,  naturism 
does  not  fully  account  for  the  origin  of  religious  and  theistic 

IV.  Statement  of  Animism.    §  33. 

I.  Tylor,  in  his  Primitive  Culture,  is  the  great  repre- 
sentative of  animism.  His  views  are,  in  a  general  way 
supported  by  Tiele  and  others.  It  is  to  be  observed,  how- 
ever, that  Tylor  uses  the  term  animism  in  a  very  wide 


■!i' 


t  V  -i 


m 


'I 


( ( 


! 


ii    i 


164 


APOLOGETICS. 


sense,  and  makes  it  include  ^iritism  and  anccstorism,  and 
to  a  certain  extent  naturism  and  fetichism.  Tiele  scarcely 
gives  animism  such  a  wide  meaning,  though  he  does  derive 
fetichism  fronr  mimism,  and  argues  that  animism  is  at  root 
a  belief  in  spirits. 

It  may  be  better  for  practical  purposes  to  give  to  animism 
a  more  definite  meaning  than  Tylor  and  Tiele  do;   for  if 
belief  in  souls  and  spiritual  beings  of  some  kind  be  regarded 
as  the  source  of  religion,  then  spiritism  would  be  a  better 
term  to  describe  it  than  animism.     If  this  were  done, 
animism  would  stand  beside  spiritism  as  a  theory  to  account 
for  the  beginnings  of  religion.    Tylor,  indeed,  makes  two 
main  divisions  of  animism,  and  this  leads  him  to  give  a 
special  meaning  to  the  term,  for  he  describes  animism  in 
such  a  way  as  to  denote  the  same  idea  as  spiritualism.    The 
one  of  these  divisions  relates  to  belief  in  human  souls,  and 
in  their  continued  existence  after  death ;  the  other  includes 
the  belief  in  spiritual  beings,  which  are  of  higher  rank  than 
human  souls,  and  may  be  regarded  as  deities  tkit  exercise 
some  influence  over  the  affairs  of  men.    In  our  judgment, 
it  is  better  to  confine  the  term  animism  to  the  first  of  these 
forms  of  early  belief,  and  to  apply  the  term  spiritism  to 
the   latter.     This   is  the  plan    followed   in   this   discus- 
sion. 

2.  Taking  animism  in  the  sense  just  defined,  it  finds  the 
origin  of  religion  in  the  belief  in  souls  in  general,  or  in  the 
souls  of  men  in  particular.  In  various  primitive  experiences 
at  the  beginning  of  his  career,  man  gradually  came  to  have 
the  belief  that  there  was  in  his  body  some  other  form  of 
being.  He  saw  a  dead  human  body,  and  concluded  that 
something  very  real  had  gone  away  from  it.  The  experience 
of  dreams  and  certain  abnormal  affections  confirmed  this 
belief.  In  this  way  the  belief  in  the  living  soul  of  man  arose. 
As  this  belief  became  more  firmly  fixed  in  the  mind  of 
primitive  man,  he  gradually  came  to  have  the  persuasion 
that  the  soul  continued  to  exist  after  death  in  a  disembodied 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       165 

state.    And  later  on,  as  this  conviction  deepened,  the  idea 
of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  was  reached. 

These  souls,  thus  conceived,  were  supposed  to  have  the 
power  to  enter  into  various  objects,  animate  and  inanimate. 
In  this  way  various  birds  and  animals,  and  different  sorts 
of  trees  and  plants,  were  supposed  to  become  the  habitations 
of  these  souls.  In  this  way,  too,  a  kind  of  animated 
philosophy  of  nature  was  reached  by  primitive  man.  These 
souls  in  the  several  objects  of  nature  were  supposed  to 
explain  its  varied  and  complex  activities.  And  having 
reached  the  conception  of  nature  as  animated  by  these  souls, 
which  were,  at  one  time  at  least,  human,  the  notion  of  the 
divine  was  gradually  associated  with  nature  in  general,  and 
with  these  souls  in  particular.  How  the  transition  from 
soul  to  deity  was  effected  is  not  made  very  plain  by  the 
advocates  of  this  theory. 

At  this  point  one  difference  between  naturism  and 
animism  appears.  In  naturism,  the  natural  object  or  process 
is  identified  more  or  less  fully  with  the  agency  associated 
with  it,  while  in  animism  this  agency  is  of  the  nature  of 
soul,  and  capable  of  existing  independently  of  any  material 
object.  In  addition,  it  can  be  conceived  as  numerically 
distinct  from  the  object  it  animates.  It  is  from  this 
animistic  conception  of  nature,  and  from  the  belief  in  souls 
which  it  implies,  that  the  origin  of  religion  is  to  be  found. 
From  the  belief  in  souls,  men  in  early  ages  rose  to  that  of 
spirits  without  bodies.  Then  they  regarded  these  as  deities, 
and  m  this  way  polytheism  came  into  existence.  Then  out 
of  polytheism,  by  a  process  of  elimination,  at  last  came 
monotheism.    Thus  animism  accounts  for  religion. 

V.  Examination  of  Animism.    §  34. 

I.  Some  of  the  difficulties  of  fetichism,  and  not  a  few  of 
the  objections  to  naturism  have  force  against  animism  as 
the  philosophy  of  the  origin  of  religion.    Some  additional 


p. 


\v 


i66 


'I 


:!! 


I  r. 


APOLOGETICS. 


aspects  of  insufficiency  may  be  mentioned.    The  fact  that 
Tylor  gives  such  a  zvide  meaning  to  animism  renders  his 
reasonings  more  or  less  inconclusive  when  animism  is  taken 
in  a  strict  sense.     The  admission  of  Tide,  that  in  all 
probability  there  existed  prior  to  animism  an  earlier  form 
of  religion  which  has  left  but  faint  traces  behind  it,  is  fatal 
to  the  claim  that  animism  has  priority.    It  leaves  the  ques- 
tion of  the  conditions  of  its  genesis  practically  untouched. 
The  earnest  contention  of  both  Muller  and  Spencer  against 
animism,  as  the  alone  source  of  religion,  has  considerable 
value.    Then,  all  the  historical  uncertainty  regarding  the 
information   which   gives  animism   its   support  tends  to 
weaken  the  theory.     The  light  that  shines  on  the  distant 
past  is  dim,  and  its  rays  have  been  refracted  through 
tradition,  so  that  its  historical  value  is  not  of  the  highest 
order.    And  if  it  be  admitted  that  the  principle  of  degene- 
ration has  been  operative,  it  may  be  that  animism  can  be  best 
mterpreted  as  a  later  decadent  aspect  of  an  earlier  and 
higher  form  of  religious  belief.     Every  indication  of  an 
original  monotheism  confirms  this  view. 

2.  As  our  exposition  proceeds,  it  becomes  more  and  more 
evident  that  the  eflfort  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  origin  of 
religious  and  theistic  belief  in  a  merely  naturalistic  way, 
and  by  means  of  purely  historical  or  linguistic  investigations 
concerning  what  was  probably  the  first  form  in  which  that 
belief  took  definite  shape  is  futile.  Such  investigations  do 
not  go  to  the  root  of  the  problem,  so  that  it  may  be  im- 
possible, in  this  way,  to  discover  certainly  what  was  the 
primary  form  of  religion.  The  analogy,  upon  which  so 
much  stress  is  sometimes  laid,  between  the  religions  of 
modem  savages  and  ancient  men,  does  not  justify  any  cer- 
tain conclusion,  for  the  reason,  mainly,  that  great  changes 
may  have  taken  place  during  the  period  between  the  present 
and  the  distant  past  in  the  matter  of  religion.  This  con- 
sideration has  special  pertinence  against  evolutionists,  who 
presuppose  change  and  progress  in  this  as  in  other  spheres. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.        167 

3.  In  order  to  make  good  the  claims  of  animism,  it  must 
be  shown  that  it  was  the  earliest  form  in  all  lands.    This 
is  a  difficult  task,  for  historical  and  other  investigations 
may  reveal  that  in  one  land  one  form  had  historical  priority, 
and  in  another  land  some  other  form  was  first.    This  being 
the  case,  it  becomes  practically  impossible  to  explain  the 
genesis  and  growth  of  religion  as  successive  strata,  lying 
historically  one  above  the  other  in  regular  order,  and  with 
genetic  relations  to  each  other.     That  diflFerent  forms  of 
early  religion  may  have  been  contemporaneous  expressions 
of  the  religious  aptitudes  of  men  on  the  one  hand,  and  of 
the  self-revelation  of  God  on  the  other  hand,  is  at  least  a 
reasonable  supposition,  even  at  this  stage  of  our  inquiries. 
If  this  be  true,  the  value  of  the  psychological  method  of 
inquiry  appears.    The  question  of  the  way  in  which  an  en- 
lightened mind  in  a  Christian  land,  in  the  exercise  of  his 
varied  powers,  arrives  at  a  well-founded  theistic  belief,  may 
be  at  least  as  fruitful  an  inquiry  as  the  attempt  to  disco\er 
with  uncertain  historical  materials  what  was  probably  the 
beginnings  of  religion  among  men. 

4.  If  tiiis  be  the  case,  then  the  pressure  of  the  psycho- 
logical difficulty  against  any  empirical  scheme  is  sorely  felt. 
In  the  case  of  animism,  with  its  belief  in  souls  as  the  genesis 
of  religion,  the  question  as  to  how  the  notion  of  soul  came 
to  be  construed  by  primitive  men  under  the  category  of 
deity  cannot  be  properly  answered.  The  only  supposition 
under  whicii  the  transition  from  soul  to  deity  can  be  made, 
is  that  the  mind  that  makes  it  has  the  two  notions  already 
in  possession.  In  the  fact  of  the  transition,  therefore,  the 
genesis  of  neither  can  be  discovered,  for  the  reason  that  both 
are  already  in  the  possession  of  the  mind.  This  being  the 
case,  the  psychological  aspects  of  the  problem  are  of  much 
more  importance  than  those  who  lay  stress  on  historical 
iiiquiry  alone  are  ready  to  admit.  In  the  light  of  this  con- 
sideration, the  question  of  the  psychological  validity  of 
theistic  and  religious  belief  is  quite  as  important  as  the 


i: 


^. 


v  I 


••I 


la 


APOLOGETICS. 


problem  of  its  historical  origin.  We  shall  seek  to  give 
proper  place  to  both  afpects  of  the  inquiry  as  we  pursue 
our  further  investigations. 

5.  It  may  be  proper  to  add  here  that  the  genesis  of  the 
notion  of  deity,  and  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  soul  may 
each  have  its  own  explanaHon,  and  that  neither  is  to  be 
derived  from  the  other.    Many  things  are  pointed  out  by 
Lang  m  his  The  Making  of  Religion  which  go  to  show 
that  the  notion  of  God  does  not  grow  out  of  the  idea  of 
soul,  but  that  men  come  to  believe  in  God  and  in  soul  along 
different  lines  and  on  independent  evidence.    Just  in  pro- 
portion as  this  is  made  out,  does  the  claim  that  animism 
IS  the  source  of  religious  belief  cease  to  have  validity     Tf 
primitive  men  acquired  the  belief  in  the  soul  apart  from 
the  body  in  one  way,  and  obtained  the  belief  in  God  in 
another  way,  the  transition  from  the  former  to  the  latter 
IS  an  unnecessary  assumption.     This  assumption  the  ani- 
mistic  theory  of  the  origin  of  religious  belief  really  makes. 


CHAPTER  V. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  RELIGIOUS  AND  THEISTIC  BELIEF. 
SPIRITISM  AND  ANCESTORISM. 

Contents. 

Spiritism  and  Ancestorisra.— Spiritism  Defined.— Its  Origin  De- 
scribed.—\'arious  Grades  of  Spirits.— Two  Great  Qasses.- Polytheism 
and  Polydaemonism.— Genesis  of  Religious  Rites.— Naturistic  Myth- 
ology.—Euhemerism.— Examination  of  Spiritism.— Spiritism  Prior  to 
Fetichism  and  Naturism.— It  Fails  to  Explain  Higher  Spiritual  Beings. 
—Fails  to  Show  Qearly  how  Finite  Spirits  were  Looked  upon  as  Deities. 
—The  Psychological  Method  Needed.— Ancestorism  Defined.— Herbert 
Spencer.— Ancestorism  is  a  Specific  Phase  of  Animism  or  of  Spiritism. 
—Starting  Point  is  a  Man's  Double.— The  Continued  Existence  of  the 
Soul.— Homage  to  Ancestors  and  Rites  at  Graves.— Transition  from 
Ancestorism  to  Religion.— Examination.— The  Origin  of  Belief  in 
Souls.— Spencer's  Primitive  Man.— Assumes  Sa\-agism.— Ancestorism 
not  always  First.— The  Theory  Breaks  Down. 

LlTEKATL-RE. 

Encyclopaedia  Articles  on  Animism.  Spiritism,  and  Ancesforism.^ 
Spencer's  Sociology.  Part  I..  Chaps.  XXI.,  XXII.-Spencers  EccUti- 
astieal  Institutions,  Chaps.  I.-VIII.— Fiske's  Outlines  of  Cosmic  PhU- 
osophy.  Part  III.,  Chaps.  II..  III.-De  Pressenses  Origins.  Book  IV„ 
Chap.  III.— Pfleiderer's  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Vol.  III.,  Chap.  I.— Pat- 
ton's  Syllabus  on  Theism.— Fisher's  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christum 
Belief.  Chap.  I.— Knight's  Aspects  of  Theism,  Chap.  II.— Ktllogg'a 
Genesis  and  Growth  of  Religion.  Chap.  Ill  — Miiller's  Naturd  Religiom. 
Chap.  XVI.— Lindsay's  ThcUtic  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  III.- 
De  La  Saussaye's  Science  of  Religion.  Chap.  VI.— Menzie's  History  of 
Religion,  Chap.  III.— Lang's  The  Making  of  Religion,  Chaps.  IX.-XI.— 
Fairbaim's  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  I. 

I.  Statement  of  Sfyiritism.    §  35. 

TWO  other  relt  .  '  .  leories  to  account  for  the  origin 
of  religion  are  to  ne  considered  in  this  cliapter.  In 
dealing  with  them,  we  have  still  before  us  the  ground  em- 
braced in  Tylor's  elaborate  treatment  of  animism.  The 
two  a9|)ects  of  this  general  scheme  now  to  Iw  noticed  are 
sfmtism  and  ancestorism.     Spiritism  in  its  more  mature 


(•  I 


h'.'4 


i  II 


170 


APOLOGETICS. 


t  'I 


forms,  as  the  belief  in  spiritual  beings,  is  really  the  highest 
of  these  types  of  view;  for  ancestorism  relates  itself  mainly 
to  some  phase  of  animism,  and  finds  its  point  of  departure 
in  the  belief  in  human  souls.  Thus  both  spiritism  and 
ancestorism  have  in  a  measure  to  be  viewed  in  the  light 
of  previous  discussions. 

I.  Spiritism  maintains  that  men  in  very  eariy  times  came 
to  entertain  the  conviction  that  there  existed  invisible 
spiritual  beings  of  various  kinds.  By  degrees  this  convic- 
tion came  to  be  a  firmly  fixed  belief  in  the  minds  of  primitive 
men,  and  in  the  course  of  time  it  became  quite  elabr.rate. 
At  the  outset,  it  is  supposed  by  some  that  this  belief  was 
m  the  reality  of  human  souls;  and  in  this  aspect  of  it 
spiritism  is  very  much  like  animism.  But  by  degrees  the 
conception  of  the  existence  of  human  souls  apart  from  the 
bodies  of  men  became  more  definite,  and  in  this  way  it  is 
supposed  that  primitive  men  attained  to  a  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  separate  spiritual  beings  without  bodies. 

This  is  the  stage  in  this  belief  which  the  term  spiritism 
properly  denotes.     It  marks  that  aspect  of  the  belie,  m 
spirits  which  regards  them  as  having  an  independent  spir- 
itual mode  of  existence  and  activity,  in  which  all  necessar> 
relations  with  a  material  body  are  severed.    This  view  is 
not  prepared  to  deny  that  these  spiritual  beings  may  not, 
at  will,  enter  into  and  possess  the  bodies  of  men,  or  even 
take  up  their  abode  in  certain  objects  in  nature.     In  some 
cases  this  view  suggests  that  the  souls  of  certain  men  seem 
to  have  undergone  a  process  of  elevation  above  the  human 
sphere,  and  to  have  had  given  to  them  a  sort  of  superhuman 
If  not  divine,  character.    In  any  case,  the  conviction  of  the 
8ei)arate  existence  of  spiritual  beings  of  some  sort  is  sup- 
posed to  have  been  the  starting  point  of  religious  belief. 
These  spirits,  whether  they  entered  into  natural  objects, 
or  possessed  human  Imdies,  or  existed  in  a  separate  state, 
were  gradiiaily  regarded  with  awe  and  respect,  which,  in 
the  course  of  time,  became  veneration.    As  the  movement 


iil   H 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       171 

advanced,  these  spiritual  beings  were  elevated  more  and 
more  in  the  reverent  esteem  and  regard  of  men,  until,  finally, 
they  came  to  be  conceived  of  as  real  deities.  In  this  way 
a  certain  type  of  polytheism  arose. 

2.  Not  only  are  these  supposed  spirits  very  numerous  and 
of  various  grades,  but  they  were  gradually  divided  into  two 
very  diverse  classes.  This  divison  is  supposed  to  have  been 
made  on  moral  grounds  by  primitve  men  in  a  somewhat 
unconscious  way.  The  one  class  is  holy,  and  ever  ready 
to  do  good  to  men ;  while  the  other  is  wicked,  and  always 
seeking  to  do  evil  to  them.  The  former  are  deities,  properly 
so  called,  while  the  latter  are  rather  demons.  In  this  way 
it  is  supposed  that  polytheism  and  polydaemonism  arose  in 
very  early  times.  Some  writers  are  inclined  to  give  the 
larger  place  to  the  former,  while  others  lay  great  stress  on 
the  latter,  in  developing,  if  not  in  producing,  religion  at 
first.  Schurman  is  inclined  to  regard  polydaemonism  as 
the  first  definite  phase  of  religious  belief;  and  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  primitive  men  seem  very  often  to  have 
been  more  anxious  to  appease  the  evil  deities  than  to  please 
the  good. 

In  such  general  ways  as  these  the  belief  in  deities  grew 
out  of  the  belief  in  spirits  which  men  in  early  times  enter- 
tained. It  was  further  felt  by  primitive  men  that  these 
deities  sustained  certain  relations  with  men,  and  that  they 
had  some  influence  on  their  welfare  and  destiny.  Out  of 
this  fact  religious  ordinances  arose,  such  as  sacrifice,  offer- 
ings and  worship,  and  were  intended  to  please  or  appease 
the  deities.  And  as  many  of  these  deities  were  supposed 
to  be  ready  to  take  offence  and  do  harm  to  men.  much  o{ 
the  religious  service  consisted  in  efforts  to  deceive,  or  to 
pacify  these  supposed  divine  spiritual  beings.  In  this  way 
the  rites  and  ceremonies  associated  with  polytheistic  or 
polydjemonistic  beliefs  originated. 

3.  Associated  with  this  scheme,  a  certain  phase  of  »i>'//i- 
ology  appears.    As  distinguished  from  the  naturistic  myth- 


n 


\72 


APOLCXJETICS. 


ology,  described  in  the  last  chapter,  the  euhemeristic  type  of 
It  now  appears.  It  might  be  called  animistic,  spiritistic  or 
anthropic  mythology.  According  to  this  view  of  the  origin 
of  certain  aspects  of  mythology,  it  began  in  the  belief  in 
the  continued  existence  of  certain  heroic  men  after  their 
death.  Their  spirits,  at  least,  still  existed  after  their  earthly 
career  ended,  posterity  regarded  them  with  growing  venera- 
tion, and  at  length  they  were  clad  with  divine  qualities  and 
regarded  as  deities.  Men  became  heroes,  and  these  heroes 
became  gods,  and  in  this  way  one  phase  of  mythology  is 
accounted  for. 

II.  Examination  of  Spiritism.    §  36. 

Only  a  few  points  of  critical  import  need  be  noticed.  So 
far  as  this  theory  connects  itself  with  human  spirits,  viewed 
apart  from  their  bodily  habitation,  the  criticism  of  animism 
m  the  last  chapter  serves  to  refute  this  aspect  of  spiritism. 
So  far  as  the  belief  in  spiritual  beings  higher  than  human 
spirits,  and  having  no  relation  with  any  kind  of  physical 
body,  is  concerned,  a  few  points  may  be  briefly  noted. 

I.  The  claim  of  spiritism  to  have  priority  over  fetichism 
and  naturism  seems  to  be  well  founded.     The  condition 
under  which  it  was  possible  for  primitive  man  to  construe 
nature  as  animate,  or  as  possessing  magical  powers,  is  the 
supposition  that  primitive  man  already  possessed  the  con- 
ception of  a  living  soul.     The  conception  of  spirit  is  one 
thmg,  and  that  of  the  objects  of  nature  is  another,  and  these 
are  essentially  different.    To  be  able  to  say  that  nature  is 
m  any  sense  inhabited  by  supposed  spiritual  beings,  the 
nund  must  already  have  attained  the  idea  of  such  beings. 
This  consideration  completely  refutes  the  claims  of  fetichism 
and  naturism  to  have  priority.     Hence,  the  reasonings  for 
spiritism  refute  these  theories  to  account  for  the  beginnings 
of  religion.    And  whatever  is  true  in  animism  renders  the 
same  service. 


IM    , 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       173 

2.  The  adequacy  of  th-  way  in  which,  according  to 
spiritism,  the  conception  of  higher  spiritual  beings  is 
reached,  may  be  seriously  doubted.  Even  if  it  be  admitted 
that  the  idea  of  the  soul  be  reached  in  the  way  that  animism 
describes,  the  question  then  arises  as  to  how  the  transition 
was  made  from  the  conception  of  the  human  soul  which 
consciousness  announces,  to  the  higher  spiritual  beings 
which  are  supposed  to  exist  without  bodies  at  all.  This  is 
the  problem  which  needs  some  further  elucidation  than  it 
has  yet  received  at  the  hands  of  those  who  advocate  the 
theory  now  under  consideration. 

3.  Then,  even  if  the  belief  in  higher  independent  spiritual 
beings  arose  in  the  way  spiritism  claims,  the  theory  would 
still  have  to  show  how  these  beings  came  to  be  regarded 
as  divine.    How  came  they  to  be  construed  under  the  cate- 
gory of  divinity?     The  explanation  often  given  by  this 
theory  consists  in  the  application  of  the  principles  of  euheme- 
ristic  mythology  to  the  facts  involved.    Heroic  men  came 
to  be  reverenced  as  gods.    But  how  came  this  to  pass  ?    How 
did  primitive  men  come  to  attach  the  idea  of  deity  to  certain 
men,  and  then  to  do  them  homage  as  gods?    Here  we  come 
again  to  the  position  that  the  notion  of  deity  cannot  be 
primarily  drawn  from  nature;  nor  is  it  reached  by  elevating 
the  human  soul,  as  such,  to  the  plane  of  deity;   nor  is  it 
the  result  of  endowing  higher  spiritual  beings  with  the 
attributes  of  deity.     It  seems  more  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  the  varied  powers  of  man's  complex  nature,  as  they 
came  into  exercise,  by  an  impulse  from  within  the  soul,  and 
were  directed  towards  nature  or  to  finite  spirits  in  a  reflective 
way,  gave  rise  to  the  belief  in  the  divine  and  to  the  idea 
of  deity.    On  this  supposition  the  mind  of  man  is  able  to 
bring  the  idea  of  deity  to  the  contemplation  of  natural 
objects,  or  spiritual  beings,  and  to  construe  them  in  terms 
of  the  concept  of  divinity.     This  cleariy  gives  prominence 
to  the  psychological  method  of  inquiry  in  dealing  with  the 
problem  of  the  genesis  of  religious  and  theistic  belief.    The 


fl 


1 J 


'v 


174 


APOLOGETICS. 


real  question  goes  deeper  than  history  or  ethnography  can 
take  us.  It  leads  us  to  ask  how  men  in  early  or  later  times 
came  to  possess  the  idea  of  deity,  and  were  thereby  able  to 
apply  theistic  predicates  to  objects  in  nature,  to  the  souls 
of  men,  or  to  higher  spiritual  beings.  This  sets  the  real 
problem  in  such  a  way  that  no  merely  empirical  explanation 
of  it  is  adequate.  Hence,  we  conclude  that  while  historical 
investigation  into  the  origin  of  religion  may  shed  helpful 
light  upon  the  problem,  it  cannot  alone  give  the  fundamental 
solution. 


III.  Statement  of  Ancestorism.    §  37. 

This  is  an  elaborate  explanation  of  the  origin  of  religion 
of  which  Herbert  Spencer  is  the  leading  exponent.  He  is 
the  author  of  what  he  calls  the  synthetic  philosophy,  in 
which  scientific  materialism,  naturalistic  evolution  and  philo- 
sophical agnosticism  are  combined  in  the  construction  of 
an  elaborate  system.  In  the  various  parts  of  his  system, 
Spencer  seeks  to  construe  all  phenomena  on  the  basis  of  a 
materialistic  philosophy,  and  by  means  of  the  principle  of 
continuity,  and  the  hypothesis  of  evolution.  Hence,  mate- 
rial, vital,  mental,  moral  and  religious  facts  are  interpreted 
in  accordance  with  these  principles.  It  is  with  Spencer's 
explanation  of  the  genesis  of  religious  and  theistic  belief 
and  practice  that  we  have  now  to  do. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  Spencer  does  not  seriously 
attempt  10  give  a  psychological  explanation  of  the  origin 
of  religion,  though  in  his  First  Principles  he  makes  certain 
suggestions  in  this  direction,  which  lead  us  to  expect  some- 
thing more  than  he  gives  us.  He  might  have  started  from 
the  idea  of  the  unknowable,  or  from  the  principle  of  causa- 
tion in  relation  to  nature,  and  have  given  a  much  more 
profound  account  of  the  origin  of  theistic  belief  than  appears 
afterwards  in  his  Sociology.  Fiske,  in  his  Cosmic  Philoso- 
phy, has  done  better  justice  to  this  aspect  of  the  problem 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       175 

than  Spencer,  who  really  turned  away  from  an  open  door 
of  psychological  explanation  to  a  purely  empirical  theory 
of  the  origin  of  religion.  This  led  him  to  elaborate  that 
theory  which  is  sometimes  called  the  ghost  theory,  but 
which,  for  the  present  discussion,  may  more  property  be 
termed  ancestorism.  In  general,  this  scheme  seeks  to  dis- 
cover the  origin  of  religion  in  that  phase  of  belief  in  human 
souls  which  regards  the  souls  of  departed  ancestors  as  still 
existing  in  some  relation  to  their  descendants,  and  as  worthy 
of  some  sort  of  reverence  and  homage.  It  thus  appears 
that  Spencer's  theory  is  little  more  than  a  specific  phase  of 
animism  or  spiritism,  which  does  not  take  into  account  all 
souls  or  spirits,  but  regards  only  the  souls  of  those  who 
departed  this  life  in  those  relations  which  enable  subsequent 
generations  to  look  upon  them  as  ancestors. 

A  brief  statement  of  Spencer's  theory,  as  it  is  set  forth 
in  his  Sociology,  may  be  the  best  way  to  get  a  compact  view 
of  ancestorism.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  Spencer  argues 
strongly  against  the  sufficiency  of  the  fetichistic  theory  of 
the  origin  of  religion;  and  he  undertakes  to  show  that 
fetichism  can  be  best  explained  from  ancestorism,  with  its 
implied  belief  in  the  reality  of  human  souls  existing  after 
death.  Spencer's  scheme  may  be  stated  in  four  particulars, 
which  represent  the  successive  steps  in  the  movement  of  the 
explanation. 

1.  The  starting  point  of  the  theory  is  the  notion  of  his 
double,  or  second  self,  which  primitive  man  in  very  eariy 
times  acquired.  Spencer  does  not  very  clearlv  define  what 
this  second  self  really  is,  but  he  describes  at  length  the  way 
m  which  he  supposes  primitive  man  came  to  possess  it. 
This  man  observed  the  shadow  which  his  body  cast  on  the 
ground,  and  concluded  that  this  was  another  self.  He 
beheld  his  form  reflected  in  the  clear  water  when  he  stooped 
down  to  drink,  and  the  notion  of  a  second  self  was  deepened. 
The  experiences  of  dreams  led  primitive  man  to  think  that 
he  had  a  double  which  could  go  off  on  various  excursions 


jinw.''?wg«jiyii[iii^j 


176 


APOLOGETICS. 


during  the  hours  of  slumber,  and  return  again  before  he 
awoke.    The  abnormal  experiences  of  catalepsy  are  taken 
to  further  Ulustrate  and  confirm  the  process  by  which  primi- 
tive man  attained  the  notion  of  his  double  or  second  self. 
In  this  crude,  blundering  way,  man,  in  the  beginning  of 
his  career,  obtained  a  vague  belief  in  something  like  a  soul. 
2.    Primitive  man  next  acquired  the  conviction  of  the 
continued  existence  of  the  dead.    As  in  the  dream  the  second 
self  went  away  from  the  body  for  a  short  time,  so  at  death 
this  self  went  away  permanently.     Hence,  men  were  sup- 
posed to  have  continued  existence  after  death.     Especially 
was  this  hel(J  to  be  true  of  relatives  or  kinsmen.     Their 
second  self  A\as  believed  to  exist  separately  from  the  body 
which  wa5  laid  in  the  grave.    In  this  way  the  idea  of  spirit 
became  more  definite,  and  a  vague  belief  in  immortality 
gradually  arose  in  the  minds  of  primitive  men.    The  second 
self,  which  had  left  the  body  at  death,  was  believed  to  have 
continued  existence  somewhere  as  a  disembodied  spirit. 
This  results  in  a  modified  spiritism. 

3.  Primitive  man  soon  began  to  perform  acts  of  homage 
at  the  graves  of  departed  ancestors,  and  to  entertain  the 
supposition  that  the  spirits  of  these  ancestors  were  capable 
of  taking  up  their  temporary  abode  in  various  objects.  In 
this  way  that  stage  in  this  scheme  which  is  properly  denoted 
ancestorism  is  reached.  At  this  stage,  also,  this  theory  parts 
company,  to  a  large  extent,  with  animism  and  spiritism. 

Primitive  men,  believing  in  the  continued  existence  of 
departed  ancestors,  began  to  do  certain  acts  of  homage  at 
the  gt.  ,es  of  these  ancestors,  and  to  express,  in  variou 
simple  ways,  their  veneration  for  them.  Burial  places  were 
kept  with  care,  and  visits  were  made  to  them  from  time  to 
time.  By  degrees  these  acts  of  reverence  became  more 
definite,  and  some  simple  rites  and  ceremonies  began  to  be 
observed  at  the  graves  of  ancestors.  Certain  offerings  were 
brought  to  these  burial  places;  and  in  the  course  of  time 
the  graves  of  departed  ancestors  were  regarded  as  sacred 


¥m 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       177 

shrines,  and  acts  of  filial  devotion  were  gradually  trans- 
formed into  religious  worship.  In  this  way,  it  is  supposed 
by  this  theory,  that  the  belief  in  deities,  the  practice  of 
worship,  and  the  offering  of  sacrifice  had  their  origin  amone 
primitive  men. 

4.  At  this  stage  an  explanation  is  given  of  the  way  in 
which  ancestorism  is  actually  transformed  into  religious 
belief  and  worship.  Here  lies  the  real  difficulty  of  the 
theory,  and  at  this  stage  Spencer  seeks  in  various  ways  to 
carry  his  theory  through  this  critical  transmutation. 

First  of  all,  he  supposes  that  the  spirits  of  departed  ances- 
tors have  the  power  of  entering  into  various  natural  and 
artificial  objects,  and  in  this  way  fetichism  is  explained  as 
an  outgrowth  of  ancestorism.  To  some  extent,  naturisra 
IS  accounted  for  in  the  same  way. 

Then,  in  seeking  to  span  the  chasm  between  veneration 
for  ancestors  and  the  worship  of  deities,  Spencer  adopts 
severe  expedients.    These  are  mainly  two :  First,  primitive 
man,  having  by  means  of  the  notion  of  his  double  attained 
to  the  Idea  of  soul  or  spirit  existing  separately,  passed  on 
to  suppose  that  these  spirits  could  take  up  their  abode,  not 
only  in  natural  and  artificial  objects  which  came  to  be  called 
fetiches  but  also  in  animals  and  in  various  forms  of  nature. 
Ihen,  these  spirits  having  veneration  paid  to  them  as  an- 
cestors, ,t  gradually  came  to  pass  that  this  veneration  was 
transferred  to  the  object  in  which  this  ancestral  spirit  was 
supposed  to  dwell.    In  this  way,  further,  the  ruder  forms 
01  polytheism  are  explained. 

Secondly,  the  euhemeristic  theory  of  mythology  is  used 
to  assist  m  making  this  transition.  According  to  this 
theory,  certain  of  the  departed  dead  are  looked  upon  as 
heroes  and  then,  by  the  play  of  the  mythical  principle, 
these  heroes  are  gradually  clothed  with  the  qualities  of  deity 
and  come  to  be  regarded  as  gods.  So  departed  ancestors, 
m  their  disembodied  state,  were  gradually  invested  with 
increasing  veneration  till  they  assumed  heroic  proportions, 


ii'!' 


■M 


178 


APOLOGETICS. 


and  as  the  process  went  on  through  successive  generations 
these  heroic  ancestors  were  gradually  elevated  to  the  rank 
of  deity,  and  worshipped  accordingly.  In  this  way  certain 
higher  forms  of  mythological  polytheism  are  explained  as 
the  outcome  of  ancestorism. 

Many  other  things  are  suggested  by  Spencer  as  assisting 
in  the  transition  from  ancestorism  to  eligion  among  primi- 
tive men.  The  experience  of  catalepsy,  the  phenomena  of 
intoxication,  and  certain  phases  o^  insanity  are  mentioned 
as  having  some  part  in  this  important  transition.  But  space 
forbids  further  allusion  to  these  things.  Departed  ancestors 
become  deities,  their  graves  are  turned  into  places  of  wor- 
ship, and  the  offerings  brought  to  their  tombs  are  trans- 
formed into  rites  of  divine  worship. 

In  this  way  ancestorism  seeks  to  explain  the  genesis  of 
religion  among  primitive  men.  And  having  accounted  for 
the  origin  of  religion,  its  growth  onward,  till  monotheism 
is  reached,  is  explained  as  a  process  of  purification  and 
elimination,  which  takes  place  according  to  the  principles 
of  natural  evolution.  Even  Judaism  and  Christianity  are 
made  subject  to  this  explanation  of  their  origin  and  develop- 
ment. 

IV.  Examination  of  Ancestorism.    §  38. 

No  criticism  of  the  synthetic  philosophy,  as  a  whole,  is 
necessary  to  expose  the  defects  of  its  explanation  of  the 
origin  of  religion.  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  do  more  than 
mention  the  fact  that  Spencer,  in  his  First  Principles  and 
in  his  Sociology,  suggests  two  quite  different  explanations 
of  the  problem  now  under  discussion.  It  is  also  sufHcient  to 
indicate  that  a  pu'-ely  empirical  explanation  of  the  origin 
of  religion  is  all  that  Spencer's  philosophy  allows  him  to 
give,  and  that  this  explanation  has  really  no  more  value 
than  the  philosophy  upon  which  it  is  founded.  Some  par- 
ticulars o\  criticism  are  now  offered. 

I.  Spencer's  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  belief  in 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       179 

souls  on  the  part  of  primitive  men  is  superficial.    To  begin 
with,  the  conception  of  man's  doubl';,  or  second  self,  set 
forth  by  Spencer,  is  unnatural,  and  at  the  same  time  very 
indefinite.     At  first  it  seems  to  have  been  man's  shadow, 
or  an  echo,  or  a  dream.    The  difference  between  these  things 
and  the  idea  of  a  man's  soul,  or  spirit,  is  very  great,  and 
Spencer  gives  no  good  reason  for  believing  that  primitive 
men  blundered  vaguely  from  the  one  to  the  other.    Then, 
if  any  untutored  man  in  the  infancy  of  the  race  did  chance 
to  make  this  blunder,  further  experience  of  a  very  simple 
kind  would  enable  him  to  correct  his  unreflecting  mistake. 
"The  result  of  this  would  be  to  make  it  impossible  for  primi- 
tive man  to  attain  to  a  belief  in  his  soul,  for  he  would  come 
to  see  that  his  shadow  was  simply  the  reflection  of  his  body. 
So  evident  is  this  that  it  is  not  easy  to  take  Spencer  seriously 
on  t'Ms  initial  point  of  his  theory.    In  the  absence  of  valid 
proof  for  Spencer's  explanation  of  the  origin  of  belief  in 
souls  or  spirits,  by  means  of  the  notion  of  a  man's  double, 
it  seems  far  more  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  idea  of 
soul  or  spirit  grew  out  of  the  experiences  of  self-conscious- 
ness, and  that  no  merely  empirical  explanation  goes  to  the 
root  of  the  problem  on  its  psychological  side.     On  this 
ground,  also,  the  primitive  belief  in  immortality  has  its 
reasonable  explanation.    So,  also,  those  eariy  beliefs  touch- 
ing the  future  life,  as  a  continuation  of  the  experiences  and 
employments  of  this  life  can  be  accounted  for  on  this  sup- 
position. 

2.  The  supposed  primitive  man  of  Spencer's  theory  is 
largely  hypothetical.  He  is  too  ancient  to  be  interviewed, 
or  even  directly  observed  in  these  later  days.  To  assume, 
as  Spencer  at  times  tacitly  does,  that  modem  savages  accu- 
rately represent  primitive  men  is  illegitimate.  The  identity 
in  their  religious  condition  can  never  be  proved,  while  there 
is  strong  probability  that  the  condition  of  men  has  greatly 
changed  through  the  passing  centuries.  Modem  savage 
peoples  may  be  higher  or  lower  in  the  religious  scale  than 


1 1 


MKMOCOiy   nSOWTION  TKT  OMn 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHAKT  No.  2) 


^ 


i^PLEDM«<3E 


1653  Eott   Uoin   Strt*( 
Rochtlttf.    tfw    York  14009        k«a 

('18)   482  -  0300  -  Phon,  "^ 

('16)   2M-19B9-F0. 


i8o 


APOLOGETICS. 


;  P 


primitive  men.  From  the  many  instances  of  degeneration 
which  we  see  among  the  races  of  men  in  matters  of  religion, 
it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  modern  savages  are  the 
result  of  religious  decline.  If  this  be  so,  to  judge  of  the 
religious  condition  of  the  first  generations  of  men  from 
what  is  now  seen  among  modem  savage  peoples,  is  quite 
illegitimate.  In  addition,  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that 
the  supposed  primitive  men  of  Spencer's  reasonings  may 
not  after  all  really  be  the  first  men.  Even  theirs  may  have 
been  a  decline  from  a  prior  and  a  purer  form  of  religious 
belief.  Most  of  Spencer's  materials  of  proof  are  drawn 
from  pagan  and  savage  peoples  of  comparatively  recent 
times.  His  inferences  from  these  facts  to  the  condition  and 
experiences  of  the  first  generations  of  the  humaa  race  is 
about  as  far-fetched  as  anything  could  well  be. 

3.  Spencer's  theory  assumes  that  man  at  first  was  in  a 
rude  savage  state,  little  better  than  the  brute  beasts  about 
him.  This  is  to  assume  what  needs  to  be  proved.  There 
are  not  a  few  indications  that  the  first  men  were  not  un- 
tutored savages.  Leaving  out  of  account  what  the  Bible 
implies  on  this  subject,  there  are  not  wanting  indications 
in  the  conclusions  of  modem  ethnology  that  many  peoples 
in  very  early  ages  were  in  a  much  higher  moral  and  religious 
conflition  than  modern  savage  races.  And  history  reveals 
tht  fact  that  in  very  early  days  whole  communities,  like 
Egypt  and  Babylon,  were  far  above  the  rude  savage  state. 
It  may  also  be  pointed  out  that  while  Spencer's  criticism 
of  fetichism,  as  the  philosophy  of  the  genesis  of  religion, 
has  much  force,  yet  his  own  evolutionary  principles  are 
rather  inconsistent  with  this  criticism.  If  evolution  marks 
onward  progress  from  the  lower  to  the  higher  in  the  sphere 
of  religion,  then,  since  fetichism  is  a  lower  form  of  religious 
belief  than  ancestorism,  it  must  have  been  pr'or  to  it.  Or, 
on  the  other  hand,  if  the  priority  of  ancestorism  be  admitted, 
it  may  be  proper  to  go  a  step  further,  and  say  that  some 
phase  of  theistic  belief  lies  before  ancestorism. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       i8i 


4.  To  make  good  this  theory,  ancestorism  must  antedate 
and  condition  religion  among  all  peoples.  It  must  be  shown 
that  religion  grew  out  of  ancestorism  in  every  country,  or 
that  ...1  forms  of  religion  have  come  by  migration,  or  in 
some  other  way,  from  lands  where  ancestorism  was  primi- 
tive. To  do  this  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  the  reason 
that  in  many  lands,  and  especially  among  some  of  those 
peoples  where  high  civilization  existed  in  very  early  ages, 
there  is  really  no  trace  of  ancestorism  in  the  sense  in  which 
Spencer  uses  the  term.  In  Egypt,  Babylon  and  Greece,  in 
the  very  earliest  times,  this  is  the  case.  Thij  is  a  difficulty 
with  which  Spencer  does  not  deal  in  any  satisfactory  way. 
The  euhemeristic  theory  of  mythology  can  scarcely  be  of 
much  service  in  this  connect-on,  for  it  is  now  very  gen- 
erally discarded.  And  even  if  it  were  admitted,  the  very 
difficulties  which  press  against  ancestorism  at  this  point 
would  remain  in  full  force.  If  it  cannot  be  shown  that 
ancestorism  precedes  and  conditions  religion  everywhere,  it 
can  scarcely  be  maintained  that  ancestorism  accounts  for  the 
beginnings  of  religion  everywhere. 

5.  This  theory  breaks  dowtt,  at  several  important  points, 
It  overlooks  the  fact  that  veneration  for  departed  ancestors 
is  one  thing,  and  worship  of  deities  is  another.  It  con- 
sequently fails  to  show  how  the  transition  is  actually  made 
from  the  one  to  the  other.  More  thorough  investigation 
might  show  that  the  transition  is  not  possible  in  a  natural 
way.  At  this  point  the  theory  must  confess  serious  failure, 
fc>r  to  explain  religion  from  ancestorism  is  either  to  take 
religion  for  granted,  or  to  explain  it  away.  It  may  be  that 
in  order  to  give  a  valid  basis  for  ancestor  worship  we  must 
presuppose  religion  as  already  existent.  In  addition  to  all 
this,  the  searching  question  may  properly  be  asked  this 
theory,  How  could  primitive  man  call  his  ancestors  deities, 
and  render  to  them  a  certain  kind  of  worship,  unless  he 
already  possessed  the  idea  of  deity,  and  understood,  in  some 
measure,  what  the  instinct  of  worship  really  was?    If  this 


m 


1 4^ 


li. 


l\l 


! 


^i 


i1 


1  i      :• 


182 


APOLOGETICS. 


be  so,  ancestorism  cannot  be  the  source  of  religious  belief 
and  practice,  for  the  inquiry  we  are  now  pursuing  relates 
to  the  origin  of  that  very  belief  which  is  presupposed  in 
ancestor  worship.  To  crown  all,  this  theory  is  not  com- 
petent to  account  for  the  development  of  theistic  belief,  and 
the  religion  of  the  Bible,  in  accordance  with  its  own  terms. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  RELIGIOUS  AND  THEIS7TC  BELIEF. 
HENOTHEISM. 

Contents. 

Muller's  General  Position.— His  Definition  of  Religion.— A  Growth, 
the  Result  of  Criticism.- His  Polemic  against  Fetichism.— This  Quite 
Successful.— Statement  of  His  Theory.— His  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite 
Underlies  It.— The  Infinite  and  the  Indefinite.— The  Theistic  Signifi- 
cance of  the  Idea  of  the  Infinite.— Materials  Drawn  from  Literature  of 
India.— Tangible,  Semi-Tangible  and  Intangible  Objects  of  Sense.— The 
Last  Suggest  the  Infinite.— Henotheism  Defined.— Henotheism  the 
Source  of  Religion.— Criticism  of  the  Theory.— The  Philosophy  of  the 
Infinite  Defective. — It  is  Historically  Insecure. — It  is  Logically  Contra- 
dictory.—It  Has  a  Psychological  Difficulty.— It  Breaks  Down  in  Passing 
from  the  Infinite  to  the  Divine. 

LiTEKATinUC 

Encycloptedia  Articles  on  Henotheism  and  Kalhenotheism.—lAuntfB 
The  Origin  of  Religion,  and  His  Natural  Religion.— Dt  Pressensc's 
Origins,  Book  IV.,  Chap.  III.— Edward  Caird's  The  Evolution  of  Re- 
ligion, Vol.  I.,  Chap.  IV.— Kellogg's  The  Genesis  and  Growth  of 
Religion,  Chap.  IV. — Lindsay's  Theistic  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap. 
III.— De  La  Saussaye's  Science  of  Religion,  Chap.  VI.— Menzie's  His- 
tory of  Religion,  Chap.  IV. — Fairbaim's  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of 
Religion,  Chap.  I.— Lang's  The  Making  of  Religion,  Chap.  XV. 

I.  Muller's  General  Position.    §  39. 

1.  TV^AX  MULLER'S  unique  theory  to  account  for 
IV J.  the  origin  of  religious  and  theistic  belief  deserves 
some  attention.  He  is  an  authority  on  philology  in  general, 
and  on  the  literature  of  India  in  particular.  He  has  also 
given  great  attention  to  the  question  of  the  nature  and 
origin  of  religion,  and  he  holds  well-defined  opinions  upon 
the  genesis  of  theistic  belief.  He  has  written  extensively 
upon  the  subject,  and  his  views  have  undergone  certain 
changes  from  time  to  time.  If  we  judged  his  opinions 
from  his  earlier  writings,  like  his  Chips  from  a  German 


i,' 


I' 

If 


M- 


:«  !, 


1; 


i84 


APOLOGETICS. 


tif: 


Workshop,  we  would  find  admissions  in  regard  to  the  native 
religious  instinct  of  men,  which  are  not  so  prominent  in 
his  later  works,  like  The  Origin  of  Religion  and  Natural 
Religion.  In  the  latter  his  empiricism  is  more  clearly  an- 
nounced, and  the  principle  of  natural  evolution  is  given  a 
larger  place  in  the  genesis  of  religion. 

The  origin  of  the  belief  in  deity,  according  to  Miiller,  is 
associated  with  the  way  in  which  men  at  first  were  led  to 
a  realization  of  the  infinite,  in  its  correlation  with  finite 
things  in  certain  aspects.  His  theory  has  come  to  be  known 
as  hcnotheism,  and  some  recent  writers  speak  of  this  gen- 
eral theory  as  kathenotheism.  He  seeks  to  illustrate  and 
confirm  it  from  the  contents  of  the  literature  of  India  which 
bear  upon  the  question. 

2.  Muller  is  careful  to  define  what  he  understands  by 
religion.     He  follows  Cicero  in  deriving  it  from  relegere. 
to  gather  up,  or  carefully  consider.     He  also  states  and 
criticises  at  length  various  proposed  definitions  of  religion. 
In  doing  so  he  presents  a  valuable  discussion  of  this  subject. 
His  own  definition  seems  to  have  been  a  gradual  growth 
in  his  hands.     He  first  says,  in  his  Introduction  to  the 
Science  of  Religion,  that  "religion  is  a  mental  faculty  or 
disposition,  which  independently  of,  nay,  in  spite  of,  sense 
and  reason,  enables  man  to  apprehend  the  infinite  under 
different  names  and  under  varying  disguises.     Without 
this  faculty,  no  religion,  not  even  the  lowest  worship  of 
idols  and  fetiches,  would  be  possible."     As  the  result  of 
criticisms  made  upon  this  definition,  he  modified  it  in  his 
The  Origin  of  Religion  so  as  to  make  religion  consist  in 
'the  potential  energy  which  enables  man  to  apprehend  the 
infinite."    He  thus  substitutes  potential  energy  for  fac-ilty, 
but  says  little  or  nothing  about  the  objective  side  of  religion.' 
Under  the  influence  of  other  criticisms,  he  still  further 
modified  his  definition  in  his  Natura    Religion,  so  as  to 
niake  it  consist  in  "that  faculty  or  pot    aal  r»uergy  in  man 
by  which  the  infinite  is  apprehended  in  such  a  way  as  to 


.■    1i 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       185 


affect  his  moral  conduct."  This  may  be  regarded  as 
Miiller's  most  manure  conception  of  religion.  It  is  to  be 
observed  that  it  still  gives  prominence  to  the  subjective  side 
of  religion,  and  relates  it  to  the  conception  of  the  infinite. 
It  is  the  or-^in  of  religion  thus  defined  which  he  investigates. 
3.  Before  he  unfolds  his  own  theory  he  enters  on  a  vigor- 
ous polemic  against  the  fetichistic  theory  advocated  by  posi- 
tivists.  His  assault  upon  this  theory  is  entirely  successful, 
inasmuch  as  he  shows  very  conclusively  that  religious  belief 
and  practices  have  not  arisen  as  the  result  of  homage  paid 
to  natural  objects  of  any  kin-'.  This  he  does  by  adducing 
the  testimony  of  travellers  i^.-ci.  \g  what  they  observed  in 
various  pagan  lands,  concernmg  the  religious  traditions, 
beliefs  and  practices  of  the  people.  He  also  draws  at  length 
upon  the  history  of  primitive  religion,  and  makes  out  a 
strong  cast  against  fetichism  as  the  first  form  of  religion 
among  men.  He  also  presents  a  learned  and  elaborate 
review  of  the  sacred  literature  of  India  in  particular,  and 
reaches  the  well-assured  conclusion  that  the  fetichistic  ex- 
planation of  the  origin  of  religion  is  not  supported  by  this 
literature.  He  further  brings  forward  a  fatal  psychological 
objection  to  the  fetichistic  theory,  to  the  effect  that  primitive 
peoples  must  have  had  some  notion  of  the  divine  before 
they  could  regard  a  fetich  as  deity  or  call  it  a  god.  This 
polemic  part  of  Muller's  work  is  excellent,  and  is  really  the 
best  service  he  has  rendered  in  this  connection. 


'4: 


"I 


II 


II.  Statement  of  Miiller's  Theory.    §  40. 

I.  Since  Muller's  theory  of  the  origin  of  religion  is  asso- 
ciated with  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  it  is  natural  to  expect 
that  he  will  set  forth  a  philosophy  of  the  infinite.  This 
philosophy  constitutes  the  basis  of  Miiller's  theory  of  primi- 
tive theistic  belief.  In  unfolding  it  he  proceeds  in  a  some- 
what empirical  way. 

Negatively,  he  argues  that  the  idea  of  the  infinite  in  the 


\\ 


i86 


APOLOGETICb. 


.    !•: 


i'\ 


human  mind  is  not  evolved  by  reason.    It  is  not  a  rational 
intuition.    Though  he  does  not  formally  deny  the  a  priori 
factor  in  human  knowledge,  yet  he  implicitly  takes  his 
stand  on  the  ground  of  the  empiricist  in  his  theory  of  know- 
ledge.    He  says  that  the*  infinite  is  a  something  which 
transcends  both  the  senses  and  the  reason,  taking  these  terms 
in  their  ordinary  meaning.     In  some  places  he  seems  to 
identify  the  infinite  with  the  indefinite,  the  invisible,  the 
supersensuous,  and  the  supernatural,  and  is  ready  to  admit 
that  any  of  these  terms  might  be  used  to  denote  what  the 
term  infinite  means.     He  adds  that  the  infinite  is  not 
merely  a  negative  concept,  nor  is  it  abstracted  from  the  finite. 
Yet  the  finite  and  infinite  are  correlatives. 

Still,  so  far  as  the  apprehension  of  the  infinite  is  con- 
cerned, it  is  supplied  to  us  in  its  original  form  by  the  senses. 
It  seems  strange  to  say  this,  after  asserting  that  the  infinite 
transcends  both  the  senses  and  reason.  Miiller's  words  are : 
"Beyond,  behind,  beneath  and  within  the  finite,  the  infinite 
is  always  present  to  the  senses.  Its  presence  presses  in  on 
us  in  all  our  experiences  of  the  finite.  The  finite  by  itself 
without  the  infinite  is  simply  inconceivable;  as  also  is  the 
infinite  without  the  finite."  He  thus  makes  the  finite  and 
the  infinite  relative  terms,  and  finds  the  one  implied  in  the 
other  in  cognition. 

Muller,  however,  makes  the  unwilling  confession  that  the 

'    nite,  thus  apprehended,  is  after  all  only  the  indefinite. 

'is  words  are,  "The  indefinite  and  the  infinite  are  in  reality 

.*'o  names  for  the  same  thing;   the  former  expressing  its 

phenomenal,  and  the  latter  its  real  character."    And  he  adds 

that  the  history  of  religion  is  a  history  of  all  human  efiforts 

to  render  the  infinite  less  and  less  indefinite,  and  that,  in 

spite  of  all  these  efforts,  the  infinite  must  always  remain  to 

us  the  indefinite.     This  goes  far  to  show  that  Muller's 

philosophy  of  the  infinite  is  not  adequate,  and  that  it  is 

justly  exposed  to  the  criticism  made  upon  it  by  Edward 

Caird,  in  his  The  Evolution  of  Religion,  to  the  effect  that 


i.-l 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       187 

the  infinite  should  not  be  so  much  regarded  as  the  correlative 
of  the  finite,  as  the  principle  of  unity  in  the  multiplicity  of 
finite  things. 

2.  After  expounding  the  philosophy  of  the  infinite,  Muller 
proceeds  to  unfold  its  religious  and  theistic  significance  in 
an  extended  discussion.  His  main  aim  is  to  connect  the 
idea  of  God  with  the  notion  of  the  infinite  in  the  earliest 
stages  of  theistic  belief.  This  leads  him  to  seek  to  show 
how  the  vague  sense  of  the  invisible  or  infinite  led  out  to 
the  sense  of  the  divine,  and  generated  religious  sentiments. 
He  finds  his  materials  for  reasoning  largely  in  the  literature 
and  religions  of  India. 

In  working  out  his  theory,  he  undertakes  to  show  that 
from  the  sacred  literature  of  India,  especially  the  Vedas, 
men  were  led  in  early  times  to  an  apprehension  of  the 
infinite  over  against  certain  forms  of  the  finite  which  were 
present  to  the  senses.  Then  he  has  further  to  explain  how 
it  came  to  pass  that  the  infinite  thus  apprehended  was  con- 
strued under  the  category  of  deity.  The  objects  of  sense 
are  divided  into  three  classes  for  the  purposes  of  complete 
discussion. 

First,  there  are  tangible  objects,  which  can  be  touched 
and  comprehended  by  the  senses.  Here  certain  objects,  such 
as  stones,  bones,  shells,  flowers,  berries,  pieces  of  wood, 
water  and  animals,  can  be  touched  all  round,  as  it  were. 
By  the  senses  these  objects  can  be  fully  apprehended,  so 
that  the  idea  of  the  infinite  is  not  realized  in  connection 
with  these  in  the  first  instance.  These  objects,  by  the  lower 
pagan  religious  systems,  are  regarded  as  fetiches;  but  this 
is  not  the  primitive  form  of  religious  belief,  since  it  is  not 
in  relation  to  them  that  men  first  began  to  suspect  or  realize 
the  presence  of  the  infinite  in  certain  relations  to  them. 
This  stage  of  religious  belief  is  a  degeneration,  and  is  not 
the  original  stage  of  that  belief. 

Secondly,  there  are  semi-tangible  ob;  cts,  which  can  be 
apprehended  by  the  senses  only  in  part,  for  to  some  extent 


Ir.. 


!!' 


i88 


APOLOGETICS. 


these  objects  lie  beyond  the  reach  of  the  senses,  especially 
of  that  of  touch.     As  examples  of  this  class  of  natural 
objects  may  be  mentioned  trees,  whose  deepest  roots  are 
out  o.  sight,  and  whose  highest  branches  are  out  of  reach 
Mountains  are  another  example,  for  we  may  tread  about 
their  base,  but  may  not  be  able  to  scale  their  snow-clad 
summits,  hidden  1  ^yond  the  clouds.    And  rivers  are  of  the 
same  nature,  for  we  may  see  the  portion  of  the  stream  visible 
as  we  stand  on  its  banks,  but  its  source  among  the  moun- 
tains, and  its  mouth  at  the  ocean,  we  cannot  see.    Here  there 
IS  a  dim  hint  of  the  infinite  in  the  fact  of  the  unseen  and 
intangible  features  of  these  objects.    The  idea  of  a  beyond 
the  senses  at  least  arises  in  the  mind.    To  some  degree  the 
infinite  is  at  hand,  in  connection  with  the  partial  apprehen- 
sion of  these  objects  by  the  senses;    but  the  sense  of  the 
infinite  is  not  yet  vivid.    This  dim  sense  of  the  infinite  passes 
over  to  the  idea  of  the  divine,  somehow,  and  the  result  is 
the  semt-deities  of  polytheistic  paganism.    Still,  this  is  not 
the  primary  source  of  religious  belief,  for  it  is  derived  by 
degeneration  from  another  earlier  stage. 

Thirdly,  intangible  objects  form  the  third  class,  and  they 
consist  in  those  objects  which  cannot  be  touched  at  ail  by 
man  They  may  be  apprehended  by  hearing  or  by  sight 
but  not  by  touch.  The  azure  sky,  the  passing  cloud,  the 
raging  s^orm,  the  shining  sun,  the  changing  moon,  the 
sparkl-  ars  and  the  morning  dawn,  are  examples  of  this 
class  to  which  Miiller  makes  frequent  allusion.  Here  it  is, 
as  Miiller  understands  the  literature  of  India,  that  there 
were  present  to  the  senses  of  men  certain  objects  in  which 
the  presence  of  the  infinite  was  distinctly  apprehend-d.  He 
eloquently  describes  how  the  early  Sanscrit  Indians,  on 
the  tablelands  of  Hindustan,  looking  up  into  the  Oriental 
skies,  gradually  reached  the  conception  of  the  infinite,  which 
they  somehow  or  other  transmuted  into  that  of  deity.  Thus, 
the  sky,  and  c  cloud,  and  the  dawn,  were  the  vehicles 
which  conveyed  the  impression  of  the  infinite  beyond,  in 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.        189 

upon  the  minds  of  these  primitive  men.  Thus,  Dyaus  and 
Varunna,  Vishnu  and  Aditi,  and  many  other  deities,  arose 
in  connection  with  this  apprehension  of  the  infinite.  Miiller 
does  not  very  dearly  show  how  the  transition  from  the 
infinite  to  the  notion  of  deity  is  actually  made,  nor  does 
he  seem  ready  to  admit  that  the  notion  of  the  infinite  is  in 
any  proper  sense  a  priori.  The  vague  sense  of  the  vast 
beyond  suggested  by  these  intangible  objects  is  the  germ 
out  of  which  religion  springs.  Thus  the  conception  of 
deities  arose,  and,  in  connection  '  '♦h  this  conception,  cer- 
tain religious  rites  were  instituted. 


III.  Henotheism  Explained.    §  41. 

I.  The  term  henotheism,  used  to  denote  Muller's  theory, 
must  now  be  more  definitely  explained  in  contrast  with 
polytheism  and  monotheism.  Polytheism  is  the  belief  in 
and  service  of  many  gods.  These  may  be  regarded  as  a 
multitude  of  separate  deities,  or  as  classes  of  deities.  Pagan 
fetichism  represents  the  former,  and  the  classic  mythologies 
the  latter.  Of  this  polytheistic  belief  there  are  many  forms. 
Monotheism  is  the  belief  in  and  worship  of  one  infinite 
personal  God.  There  is  only  one  such  being,  and,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  there  cannot  be  more  than  one.  There 
are  different  types  of  this,  also,  represented  bj  Mohamme- 
dani  i,  Judaism  and  C'lristianity.  Certain  types  of  specu- 
latr  e  theism,  whicfc  ^  f  ffe  towards  pantheism,  are  also  to 
be  thought  of  in  this      nnection. 

2.  Now,  henothrism  is  a  curious  intermediate  doctrine, 
'*«d.  It  denotes  the  belief  in,  and 
"  at  a  time,  which  are  repre- 
ible  objects  wherein  men  first 
-  of  the  infinite.  These  dei: .  js 
i  independent  of  each  other,  to  a 
large  extent,  so  that  only  --ne  among  the  many  gods  whose 
reality  is  admitted,  for  tb       ne  being,  engages  the  attention 


which  is  not  easily 
worship  o',  single 
sented  by  those  natt 
began  to  suspect  the 
are  regarded  as  single 


190 


APOLOGETICS. 


of  the  worshipper.    These  individual  gods  are  not  conceived 
as  hmited  by  the  power  of  others,  superior  or  inferior  in 
rank.    Each  god  is,  to  the  mind  Oi  the  suppliant,  as  good 
as  all  the  gods.     The  reality  of  more  than  one  god  is 
admitted;  but  one  is,  for  the  time  being,  regarded  as  a  real 
divmity,  with  its  claim  to  homage.     Mtiller  thinks  that 
this  view  of  the  subject  is  properly  drawn  from  the  litera- 
ture  and  religion  of  India.    But  he  also  argues  that  there 
are  traces  of  the  same  form  of  religious  belief  in  Greece 
and  Rome,  and  also  in  Germany.    It  marks  in  these  lards 
that  phase  of  religious  belief  which  preceded  that  polytheism, 
where  the  gods  were  organized  into  a  commonwealth,  with 
one  as  supreme,  like  Zeus,  Jupiter  or  Wodin. 

J.  The  contenti.  -  of  Muller  is  that  this  henotheistic  stage 
of  religious  belief  is  the  earliest  of  all,  and  the  source  whence 
all  others  have  come.  A  twofold  development,  he  says,  has 
taken  place  in  the  history  of  religion.  The  one  is  the  evolu- 
tion of  henotheism  into  theism  and  monotheism.  This  has 
taken  place  by  a  process  of .  elimination  and  elevation 
according  to  which  attention  was  fixed  more  and  more  on 
the  single  deity,  till  at  length  all  thought  of  others  faded 
out  of  the  minds  of  men.  In  due  time  monotheism,  as  it 
appears  in  Judaism  and  Christianity,  originated. 

The  other  mo  /ement  is  by  the  of  oration  of  dei     "ruHon 
whereby  henotheism  declines  to  pagan  polytheisn      od  this' 
polytheism,  in  turn,  sinks  still  lower  and  1  ecomes  letichism 
m  Its  various  forms.     Fetichism,  instead     f  Deing  the  pri- 
mary source   of   religion,   is   :>    seconda.  .    product   from 
henotheism,  resulting  from  o-'e  aeration  ir.  religion      In 
this  way  Miiller  argues  that  all  the  phenomena  of  religion 
may  be  accounted  for,  from  the  assumption  of  henotheism 
as  the  fountain  whence  they  all  flow.    Theism  is  the  result 
of  an  advance  on  henotheism,  and  fetichism  is  the  product 
of  a  decline  from  it.    There  is  a  good  deal  that  is  interesting 
and  attractive  about  this  whole  scheme,  so  that  it  needs 
some  careful  scrutiny. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       191 


IV.  Criticism  of  Henotheisni.    §  42. 

I.  7'  philo-  'i)hy  involved  in  Miiller's  theory  is  de- 
fective. He  a  ..is  ,he  empirical  theory  of  knowledge, 
and  presents  a  peculiar  philosophy  of  the  infinite.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  it  .s  his  empirical  epistemology  which  leads 
to  his  philosophy  of  the  infinite.  It  is  with  the  latter  that 
we  have  now  chiefly  to  do,  and  some  critical  remarks  may 
now  be  made  upon  it. 

In  denying  that  the  notion  of  the  infinite  is  a  deliverance 
of  reason,  and  in  asserting  that  it  is  present  in  a  'lenomenal 
way  to  the  senses  is  to  miss  the  mark  in  both  cases.  The 
notion  of  the  infinite  is  not  apprehended  by  the  senses,  jut 
is  contributed  by  reason  to  certain  aspects  of  cognition.  He 
also  confounds  the  infinite  with  the  indefinite,  and  over 
looks  the  fact  that  these  are  entirely  diverse  conceptions. 
The  indefinite,  no  matter  how  vast,  is  still  the  finite.  To 
speak  of  the  infinite  and  the  indefinite  as  the  real  and  phe- 
nomenal aspects  of  the  same  thing  is  to  introduce  hopeless 
confusion  into  the  discussion.  Further,  if  we  begin  with 
the  senses  as  our  only  source  of  knowledge,  we  can  never 
reach  the  -nfinite.  Empiricism  will  never  lead  to  the  goal 
of  the  in.'  aite,  for  the  infinite  pertains  to  the  reason  as  the 
faculty  of  supersensible  principles. 

Miiller's  fundamental  error  regarding  the  infinite  is  that 
he  confounds  the  mathematical  with  the  metaphysical 
infinite.  The  former  is  a  quantitative  conception,  while 
the  latter  is  qualitative.  In  the  former  case  the  finite  stands 
related  to  the  infinite  as  a  mode;  in  the  latter  case  it  per- 
tains to  some  form  of  beim  as  a  quality.  The  infinite, 
therefore,  is  not  a  substanti  .  entity,  supplying  i'  stuff 
out  of  which  the  finite  is  made;  it  is  rather  a  quai-.y  per- 
taining to  the  basal  ground  of  the  reality  of  all  finite  things. 
Nor,  again,  is  the  infinite  the  sum  total  of  all  finite  things ; 
it  is  rather  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  finite  things 


l| 


i 
t 

\ 


v. 


' 


t* 


1  . ' 


192 


APOLOGETICS. 


existing  as  a  totality.  Nor,  again,  is  the  infinite  the  highest 
or  most  general  conception;  it  is  rather  an  a  priori  prin- 
ciple of  reason  on  its  psychological  side.  This  suffices  to 
show  how  far  short  Mtiller's  doctrine  is  of  being  an  ade- 
quate philosophy  of  the  infinite,  either  on  its  ontological 
or  its  psychological  side. 

2.  Historically,  Muller's  theory  is  open  to  objections. 
Indeed,  some  of  the  reasonings  which  he  uses  against 
fetichism  as  the  source  of  religious  belief  tell  against  his 
own  theory.     History  shows  that  when  religions  are  left 
to  themselves  they  surely  degenerate,  and  that  the  early 
forms  of  belief  and  the  oldest  traditions  are  the  purest. 
Miiller  admits  the  operation  of  the  principle  of  degeneration 
m  deriving  polytheism  and   fetichism   from  henotheism. 
But  he  gives  no  good  reason  for  beginning  with  what  he 
calls  henotheism,  which,  at  best,  is  a  somewhat  hypothetical 
stage.    If  he  had  fully  traced  out  his  views,  he  might  have 
been  led  to  a  primitive  monotheism,  instead  of  to  heno- 
theism.   For  if  henotheism  be  prior  to  fetichism,  and  the 
latter  a  degeneration  from  the  former,  may  not  monotheism 
be  before  either,  and  both  be  a  degeneration  from  it?    This 
consideration  might  be  illustrated  at  length  from  the  his- 
tory of  religion  in  Egypt,  Babylon  and  India,  did  space 
permit. 

3.  Muller's  effective  polemic  against  the  positivist  account 
of  the  origin  of  religion  is  inconsistent  with  his  own  con- 
structive exposition  of  the  genesis  of  theistic  belief.    Against 
fetichism.  he  argues  that  it  is  a  degeneration  from  heno- 
theism ;  and  against  the  view  that  religious  belief  originated 
m  a  primitive  monotheism,  he  asserts  the  operation  of  an 
upward  evolution   from  henotheism.     And  he  does  this 
without  introducing  any  sufficient  reason  why  the  develop- 
ment should  have  taken  one  direction  in  the  one  case  and 
another  in  the  other.     He  refuses  to  allow  the  operation 
of  any  supernatural  factor,  and  cannot  consistently  hold  one 
principle  to  explain  fetichism  and  another  to  account  for 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       193 

theism.  Christianity,  with  its  supernatural  factor,  can 
account  for  general  decline  in  religion  beyond  the  sphere 
of  its  influence,  and  for  upward  movement  in  religion  where 
the  supernatural  factor  is  operative,  as  in  Judaism  and  the 
Christian  system.    Miiller's  inconsistency  is  evident. 

4.    The  same  psychological  difficulty  arises  here  as  in 
former  naturalistic  explanations  of  religion.    When  Muller 
properly  enough  says  that  savage  men  could  not  have  called 
their  rude  fetiches,  deities,  unless  they  already  had  some 
conception  of  deity  in  their  minds,  he  provides  a  weapon 
to  strike  his  own  theory  a  sore  blow;   for  the  question  at 
once  arises  as  to  how  the  Sanscrit  Indians  could  have  called 
those  intangible  objects,  in  which  they  began  to  suspect 
the  presence  of  the  infinite,  deities,  unless  they  already  had 
in  their  minds  the  concept  of  deity.    It  is  quite  clear  that 
at  this  point  Muller  is  little  better  off  than  the  positivist, 
and  that  henotheism  is  scarcely  more  successful  than  fetich- 
ism  in  accounting  for  the  genesis  of  theistic  belief.     The 
only  supposition  upon  which  Muller's  theory  can  be  made 
to  work  is  that  the  human  mind  possesses,  in  its  very  nature, 
the  principles  of  theistic  belief.     But  if  this  assumption  be 
made,  Miiller's  theory  is  not  needed  to  account  for  the  origin 
of  theistic  belief.     He  cannot  surmount  this  psychological 
difficulty. 

5.  In  addition  to  .'1  this,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that 
Muller  tacitly  identifies  the  infinite  and  the  divine,  without 
showing  how  primitive  men  made  the  passage  from  the  one 
notion  to  the  other.  The  notion  of  the  infinite  is  one  thing, 
and  the  idea  of  deity  is  another.  The  former  is  a  meta- 
physical concept,  the  latter  is  a  theistic  notion.  How  are 
the  two  to  be  related,  and  how  is  the  passage  made  from 
the  one  to  the  other  on  the  basis  of  Miiller's  theory  ?  Before 
the  predicate  of  infinity  can  be  rationally  made  of  God,  the 
mind  must  already  have  both  concepts.  It  may  be  that 
neither  is  to  be  derived  from  the  other,  but  that  each  has 
its  own  independent  psychological  origin.  What  is  now 
13 


^ 


■-I 


:  » 


■f'i 


Jij 


iiifa 


194 


APOLOGETICS. 


chiefly  charged  against  MuUer's  theory  is,  that  it  does  not 
show  how  the  transition  was  made,  or  can  be  effected  from 
the  infinite,  which  he  assumes  to  be  first,  to  the  concept  of 
deity,  which,  he  argues,  is  derived  from  the  apprehension 
of  the  infinite  over  against  the  finite  under  certain  con- 
ditions. 

With  the  acknowledgment  that  Muller  has  rendered  good 
service  in  this  discussion,  we  are,  nevertheless,  compelled 
to  pronounce  his  theory  inadequate  to  account  for  the 
genesis  and  growth  of  religion. 


.1 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  RELIGIOUS  AND  THEISTIC  BELIEF. 
THE  FUNCTION  OF  REASONING  OR  INFERENCE. 

Contents. 

Preliminary.—Inference  Theory.— General  Statement— Relation  of 
Inference  to  Theistic  Belief.— Confusion  among  Different  Advocates.— 
Various  Reasons  for  the  Confusion.— Particular  Statement  of  the  The- 
ory of  Inference.— Two  Types.— Theistic  Belief  Complex,  Therefore 
not  Intuitive.— Rather  an  Inference.— Confusion  Again.— Theistic  Belief 
an  Unconscious  Inference.— Not  Intuitive,  However.— Flint's  View.— 
Cruder  Forms.— Examination  of  the  Theory.— Admissions  Made.— The 
Usage  of  the  Term  Intuition  Ambiguous.— Though  now  Complex,  may 
Have  an  Intuitive  Root.— Flint's  Exposition  Rather  Ambiguous.— Con- 
fuses the  Question  of  the  Ougin  of  the  Idea  of  God  with  Proofs  for  His 
Existence.— Hence  an  Important  Distinction  Between  the  Genesis  and 
Vindication  of  a  Belief.— The  Threefold  Function  of  Logical  Inference. 
— This  View  Confirmed. 

LlTEItATtJU. 

Flint's  Theism,  Chaps.  I.,  II.— McCosh's  Intuitions.— Hstnii'  Philo- 
sophical Basis  of  Theism,  Chap.  XVI.— Cocker's  Christianity  and  Greek 
Philosophy,  Chap.  II.— De  Pressense's  Origins,  Book  IV.,  Chap.  'TL— 
Principal  Caird's  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  VI.— Lindsay's  Theistic 
Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  III.— Schurman's  Belief  in  God,  Chap.  II. 
— De  La  Saussaye's  Science  of  Religion.  Chap.  VI.— Sabatier's  Outlines 
of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  I. 

I.  Preliminary.    §  43. 

SEVERAL  naturalistic  theories  to  account  for  the  origin 
of  religious  and  theistic  belief  have  been  considered. 
It  has  been  found  that  they  all  presuppose  more  or  less 
definitely  a  non-religious  and  non-theistic  stage  in  the  early 
history  of  the  human  race,  and  that  they  also  attempt  to 
explain,  in  some  empirical  way,  the  genesis  of  the  religious 
consciousness  and  of  theistic  belief  in  man.  It  has  also 
been  discovered  that  each  of  these  theories  is  marked  by 
certain  radical  defects,  and  that  some  other  solution  of  the 
problem  must  be  sought. 


.  r 


■IB 


196 


APOLOGETICS. 


-H 


I.  We  now  proceed  to  the  discussion  of  another  theory 
which  needs  careful  scrutiny,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  defective, 
rather  than  an  erroneous,  solution  of  the  problem.    This 
theory  discovers  the  origin  of  the  belief  in  God,  and  hence 
of  religion,  in  a  reasoning  process  of  some  kind.    Accord- 
ing to  this  view,  theistic  belief  originates  in  some  s,ort  of 
a  logical  inference.    Much  diversity  of  opinion  exists  as  to 
the  precise  nature  of  the  inference  in  question.     It  can 
scarcely  be  maintained  that  belief  in  God  results  from  a 
strict  logical  demonstration,  inasmuch  as  such  demonstra- 
tion only  makes  explicit  what  is  already  an  implicit  mental 
possession.    To  suppose,  therefore,  that  men  in  very  early 
times  obtained  the  idea  of  God,  and  came  to  believe  in  his 
existence  because  they  proved  it,  can  hardly  be  a  proper 
explanation  of  the  origin  of  religious  and  theistic  belief,  for 
the  reason,  mainly,  that  men  can  only  reason  about  that 
of  which  they  already  have  some  idea. 

2.  Most  of  the  advocates  of  this  theory  are  content  to 
say  that  the  origin  of  theistic  belief  is  to  be  discovered,  in 
a  general  v/ay,  in  an  inference  of  some  sort  touching  the 
existence  of  God.  At  the  same  time  no  clear  statement  is 
given  as  to  the  precise  logical  form  of  this  inference.  It  is 
not  made  plain  whether  it  is  the  product  of  a  mediate,  an 
immediate  or  an  inductive  inference,  nor  is  any  definite 
view  announced  as  to  the  non-theistic  grounds  upon  which 
the  inference  rests  which  generates  theistic  belief. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  logical  inference 
has  no  relation  at  all  to  theistic  belief.  It  has,  as  we  shall 
see,  important  bearings  upon  that  belief,  and  it  is  of  vital 
moment  to  ascertain  its  precise  functions  in  relation  to  the 
belief  in  God.  It  must  not  be  hastily  concluded  that  logical 
mference  has  no  bearing  upon  theistic  belief,  simply  because 
that  belief  may  not  originate,  in  the  first  instance,  in  such 
an  inference.  It  is  precisely  at  this  point  that  a  good  deal 
of  confusion  has  arisen  in  the  discussion  of  this  topic.  Very 
many  things  that  those  who  hold  this  view  say  do  not  bear 


tv 


iiii 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       197 

upon  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  God  in  the  human  soul, 
but  relate,  rather,  to  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God. 
It  is  with  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  God  that 
the  psychology  of  theisiu  has  to  do,  and  this  is  the  topic 
now  in  hand. 

3.   Further  confusion  arises  in  the  discussion  of  this 
theory  from  the  fact  that  different  writers  seem  to  have 
before  their  minds  diverse  ideas  of  God.    One  thinks  of  God 
mainly  as  the  first  cause,  or  creator  of  all  things;    and 
another  regards  him  chiefly  as  one  infinite  personal  God, 
the  object  of  homage  and  ser\'ice.    One  has  before  his  mind 
the  matured  idea  of  God  found  in  the  Christian  system, 
which  is  quite  complex  in  its  nature,  while  another  turns 
his  attention  rather  to  the  simpler  forms  of  the  idea  of  God 
found  in  cruder  systems.    It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  function 
of  reasoning  in  relation  to  these  different  ideas  of  God  will 
necessarily  be  differently  regarded  by  these  several  writers. 
In  cases  where  the  idea  of  God  is  complex,  certain  elements 
in  it  may  be  due  to  reflection  and  reasoning,  although  in 
no  case  can  it  be  shown  that  the  basal  elements  of  the  idea 
are  generated  by  any  reasoning  process,  because  they  must 
be  presupposed  in  order  to  the  possibility  of  the  reasoning. 
4.  An  additional  element  of  confusion  arises  from  the 
somewhat  vague  way  in  which  tlie  supporters  of  this  theory 
regard  the  operation  of  the  faculties  of  the  human  mind 
upon  the  manifold  objects  in  nature.     How  far  can  the 
observation  of,  and  reflection  on,  the  glories  of  the  heavens 
and  the  wonders  of  tlie  earth,  go  to  generate  the  idea  of 
God  in  a  mind  presumably  devoid  of  it?    How  much  may 
this  observation  and  reflection  do  to  enlarge  and  enrich  the 
idea  of  God  in  the  minds  of  those  who  already  possess  it? 
These  are  two  very  different  questions,  and  many  of  the 
advocates  of  the  theory  now  under  consideration  do  not 
make  a  proper  distinction  between  them.    They  speak,  in  a 
general  way,  of  reflection  up^m  the  starry  heavens  and  the 
beautiful  earth,  and  grow  quite  eloquent  about  how  all  this 


m 


I. 


\ 


■I 


^ 


ifi 

■i 


(  t 


!      I 


,  I 


i  i 


198 


APOLOGETICS. 


leads  out  to  God,  and  produces  the  idea  c  K)d  in  the  mind 
of  the  reverent  beholder.  With  much  thc>  scy  we  heartily 
agree,  if  it  be  regarded  as  vindicating  the  objective  validity 
of  the  belief  in  God,  and  as  enlarging  1'.  idea  already  in 
the  mind  of  the  observer.  But  all  thi.  leaves  untouched 
the  basal  inquiry  as  to  the  origin  of  the  primary  con-natural 
idea  of,  or  belief  in,  God,  which  must  be  presupposed  before 
reflection  on,  and  inference  from,  the  objects  of  nature  can 
possess  theistic  quality.  We  seek  to  keep  clearly  before  our 
minds  the  single  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  theistic  belief. 

II.  Statement  of  the  Inference  Theory.    §  44. 

A  brief  statement  of  the  theory  which  finds  the  origin 
of  religious  and  theistic  belief  in  some  reasoning  or  infer- 
ential process  may  now  be  given.  It  is  not  easy  to  make 
such  a  statement,  because  able  writers  vary  not  a  little  in 
their  mode  of  setting  it  forth.  There  are  two  main  forms 
of  stating  it. 

I.  The  first  takes  the  somewhat  mature  notion  of  Goc' 
found  in  the  human  mind,  and  discovers  that  it  is  quite 
complex.  It  then  asserts  that  the  belief  in  God  which  this 
notion  implies  cannot  be  an  intuition,  in  the  proper  sense 
of  the  term.  Hence,  it  is  argued  that  the  idea  of  God  i- 
the  mind  of  man  is  not  a  simple  and  original  idea  or  belief, 
but  that  it  is  comr'ox  and  derived.  Consequently  it  is  no' 
an  ultimate  idea,  but  capable  of  being  reduced  to  lower 
terms,  or  of  analysis  into  its  component  elements.  Accord- 
ing to  this  view,  the  term  intuition  is  taken  to  denote  a 
mental  product,  rather  than  the  mental  activity  involved  in 
ongmating  that  product.  When  this  view  of  what  an 
intuition  consists  in  is  applied  to  the  idea  of  God,  it  follows 
that  since  intuitions  are  simple  and  original  ideas,  the  idea 
of  God,  which  is  not  simple  and  original,  cannot  be  an 
intuition.  And,  touching  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  God, 
It  IS  further  contended  that  it  cannot  arise  in  an  intuitive 


m 


Jt^v4- 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       19^ 

way.  And  it  also  follows,  from  the  position  just  stated, 
that  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  God  in  the  human  mind  must 
be  sought  in  some  other  quarter.  If  it  be  not  intuitive,  it 
must  be  empirical  in  its  origin.  If  it  be  not  original,  it 
must  be  derived  from  some  other  source.  The  supporters 
of  the  theory  now  under  consideration  usually  fall  back  on 
the  ground  that  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  God  is  the  product 
of  reflection  on,  or  an  inference  from,  certain  aspects  of  the 
world  about  us.  Reflective  observation  of  the  starry 
heavens,  the  fruitful  earth,  the  changing  seasons,  the  inci- 
dents of  our  lives,  the  events  of  history,  and  similar  things, 
generates  the  idea  of  God  'in  the  minds  of  men,  and  leads 
them  to  believe  in  his  existence. 

There  is  evidently  some  confusion  in  this  phase  of  the 
inference  theory  at  this  point.  Those  who  argue  in  its  favor 
do  not  distinguish  clearly  between  the  question  of  the  origin 
of  the  idea  of  God  and  that  of  the  reasons  for  believing 
In  hi-  existence.  Much  of  what  they  say  bears  upon  the 
latter  ques'  i  rather  than  upon  the  former,  and  it  has  much 
•  e  ■  •  s  .egarded.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  because 
»  •  iDJe  to  give  good  reasons  for  believing  in  the 

-;  '•i>.nce  of  God,  these  reasons  generate  the  idea  of  God 
;.-  the  soul  of  man  at  first.  More  will  be  said  upon  this 
point  later  on  in  this  chapter. 

2.  The  other  aspect  of  the  inference  theory  prefers  to 
say  that  the  belief  in  God  is  the  result  of  an  immediate 
inference  which  men  unconsciously  make.  Like  the  other 
phase  of  this  tlieory,  it  denies  that  the  belief  in  God  is  the 
product  of  immediate  intuition,  or  that  it  originates  in  any 
kind  of  feeling.  It  is  not  always  quite  clear  whether  the 
adherents  of  this  view  are  dealing  with  the  genesis  of  the 
idea  of  God  without  reference  to  his  existence,  or  whethtr 
they  are  really  assuming  the  presence  of  that  idea  in  the 
human  mind,  and  then  seeking  to  account  for  the  validity 
of  this  belief  in  the  existence  of  God.  Flint,  in  the  third 
chapter  of  his  excellent  treatise  on  Theism,  in  which  he 


If 


M  1 


200 


APOLOGETICS. 


(  ' 


deals  with  the  nature,  conditions  and  limits  of  the  theistic 
proof,  seems  to  stand  on  this  general  ground,  as  a  few 
quotations  may  show.  H-  says  that  "if  not  perfectly  instan- 
taneous, the  theistic  inference  is  so  rapid  and  spontaneous 
as  to  have  seemed  to  many  intuitive.  And,  in  a  loose  sense, 
perhaps,  it  may  be  considered  so.  Not,  however,  strictly 
and  properly,  since  the  idea  of  deity  is  no  simple  idea,  but 
the  most  complex  of  ideas."  Again,  he  says  that  "the 
contemplation  of  nature,  and  mind,  and  history,  is  an  indis- 
pensable .  tage  towards  the  knowledge  of  him.  Physical  and 
mental  facts  and  laws  are  the  materials  or  data  of  reason 
in  its  quest  of  reHgious  truth."  These  passages,  so  far  as 
they  bear  upon  the  origin  of  theistic  belief,  seem  to  indicate 
that  this  belief  is  not  intuitive,  but  the  result  of  the  contem- 
plation of  nature. 

Flint  further  says  that  "our  knowledge  of  God  is  obtained 
as  simply  and  naturally  as  our  knowledge  of  our  fellow- 
men.    It  is  obtained,  in  fact,  mainly  in  the  same  way.    We 
have  no  direct  or  immediate  knowledge,  no  intuitive  or 
a  priori  knowledge,  of  our  fellow-creatures  any  more  than 
we  have  of  the  intelligence  of  our  Creator.     We  grow  up 
into  knowledge  of  the  mind  of  God,  as  we  grow  in  acquaint- 
ance with  the  minds  of  men,  through  familiarity  with  their 
acts."    In  such  passages  as  these  it  is  not  very  clear  what 
Flmt  means  by  the  knowledge  of  God.    It  seems  not  easy 
to  decide  whether  he  intends  this  phnib-  to  denote  the  idea 
of  God  m  the  human  mind,  or  to  describe  the  belief  in  the 
existence  of  God.    One  feels  like  asking  whether  he  includes 
both  of  these  aspects  of  theistic  belief  under  the  phrase,  the 
knowledge  of  God  ?    And  one  hesitates  to  admit  the  cogency 
of  the  analogy  between  the  way  we  know  our  fellow-men 
and  obtain  our  knowledge  of  God.    Our  relations  with  our 
fellow-men  and  with  God  are  by  no  means  the  same.    Our 
relation  to  God  is  one  of  origin  and  dependence,  such  as 
our  relations  with  our  fellow-men  do  not  imply. 

Flint  adds  that  "the  inferences  which  theistic  belief  in- 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       201 

volves  are,  in  fact,  involuntary  and  unconscious."  It  is 
thus  an  immediate,  iir  oluntary,  spontaneous  and  uncon- 
scious inference.  "As  a  rule,  the  theistic  process  is  as 
simple  and  easy  an  operation  for  the  mind  as  digestion  is 
for  the  body."  Here,  again,  one  is  impelled  to  ask  what 
kind  of  an  inference  a  spontaneous,  unconscious,  involuntary 
inference  really  is.  It  looks  almost  as  if  there  were  an 
intuitive  or  con-natural  factor  in  it.  And  the  question  still 
presses  as  to  whether  the  result  of  this  peculiar  inference  is 
the  production  of  che  idea  or  knowledge  of  God  in  the  soul, 
where  it  did  not  already  exist,  or  whether  it  relates  to  the 
apprehension  of  the  reasons  why  we  believe  in  the  existence 
of  God. 

3.  There  are  other  and  cruder  form?  in  which  the  infer- 
ence theory  is  presented,  but  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  ex- 
plain them.  They  are  generally  quite  unreflecting,  and 
usually  presuppose  that  the  mind  actually  possesses  the  idea 
of  God.  What  they  say  relates  very  largely  to  the  elabora- 
tion of  that  idea,  or  to  reasonings  to  vindicate  the  actual 
existence  of  God.  But  the  real  question  now  before  us  is 
as  to  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  God  in  the  human  soul,  and 
of  the  origin  of  what  may  be  called  the  theistic  and  religious 
consciousness.  The  theory  under  notice  claims  that  some 
reasoning  process  originates  these  experiences  in  the  soul 
of  man.  The  validity  of  this  claim  is  now  to  be  examined, 
and  the  function  of  reasoning  in  relation  to  theistic  belief 
is  to  be  indicated. 


III.  Examination  of  the  Inference  Theory.    §  45. 

As  there  are  elements  of  truth  in  this  theory,  and  at  the 
same  time  not  a  little  confusion  in  the  statement  of  it,  a 
somewhat  careful  examination  is  needed. 

I.  Concerning  the  inference  theory,  certain  admissions 
should  be  freely  made.  It  is  frankly  admitted  that  observa- 
tion and  reflection  upon  the  manifold  facts  of  nature,  as 


202 


APOLOGETICS. 


well  as  Upon  the  evenis  of  human  history,  may  serve  to 
enlarge  and  elevate  the  idea  of  God.  Various  forms  of 
inference  or  reasoning  may  do  much  to  clarify  theistic  belief 
and  give  it  definiteness  and  persistence. 

And  it  should  be  just  as  readily  conceded  that  reflection 
and  reasoning  may  do  much  to  confirm  the  belief  in  the 
existence  of  a  supreme  being.  Logical  inferences  of  various 
kmds  may  go  far  to  establish  the  objective  validity  of  the 
idea  of  God.  The  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God  are 
reasonings  of  diflferent  sorts  which  serve  to  provide  a 
rational  basis  for  this  belief.  This,  indeed,  is  the  main 
function  of  reasoning  in  relation  to  theistic  belief. 

Further,  the  function  of  reasoning  is  of  great  value  in 
its  inductive  forms,  since  it  enables  us  to  solve  the  most 
profound  problems  of  the  universe  by  means  of  the  theistic 
postulate.  These  problems  are  many  and  varied,  and  they 
pertain  to  the  origin  and  continued  existence  of  the  universe 
The  human  mind,  having  the  idea  of  God  in  its  possession, 
IS  able  to  bring  it  to  the  solution  of  these  great  problems. 
In  doing  so,  it  pursues  a  legitimate  inductive  process  of 
reasoning,  and  announces  a  sound  theistic  philosophy  of 
the  universe.    The  result  is  a  theistic  cosmology. 

But  when  all  these  admissions  are  made,  the  question  as 
to  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  God,  or  of  theistic  belief  on  its 
subjective  side,  still  remains.  The  reflection  which  enlarges 
the  idea  of  God,  the  reasoning  which  confirms  belief  in  the 
existence  of  God,  and  the  theistic  inference  which  solves 
the  world  problems,  rather  presuppose  than  produce  the  idea 
of  God  m  the  first  instance.  The  idea  of  God  already  in 
the  mind  logically  conditions  this  reflection,  reasoning  or 
inference. 

2.  The  usage  of  the  term  intuition  in  connection  with 
the  idea  of  God  is  not  uniform,  and  consequently  needs 
some  elucidation.  Indeed,  in  philosophy  few  terms  are  so 
ambiguous  as  intuition,  and  in  the  discussion  of  the  psy- 
chology of  theism  it  might  be  better  to  avoid  it  altogether. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       203 

It  has,  however,  been  used  so  much  that  it  car  ot  easily 
be  set  aside. 

Those  who  say  that  the  idea  of  God  is  not  int  itive  be- 
cause it  is  complex,  scarcely  go  to  the  root  of  the  juestion. 
They  leave  it  uncertain  whether  they  take  the  term  aituition 
to  denote  a  mental  product,  or  the  mental  process  therein 
involved.  The  advocates  of  the-  inference  theory,  already 
alluded  to,  make  it  refer  mainly  to  the  mertal  oroducL  An 
intuition  is  a  simple  original  belief,  rather  lan  the  act  of 
believing.  It  is  a  definite  mental  product  expressive  of  a 
fundamental  conviction  of  the  mind.  T'  ''  ^w  of  intuition 
scarcely  does  justice  to  the  activity  nind  whic     is 

spontaneous,  and  which  conditions  the  on  as  a  ment.  J 

product.    Now,  it  may  be  that  the  ic  God,  as  four! 

in  the  human  mind,  is  complex  in  its  t. 
are  factors  in  it  which  are  the  produ« 
spontaneous  activity  of  the  soul.  In  a 
plex,  there  may  be  con-natural  elenttnt 
and  it  may  be  found  that  those  con-timtiona  factors  in 
theistic  belief  lie  at  the  basis  of  the  pos-^ibility  r  Miza- 

tion  of  this  idea.  Hence,  to  deny  altogethe  ■  -  n  uitive 
factor  in  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  (lod  may  h  ^imt^  too 
far,  even  if  we  admit  complexity  ia  ■  4  s  realized  m  experi- 
ence. Let  it  be  carefully  observed,  howe'-sr  ^m  the  -eal 
question  now  before  us  is  not  a  hov  thr  *  becaane 
complex,  but  as  to  how  man  ca       to  p  :dea  of 

God  at  the  very  first.    The  real  riuestion  is  r» 
of  the  theistic  consciousness,  not  in  referen 
ment.    And  so  we  conclude  that  the  ambij;  -. 
intuition  exhorts  us  to  avoid  its  use  as  much 
the  discussion  of  the  psychology  of  theism,    i ' 


*.  > 


and  •  ^at  ther*- 

the  naive  and 

i,  thouig^  com- 

the  rdca  of  God. 


lie  origin 

levelop- 

be  term 

•isible  in 

^av  be  better 


to  use  the  term  native,  or  con-natural,  to  di  lote  the  r. 
of  theistic  belief  as  it  springs  up  in  the  human  soul. 

3.  The  exposition  of  Flint,  usually  so  clear,  is  a  I'* tie 
confused  at  this  point.  He  denies  that  theistic  belief  is 
intuitive,  by  saying  that  "the  opinion  that  man  has  an 


% 


111 


204 


APOLOGETICS. 


I'  it 


m 


mtuitiv  .  or  immediate  perception  of  God,  is  untenable;  and 
the  opmion  that  he  has  an  immediate  feeling  of  God  is 
absurd."  The  latter  part  of  this  statement  has  much  force 
agamst  the  absolutists,  like  Schelling  and  Schleiermacher. 
The  first  part  of  the  statement  quoted  shows  that  by  an 
mtmtion  Flint  means  an  immediate  perception  of  God  by 
gazmg  with  the  eye  of  the  soul  upon  the  very  being  of 
God.  The  force  of  Flint's  remark  may  be  admitted,  if 
mtuition  be  taken  only  in  the  sense  in  which  he  uses  it.  But 
It  does  not  follow  that  there  is  not  in  the  soul  of  man  a 
native  the.stic  capacity  which  is  not  produced  by  any  infer- 
mtial  process  of  the  mind  itself.  The  ambiguity  of  the 
term  mtuition  is  again  evident. 

4-  Flint's  exposition  seems  ambiguous  in  another  respect 
He  evidently  identifies  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God 
with  the  grounds  for  the  belief  in  God.    He  says  that  "the 
proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  coincide  with  the  grounds 
for  the  belief  in  God;  they  are  simply  the  real  grounds  of 
the  belief  established  and  expounded  in  a  scientific  manner. 
If  there  were  no  such  proofs  there  could  be  no  such 
grounds."    If  Flint  is  here  speaking  of  the  theistic  proofs, 
his  statement  is  almost  a  truism,  for  the  proofs  are  simply 
the  grounds  for  believing  in  the  existence  of  God,  explicated 
in  a  more  or  less  thorough  manner.    But  if  this  statement 
has  reference  also  to  the  origin  of  the  belief  in  C  .d,  it  implies 
that  the  explication  of  the  proofs  for  believing,  m  the  exist- 
ence ot  God  generates  the  idea  of  God  in  the  soul.    If  this 
is  Flint's  explanation  of  the  genesis  of  che  idea  of  God 
in  the  soul  of  man,  we  are  constrained  to  take  issue  with  it, 
for  the  reason,  mainly,  that  the  human  soul  must  already 
possess  some  definite  notion  of  God  before  it  can  lead  out 
the  proofs  for  his  existence.    This  being  the  case,  the  proofs 
are  not  necessary  to  generate  the  belief  which  already  exists 
The  fact  seems  to  be  that  Flint  does  not  clearly  conceive 
the  question  of  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  God.     When  he 
calls  theistic  belief  an  immediate  unconscious  belief,  and 


p 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       205 

when  he  makes  the  proofs  coincide  with  the  grounds  of 
that  belief,  he  can  scarcely  mean  anything  else  concerning 
the  origin  of  the  idea  of  God  than  what  Luthardt  and  H.  B. 
Smith  mean  when  they  say  that  belief  in  God  is  a  native 
con-natural  belief  of  the  human  soul,  which  springs  up 
spontaneously  on  suitable  occasion,  and  as  the  faculties  of 
the  soul  come  into  exercise.  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
belief  is  not  rational,  or  that  it  cannot  be  vindicated  by  rea- 
sonings which  show  the  reality  of  its  object.  This  position 
simply  maintains  that  in  the  first  instance  the  idea  of  God 
springs  up  within  the  soul,  and  is  not  brought  into  it  by 
any  process  of  inference  or  reasoning.  Perhaps  this  is 
what  Flint  really  means,  so  far  as  the  origin  of  the  idea 
of  God  which  theistic  belief  implies  is  concerned.  If  so,  )♦• 
seems  a  pity  that  he  should  have  denied  the  intuitional  nature 
of  this  belief  so  decidedly  as  he  has  done.  The  truth  may 
be,  as  we  shall  see  later  on,  that  there  are  both  con-natural 
and  empirical  elements  in  theistic  belief,  as  we  find  it  fully 
matured  in  the  human  mind. 

5.  A  very  important  distinction  now  emerges.  This  is 
the  distinction  between  the  vindication  of  a  belief  and  the 
genesis  of  a  belief.  To  account  for  the  origin  of  a  belief 
is  one  thing,  and  to  establish  its  validity  is  another.  To 
explain  how  an  idea  comes  into  the  possession  of  the  mind 
is  one  problem,  to  prove  tlie  reality  of  its  object  is  quite 
another.  Now,  inference,  reasoning  or  proof,  has  much 
force  in  justifying  the  rational  nature  of  theistic  belief,  and 
in  vindicating  the  real  existence  of  the  object  to  which  that 
belief  relates.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  we  prove  the  divine 
existence.  But  inquiry  concerning  the  origin  of  the  idea 
of  God  in  the  mind  is  a  very  different  thing;  and  this  must 
be  settled  before  the  proofs  can  be  properly  opened  up.  This 
is  an  inquiry  in  psychology,  while  the  question  of  the  theistic 
proofs  is  a  matter  of  logic.  Those  who  find  the  genesis 
of  the  idea  of  God  in  inference  have  the  question  of  the 
proofs  uppermost  in  their  thought,  while  the  problem  now 


t 


F 

n 


I' 


'4 


206 


APOLOGETICS. 


before  us  is  that  of  the  origin  of  the  idea.  These  two 
questions  should  be  kept  apart,  and  each  ought  to  be  con- 
sidered in  its  proper  place.  The  question  of  its  origin  now 
engages  attention.  We  may  be  well  able  to  give  very  good 
reasons  for  holding  that  there  is  a  God,  but  it  does  not 
follow  that  the  idea  of  God  springs  from  these  reasons. 
Hence,  we  conclude  that  this  theory  does  not  rightly  regard 
the  distinction  between  these  two  questions,  and  that  it  fails 
to  show  that  man  at  first  acquired  the  idea  of  God  by  any 
process  of  ratiocination  from  non-theistic  premises. 

6.  Inquiry  into  the  resources  of  logical  processes  will 
further  show  that  theistic  belief  does  not  arise  from  any 
sort  of  logical  inference.  This  is  a  point  of  vital  importance 
in  this  discussion,  and  n«^lect  of  it  has  led  to  much  con- 
fusion. 'There  are  three  modes  of  logical  inference  of  which 
the  logicians  speak,  and  these  three  exhaust  the  list. 

There  is  immediate  inference,  first  of  all.    By  this  mode 
of  inference  the  conclusion  is  reached  without  the  use  of 
a  third  term  for  the  purpose  of  comparison.    By  this  kind 
of  inference  we  merely  elucidate  in  one  form  of  expression 
what  is  contained  in  another.    We  really  do  not  originate 
any  new  truth  which  is  not  implicitly  in  the  first  statement; 
we  simply  explicate  the  contents  of  the  original  assertion. 
Nor  have  we  any  right  to  put  into  the  second  statement  any- 
thing which  is  not  latent  in  the  first.     Hence,  if  the  idea 
of  God  be  not  in  some  way  implied  in  the  original  proposi- 
tion, it  can  never  justify  for  itself  a  place  in  the  second, 
as  the  result  of  immediate  inference.    Then,  if  the  idea  of 
God  be  in  the  original  statement,  its  origin  cannot  be  ac- 
counted for  as  the  product  of  au  immediate  inference  from 
that  statement,  which  already  has  a  theistic  quality  about  it. 
All  that  inference  can  do  in  such  a  case  is  to  elaborate  the 
idea  and  vindicate  the  reality  of  the  existence  of  its  object. 
Then,  there  is  mediate  inference.     Here  a  third  term 
comes  into  service  in  reaching  the  conclusion.    In  this  case, 
the  form  of  reasoning  is  the  syllogism,  which  consists  of 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       207 

two  propositions,  from  which  a  conclusion  is  drawn.  In 
this  case,  also,  no  new  truth  is  obtained.  We  simply  unfold, 
in  the  conclusion,  what  is  implicitly  in  the  premisses,  and 
we  can  never  have  more,  seldom  as  much,  in  the  conclusion 
as  in  the  premisses,  without  having  a  logical  fallacy  in 
our  procedure.  Hence,  if  the  idea  of  God  be  not  implicitly 
in  the  premisses,  it  can  never  get  into  the  conclusion.  We, 
therefore,  have  the  idea  of  God  before  we  make  the  infer- 
ence, and  hence  we  do  not  need  the  inference  to  generate 
that  idea.  In  a  word,  we  do  not  rightly  explain  the  origin 
of  the  idea  of  God  by  means  of  a  logical  process,  which 
presupposes  its  existence  in  the  mind. 

There  remains  a  third  mode  of  inference.  This  is  known 
as  the  inductive,  and  it  consists  in  the  observation  and  classi- 
fication of  facts,  with  a  view  to  discover  the  laws  which 
gove.n  the  facts,  and  thereby  solve  the  problems  which 
the  facts  present.  In  a  word,  in  inductive  reasoning  we 
bring  some  sort  of  postulate,  which  the  mind  already  has 
in  its  possession,  and  we  seek  to  solve  the  problems  by 
means  of  it.  Thus,  we  observe  the  manifold  facts  of  order 
and  design  in  nature,  and  we  bring  the  theistic  hypothesis 
which  involves  the  idea  of  God  to  bear  upon  these  facts, 
and  therein  we  find  their  adequate  solution.  But  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  the  mind  already  possesses  the  idea  of  God, 
otherwise  it  could  not  formulate  and  apply  the  theistic 
hypothesis ;  and  hence,  again,  the  idea  of  God  cannot  origi- 
nate from  an  inductive  inference  which  presupposes  its 
existence  already  in  the  mind  making  the  inference.  Thus, 
it  seems  clear  that  it  does  not  lie  within  the  province  of 
reasoning  or  inference  to  generate  the  idea  of  God  in  the 
human  mind  at  first. 

7.  The  general  conclusion  thus  reached  is  confirmed  by 
the  fact  that  men  generally  have  the  idea  of  God,  and  even 
believe  in  his  existence  before  they  begin  to  reason  abiut 
these  questions.  Now,  if  theistic  belief  arose  from  infer- 
ence,  only  those   who  had  gone   through   the   reasoning 


IP 

i 
If 


''i^ 


M 


•■*4 


I    e' 


208 


APOLOGETICS. 


process  involved  in  that  inference  would  have  that  belief, 
and  the  idea  of  God  involved  therein.     But,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  men  seem  to  have  the  idea,  or  belief,  first  of  all. 
Long  before  a  child  can  conduct  any  sort  of  reasoning 
process,  it  may  come  to  possess  a  pretty  clear  notion  of  God. 
In  early  times  there  seems  to  be  little  doubt  that  men  had 
the  theistic  notion  long  before  they  reasoned  about  it,  or 
concerning  the  existence  of  its  object.     Flint,  of  course, 
would  say  that  the  child  or  the  primitive  man  makes  the 
inference  so  quickly  as  not  to  be  aware  of  it.    But  surely 
it  seems  better  to  say  that  theistic  belief  is  the  natural 
deliverance  of  the  human  mind,  which  is  endowed  w    h  a 
con-natural  theistic  capacity.    Before  the  mind  can  perf.  m 
any  act  of  conscious  theistic  inference,  it  must  already 
possess  the  idea  of  God.    An  unconscious  inference  is  prac- 
tically an  intuitive  operation  of  the  mind,  determined  by 
the  nature  of  the  mind  itseK.  and  springing  up  spontaneously 
therein.    It  is  certainly  a  priori  in  its  fundamental  principles. 


wn 


;  CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  RELIGIOUS  AND  THEISTIC  BELIEF. 

idealistic  evolution. 
Contents. 

This  Theory  Important— Vital  Interests  Involved.— The  Hegelian 
Type  of  Thought.— Kant.— Fichte.—Schelling.— Hegel.— Spencer  and 
H^el.— Statement  of  the  Theory.— Unconscious  Reason  the  Basal  Fact. 
—Hegel,  Green,  Caird.— In  the  Absolute  an  Inner  Principle  of  Move- 
ment.—Produces  Nature  and  Spirit.— The  Origin  of  Religious  Con- 
sciousness.—Man's  Consciousness  of  God  is  God's  Consciousness  of 
Himself.— Examination  of  the  Theory.— Certain  Admissions.— Funda- 
mental Conception  Inadequate.— No  Reason  for  the  Direction  of  the 
Evolution.— No  Teleology.— Explains  the  Higher  from  the  ^ower.— De- 
stroys Man's  Individuality.— Tends  to  Pantheism.— A  Psychological 
Difficulty. 

Literature. 

Encyclopaedia  Article  on  Idealism.— HegeVs  Logic— Cocker's  Chris- 
tianity  anrf  Greek  Philosophy,  Chap.  II.— Pflciderer's  Philosophy  of 
Religion.  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  VI.— Principal  Caird's  Philosophy  of  Religion, 
Chap.  VIII.— Green's  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  I.,  Chap.  I.— Ed- 
ward Caird's  The  Evolution  of  Religion,  Chaps.  VI.,  VII.— Watson's 
Christianity  and  Idealism,  Chap.  XI.— Lindsay's  Theistic  Philosophy  of 
Religion,  Chap.  III.— Sabatier's  Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion, 
Chap.  I.— Royce's  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Chaps.  VIII.,  IX.— 
Bowne's  Philosophy  of  Theism,  Chaps.  I.-III. 

I.  Preliminary.    §  46, 

I.  \^7^  "°^^'  "^*^'i  ^  profound  and  subtle  theory,  which 
W  in  a  measure  deals  with  both  the  psychology  and 
ontology  of  theism.  It  is  based  on  certain  aspects  of  the 
Hegelian  nhilosophy,  especially  as  modified  by  writers  like 
Thomas  .1.  Green  and  Edward  Caird.  It  may  be  termed 
the  th&  .y  of  idealistic  evolution  or  dialectic  process.  It 
must  be  kept  clearly  in  mind  that  the  evolutionary  process 
involved  m  this  theory  is  not  mechanical  nor  physical,  but 
rather  logical  and  idealistic.  According  to  this  theory,  the 
inner  resources  of  absolute  reason,  developing  in  accordance 
14 


ri 


^lO 


APOLOGETICS. 


!  ■., 


m 


W  \ 


•with  their  inherent  conditions,  produce  the  religious  con- 
isciousness  in  the  human  soul  which  theistic  belief  implies. 
As  this  theory  touches  vital  questions  in  psychology, 
ontology  and  theolog}%  it  merits  careful  consideration.  And 
the  fact  that  the  general  type  of  thought  with  which  it  is 
associated  commands  the  sympathetic  attention  of  m?.ny 
thoughtful  minds  at  the  present  day  exhorts  us  to  give  it 
a  respectful  hearing.  If  there  be  in  it  elements  of  value, 
and  if  it  shows  a  deep  insight  into  the  psychology  of  theism, 
we  cannot  afford  to  ignore  it.  And  if  it  be  marked  by 
some  -crious  and  radical  defects,  these  should  be  clearly 
indicated. 

2.  The  Hegelian  philosophy  is  the  outcome  of  that  re- 
markable movement  of  speculation  in  Germany  which  began 
with  Kant,  and  continued  through  Fichte  and  Schelling, 
till  it  culminated  in  Hegel.    So  far  as  this  type  of  specula- 
tion relates  to  the  absolute  reality  of  things,  it  deals  with 
the  problem  of  the  dualism  between  mind  and  matter  which 
Descartes  set,  and  which  Spinoza  sought  to  solve  by  his 
thorough-going  monistic  system.    Kant  held  that  the  abso- 
lute reality,  as  the  thing  in  itself,  is  noumenal,  and  that 
cognition  has  to  do  with  phenomena  only.     The  absolute 
reality  was  merely  assumed  by  Kant  to  provide,  through 
sensuous  intuition,  the  materials  which  the  categories  of 
the  understanding  are  to  organize  into  definite  forms  of 
cognition.     Fichte  discarded  the  absolute,  as  the  thing  in 
itself,  lying  beyond  the  conscious  subject,  and  placed  it 
within  that  subject  as  a  kind  of  reaction  against  its  own 
activity.     Schelling  conceived  of  the  absolute,  or  thing  in 
itself,  as  having  two  sides  or  poles.    One  of  these  is  positive, 
ideal  and  spiritual,  the  other  is  negative,  real  and  material. 
By  tliis  assumption  it  was  supposed  that  tlie  dualism  between 
matter  and  spirit  was  solved  in  the  inner  unity  of  the 
absolute  where  tliey  were  really  identical.     The  dualism, 
however,  was  solved  by  postulating  a  sort  of  dual  identity 
in  tlie  absolute. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF. 


211 


Hegel,  in  turn,  identified  the  absolute  reality  with  uni- 
versal reason  or  thought,  which  is  impersonal  and  uncon- 
scious. This  absolute  or  universal  reason,  which  is  a 
rational  unity,  unfolds  itself  in  the  twoiold  forms  of  ex- 
ternal nature  and  of  human  spirit.  This  supposition  is 
taken  to  be  an  adequate  solution  of  the  problem  of  the 
dualism  between  matter  and  spirit,  whv..  had  perplexed 
philosophers  ever  since  the  time  of  Descartes.  These 
systems  are  all  more  or  less  idealistic.  The  kinship  of  these 
theories  is  evident.  Kant's  idealism  is  critical,  Fichte's  is 
subjecti  'e,  Schelling's  is  objective,  and  Hegel's  is  absolute. 
The  absolute  reality  with  Kan',  is  noumenal  object,  with 
Fichte  it  is  universal  subject,  with  Schelling  universal 
reason,  and  with  H'igel  it  is  universal  process. 

3.  The  relations  between  the  idealism  of  Hegel  and  the 
materialism  of  Spencer  are  worthy  of  passing  notice.  At 
first  sight  they  seem  entirely  different,  yet  they  have  features 
of  resemblance.  Both  are,  in  a  sense,  nion'':<:  :,  and  both 
proceed  to  explain  the  world  by  an  evolutionary  principle. 
But  Hegel  starts  irom  an  ideal,  and  Spencer  from  a  mate- 
rial, principle.  Hegel  begins  with  the  absolute  reason, 
Spencer  with  the  atomic  homogeneous.  Hegel  endows  the 
absolute  with  thought  which  is  unconscious ;  Spencer  clothes 
it  with  power  which  is  inscrutible.  Hegel  posits  the  idea, 
and  by  a  logical  process  develops  the  universe;  Spencer 
posits  the  atom,  and  by  a  mechanical  process  evolves  the 
universe.  These  two  modes  of  philosophizing  are  as  ancient 
as  the  Greek  philosophy.  Plato  is  the  forerunner  of  Hegel, 
and  Democritus  paves  the  way  for  Spencer.  Perhaps  the 
old  Greeks  have  the  best  claim  to  originality. 


1 


II.  Statement  of  the  Idealistic  Theory.    §  47. 

In  the  statement  now  to  be  made  of  the  idealistic  evolu- 
tionary theory  of  the  genesis  of  theistic  belief,  we  shall 
keep  in  view  tlie  general  type  of  modern  thought  now 


MSB 

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1 

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313 


APOLOGETICS. 


known  as  Hegelianism,  and  neo-Heg«lianism.  '^his  type 
of  thought  has  greatly  modified  both  philoboi/hy  and 
theology  in  Germany.  It  has  also  been  imported  into 
English-speaking  circles  in  Britain  and  America,  through 
the  writings  of  Green  and  Caird,  Royce  and  Watson.  In 
its  imported  form  it  has  undergone  considerable  modifica- 
tions, and  it  certainly  strikes  a  profound  note  in  philo- 
sophical speculation. 

I.  The  fundamental  fact  in  the  system  is  the  view  taken 
of  the  absolute  reality.    The  ground  of  all  reality  is  absolute 
reason  or  pure  thought,  which  is  held  to  be  alike  uncon- 
scious and  impersonal.    What  this  reason  or  thought  is  in 
its  essential  nature  does  not  very  clearly  appear  in  the 
system.    Whether  it  is  pure  spirit,  or  highly  refined  matter, 
or  the  widest  possible  abstraction,  is  not  easily  determined. 
According  to  Hegel  himself,  it  seems  to  be  the  impersonal 
spiritual  ground  of  the  reality  of  nature  in  the  material 
universe,  and  of  spirit  in  the  realm  of  thought.    But  whether 
it  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  entity  of  some  kind,  or  simply 
as  an  empty  abstraction,  is  a  question  in  regard  to  which 
the  interpreters  of  Hegel  widely  differ.     Green  maintains 
that  the  spiritual  principle,  which  is  assumed  to  exist  alike 
in  nature  and  spirit,  is  the  ground  of  the  reality  of  both. 
This  spiritual  principle  unifies  and  explains  the  world  of 
nature  and  the  realm  of  mind.    Caird  lays  much  stress  on 
the  view  that  being  and  thought  are  really  at  root  identical. 
But  he  does  not  very  clearly  show  how  they  are  to  be  iden- 
tified, whether  on  the  side  of  being  or  of  thought.     Hegel 
makes  the  absolute  to  lie  unconscious  reason  or  thought, 
and  regards  it  as  the  ground  of  the  reality  of  both  nature 
and  spirit.     Green  looks  upon  the  absolute  as  a  spiritual 
principle,  and  as  the  element  of  reality  common  to  both 
nature  and  spirit.     Caird  regards  the  absolute  as  a  prin- 
ciple  of    rational    unity,    and    describes    it    as    the    bond 
which  binds  nature  and  spirit  into  one  rational  system. 
Thus,  in  a  threefold  way,  the  tj-pe  of  thought  now  under 


n 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       213 

notice  is  described  in  its  basal  principle  of  reality  in  the 
absolute. 

2.  This  theory  presupposes  an  inner  principle  of  move- 
ment in  unconscious  reason  or  pure  thought.  This  internal 
principle  of  movement  is  a  dialectic  or  thought  process;  its 
mode  of  operation  is  logical  and  rational.  Its  operation 
causes  the  absolute  and  unconscious  reason  to  unfold  itself 
in  nature  and  finite  spirit,  by  means  of  a  progressive  move- 
ment from  the  lower  to  the  higher.  This  self-unfolding 
causes  unconscious  reason  or  absolute  spirit  to  differentiate, 
and  externalize  itself  first  of  all  in  nature,  where  it  becomes 
other  than  itself.  Then  it  returns  to  itself  in  finite  spirit, 
and  thus  preserves  its  identity.  In  reaching  this  result  there 
are  at  least  three  distinct  stages.  The  first  is  in  abstract 
thought,  the  second  in  outward  nature,  and  the  third  in 
finite  spirit.  The  first  movement  of  absolute  reason  is  from 
the  most  abstract  of  all  conceptions,  that  of  pure  being,  to 
the  most  concrete  conception  which  still  retains  in  it  the 
unity  of  nature  and  finite  spirit.  This  is  the  absolute  idea. 
This  absolute  idea  is  that  moment  in  the  self-development 
of  absolute  reason  which  precedes  the  differentiation  of  it 
into  nature  and  finite  spirit.  In  the  second  stage,  the  abso- 
lute idea  passes  over  into  nature  as  other  than  itself,  not 
by  any  creative  process,  but  by  a  rational  movement.  In 
the  third  stage,  the  differentiation  takes  place  into  finite 
spirit,  when  consciousness  arises,  and  wherein  the  absolute 
returns  to  itself,  so  that  the  cycle  of  logical  movement  is 
complete.  Then,  in  the  experience  of  finite  spirit,  the  move- 
ment is  through  subjective  spirit,  on  to  objective  spirit,  and 
up  to  absolute  spirit,  which  is  God.  This  is  a  very  brief 
outline  of  a  great  scheme,  but  it  may  pave  the  way  for  the 
statement  cf  the  next  section. 

3.  The  origin  of  the  religious  consciousness  in  inan, 
according  to  this  theory,  must  now  be  explained.  This 
consciousness  should  be  called  God-consciousness,  rather 
than  theistic  belief.    This  explanation  is  founded  upon  the 


I 

SI 


214 


APOLOGETICS. 


exposition  made  in  the  last  section.    The  absolute  reason, 
which  is  the  basal  fact  in  this  theory,  is  at  first  regarded 
as  unconscious  and  impersonal.    It  only  attains  conscious- 
ness m  the  process  of  development,  as  the  absolute  idea  is 
differentiated  into  nature  and  spirit.    As  the  absolute  idea 
IS  realized  in  human  spirit,  by  means  of  its  own  inner  self- 
development,  God,  on  the  one  hand,  becomes  conscious  of 
himself,  and  man,  on  the  other,  rises  to  the  consciousness 
of  God.    The  consciousness  of  God  which  the  human  spirit 
comes  to  possess  is  but  a  moment  in  the  logical  process  by 
which  unconscious  reason  rises  to  consciousness.    Thus  it 
comes  to  pass,  as  Patton  says,  that  man's  thought  of  God 
becomes  God's  thought  of  himself.    Or,  to  put  it  in  another 
way,  man  comes  to  have  a  consciousness  of  God  as  God 
becomes  conscious  of  himself.     In  this  way  the  religious 
^consciousness  of  man,  and  his  belief  in  God,  originates     It 
IS  the  product  of  the  self-evolution  of  the  absolute  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  human  spirit. 

The  statement  just  made  is  essentially  that  of  Hegel. 
Edward  Caird,  who  maintains  the  identity  at  root  of  being 
and  thought,  states  the  theory  in  a  different  way.    He  says 
that  it  IS  necessary  for  the  human  spirit  to  relate  itself  to 
God     In  explaining  what  he  means  by  this,  he  seems  to 
imply  that  belief  in  God,  and  the  religious  consciousness 
which  goes  with  it,  are  to  be  regarded  as  the  natural  result 
of  the  relation  of  the  absolute  spirit  to  the  finite  spirit  of 
man.     God  comes  in  some  way  into  the  activities  of  the 
human  spirit,  and  thus  the  consciousness  of  God  arises 
therein.    Other  adherents  of  the  Hegelian  mode  of  thinking 
gn-e  different  explanations  of  the  way  in  which  the  belief 
in  God  originates;  but  they  all  substantially  agree  in  finding 
the  genesis  of  the  religious  consciousness  as  a  moment  in  the 
process  of  the  inner  self-development  of  absolute  uncon- 
scious reason.    Absolute  spirit  and  finite  spirit  relate  them- 
selves to  each  other,  and  out  of  this  relation  the  genesis  of 
the  religious  and  theistic  consciousness  naturally  springs. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       215 

III.  Examination  of  this  Theory.    §  48. 

To  examine  this  theory  fully  would  require  an  investiga- 
tion of  the  entire  Hegelian  system.  This  cannot  now  be 
done;  nor,  indeed,  is  it  necessary  to  do  so.  Some  general 
considerations  are  presented  which  may  give  a  just  estimate 
of  the  import  of  the  theory  which  finds  the  explanation  of 
the  idea  of  God  and  of  the  religious  consciousness  in  man 
in  the  necessary  evolution  or  logical  self-revelation  of  the 
absolute. 

I.  Certain  important  admissions  are  frankly  made.  It 
must  be  acknowledged  that  the  view-point  of  the  Hegelian 
system  in  regard  to  some  of  the  deepest  probl'-ms  of  exist- 
ence and  thought  is  profound  and  comprehensive.  It  is  a 
highly  speculative  type  of  thought,  and  to  discover  what 
is  called  the  secret  of  Hegel  has  greatly  puzzled  many  of 
his  interpreters.  It  may  be  further  confessed  that  the 
Hegelian  point  of  view  gives  glimpses,  though  perhaps  in 
a  one-sided  way,  of  a  profound  philosophical  truth.  That 
truth  consists  in  the  fact  that  between  subjective  rationality 
in  the  fundamental  laws  of  thought,  and  objective  ration- 
ality in  the  basal  conditions  of  existence,  there  is  corre- 
spondence. In  other  words,  in  the  cognition  of  the  external 
world,  the  necessary  forms  of  thought,  and  the  underlying 
laws  of  nature,  come  into  rational  correlation.  Human 
thought  has  its  order  and  uniformity,  and  nature  is  a  system 
of  rationally  related  things.  Between  the  two  systems  there 
is  rational  correspondence,  and  in  true  cognition  there  is 
rational  correlation.  This  reveals  the  profoundly  important 
position  that  the  categories  or  necessary  laws  of  thought 
have  a  fundamental  relation  of  correspondence  with  the 
essential  conditions  under  which  the  external  world  exists 
for  rational  apprehension.  The  questions  of  how  this  cor- 
respondence has  been  established,  and  whether  the  higher 
rational  ground  of  their  unity  may  not  be  in  God,  need 
now  only  be  suggested.         -vill  recur  later  on  in  these  dis- 


', 

1 


2l6 


APOLOGETICS. 


cussions  It  is  only  just  to  acknowledge  the  good  service 
which  the  Hegelian  view-point  has  rendered  in  this  con- 
nection. 

2.  The  adequacy  of  the  fundamental  assumption  of  the 
Hegelian  system  may  be  seriously  questioned.    It  assumes 
that  the  fundamental  fact  which  is  the  ground  of  all  reality 
IS  absolute   unconscious,  impersonal  reason,  spirit  or  pure 
thought.     It  IS  difficult  to  determine  whether  it  is  a  real 
form  of  existence  or  an  abstraction.    Hegel  himself  seemed 
to  look  upon  the  absolute  as  the  highest  possible  abstraction. 
At  the  same  time,  being  in  the  first  instance  impersonal,  it 
IS  hard  to  see  how  it  can  be  spiritual.     Then,  if  it  be  an 
abstraction,  the  mode  of  its  formation  may  be  properly 
raised.    If  the  absolute  be  not  the  supposition  of  a  reality 
of  some  kind   the  question  at  once  arises  as  to  whence  it 
!!  h'T.  ,  -f .!'  ^  '"  abstraction  in  the  proper  sense,  it 
IS  doubtful  If  the  notion  of  the  highest  abstraction  can  be 
formed,  save  as  it  may  be  drawn  from  materials  already 
given  m  the  worid  of  nature  and  the  realm  of  spirit,  which 
exist  as  a  closely-related  dualism.    Pure  Hegelianism  seems 
to  be  sporting  with  abstractions,  rather  than  dealing  with 
realities  m  its  fundamental  postulate.    Neo-HegelianUm,  if 
It  admits  the  reality  of  a  personal  God,  and  the  fact  of 
creation,  avoids  some  of  these  difficulties.    The  assumption 
of  an  unconscious  reason,  with  an  inner  principle  of  develop- 
ment operating  by  necessity,  is  not  vindicated  by  any  good 
reasons.     And    even  when  this  postulate  is  made,  ft  fails 
to  explain  all  the  problems  of  personality  and  freedom.    And 
to  make  the  process  of  evolution,  by  which  all  finite  things 
have  been  produced,  a  merely  logical,  and  not  an  ontological 
one.  IS  either  to  identify  thought  and  being,  or  to  move 
n  the  regions  of  abstraction  only.     The  postulate  of  one 
infinite  personal  God  is  a  far  more  adequate  assumption. 
tltlT^  ^ssuniption  has  to  be  made,  it  is  proper  to 
make  that  assumption  which  best  meets  the  conditions  of 
the  problem.    If  the  choice  be  between  the  supposition  of 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       217 

absolute  unconscious  reason,  and  the  postulate  of  an  infinite 
personal  God  as  the  basal  fact  of  reality,  the  latter  surely 
seems  the  more  rational  of  the  two.  Hence,  we  cannot 
but  hesitate  to  accept  the  fundamental  postulate  of  pure 
Hegelianism. 

3.  But  even  if  this  postulate  were  accepted  as  sufficient 
at  the  outset,  and  if  it  were  admitted  that  absolute  reason, 
in  its  logical  yet  unconscious  evolution,  did  produce  nature 
and  finite  spirit,  no  principle  is  provided  which  explains 
why  the  evolution  should  rationally  move  in  one  direction 
rather  than  in  another.     There  is  no  free  rational  deter- 
mination on  the  part  of  the  absolute.    Hegelianism  simply 
presupposes  an  immanent  principle  of  movement  in  the 
absolute,  and  seeks  to  construe  this  under  the  category  of 
the  rational  and  logical,  though  it  be  unconscious  and  im- 
personal.    This  virtually  compels  the  conclusion  that  this 
principle  of  supposed  rational  activity  is  really  bound  by 
the  law  of  necessity,  so  that  idealistic  evolution  is  not  radi- 
cally different  from  mechanical  evolution  in  this  respect. 
There  is  in  it  no  basis  for  the  formation  of  a  plan  which 
involves  foresight  and  purpose.    There  is  no  free  rational 
agency  by  which  that  plan  is  wrought  out  in  the  logical 
evolution  of  the  absolute.     In  a  word,  the  absolute,  con- 
ceived of  as  impersonal  spirit  or  unconscious  reason,  does 
not  contain  any  principle  which  determines  the  nature  and 
the  direction  of  the  evolution.    There  is  no  conscious  realiza- 
tion of  the  plan,  especially  in  its  earlier  stages  there  is  no 
creation  of  anything  by  the  free  activity  of  the  absolute. 
The  evolution  out  of  which  all  finite  things  spring  is  the 
necessary  logical  development  of  the  absolute  in  accordance 
with  its  own  inner  nature.     Above  all,  there  can  be  no 
teleology  in  this  process,  save  a  kind  of  immanent  teleology, 
which  is  no  proper  teleology  at  all.     On  this  account,  the 
Hegelian  explanation  of  the  origin  of  religious  belief  is  not 
sufficient,  for  it  makes  the  consciousness  of  God  in  the 
human  soul  merely  a  moment  in  a  process,  which,  though 


4 


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A 


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V 


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2l8 


APOLOGETICS. 


The  reason  in  it,  there- 


termed  rational,  is  necessitarian, 
fore,  is  non-free. 

4.  It  is  further  to  be  observed  that  this  theory  has  to 
explain  the  higher  out  of,  and  by  means  of,  the  lower.    It 
begins  with  the  lowest  form  of  rationality  in  absolute 
unconscious  reason.    Indeed,  it  seems  almost  a  misnomer 
to  call  the  absolute,  thus  viewed,  rational;  and  there  is  no 
transcendent  rationality  at  all.    It  is  merely  immanent  at 
best.    It  is  claimed  by  this  theory  that  somehow  the  inner 
self-movement  of  the  absolute,  which  is  yet  unconscious, 
produces  the  consciousness  which  the  human  soul  experi- 
ences.    And  this  same  movement  rises  even  higher,  and 
generates  the  God-consciousness  which  the  soul  of  man  is 
supposed  to  reach.    This  self-consciousness  and  this  God- 
conscousness  are  the  products,  by  a  necessary  movement 
in  the  absolute  by  which,  in  some  mysterious  way,  the 
unconscious  is  transmuted   into  the  conscious.     In  like 
manner  the  impersonal  in  some  remarkable  way  becomes 
endowed  with  the  dignity  and  glory  of  personality.     The 
lower  produces  the  higher  without  the  aid  of  anything 
which  lies  outside  of  the  lower.    It  gives  an  effect  without 
a  cause. 

One  naturally  asks,  Is  this  rationally  possible?    Can  the 
unconscious  produce    out  of  itself,  the  conscious?     Can 
the  impersonal  beget  the  pcrsor/al?    Can  the  non-moral,  by 
Its  own  mner  movement,  generate  the  moral?     Can  the 
non-religious  lift  itself  up  to  the  religious?    Can  the  non- 
free  transmute  itself  into  the  free?    To  these  questions  the 
theory  supplies  no  satisfactory  answer.    Indeed,  the  law  of 
causation  is  transgressed  at  every  upward  movement  of  the 
theory,  for  there  is  a  new  factor  in  the  higher  moment 
whose  causality  does  not  lie  in  the  lowei.     This  is  the 
msuperable  difficulty  which  faces  any  self-contained  evolu- 
tionary theory  which  admits  no  reason  and  efficiency  outside 
the  process  of  onward  progress.    And  it  is  just  as  effective 
against  idealistic  evolution  as  against  mechanical,  when  it 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       219 

proposes  to  explain  the  higher  from  the  lower,  by  means 
of  an  immanent  reason  and  efficiency  which  is  not  also 
transcendent.  We  maiijtain  that  God  is  the  only  absolute 
form  of  being,  from  whom  all  other  grades  of  being  come. 
But  we  conceive  of  him  as  possessing  rationality,  conscious 
personality,  self-determination,  creative  power  and  moral 
perfection.  These  characteristics  of  God,  as  the  absolute, 
manifest  themselves  in,  and  account  for,  nature  and  human 
spirit.    This  is  the  correct  theistic  view. 

5.  It  also  follows  that  this  theory  destroys  the  proper 
individual  existence  of  the  human  spirit.  It  also  leaves  no 
legitimate  basis  for  man's  moral  freedom.  Hence,  it  may 
be  charged  with  cutting  the  roots  of  morality  and  religion. 
According  to  this  theory,  man  is  but  a  stage  in  the  process 
of  the  self-developmei.t  of  the  absolute,  but  a  moment  in 
the  evolution  of  unconscious  reason.  He  has  no  proper  sub- 
stantial, even  though  dependent,  existence  apart  from  his 
place  in  the  evolution  of  which  he  is  a  moment.  The  con- 
ditions of  the  continuity  of  the  existence  of  the  individual 
human  spirit  are  not  made  plain.  The  basis  for  moral 
responsibility  is  insecure,  and  the  ground  for  a  real  immor- 
tality is  wanting.  If  this  be  the  case,  there  is  no  rational 
basis  for  either  morality  or  religion.  Any  valid  theory  must 
preserve  both  the  object  and  the  subject  in  religion.  God, 
as  the  infinite  personal  Spirit,  is  absolute.  Man,  as  a 
rational,  moral,  though  dependent,  personality,  has  real 
existence.  The  theory  under  notice  fails  to  do  justice  to 
either  the  object  or  the  subject  in  religion. 

6.  It  is  evident,  from  what  has  been  said,  that  the 
Hegelian  type  of  thought  tends  to  pantheism.  Some  of  its 
later  adherents  have  guarded  against  this  charge,  but  it  is 
true  of  Hegel  himself.  He  may  not  inaptly  be  described 
as  an  idealistic  pantheist;  and  he  has  some  kinship  with 
Spinoza.  With  Spinoza,  the  absolute  is  construed  as  sub- 
stance, which  has  two  attributes,  according  to  which  t'.is 
substance  unfold,   itself  for  us.     These  are  extension  and 


aao 


APOLOGETICS. 


thought,  and  aU  finite  things  are  merely  modifications  of 
these  two  attributes.    Hegel  regards  the  absolute  as  uncon- 
scious reason,  which  evolves  itself,  through  the  absolute 
Idea,   m   the   two   forms   of   nature   and   human   spirit 
Spmoza's  absolute  is  substance;    Hegel's  is  reason.     Spi- 
noza's ::..te.v;ioi.  and  thought  are  not  unlike  Hegel's  nature 
and  f.nnt.     And   boti  are  essentially  monistic  systems 
tfioug.    liagd's  viev  is  of  a  more  elevated  type  than 
Spmoir,  3.      Th-n  fne  way  in  which   Hegel,   in  a  quite 
monistic  manner,  relates  all  finite  forms  of  existence  to 
absolute  unconscious  reason,  gives  a  decidedly  pantheistic 
color  to  his  system.    Ebrard,  in  his  Apologetics  (Vol.  H., 
p.  204),  says  that  in  the  controversy  between  Rosencrantz 
and  Hoffmann,  the  latter  proved  conclusively  against  the 
former  that  Hegel  was  a  pantheist,  not  a  theist.     If  this 
be  a  just  remark,  then  Hegelianism  has  no  proper  account 
to  give  for  the  origin  of  the  religious  consciousness,  and  of 
theistic  belief,  for  the  reason  that  it  makes  no  real  numerical 
difference  between  God  and  the  human  spirit.    Man  is  but 
a  moment  in  the  evolution  of  the  absolute;  his  consciousness 
of  God  is  God's  consciousness  of  himself,  which  comes  very 
near  to  making  the  consciousness  and  personality  of  God 
depend  on  these  features  in  man. 

7-  Finally,  even  if  we  admit  the  validity  of  the  general 
Hegelian  doctrine,  and  concede  that  the  absolute,  as  uncon- 
scious, IS  capable  to  doing  all  that  is  claimed  for  it,  there 
IS  still  a  very  serious  difficulty.  How  can  the  absolute  be 
denominated  God,  unless  the  mind  already  possesses  the 
Idea  of  God.  The  notion  of  the  absolute  is  one  thing,  and 
the  xdca  of  God  is  another.  The  question  as  to  how  they 
are  to  be  related  is  not  easily  answered.  Does  the  mind 
rise  from  the  absolute,  as  an  abstract  conception,  to  God. 
as  a  concrete  infinite  being?  Or  does  the  mind,  already 
possessing  the  idea  of  God.  pass  on  to  associate  with  it  the 
notion  of  absolute  existence?  The  latter  is  the  more  rea- 
sonable view.     Hence,  it  follows  that  before  we  can  apply 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       221 

a  theistic  predicate  to  the  absolute,  we  must  already  have 
the  idea  of  God.  And  it  is  the  origin  of  this  idea  for  which 
we  are  now  making  search. 

All  who  are  in  sympathy  with  the  Hegelian  type  of 
thinking  on  this  subject  are  in  real  danger  here;  so  that 
while  we  admit  that  the  view-point  it  gives  us  is  profound, 
yet  great  care  needs  to  be  exercised  in  regard  to  it.  Various 
writers  in  prose  and  poetry  have  exhibited  it  in  attractive 
colors  and  in  fine  literary  form.  Others,  like  Green  and 
Caird,  have  sought  to  give  this  type  of  thought  greater 
philosophical  precision,  and  to  present  an  interpretation 
which  is  profoundly  theistic.  If  we  assume  the  fundamental 
reality  to  be  an  infinite  personal  God,  who  is  the  ground, 
reason  and  cause  of  all  else,  then  there  are  features  in  the 
Hegelian  way  of  thinking  with  which  theism  may  have 
sympathy.  But  it  is  hardly  an  adequate  theory,  especially 
as  presented  by  Hegel  himself,  to  account  for  the  origin 
of  theistic  belief.  At  the  same  time,  we  do  not  hesitate 
to  believe  that  the  Hegelian  type  of  thought  has  great  value 
against  the  current  empiricism  and  superficial  positivism  of 
our  own  time. 


,  r 


1 ' 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  RELIGIOUS  AND  THEISTIC  BELIEF 
THE  FUNCTION  OF  REVELATION. 

Contents. 

fe^IJl'n^T"'"'"'^'""'  ^^'^'''"■■°"-  Vague.-Three  Senses.-Mani- 

E,^  rT"'",';°"-~^'^''"'°"-P'"™"'^«  Unrecorded  Reve- 
Utions  now  Mamly  m  V.ew.-The  Process  o'  Revelation  an  1  iu  Record. 

fJ*      P^oWeni.-Statement  of  the   Theory.-No   Intuitive   Religious 

Factors.-.Watson.-Luthardt-Man's    Converse    with    God    in    Srl^ 

Ages.-Admu  .t  so  Far.-But  Redemptive  Relation  the  Same.-Outlines 

of  Redemption  Due  to  Primitive  Revelation—Theory  Explains  General 

Rel.g,ou,  Belief  and  Practice-Examination  of  the  ThLry-Srufn 

SnSn^"''""';";^."'''''^  ^"'  Q""''°"  Remains-Hements  of 
Confus  on-Or,g,n  of  Rehg.on  and  the  Knowledge  of  Redemption- 
The  Or.gm  of  Religious  Belief  and  its  Perpetuation-Danger  of  Athe- 
istic Consciousness-General  Summary  and  Conclusion. 

LlTESATURE. 

/«/f "  VolT^P  ^'r''''  °"  /e«^Wa/,<,»-Watson's  Theological  Insti- 
X    '     T     tV  ^f "  ^•'  ^*"P'-  ^-  "-Howe's  Living  Temple,  Vol    I 

ch:s^Ii"D~''p"'"'''^^'A^'^'"•'''""^''""  ^^•"*'  "f  ^'^-i^> 

Chap.  VII.-De  Pressense's  Origins,  Book  IV.,  Chap.   III-Hodge-s 

t1?u  ,f^  "7^?  *  ^"f""*'""'-'-'  Revelation,  Chap.  III-Beattie's 
The  Me^ds  of  The,sm,  Part  I..  Chap.  Il.-Cocker's  Christianity  and 
r  Mosophy    Chap    II-Edward  Caird's  The  Evolution  of  Re- 

Rel     „„      '''*P*-/-V"-Sabaticr's   Outlines   of  the  Philosophy  of 
ReU^n,  aap.  II.-Kuyper's  Encyclopedia  of  Sacred  Theology,  Div 
III..  Chap    II-Martmeau',  A  Study  of  Religion,  Vol.  I.,  Book  II- 
Men.,es  «„/.ry  o/ ^W.^,<,„,  Chap.  Il-Iverach's  Theism.  Chap.  VIII 

Of^r  Z'^'n^'ctt  t  "''"'""''  ''-'■  "-^'"-'^•^  ^--  "^ 

I.  Revelation  Defined.  §  49. 
'T^O  determine  the  function  of  revelation  in  relation  to 
J  -he  genesis  of  thcistic  belief  is  important,  but  by  no 
means  easy.  Some  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  origin  of 
rel,,-.,us  behef  in  general  is  due  to  some  sort  of  outward 
reve    .,on  from  God.    Not  a  few  theologians  of  a  century 


41 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       223 

ago,  who  had  not  freed  themselves  entirely  from  the 
philosophy  of  deism,  adopted  this  explanation  of  religious 
and  theistic  belief.  Watson  is  an  able  exponent  of  this  view. 
In  his  writings  he  maintains,  in  an  earnest  way,  what,  in 
a  sense,  is  true  of  sinful  man,  that  human  reason  cannot 
give  him  genuine  religious  knowledge,  and  that  a  revela- 
tion from  God  alone  can  d^  this. 

As  the  term  revelation  is  rather  vague,  and  is  used  in 
different  senses,  it  is  necessary  to  define,  as  clearly  as  pos- 
sible, what  it  really  means.  There  are  at  least  thr.e  distinct 
Usages  of  the  term. 

I.  The  most  general  meaning  of  the  term  takes  it  to 
denote  any  manifestation  which  God  makes  of  himself  in 
any  way  whatever.  These  manifestations  of  God  may 
appear  in  nature  about  us,  in  our  own  spirits,  and  in  human 
history,  as  well  as  in  his  Word.  In  all  of  these  ways,  God 
is  said  to  be  revealing  himself  to  men.  The  term  revelation 
thus  comes  to  mean  the  same  thing  as  manifestation.  This 
usage  of  the  term  really  leaves  no  place  for  any  distinction 
between  the  natural  and  supernatural  forms  of  revelation, 
nor  does  it  rightly  distinguish  between  what  may  be  called 
outward  and  inward  revelation. 

This  wide  sense  of  the  term  may  denote  much  that  is 
true,  yt  it  is  of  little  value  in  this  discussion.  It  is  doubt- 
less true  that  men  may  learn  much  about  God  in  all  of  these 
ways,  but  this  fact  throws  littio  light  upon  the  question  of 
the  origin  of  religious  belief  at  first. 

2.  The  term  revelation  is  used  in  a  narrower  sense,  to 
denote  any  direct  communications  which  God  may  make 
to  man.  This  excludes  nature  and  history,  and,  in  a  sense, 
the  witness  of  our  own  constitution,  from  tha  sphere  of 
revelation.  But  it  includes  within  its  scope,  not  only  the 
revelations  recorded  in  the  holy  Scriptures,  but  also  any 
other  special  or  supernatural  communications  which  God, 
in  any  age,  may  have  made  to  men.  Such  communications 
may  have  been  made  in  patriarchial  times,  in  the  Mosaic 


224 


APOLOGETICS. 


Ini 


!!  ' 


i 


,"^1 


era,  and  in  the  apostolic  period.    And  if  God  has,  since  the 
•  canon  of  Scripture  closed,  given,  by  his  Spirit,  any  special 
messages  to  men,  these  would  also  come  under  this  meaning 
of  the  term.    This  sense  of  the  Word  includes  all  the  special 
messages  that  God  may  have  made  known  to  men  ji  a 
supernatural  way,  whether  they  have  been  recorded  or  not 
From  the  Scripture  itself  there  is  good  r-ason  to  believe 
that  such  messages  were  given,  but  not  recorded  in  the 
canonical  Scriptures.    It  is  in  this  sense  that  we  may  very 
properly  speak  of  primeval  revelation.     Of  such  a  nature 
would  be  the  unrecorded  messages  given  to  Adam,  to  Enoch 
or  to  Noah,  to  Abraham,  to  Moses  or  to  Ezra,  to  John 
to  Peter  or  to  Paul.    And  Jesus,  no  doubt,  uttered  many 
thmgs  not  recorded  in  the  Gospel  narratives. 

This  sense  of  the  term  is  much  more  definite,  and  has  a 
very  proper  place  in  the  discussion  now  in  hand.  The 
question  of  the  influence  of  primitive  external  revelation  in 
generatmg  religious  and  theistic  belief  is  the  very  inquiry 
which  IS  now  pursued.  And  the  special  problem  now  before 
us  relates  to  the  effect  of  any  kind  of  outward  supernatural 
revelation,  whether  primitive  or  biblical,  in  generatin  belief 
in  God  and  originating  religion. 

3-  But  the  term  revelation  is  used  in  a  still  more  definite 
sense.    In  this  sense  it  relates  only  to  that  series  of  special 
divme  communications  which  are  on  record  in  the  canonical 
Scriptures.     Tills  is  much  narrower  in  its  scope  than  the 
preceding  view,  for  it  includes  only  those  divine  messages 
which  God,  in  his  wisdom  and  goodness,  deemed  necessary 
to  have  put  on  permanent  record  for  all  ages.    In  this  sense 
revelation    is    really    equivalent    to    the    holy    Scripiures 
Strictly  speaking,  this  is  the  meaning  of  the  term  revela- 
tion with  which  the  apologete  has  chiefly  to  do  in  vindicat- 
mg  supernatural  revelation. 

Now,  in  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  origin  of  re- 
ligious belief,  the  question  is  as  to  which  of  these  senses 
of  the  term  revelation  is  to  be  taken.     Some  are  inclined 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       225 

to  take  the  most  general  view,  and  argue  that  religion  origi- 
nates in  some,  or  all,  of  the  external  manifestations  which 
God  makes  of  himself.  This  scarcely  meets  the  case,  for 
the  reason  that  unless  there  be  some  capacity  on  the  part 
of  man  to  apprehend  these  manifestations,  they  would  have 
no  effect  on  him.  But  the  very  question  in  debate  is  the 
origin  of  this  capacity.  Few,  if  any,  at  the  present  day, 
take  the  third  meaning  of  the  term,  and  argue  that  the 
genesis  of  religious  belief  is  to  be  found  arising  from  the 
influence  of  the  Bible.  The  Bible,  rather,  presupposes 
religion  as  already  existent,  and  its  great  purpose  is  to 
perpetuate,  purify  and  elevate  religion  by  means  of  the 
redemption  which  is  in  Christ. 

It  is,  therefore,  the  second  meaning  of  the  term  which 
those  who  find  the  origin  of  religion  in  outward  revelation 
usually  adopt.  In  some  form  of  primitive  revelation,  made 
in  the  earliest  times,  is  the  beginnings  of  religion  to  be  dis- 
covered. Watson  evidently  takes  this  view  when  he  says 
that  the  traditions  of  early  revelations  had  much  to  do 
with  producing  lelij^ion,  and  in  accounting  for  its  general 
prevalence  in  the  world.  T  .*  question  now  to  be  considered 
is,  How  far  is  this  view  true?  Has  religious  and  theistic 
belief  originated  in  any  form  of  outward  revelation  in  early 
times } 

4.  To  detern  the  idea  of  revelation  still  more  clearly, 
another  distinction  must  be  made.  This  relates  to  the  con- 
trast between  the  process  of  revelation  and  the  record  of  it. 
The  process  pertains  to  the  activity  of  God  in  making  the 
messages  known  to  men,  while  the  record  is  the  permanent 
form  into  which  the  messages  have  been  reduced.  The 
former  had  its  main  effect  only  on  the  few  men  who  were 
chosen  to  be  its  subjects,  while  the  latter  remains  in  per- 
manent form  for  men  in  all  ages.  So  far  as  the  divine 
activity  is  concerned,  the  effect  of  it  would  be  practically 
the  same  upon  all  who  were  its  subjects,  no  matter  whether 
the  revelation  were  recorded  or  not;  but  the  result  of  each 
»5 


J26 


APOLOGETICS. 


T)n  men  in  after  ages  would  be  very  different.  The  unre- 
corded revelations  would  have  but  little  influence,  while 
the  recorded  would  have  very  much. 

This  simple  distinction  has  important  bearing  upon  the 
question  now  before  us.     If  by  revelation  we  mean  the 
mfluence  of  the  divine  activity  in  giving  the  message,  then 
the  question  of  this  influence  in  generating  religious  belief 
would  have  to  be  considered.    But  if  we  mean  rather  the 
tradition,  or  the  recorded  account  of  this  activity,  the  ques- 
tion will  be  quite  different  in  its  form.    The  latter  form  of 
the  inquiry  can  scarcely  bear  upon  the  problem  of  the  genesis 
of  the  belief  in  God,  for  the  reason,  mainly,  that  before  the 
tradition,  or  the  record  of  things  revealed  ages  ago,  would 
have  any  effect  on  men  of  later  times,  these  men  must  already 
possess  some  religious  sentiment  or  theistic  capacity.    It  is 
the  genesis  of  this  which  is  our  present  problem.    The  real 
mquiry,  therefore,  must  be  concerning  the  effect  of  the 
divine  activity  on  those  men  in  early  times  who  were  the 
subjects  of  special  outward  revelations  from  God  in  origi- 
nating  religious  and  theistic  belief  and  experience.     In  its 
lowest  terms,  the  question  is  as  to  the  effect  of  this  activity 
on  Adam  and  Eve,  and  as  to  whether  they  came  to  be 
possessed  of  their  religious  constitution  and  capacity  by 
creation  or  by  revelation,  in  the  first  instance.    The  related 
question  of  the  influence  of  tradition  and  the  record  of  the 
revelation  in  the  development  of  theistic  belief  is  one  which 
ts  also  of  much  importance,  and  must,  at  the  same  time  be 
carefully  considered.     To  educe  clearly  the  function'  of 
revelation  in  its  relation  to  the  con-natural  constitution  of 
man.  and  to  elucidate  its  relation  first  to  the  origin,  and 
then  to  the  grozvth  of  theistic  belief,  is  important. 

II.  Statement  of  the  Revelation  Theory.    §  50. 

The  way  in  which  outward  revelation  is  taken  to  account 
for  theistic  behef  may  now  be  explained. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       227 


I,  Those  who  hold  this  view  assert  that  there  is  no 
intuitive  knowledge  of  God  in  the  human  mind.  They  also 
maintain  that  the  human  reason  by  itself  is  not  sufficient 
to  lead  men  to  true  religious  knowledge.  Watson  dwells 
on  this  point  at  great  length.  He  seeks  to  show  that  the 
general  religious  condition  of  the  peoples  that  are  destitute 
of  the  light  of  revelation  fully  proves  the  necessity  of  that 
light  to  meet  the  religious  need  of  mankind.  It  is  evident 
that  Watson  is  here  speaking  not  so  much  of  the  primitive 
natural  religious  experiences  of  men,  as  of  the  true  know- 
ledge of  God  and  of  his  will,  which  sinful  men  need  in  order 
to  life  and  salvation.  When  so  regarded,  much  that  he  says 
may  be  freely  admitted. 

He  also  traces  whatever  is  pure  in  morals  and  true  in 
religious  knowledge  among  pagan  peoples  indirectly  to 
revelation.  He  likewise  finds  the  origin  of  the  belief  in 
immortality  and  future  rewards  and  punishments,  in  the 
same  outward  divine  source.  The  ordinance  of  sacrifice, 
and  a  knowledge  of  its  meaning,  are  accounted  for  in  the 
same  way.  In  regard  to  the  knowledge  of  God,  he  dis- 
tinctly says  that  "the  first  man  received  the  knowledge  of 
God  by  sensible  converse  with  him,  and  that  the  doctrines 
were  transmitted,  with  the  confirmation  of  successive  mani- 
festations, to  the  early  ancestors  of  all  nations."  It  is  clear 
that  Watson  is  here  speaking  chiefly  of  the  purification  and 
perpetuation  of  religious  knowledge  by  revelation,  and  that 
a  capacity  at  least  to  receive  religious  instruction  by  divine 
revelation  must  be  presupposed  in  the  first  man. 

In  a  somewhat  similar  way,  Luthardt,  who  does  not 
entirely  deny  the  intuitive  element  in  religion,  sets  forth 
the  same  general  view.  He  says  that  "all  religion  rests 
ultimately  upon  a  primitive  revelation."  It  is  to  be  observed 
that  Luthardt  does  not  make  it  clear  what  he  means  by 
primitive  revelation.  Since  he  admits  the  intuitive  factor, 
it  may  mean  either  inward  or  outward  revelation.  The 
intuitive  factor  may  be  the  inward  revelation  which  needs 


228 


APOLOGETICS. 


the  outward  revelation  to  bring  it  into  distinct  conscious- 
ness. 

2.  This  general  theory  assumes  that  men  in  early  times 
had  more  intimate  fellowship  with  God  than  in  later  days. 
Those  passages  of  Scripture  which  tell  of  God  walking  and 
talking  with  men  in  primitive  days  are  so  interpreted,  Wat- 
son says  that  "the  belief  in  God  among  the  Jews  was  pre- 
served by  continual  manifestations  of  the  presence  of 
Jehovah."  He  also  goes  on  to  say  that  as  the  knowledge 
of  God  and  of  religion  became  more  generally  fixed  and 
deN  eloped,  the  converse  God  held  with  men  became  less 
mtimate  and  personal,  and  men  were  led  to  depend  more 
on  the  contents  of  the  record  of  the  revelation,  and  to 
expect  less  of  the  personal  manifestations. 

It  may  be  admitted  that  in  very  early  times  God  did  hold 
mtercourse  in  a  more  personal  way  with  men,  as  the  modes 
of  revelation  were  then  adapted  to  the  conditions  of  the 
race.     But  it  does  not  follow  that  the  essential  relations 
between  man  and  God,  on  the  basis  of  which  revelations 
are  made,  have  changed.    The  only  radical  change  of  rela- 
tion was  produced  by  the  income  of  sin.    Ever  after  man 
smned  and  had  hope  of  deliverance  and  restoration  given 
him,  the  relation  between  God  and  man  is  a  redemptive  one. 
This  relation  remains  unchanged,   though  the  modes  of 
communicating  the  knowledge  of  it,  and  of  administering 
Its  benefits  may  be  modified.    It  is  to  be  observed  all  through 
that  Watson  has  in  view  early  unrecorded  revelations,  as 
well  a^   hose  on  record  in  the  canonical  Scriptures.    Indeed 
he  lays  special  stress  on  these  early  revelations,  made  when 
man  held  intimate  converse  with  God. 

3-  This  view  also  maintains  that  these  early  unrecorded 
revelations  contained  the  outlines  of  redemption.  Hence 
the  origin  of  sacrifice,  and  of  religious  rites  and  duties,  is 
explained  in  relation  to  these  primitive  revelations.  There 
:  •  much  force  in  many  things  set  forth  in  this  connection 
by  the  advocates  of  this  view.    The  germ  of  the  hope  and 


k 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       229 

k-.owledge  of  redemption  was  planted  in  the  mind  of  the 
human  race  as  our  first  parents  left  paradise,  and  this  know- 
ledge was  made  clearer  and  this  hope  brighter  by  advancing 
revelation  as  the  ages  moved  on.  But  Adam  and  Eve  had 
a  knowledge  of  God,  and  religious  experiences,  prior  to 
the  invasion  of  sin.  The  question  may  still  be  raised  as 
to  the  origin  of  this  in  them  first  of  all.  Thus,  unless  it 
is  held  that  the  fall  reduced  man  to  an  entirely  non-religious 
condition,  revelation  may  not  be  needed  to  constitute  him 
a  religious  being.  In  addition,  it  may  be  pointed  out  that 
redemption  stands  related  to  sin,  and  that  sin  is  an  abnormal 
fact,  which  presupposes  some  knowledge  of  God  and  his 
law.  Hence,  religion,  at  its  root  in  the  human  race,  can 
scarcely  originate  in  those  conditions  of  sin  and  redemption 
which  presuppose  iii  presence  already  in  the  race. 

4.  This  theory  seeks  to  find  further  support  in  the  claim 
that  it  best  accounts  for  the  general  prevalence  of  the  belief 
in  God  among  men,  and  the  universal  observance  of  religious 
rites  everywhere.  It  argues  that  the  history  of  the  race 
shows  that  when  men  are  left  to  themselves  they  gradually 
lose  the  knowledge  of  God,  and  that  divine  revelation  has 
ever  been  their  only  safeguard.  The  survivals  of  the  true 
religion  now  to  be  found  in  non-biblical  religions  have 
their  explanation  and  source  in  original  primitive  revelation. 
They  are  dim  reflections  from  the  bright  light  of  primaeval 
revelations. 

Watson  and  others  lay  much  stress  upon  this  point  in  the 
interests  of  revealed  religion.  Cocker,  on  the  other  hand, 
thinks  that  if  there  be  no  native  theistic  endowment  in  man's 
constitution,  a  primitive  revelation  alone  would  not  be  suffi- 
cient to  explain  the  universality  of  religious  belief  and 
practice.  Consequently,  he  suggests  that  the  fundamental 
explanation  of  the  prevalence  of  religion  lies  in  the  fact 
that  men  have  a  native  theistic  capacity,  which  they  carry 
with  them  wherever  they  go.  There  is  no  doubt  some  force 
in  both  of  these  views.     Man  has  a  con-created  theistic 


APOLOGETICS. 

capacity;  otherwise  he  would  not  be  a  religious  being  at 
all.  At  the  same  time,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  not  a 
few  things  found  in  the  non-biblical  religions  are  to  be 
explained  as  survivals  of  primitive  or  biblical  revelation. 

III.  The  Theory  of  Revelation  Examined.    §  51. 

In  the  examination  of  this  theory  much  care  is  needed, 
for  there  are  certain  aspects  of  truth  in  it.  There  is,  how- 
ever, a  good  deal  of  confusion  in  the  views  of  its  advocates. 
The  aim  of  this  examination  is  to  sift  the  truth  from  the 
error,  and  to  eliminate,  as  far  as  possible,  the  confusion. 
The  function  of  revelation  in  generating  and  developing 
religious  belief  will  then  appear. 

I.  Certain  important  admissions  are  to  be  made  at  the 
outset.    It  is  admitted  that  the  clear  and  complete  knowledge 
of  God  and  his  will  which  prevail  in  Christian  lands  is  due 
largely  to  the  revelations  found  in  the  holy  Scriptures.    The 
knowledge  of  the  nature  and  attributes  of  God,  and  of  his 
tri-personality,  comes  largely  from  the  Bible.     Our  lofty 
view  of  his  transcendent  majesty  and  moral  perfection  is 
chiefly  drawn  from  the  same  source.     The  clear  view  we 
have  of  our  relation  to  God,  of  his  constant  care  over  all 
his  creatures,  of  his  moral  government  over  moral  beings, 
and  of  our  duties  to  him  and  to  our  fellow-men,  is  obtained 
from  divine  revelation.     Above  all,  our  knowledge  of  the 
world  to  come,  our  information  regarding  the  nature  and 
desert  of  sin,  and  our  instruction  in  reference  to  the  redemp- 
tion which  is  in  Jesus  Christ,  are  drawn  entirely  from  the 
sacred  record  of  special  revelation  found  in  the  Bible.     In 
all  these  things  it  is  ours  to  rejoice  and  give  praise  to  God. 
But,  after  all  these  admissions  are  made,  the  vital  ques- 
tion still  remains,  How,  in  the  very  first  instance  in  the 
earliest  times,  did  any  kind  of  religious  belief  and  practice 
ongmate?    Outward  revelation  has,  no  doubt,  done  much 
to  purify  and  c;evate  religious  belief,  but  it  may  be  an  open 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       231 

question  whether  such  revelation  generated  it  at  first.  Deal- 
ing with  the  question  of  the  genesis  of  religious  and  th  ;istic 
belief,  as  we  now  are,  we  are  persuaded  that  the  con-natural 
theistir  capacity  must  be  presupposed  in  man  in  order  to 
render  him  capable  of  receiving  and  understanding  any 
objective  revelation  from  God.  This  primitive  theistic 
factor  must  antedate  the  reception  of  any  outward  revela- 
tion, and,  in  part  at  least,  must  logically  condition  it.  This 
being  granted,  the  revelation  may  come  in  to  conserve  and 
develop  this  con-natural  factor  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness. It  may  also  be  conceded  that  this  revelation  is  really 
needed  to  preserve  a  well-defined  monotheism,  and  thus 
prevent  it  from  declining  to  pantheism,  and  then  breaking 
up  into  polytheism. 

2.  In  the  advocacy  of  this  theory  there  are  certain  ele- 
ments of  confusion  which  need  to  be  removed. 

Watson,  and  those  who  agree  with  him,  are  discussing 
what  is  necessary  to  give  men  who  are  in  the  darkness 
and  deadness  of  sin  a  saving  knowledge  of  God,  and  of 
the  redemption  which  is  in  Christ.  Much  they  say  on  this 
point  is  true  and  valuable.  But  this  is  not  the  question 
now  in  hand.  The  real  problem  relates  to  the  origin  of 
religious  and  theistic  belief  at  the  first.  The  inquiry  relates 
to  the  genesis  of  religious  experiences  in  the  human  race. 
To  overlook  this  is  to  miss  the  mark  and  introduce  con- 
fusion. 

The  advocates  of  this  theory  confuse  two  other  ques- 
tions. These  are  the  origin  and  the  growth  of  religion. 
The  inquiry  into  the  development  of  religious  and  theistic 
belief  is  a  very  important  and  interesting  one,  and  much 
that  the  advocates  of  the  theory  now  under  consideration 
adduce  bears  directly  upon  this  question.  Outward  revela- 
tion, in  oral  or  in  written  form,  may  do  much  to  preserve, 
perpetuate  and  purify  theistic  belief.  Yet  it  may  be  helpless 
to  originate  this  belief. 

The  real  question  with  which  the  psychology  of  theism 


i  % 


232 


APOLOGETICS. 


deals  relates  to  the  initial  appearance  of  theistic  belief  in  the 
human  race.    It  is  not  merely  an  investigation  of  the  way 
in  which  men  now  come  to  believe  in  God  and  have  religious 
experience,  but  of  the  manner  in  which  any  belief  in  God 
originated  among  men.    Did  man  at  first  appear  without 
any  theistic  factors  in  his  nature,  and  had  he  to  wait  till 
these  were  produced  by  outward  revelation?    Or  was  he 
first  possessed,  in  his  very  nature,  of  these  factors?    The 
debate  lies  between  these  contending  views.    The  latter  view 
has  the  better  claim  to  our  acceptance,  mainly  because  it 
must  be  presupposed  in  order  to  give  revelation  access  to 
the  soul  of  man.    The  first  chapter  of  the  Epistle  to  the 
Romans  confirms  this  view. 

3-  This  theory  is  in  danger  of  taking  a  defective  view 
of  man  s  origmal  constitution  and  consciousness.     It  im- 
plicitly, at  least,  assumes  that  there  is  no  theistic  factor  in 
human  nature  at  first.    At  the  present  day,  when  naturalistic 
evolution  so  strongly  asserts  that  man  slowly  rose  up  from 
a  non-moral  and  non-religious  state,  it  is  perilous  to  deny 
of  man,  even  in  the  interests  of  supernatural  revelation  the 
native  theistic  factor.    The  position  of  Descartes,  that  the 
knovvledge  of  God  is  necessary  to  give  guarantee  for  the 
validity  of  our  other  knowledge,  is  important  here.    Even 
Luthardt,  who  favors,   in  a  general  way,  the  revelation 
theory,  still  says  that  "an  intuitive  conviction  of  the  exist- 
ence of  God  dwells  within  the  human  mind.     We  can  by 
no  means  shake  ourselves  free  from  the  notion  of  God 
Consciousness  of  God  is  as  essential  an  element  of  our  own 
mind  as  consciousness  of  the  world,  or  of  self-conscious- 
ness.      Schelling  says  that  "the  revelation  theory  implies 
an  original  atheism  of  consciousness."    There  is  much  force 
in  these  statements.     If  man's  consciousness  be  at  first 
atheistic,  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  he  would  ever  come  to 
be  a  religious  being,  or  be  capable  of  receiving  religious 
instruction,  even  by  divine  revelation.     Nit^sch  says  that 
If  education  be  not  already  preceded  by  an  innate  con- 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       233 

sciousness  of  God  as  an  operative  predisposition,  there  would 
be  nothing  for  education  and  culture  to  act  upon."  Cocker 
puts  the  same  view  in  another  form  when  he  says  that  "a 
merely  verbal  revelation  cannot  communicate  the  knowledge 
of  God  if  man  has  not  already  the  idea  of  God  in  his  mind." 
With  these  views  we,  in  the  main,  concur. 

4.  The  conclusion  in  which  wo  rest,  therefore,  is  that 
primitive  theistic  beliei  in  the  humai  race  has  not  originated 
in  the  first  instance  as  he  result  of  any  outward  revelation 
producing  it  where  its  constitutional  factors  did  not  exist. 
These  factors  tp  t  be  presupposed,  in  order  to  give  validity 
to  outward  revelation  and  render  it  intelligible.  At  the 
same  time,  revelation  renders  good  service  in  preserving, 
perpetuating  and  purifying  theistic  belief.  Without  it,  and 
by  reason  of  sin,  this  belief  would  almost  surely  decline. 
Above  all,  revelation  is  indispensable  to  give  important  new 
elements  of  knowledge,  regarding  God  and  his  will,  man 
and  his  destiny,  and  the  way  of  life  and  salvation  through 
the  Gospel,  which  was  a  mystery,  hidden  till  revealed. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  RELIGIOUS  AND  THEISTIC  BELIEF 
THE  ACCEPTED  THEORY. 

Contents. 

The  True  Doctrine.-A  Philosophical  Conflict.-The  Theist  an  In- 

S,«iH„H  A  ""?'''""-"»"'"'°"  »""  Kant-Calderwood.- 
Dwcartes  and  An.elrn.-Statement  c£  the  Doctrine-Intuitional    Ra- 

wL°%  M'""r^T^°'  Empirical-Exposition  of  the  Do^fr  net 

£nse  Not  f  ^  ^r  '^'*'""  *"'  ^°"'-Y«'  "«'  I""««  '"  Strict 
.S^  rl  Ge"««i5onception.-Experience  its  Occasion  of  Coming 

Confirmafon  of  the  D^trine.-Hodge.-Flint.-H.  B.  Smith.-Luth- 
ardt.-Owen.-Ca^v,n.-Ebrard.-Agrees  with  Theory  of  Knowledge - 
Gives  Basis  for  Ontological  Proofs.-Gives  Key  to  CausarPr^ffs -iT 
Harmony  w.th  the  Way  the  Holy  Spirit  Works  in  the  Humanloul. 

LlTESATUSE. 

Temu'vT'l  tC'""x°",f'''^''"'  »"*»  Theism.-Hoyr.'»  Living 
Ch^Ll  rl"  ^T^-  "-L-'hardfs  Fundamental  Truths  of 
U^TtI'  P'P-  VI-P'««°"'''  Syllabus  on  rAmm-Hodge's  Sy- 
vTl  San^fm^J-  ^^'"'-  ^-Thornwell's  Collected  WriHnl. 
Chap  i-H  B  Smi  h^iri^"'""^'"  '^''"''""'  D'X^'-o'ics.  Part  L 
^Z  V^'f'  !""*'  ;^f'"''«^''«.  Div.  I..  Chap.  II.-Ebrard-s  Apolo- 
gettcs.  Vol  I  Sec.  i.  Chap.  II.-FIint's  Theism.  Chap.  I.-Strone's 
Systematic  Theology,  Part  II    Chan  T  —<;»-=.,„.•  r   w  ^  i;    .    *  * 

Exherienro    ri„„    irr     ir   u    .     JL'  '-S'Mrns  Evidence  of  Christian 

Belie?  cL.)\^A~^f"'  ^""'"'''  "f  ^"'""'  "'"'  Christian 
ael,ef    Chap.   I._Meads  Supernatural  Revelation,  Chap.  I.-Cocker's 

?:;• 'rchao"''ii''K?/"'r"^'-  ""'''■  "-Kni«h?s  j.,,";",: 

//.c.^./,  Chap.  II.-Kelloggs  Genesis  and  Grouih  of  Religion    Chap 
V-K„yper  s  Encyclopaedia  of  Sacred  Theology.  Du.  I .  Chap,        U- 
Creen$  Proltgomena  to  Ethics.  Book  I..  Chan   I -Orr',  rlyr,      .'■ 
yie.  of  Cod  and  the  World.  Chap,   Il.-Sc'hu'ma?   '/J  ."^^T; 
Chap  IlI.-Deat„e-s  The  Methods  of  Theism.  Part  I..  Chap   IV-Fair 

LS;i//Z '"  ""/'"i-"^/:^  "f  '?-"•*••<"'.  Chap.  L^Mailers  rL 
L,m,ls  of  ReUgwus  Thought.-CaUin's  Institutes.  Book  I..  Chap.  III. 


I. 


Preliminary.    §  52. 


ft 


l.q^HREE  defective  and  four  erroneoits  explanation* 

i      of  the  genesis  of  religious  and  theistic  belief  have 

been  passed  under  review.    Their  discussion  leads  up  to  the 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       235 

true  doctrine  I  >  be  unfolded  in  this  chapter.  This  doctrine 
seeks  to  give  a  careful  account  of  the  origin  of  the  religious 
consciousness  in  the  human  race.  Its  exposition  raises  pro- 
found questions,  and  brings  us  upon  a  great  controversial 
battle-field,  where  many  a  hard-fought  fight  has  taken  place, 
and  where  the  din  of  the  conflict  has  not  yet  ceased.  The 
lines  of  battle  are  drawn  between  the  Intuitionalist  and 
Empiricist  in  reference  to  the  theory  of  knowledge.  The 
form  of  battle  and  the  weapons  used  may  have  changed 
from  age  to  agfe,  but  the  inner  nature  of  the  conflict  has 
always  remained  the  same.  In  ancient  times  Sophist  and 
Socratist,  Democritean  and  Eleatic,  Epicurean  and  Platonist 
crossed  swords  on  this  field.  In  later  times,  Nominalist 
contended  with  Realist,  Lockian  with  Cartesian,  Sensation- 
alist with  Intuitionalist,  in  many  an  historic  conflict.  And 
on  the  same  field,  at  the  present  day,  Materialist  and  Idealist, 
Empiricist  and  Rationalist,  Relativist  and  Realist,  are  fight- 
ing the  same  battles  over  again.  The  combatants  may 
change,  the  plan  of  attack  and  defence  may  vary,  but  it  is 
ever  the  same  old  controversy  in  regard  to  the  problems  of 
being  and  cognition. 

2.  The  Christian  theist  cannot  be  an  uninterested  spec- 
tator of  this  age-long  conflict.  If  empiricism  wins  the  day 
on  the  field  of  pliilosophy.  theism  may  have  to  capitulate 
in  the  sphere  of  religion,  and  leave  agnosticism  or  skepticism 
in  possession  of  the  spoils.  If  we  have  no  knowledge  save 
that  which  comes  by  the  senses,  then  the  knowledge  of  God, 
as  an  infinite  spiritual  Iwing.  is  ruled  out.  In  the  fourth 
chapter  of  tlie  Introduction,  the  intuitional  or  rational 
theory  of  knowledge,  in  its  general  outlines,  was  accepted 
as  correct.  It  is  accepted,  however,  not  in  the  sense  of  the 
historic  ini.atc  ideas,  hut  rather  in  the  sense  justified  by 
the  K.intian  criticism.  It  is  thereby  admitted  that  experi- 
ence may  be  the  occasion  when  knowletlge  rises  into  con- 
sciousness; but  it  is  also  held  that  experience  is  not  the 
sole  source  of  knowledge.    According  to  this  view,  the  mind 


236 


APOLOGETICS. 


Itself,  by  the  very  laws  of  its  own  spontaneity,  contributes 
certain  rational  elements  to  the  fabric  of  knowledge  These 
a  pnon  elements  do  not  spring  from  experience,  either 
mdmdual  or  hereditary,  but  are  the  necessary  rational 
conditions  of  the  possibility  of  the  experience  itself 

This  theoiy  of  knowledge  is  carried  with  us  as  we  enter 
the  realm  of  religious  and  theistic  experience.  We  shall 
seek  to  thread  our  way  with  some  care  over  very  difficult 
and  delicate  ground.  We  may  first  seek  to  understand  the 
significance  of  certain  partial  views,  and  then  try  to  unfold 
the  better  doctrine. 


im^^ 


II.  Some  Partially  Correct  Views.    %  53. 

Several  phases  of  this  theory,  which,  in  a  rather  one-sided 
way,  seek  to  account  for  the  origin  of  theistic  belief,  are  to 
be  briefly  noticed     These  all  agree  m  denying  that  primitive 
theistic  belief  is  the  product  of  any  empirical  process,  or  of 
any  kind  of  logical  inference,  or  even  of  an  outward  revela- 
tion.    Though  these  operations  may  do  much  to  develop 
the  behef  m  various  ways,  yet  they  do  not  originate  it  at 
hrst.    There  are  several  types  of  this  view;  and  it  will  be 
obsenxd  that  the  problem  they  deal  with  is  the  way  in 
which  a  knowledge  of  God  is  obtained,  rather  than  the 
question  of  the  genesis  of  the  belief  in  God  in  the  human 
mind. 

I.  Fichte  and  Schelling,  with  the  transcendentalists  gen- 
erally,  represent  one  type.  This  is  the  a&.o/«/,>/ type.  God 
IS  Identified  with  the  absolute,  and  is  immediately  appre- 
hended by  an  act  of  pure  intellection.  God  is  known  face 
to  face  by;  immediate  intuition.  There  is  a  vision  of  the 
absolute  V  the  human  soul.  In  this  vision  subject  and 
objec  arc  ^ought  to  a  sort  of  rational  identity.  This  vision 
»s  not  of  Che  nature  of  an  ordinary  consciousness;  it  is 
rather  an  intellectual  intuition,  which  looks  directly  upon 
the  ftaiitj-  of  the  absolute,  which  is  God.     By  some  it  is 


dl 


mm 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  1   '    .STIC  BELIEF.       237 

regarded  as  a  transcendental  gaze  upon  the  very  essence 
of  deity  by  pure  reason,  as  the  faculty  of  the  supersensible. 
It  need  only  be  remarked  that  the  transcendental  philoso- 
phy upon  which  this  view  of  intuition  rests  is  not  accepted. 
It,  however,  announces  a  great  truth  in  an  exaggerated  way. 
That  truth  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  human  spirit  may 
sustain  definite  spiritual  relations  with  God;  but  he  is 
thereby  apprehended  as  a  living,  loving,  personal  God,  not 
merely  gazed  on  intellectually  as  the  absolute. 

2.  Cousin,  the  eclectic  French  philoso^lrer,  gives  a  slightly 
different  turn  to  this  general  view.  He  argues  that  the 
absolute  is  of  the  nature  of  reason,  and  hence  capable  of 
being  immediately  cognized  by  human  reason.  He  differs 
with  the  transcendentalists  as  to  the  mode  in  which  the 
absolute  is  known.  He  holds  that  the  absolute  or  infinite 
is  immediately  known  in  consciousness,  rather  than  by  pure 
intellection.  He  asserts  that  the  absolute  is  both  conceivable 
and  cognizable,  and  that  the  conditions  of  consciousness, 
which  are  relation,  plurality  and  difference,  are  applicable 
to  the  absolute.  In  particular,  Cousin  maintains  that,  over 
against  the  finite,  the  infinite  is  also  present  in  conscious- 
ness. Hence,  he  contends  that  the  infinite  or  absolute  is 
known  in  consciousness,  and  thus  the  knowledge  of  God 
is  realized. 

The  process  by  which  Cousin  explains  the  consciousness 
of  the  infinite  is  merely  logical.  We  have  the  rational  con- 
viction of  the  reality  of  an  infinite  somethine  over  against 
finite  things;  but  this  can  scarcely  be  called  consciousness, 
unless  we  use  that  term  in  a  very  wide  sense.  Then  the 
notion  of  the  infinite,  as  Cousin  conceives  of  it,  is  scarcely 
the  same  as  tlie  idea  of  an  infinite  personal  God. 

3.  Jacobi  and  Schlciermacher,  though  differing  in  various 
respects,  may  be  grouped  together  as  another  type  of  this 
general  view.  The  conviction  or  apprehension  of  God  is  of 
the  nature  of  faith  or  feeling.  Jacobi  lays  stress  on  faith, 
and  Schleiermacher  on  feeling.     We  hav     belief  in,  and 


238 


APOLOGETICS. 


sense  of  dependence  on,  some  higher  power.  God  is  believed 
in  rather  than  known ;  he  is  felt  rather  than  cognized.  This 
faith  and  feeling  are  simple,  spontaneous  and  immediate 
activities  of  the  soul,  and  they  relate  the  soul  to  God  in 
what  may  be  called  a  God-consciousness.  Schleiermacher 
made  this  feeling  of  dependence  the  essence  of  religion.  God 
was  immediately  felt. 

There  is  an  element  of  truth  in  this  view.  God  is  believed 
in,  from  one  point  of  view,  and  the  sense  of  dependence  is 
a  factor  in  religious  experience.  But  these  views  scarcely 
do  justice  to  the  intellectual  factor  in  the  religious  con- 
sciousness, and  hence  they  tend  to  some  form  of  mysticism. 
The  theistic  intuition,  rightly  understood,  is  more  than 
feeling,  and  it  involves  more  even  than  a  spontaneous  act 
of  faith. 

4-  Hamilton  and  Kant,  though  representing  different 
types  of  philosophy,  are  in  substantial  agreement  touching 
the  question  now  under  discussion.  Hamilton  holds  that 
the  unconditioned,  which  includes  both  the  infinite  and  the 
absolute,  is  both  incognoscible  and  inconceivable.  It  is  the 
negative  of  the  conditioned,  and  it  is  the  conditioned  alone 
that  can  be  known  and  conceived.  The  unconditioned 
cannot  be  cognized,  and  hence  God,  as  the  unconditioned, 
lies  beyond  rational  cognition.  It  does  not  follow,  however, 
that  Hamilton  was  an  agnostic;  for  though  he  holds  that 
God  is  not  the  object  of  intellectual  cognition,  his  real  exist- 
ence is  a  fixed  comnction  of  man's  moral  nature. 

Kant  held  that  God  cannot  be  the  object  of  cognition  by 
the  human  understanding,  which  deals  only  with  phenomena 
m  the  sphere  of  experience.  According  to  Kant,  the  idea 
of  God  is  merely  a  regulative  principle  of  pure  reason  itself. 
by  which  it  is  to  be  guided  in  unifying  its  cognitions. 
Hence.  Kant  held  that  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God 
are  invalid,  since  they  do  not  deal  with  realities,  but  wi  . 
phenomena.  As  the  door  for  the  intellectual  cognition  of 
God  is  thus  closed  by  Kant,  it  looks  as  if  he  must  be  an 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       239 

agnostic.  But  he  is  not ;  for  he  holds  that  what  pure  reason 
or  intellect  cannot  do,  practical  reason  or  conscience  can. 
Pure  reason  has  God  as  merely  a  regulative  idea,  while 
practical  reason  makes  God  its  fundamental  postulate. 
Thus,  both  Hamilton  and  Kant  find  the  knowledge  of  God 
to  be  a  product  of  man's  moral  experiences;  and  hence  it 
is  a  matter  of  faith,  rather  than  of  cognition. 

There  is,  no  doubt,  much  force  in  what  both  of  these 
writerj  say  in  regard  to  the  theistic  import  of  man's  moral 
nature,  and  they  both  render  good  service  in  giving  faith 
a  large  place  in  theistic  belief.  Still,  both  of  them  have 
done  harm,  alike  to  speculative  and  theistic  philosophy,  in 
denying  the  validity  of  the  intellect  in  relation  ic  the  know- 
ledge of  God.  Herbert  Spencer  has  ingenious" .  used  both 
of  these  names  in  support  of  agnosticism,  in  a  way  never 
intended  by  them.  But  the  door  was  opened  for  him  to 
do  so,  and  the  efforts  of  Mansel  were  not  entirely  successful 
to  close  it.  The  sound  doctrine  here  is  that  both  intellectual 
cognition  and  moral  conviction  relate  us  to  God.  If  he  be 
the  postulate  of  practical  reason,  he  is  the  same  also  for 
pure  reason.  God,  as  truth,  is  the  object  of  the  intellect; 
and  God,  as  right,  is  the  object  of  the  conscience.  If  the 
cognition  of  God  be  banished  from  pure  rea^son,  it  is  hard 
to  see  how  it  can  be  retained  in  the  spliere  of  practical  reason. 
But  all  this,  it  will  be  observed,  pertains  as  much  to  the 
existence  of  God  as  to  the  origin  of  the  Idea  of  God  in  the 
mind. 

5.  Calderwood  may  be  taken  as  an  example  of  another 
type  of  view.  He  makes  the  knowledge  of  God  10  be 
intuitive,  but  this  intuition  is  not  so  much  an  immediate 
perception  of  God.  as  a  necessary  judgment  affirming  the 
existence  of  an  infinite  personal  God.  Some  who  take  this 
general  view  describe  the  intuition  of  God  as  a  necessary 
belief  which  the  mind  possesses.  This  judgment  is  not  at 
first  in  itself  theistic,  for  it  arises  from  what  is  really  a 
non-theJstic  aspect  of  the  soul.     The  religious  conscious- 


'  1 


240 


ll  1 


APOLOGETICS. 


ness  arises  from  the  exercise  of  the  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  rather  than  conditions  it,  according  to  this 
view. 

Calderwood,  and  those  who  think  with  him,  have  per- 
haps, been  too  much  influenced  by  Kant's  criticism  of  the 
theistic  proofs,  and  hence  have  been  led  to  rest  mainly  on 
mtuition  to  justify  belief  in  the  existence  of  God.    Hence 
they  mmimize  the  value  of  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of 
God,  as  they  magnify  the  import  of  the  theistic  intuition, 
as  a  necessary  judgment  or  belief  asserting  the  divine  exist- 
«ice.    If  Kant  goes  to  one  extreme  in  making  little  of  the 
theistic  proofs,  we  have  to  be  careful  not  to  put  too  much 
stress  on  the  intuition.     It  is  precisely  this  mistake  that 
Calderwood  and  others  are  in  danger  of  making.    It  may 
be  going  too  far  to  say  that  the  intuition  of  God  is  a  neces- 
Mry  judgment  affirming  the  existence  of  one  infinite  God 
For  even  if  we  admit,  as  we  do,  that  there  are  con-natural 
factors  m  the  idea  of,  or  belief  in,  God,  it  may  still  be  true 
that  revelation  and  reflection  have  done  much  to  enlarge 
the  Idea  and  enrich  the  belief.    It  may  also  be  true  that  the 
rea.'  lings  which  vindicate  the  rational  nature  of  the  belief 
in  Cue  existence  of  God  are  of  much  value.     And  it  must 
ever  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  question  of  the  origin  of 
theistic  belief  is  one  thing,  and  that  the  problem  of  the 
proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  is  another. 

6.  The  last  partial  type  of  view  now  to  be  noted  is  that 
represented  by  Descartes  and  Anselm.    This  view  emerges 
in  connection  with  the  elaboration  of  the  ontological  proofs 
for  the  existence  of  God.     Anselm  seems  to  have  simply 
assumed  that  the  human  mind  is  ,„  possession  of  the  idea 
ot    a  being  than  whom  a  greater  cannot  be  thought":  and 
from  this  Idea  he  proceeds  to  vindicate  the  existence  of  the 
being  to  whom  it  relates.     Descartes,  in  one  of  his  argu- 
ments for  the  existence  of  God,  drawn  from  the  idea  of 
an  all-perfect  being."  which  the  mind  nei-essarily  possesses, 
gives  no  account  of  how  the  mind  arrives  at  this  idea 


tumu 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       241 

When,  however,  Descartes  opens  up  another  of  his  theistic 
proofs,  he  says  that  the  only  adequate  explanation  of  the 
idea  of  God  in  the  mind  is  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  God. 
Were  Anselm  or  Descartes  asked,  whence  the  idea  of  God 
came,  he  would  likely  say  that  the  human  mind,  in  its  very 
nature  as  created  by  God,  possessed  it.  Most  of  those  who 
give  value  to  the  ontological  proofs  agree  in  holding  that 
the  idea  of  God  is  innate,  or  con-natural,  in  some  sense. 
The  idea  is  in  the  mind,  not  so  much  as  an  intuition,  which 
the  mind  itself  arrives  at,  as  a  product  of  which  God,  in 
the  last  analysis,  is  the  author. 

In  this  position  there  is  something  profoundly  true,  but 
that  truth  does  not  bear  directly  upon  the  question  of  the 
psychological  origin  of  theistic  belief.  It  is  not  really 
intended  to  be  a  philosophy  of  the  genesis  of  that  belief. 
It  assumes  man's  theistic  constitution,  and  proceeds  to 
justify  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  from  the  contents  of 
that  constitution.  The  discussion  will  recur  to  this  position 
again  in  the  ontology  of  theism. 

These  six  tvpes  of  view  are  all  on  the  true  ground,  m 
the  ma.n;  but  they  do  not  distinguish  between  the  psy- 
chology and  the  ontology  of  theism,  and  in  some  instances 
they  bear  chiefly  upon  its  ontology.  But  the  origin  of  the- 
istic belief  in  the  human  mind  is  the  question  now  under 
careful  consideration. 


III.  Statement  of  the  Correct  Doctrine.    §  54- 

I.  It  now  remains  to  give  a  statement  of  the  doctrine 
which  we  are  led  to  adopt  in  regard  to  the  genesis  of  theistic 
belief  and  the  religious  consciousness.  This  is  one  of  the 
deepest  problems  in  psycholor;y  which  can  engage  our 
attention.  It  relates,  not  so  much  to  the  way  in  which  we 
now  comf.  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  God,  as  to  how  the 
religious  consciousness  in  the  human  race  at  first  had  its 
16 


242 


APOLOGETICS. 


■'it 


ongin  How  has  it  come  to  pass  that  man  possesses  the 
con-natural  theistic  capacity  which  expresses  itself  in  re- 
hgious  behef  and  practice  everywhere  among  men? 

fJ:  I  .*"*''  ^""'""^  '"^^  ^  '^"'^^  ^^"^  intuitional,  if  we 
ake  the  term  mtu,t.on  in  the  sense  of  con-naturci,  con- 
stitutional or  a  pnori.  It  may  be  termed  the  rational  tieo,^ 
which  imp^^es  that  human  reason,  or  spirit,  in  its  very"?: 
stitution,  has  a  theistic  factor.  Some  would  callTt  the 
inspirational  theory,  indicating  thereby  that  God  himself 

ir^olier  tJ'  '''' J'"  '"  *'^  ™"^  -h'«=h  theistic  S 
he  r^e  V'^'^^^^-'}^-^  t«n««.  Perhaps,  best  describes 
InalvsTnfj  r  ?  ''^"^'^^  to  keep  in  mind  the 
chate  oTl'  /'  '  '1^°"'  consciousness  in  the  second 
chapter  of  this  division  of  the  discussion.  It  is  the  origin 
of  this  that  we  are  now  dealing  with. 

3.  In  general,  this  view  holds  that  the  basal  factors  in 
religious  consciousness  and  theistic  belief  are  not  empirical 

ZtZr^T.  ''''^  ^°  "°'  ^"^^  '^^^  "^*"^^'  -volition. 
^Tn         ""  °"  ^°^"^^  '"^^'■^"«-    Nor  are  they  the 
result  of  the  necessary  evolution  of  absolute  unconscious 
r^son.     On  the  other  hand,  while  it  is  admitted  that  in 
mature  theistic  belief  there  are  empirical  elements  which 
spnng  from  these  various  sources  just  named,  yet  it  is  firmly 
maintained  that  the  human  spirit  itself,  in  its  very  constitu- 
tion possesses  certain  primitive  con-natural  factors,  which 
antedate  all  distinct  conscious  religious  and  theistic  experi- 
ence   and  which,  indeed,  condition  that  experience  and 
render  it  possible.    These  primitive  factors  constitute  the 
intumonal  or  rational  basis  of  theistic  belief,  and  the  genesis 
of  this  belief  must  have  relation  to  these  native  factors     In 
this  sense,  theistic  belief  is  intuitive  or  a  priori.    This  belief 
IS  not  a  translation  from  something  in  the  soul  which  is 
not  theistic,  for  the  original  itself  is  already  theistic.    This 
belief  is  what  it  is  in  religious  consciousness,  because  it  is 
on  the  occasion  of  experience,  the  spontaneous  outcome  of 
the  native  theistic  factors  in  the  constitution  of  man     On 


yk 


mam 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       243 

this  basis  education  and  revelation  may  have  much  influ- 
ence in  developing  the  belief. 

Such  is  a  general  outline  of  the  doctrine  held.  The  belief 
in  God  is  not  intuitive,  in  the  sense  that  we  have,  at  first, 
the  immediate  perception  of  God,  or  that  we  make  a  neces- 
sary judgment  asserting  the  existence  of  one  infinite  God. 
This  belief  at  first  implies  that  man,  having  the  theistic  con- 
stitution, naturally  attains,  by  an  impulse  from  within, 
rather  than  by  influences  from  without,  to  that  belief  in 
God  which  religious  experience  implies.  The  influences 
acting  from  without  may  be  the  occasion  of  the  rise  of  this 
belief  into  distinct  consciousness,  but  the  impulse  of  the 
con-natural  theistic  endowment  of  man,  working  from 
within,  conditions  and  shapes  that  consciousness.  This,  in 
the  last  analysis,  is  the  source  of  theistic  belief. 


IV.  Exposition  of  this  Doctrine.    §  55. 

That  the  doctrine  thus  stated  may  \ie  more  thoroughly 
understood,  some  further  exposition  of  k  may  be  of  value. 

1.  The  genesis  of  theistic  belief  must,  in  the  end,  be  dis- 
covered within  the  human  spirit,  rather  than  in  any 
circumstances  operating  on  it  outwardly.  This  is  a  simple 
statement,  but  full  of  significance.  It  means  that  the  human 
mind  rises  to  the  belief  in  God,  not  merely  as  the  result 
of  certain  external  experiences,  such  as  may  be  exerted  by 
nature,  or  outward  revelation,  or  education  and  reflection. 
It  means  that  the  soul  at  first  is  not  like  a  blank,  unruled 
sheet  of  paper,  but  that,  in  its  very  nature,  it  is  endowed 
with  a  native,  theistic  appetency,  or  aptitude.  In  this  nature 
the  germ  of  theistic  belief  lies,  here  it  is  quickened  into  life, 
and  here  it  plants  its  roots  as  it  grows  up  into  a  mature 
religious  experience.  Deep  down  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
soul  the  sources  of  theistic  belief  lie. 

2.  This  doctrine  does  not  imply  that  the  idea  of  God 
which  theistic  belief  involves  is  innate,  in  the  sense  in  which 


244 


APOLOGETJCS. 


lit 


the  term  "innate  ideas"  has  often  been  used.  This  phrase, 
coming  to  us  from  Plato  through  the  scholastic  philosophy' 
has  caused  much  confusion,  and  introduced  some  error  inro 
both  philosophy  and  theology.  The  doctrine  of  the  origin 
of  theistic  belief  just  stated  does  not  imply  that  the  idea 
of  God  is  stored  away  in  the  mind,  as  a  fully  formed  idea 
of  one  infinite  God,  ready  to  be  brought  forth  into  experi- 
ence at  any  time.  By  intuitive  or  a  priori  we  do  not  mean 
the  same  thing  as  the  scholastic  term  innate  usually  denotes. 
The  idea  of  God,  in  its  maturity,  does  not  lie  in  the  human 
soul;  but  Its  germ,  which  is  already  theistic  in  its  nature 
is  there.  ' 

3.  Nor  does  this  doctrine  imply  that  the  idea  of  God  is 
of  the  nature  of  a  general  conception  framed  by  the  mind 
A  general  concept,  which  is  expressed  in  a  general  term 
is  a  mental  product,  and  is  the  result  of  abstraction  and 
generalization.     When  it  is  said,  therefore,  that  belief  in 
God  has  Its  genesis  in  the  soul,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that 
the  soul  has  formed  it  there,  in  the  same  way  that  a  general 
conception  is  framed.     Were  this  the  case,  no  legitimate 
mference  could  be  made  from  the  idea  of  God  to  his  actual 
existence,  for  the  reason  that  general  conceptions  have  no 
real  objects  actually  existing,  other  than  the  qualities  con- 
stituting these  conceptions,  as  they  are  found  in  individual 
objects.     Much  of  the  criticism  of  some  of  the  proofs  for 
the  existence  of  God  has  proceeded  on  the  ground  that  the 
idea  of  God  is  a  general  conception  framed  by  the  mind 
instead  of  an  idea  formed  in  it.    All  such  criticisms  are  dis- 
armed when  it  is  seen  that  the  idea  of  God  is  con-natural, 
and  that  it  conditions  theistic  experience. 

4.  This  doctrine  further  implies  that  theistic  belief  comes 
into  distinct  consciousness  as  the  powers  of  the  soul  de- 
veloping from  within,  find  themselves  in  relation  with  those 
conditions  which  constitute  the  occasion  of  this  conscious- 
ness taking  definite  form.  AH  growth  is  the  result  of  the 
hfe-germ  in  the  seed,  and  of  the  suitable  conditions  to  render 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       245 

it  vitally  active.  This  is  true  in  the  vegetable  and  animal 
kingdoms.  The  source  and  cause  of  the  growth  and 
development  are  within  the  germ,  but  the  occasion  of  the 
activity  coming  into  play  are  certain  external  conditions. 
So  in  regard  to  the  genesis  and  growth  of  theistic  belief. 
Its  germinal  elements  are  con-natural,  as  a  constitutional 
endowment  of  our  nature;  and,  as  the  intellectual,  emo- 
tional and  moral  life  of  the  soul  opens  up,  theistic  belief 
comes  into  ever  clearer  consciousness.  The  initial  move- 
ment is  from  within  the  soul,  and  not  from  without. 

5.  The  true  doctrine,  finally,  maintains  that  the  con- 
natural factor  in  theistic  belief  needs  expansion  before  it 
reaches  its  maturity.  Here  it  is  that  reasoning,  reflection 
and  revelation  render  valuable  service  in  leading  the  theistic 
belief  out  to  its  maturity.  By  this  means  a  purified,  elevated, 
rational  theism,  such  as  Christianity  presupposes,  is  realized. 
Some  intuitionalists  put  too  much  into  the  intuition  of  God, 
and  do  not  allow  enough  for  the  influence  of  reasoning, 
revelation  and  religious  education.  The  basal  factors  of 
theistic  belief  are  a  priori  or  con-natural;  but  reasoned, 
mature  theism  has  in  it  many  empirical  elements.  Here, 
as  in  other  aspects  of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  the  a  priori 
and  the  a  posteriori,  are  both  necessary  to  the  matured 
product  of  cognition. 


V.  Some  Coniirmation  of  the  Doctrine.    §  56. 

I.  The  views  of  eminent  scholars  greatly  confirm  this 
doctrine.  Charles  Hodge  (Sys.  Th.,  Vol.  I.,  Ch.  I.)  holds 
that  the  idea  of  God  is  intuitive,  and  at  the  same  time  he 
properly  recognizes  the  use  and  force  of  the  theistic  proofs. 
Flint  {Theism,  Lect.  III.,  §  2),  when  he  speaks  of  theistic 
belief  being  an  immediate  unconscious  inference,  can 
scarcely  mean  anything  different  from  this  doctrine.  H.  B. 
Smith  (Introd.  to  Christian  Theology,  p.  90)  says  that 
"such  is  the  human  constitution  that  under  appropriate 


246 


APOLOGETICS. 


5(^ 

i 


arcumstances  it  always  recognizes  the  existence  of  God  as 
a  fact."    He  calls  this  aspect  of  the  knowledge  of  God  "con- 
natural."   Owen  (quoted  in  Haliburton's  Rational  Inquiry, 
Ch.  III.)  says  that  "men  are  bom  with  a  capacity  of  know- 
ing him  (God),  and  they  do  not  so  naturally  know  as  they 
feel  this  implanted  capacity  of  knowing  God."     Calvin 
{Institutes.  Book  I..  Ch.  III.)  says  that  "all  men  have  by 
nature  an  mnate  persuasion  of  the  divine  existence,  a  per- 
suasion inseparable  from  their  very  constitution."   Luthardt 
{Fundamental  Truths,  Lect.  II.,  pp.  43.  44)  says  that  "an 
intuitive  conviction  of  the  existence  of  God  dwells  within 
the  human  mind.    We  can  by  no  means  free  ourselves  from 
the  notion  of  God.    It  is  a  question  of  the  whole  man,  of 
his  whole  mental  and  moral  life.    And  if  it  be  a  question 
of  the  whole  man,  its  answer  must  come  from  the  whole 
man.      Ebrard  (Apologetics,  Vol.  I.,  §  100)  says,  with 
deep  insight,  that  "both  the  premises  which  lead  to  the 
cognition  of  God, ,".  c,  the  knowledge  of  the  external  world, 
and  the  knowledge  of  self,  are  in  every  human  consciousness 
immediately  given,  even  in  that  of  the  simplest  child,  ind 
operate  directly  as  an  urgent  feeling  which  presses  on  to 
the  knowledge."    Again.  Luthardt  {Fundamental  Truths, 
Ch    VIL)  adds  that  "we  have  within  us  a  consciousness 
Of  his  (God's)  existence,  a  natural  knowledge  of  God  which 
is  further  developed  by  his  'estimony  of  iiiniself  in  creation 
and  providence."    The  consensus  of  opinion  thus  adduced 
could  be  greatly  expanded  by  reference  tr     ther  writers 
like  Augustine,  Howe,  Christlieb,  Th  rnu^       Diman  and 
Patton. 

2.  Some  ^<?K.ra/ considerations.  -0  estaUish  the  doctrine. 
A  few  of  these  are  merely  mentioned. 

First,  it  is  in  harmony  wit!  the  sound,  rat...nai  epis- 
fcmology.  According  to  tl  s  tlxory,  the  mind  itself  always 
makes  some  contribution  t  t}  e  fabric  of  knowledge,  and 
hence  all  knowledge  '  <  in  .  an  ..  priori  factor.  Thcistic 
Dehef  IS  in  harmony  wuu  this  tiieorv  of  knowledge. 


Sa^ak 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THEISTIC  BELIEF.       247 


Secondly,  it  lays  a  basis  and  paves  the  way  for  the  onto- 
logical  and  psychological  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God. 
The  con-natural  factor  becomes  a  witness  to  the  reality  of 
its  object.  The  a  priori  endowment  constitutes  the  premises 
from  which  the  existence  of  God  may  be  argued.  The  in- 
tuitive reality  of  the  idea  of  God  pledges  its  objective  validity 
in  the  existence  of  God.  This  is  the  starting  point  of  some 
subtle  and  forcible  proofs. 

Thirdly,  it  provides  the  ground  for  the  inductive  proofs 
for  the  existence  of  God,  drawn  from  the  order  and  design 
seen  in  nature.  If  man  had  no  theistic  capacity,  he  could 
never  frame  the  theistic  hypothesis  of  the  universe.  But 
he  can  do  so,  and  thus  bring  the  theistic  postulate  to  solve 
the  problems  of  the  cosmos.  This  constitutes  the  essence 
of  several  potent  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God. 

Fourthly,  this  doctrine  ij  in  harmony  with  th  vay  in 
which  the  human  spirit  comes  to  know  more  and  more  of 
God  under  the  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  it.  If  there 
were  no  natural  kinship  between  God  and  the  human  spirit, 
religious  experience,  as  the  result  of  the  indwelling  Spirit 
of  God,  would  have  no  foundation  in  its  psychical  side. 
But  if  we  regard  the  intuitive  factors  of  theistic  belief  as 
in  a  sense  a  natural  revelation  of  God  in  the  soul,  then  we 
have  a  secure  natural  basis  on  which  the  Holy  Spirit  operates 
in  his  supernatural  activities  in  the  human  soul.  Thus,  the 
natural  spiritual  relation  between  God  and  man  provides 
the  ground  in  man's  soul's  upon  which  the  supernatural 
spiritual  relation  of  the  regenerate  life  is  constituted.  These 
four  reasons  greatly  confirm  the  doctrine. 


V  i 


^l 


•To  fa«  a  settled  Christian,  it  is  necessary,  first  of  all,  to  be  a  good 
theist"— SHArresBUBY. 

"If  nature  does  not  belong  to  God,  we  also  cannot  belong  to  him."— 

SCRILUNO. 

"No  one  can  be  called  a  theist  who  does  not  believe  in  a  Personal 
God.  whatever  difficulty  there  may  be  in  defining  the  word  'Per- 
sonal.' "— NlWMAN. 

"By  the  name  of  God,  I  undersUnd  -i  substance,  infinite,  indepen- 
dent,  all-knowing,  all-powerful,  and  by  which  I  myself,  and  every  other 
creature  that  exists,  if  there  be  any  such,  were  created. "-Descabtm. 

"Theism  assumes  a  living  relation  of  God  to  his  creatures,  but  does 
not  define  it.  ne  may  be  a  theist  and  not  be  a  Christian,  but  he  cannot 
be  a  Christian  and  not  be  a  theist. "-Centuby  Dictionaby. 

"The  primitive  revelation,  which  was  a  fact,  was  necessarily  ad- 
dressed to  a  precedent  religious  nature,  without  which  it  could  not 
have  been  r-ceived;  it  was  important  in  developing  the  idea  of  God. 
but  did  not  at  first  produce  it."— WAB«tLa 


Hi 


THE  SECOND  DIVISION. 
THE   ONTOLOGY  OF   THEISM. 

THE  FIRST  SECTION. 
THE   EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. 


CHAPTER  I. 
INTRODUCTORY  TOPICS. 

Contents. 

Preliminary  Remarks.— The  Psychology  and  Ontology  of  Theism.— 
The  Objective  Validity  of  Theistic  Belief.— Vast  Subject.— The  Precise 
Task.— Not  to  Prove  the  Existence  of  a  God  of  Whom  we  are  Entirely 
Ignorant,  but  to  Show  that  Theistic  Belief  is  Rational.— Proving  and 
Solving.— Changed  Form  of  Proof.— The  Relation  of  the  Proofs.— 
Cumulative.— Strands  in  a  Cable,  not  Links  in  a  Chain.— The  Logical 
Form  of  Each  Proof  to  be  Regarded.- Also,  its  Subject-Matter.- The 
'  Relation  of  the  Proofs  to  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God.— The  Order 
of  the  Proofs— Begin  Where  the  Psychology  of  Theism  Leaves  us.— 
Classification  of  the  Proofs.— Various  Plans.— Adopt :  Psychical,  Cos- 
mical  and  Moral.— Several  Subdivisions  of  E-^ch  of  These  Three  Classes. 

LlTER.\TURE. 

Encyclopedia  Articles  on  God  and  T/tcwwi.— Flint's  Theism,  Chap. 
II.— Schurman's  Belief  in  God.  Chap.  II.— Lindsay's  Recent  Advances 
in  the  Theistic  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  I.— Luthardt'i  Funda- 
mental Truths,  Chap.  I.— Diman's  The  Theistic  Argument,  Chap.  I.— 
Orr's  Christian  I'ieic'  of  God  and  the  ll'orld,  Chap.  II.— Rishell's  Tkt 
Foundations  of  the  Faith.  Div.  I..  Chap.  I.— Foster's  Systematic  The- 
ology, Part  II..  Chap.  I.— Re<lford's  The  CliHslian's  Plea,  Part  II.. 
Chap.  I.— Calderwood's  Iland-Book  of  Moral  Philosophy,  Part  V., 
Chap.  I.— Conder's  The  Basis  of  Faith.  Chap.  III.-Howe's  l.ning 
Temple,  Vol.  I..  Chaps.  I.,  II.— Eraser's  Philosophy  of  Theism.  Vol.  I., 
Chap.  I.— H,  B.  Smith's  Apologetics.  Div.  I.,  Chap.  III.— Clarke's  An 
Outline  of  Christian  Theology,  Part  I..  Chap.  II.— Steams'  The  Evi- 
dence of  Christian  Experience,  Chap.  II.— Dale's  Christian  Doctrine. 
Chap.  I.— Butler's  Analogy.  Introduction.— General  Works  on  Apolo- 
getics by  Ebrard.  Delitxsch.  Sach,  Lechler,  Frank,  Baumstark,  and 
others,  may  be  consulted. 


i 


( ! 


^So  APOLOGETICS. 


I.  Preliminary.    §  57. 

i.'T^HE  discussion  of  theism  has  thus  far  been  concerned 
J.      with  Its  psychology.     The  nature  and  origin  of 
rehgious  and  theistic  belief  have  been  considered.    A  careful 
analysis  of  the  religious  consciousness  and  of  thei.tic  belief 
has  been  made.    The  question  of  the  genesis  of  this  belief 
has  been  discussed  at  length.    Various  theories  to  account 
tor  Its  origin  in  human  experience  have  been  passed  under 
critical  review,  and  the  true  doctrine  has  been  educed.    This 
doctrine  announces  that  there  is  a  con-natural,  intuitive  or 
a  pnon  factor  in  theistic  belief,  which  pertains  to  the  very 
constitution  of  the  human  soul,  and  is  not  the  product,  in 
the  first  instance,  of  natural  evolution,  logical  inference,  nor 
external  revelation.     But  this  doctrine  also  maintains  that 
this  native  theistic  aptitude  or  capacity  of  man's  const:     'on 
requires  certain  external  circumstances,  such  as  revelat.. 
education  and  reflection,  to  preserve,  purify  and  perpetuate 
It  m  such  maturity  as  to  constitute  the  proper  rational  basis 
for  Christianity.    In  mature  monotheistic  belief,  therefore, 
there  are  two  related  elements.     The  one  is  the  primitive 
or  con-natural  factor,  which  is  the  antecedent  condition  of 
the  subsequent  theistic  experience;   and  the  other  consists 
in  all   those  elements  which  are  incorporated  into  that 
experience  by  means  of  revelation,  reflection  and  educa- 
tion. 

2.  Wc  now  pass  on  to  the  second  main  division  of  theistic 
discussion  on  its  positive  side.  This  may  be  termed  the 
ontology  of  theism.  This  leads  to  the  studv  of  the  intricate 
problem  of  the  ontological  validity  of  theistic  belief,  and 
of  the  Idea  of  God  therein  involved.  The  question  now  is: 
^  there  actually  existing  a  real  object  upon  which  theistic 
behef  legitimately  rests?  Is  there  really  existent  in  the 
objective  sphere  a  personal  being  in  rational  correspondence 
with  the  Idea  of  such  a  being  in  the  human  mind?    Given 


. 


INTRODUCTORY  TOPICS. 


251 


the  udief  in  God  which  is  native  to  the  human  soul,  what 
is  its  ontological  significance?  Has  subjective  the'st-:  belief 
objective  validity? 

The  problem  thus  raised  is  a  profound  one,  ana  i    pr  jper 
solution  is  of  the  deepest  import.    It  raises  the  whole  debate 
concerning  tiie  theistic  proofs,  or  the  arguments  for  the 
existence  of  God.    The  field  of  discussion  is  wide,  its  mate- 
rials are  vast,  and  the  treatment  is  difficult.    The  treatises 
dealing  with  this  subject  would  form  a  large  library.    Every 
system  of  philosophy  has  to  face  the  problem  of  the  existence 
of  God.    Modem  science  often  leads  up  to  the  same  problem. 
Theology  has  to  deal  with  it  also,  as  one  of  its  fundamental 
facts.    Even  poets  often  find  the  same  mysteilous  inquiry 
before  them  as  they  wander  in  the  sunlit  and  flowery  fields 
of  imagination.    This  problem  of  the  ages  meets  us  every- 
where.   Ancient  Greek  in  shady  ■  "ove,  mediaeval  monk  in 
lonely  cell,  modem  philosopher  i'.  quiet  study,  present-day 
scientist  in  the  laboratory,  the  poet  in  every  age,  as  well 
as  the  theologian,  are  alike  concemed  to  know  what  answer 
should  be  given  to  the  inquiry  concerning  the  objective 
validity  of  theistic  belief. 

Before  proceeding  to  the  formal  exposition  of  the  theistic 
proofs,  there  are  "several  preliminary  topics  to  be  considered, 
so  that  the  way  may  be  made  plain  for  an  intelligent  dis- 
cussion of  these  proofs.  This  is  very  important,  in  order 
to  avoid  confusion  in  the  whole  theistic  discussion.  This 
chapter  will  deal  with  these  preliminjiry  topics. 

II.  The  Precise  Task  Undertaken.    ^  58. 

I.  First  of  all  the  results  reach"!  in  the  psychology  >f 
theism  are  assumed,  and  carried  forward  to  the  discubion 
of  its  ontology.  This  affords  the  starting-point  of  the  /ea- 
sonings  which  justify  belief  in  the  existence  of  Gud ,  and 
it  at  the  same  time  supplies,  in  part  at  least,  some  of  the 
materials  for  the  proofs  to-  the  reality  01  the  object  of 


, 


252 


APOLOGETICS. 


theistic  belief.  It  is  held  that  this  belief  has  its  roots  deeply 
fixed  in  the  very  nature  of  man.  and  that  it  is  an  essential 
element  m  his  constitution.  From  this  secure  subjective 
fact  the  reasonings  for  the  existence  of  God  proceed-  and 
never,  m  the  exposition  of  the  theistic  proofs,  should  the 
con-natural  or  intuitive  nature  of  the  belief  in  God  be  lost 
sight  of. 

2.  It  Should  also  be  kept  in  mind  that  we  do  not  under- 
take to  prove  the  existence  of  God  after  the  manner  of  a 
stnct  demonsiration.  The  method  of  mathematics  is  not 
the  one  now  to  be  followed.  The  method  must  rather  be 
that  of  rational  vindication,  and  the  result  will  be  moral 
probability.  This  is  perhaps  the  only  method  possible  in 
dealing  with  this  problem,  for  it  is  doubtful  if  real  exist- 
ence in  any  sphere  can  be  proved  by  strict  deductive  or 
demonstrative  reasonings.  Hence,  we  undertake  to  show 
that  theistic  belief,  which  involves  the  actual  existence  of 

w  u',f  T'T^  ^^^^'  ^^^^"^  °^  ^»'""d«"t  vindication. 
We  shall  also  be  prepared  to  make  it  plain  that  the  denial 
of  the  divine  existence  is  irrational  and  unnatural,  and  that 
theistic  belief,  in  predicating  the  actual  existence  of  its 
object  IS  reasonable  and  natural.  In  a  word,  we  undertake 
to  make  good  the  claim  that  theistic  belief  is  reasonable 
and  that  atheism  is  irrational.  ' 

3-  This  position  further  implies  that  theistic  belief  is  not 
a  mental  fancy  or  a  subjective  dream,  but  an  a  priori  belief, 
^v•h.ch  asserts  the  existence  of  its  object.  The  exposition 
of  the  theistic  proofs  will  mainiy  consist  in  the  rational  vin- 
dicat.on  of  the  objective  validity  of  this  native  belief.  Thi>= 
belief  will  be  regarded  as  a  valid  witness,  and  the  significant 
of  Its  testimony  will  be  interpreted. 

Hence,  we  do  not  begin  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  God 
of  whom  we  are  entirely  ignorant,  or  concerning  whom 
we  have  no  idea.  To  take  this  position  would  be  to  make 
reasonings  m  regard  to  the  existence  of  God  impossible. 
But  we  begin  with  the  primitive  theistic  belief,  whose  sub- 


INTRODUCTORY  TOPICS. 


353 


jective  and  con-natural  reality  has  been  established  in  the 
psychology  of  theism,  and  then  proceed  to  vindicate  the 
ontological  reality  of  this  belief  in  the  existence  of  God. 
This  initial  position  for  the  ontology  of  theism  is  well 
brought  out  by  Luthardt  (Fundamental  Truths,  p.  48), 
when  he  says  that  "the  theistic  arguments  are  not  intended 
to  prove  to  us  that  which  we  are  not  already  acquainted 
with,  but  to  justify  our  intuitive  conviction  to  our  reasoning 
faculties,  by  directing  us  to  the  traces,  scattered  on  all  sides, 
of  that  God,  whom  we  already  perceive  and  know  in  our 
hearts."  Thus  we  undertake  to  vindicate  the  native  spori- 
taneous  conviction  of  the  heart  before  the  bar  of  reason, 
and  so  to  set  sail  for  the  long  voyage  across  the  wide  sea 
of  the  theistic  discussion. 

4.  The  import  of  the  difference  between  proving  and 
solving  should  also  be  kept  in  mind  as  it  here  emerges.  This 
may  seem  but  a  verbal  distinction;  yet  it  is  necessary  to 
make  it  in  order  to  understand  the  function  of  the  argu- 
ments for  the  existence  of  God.  To  prove  is  one  thing, 
and  to  solve  is  another.  The  former  is  of  the  nature  of 
demonstration,  the  latter  of  explanation.  Proving,  as 
demonstr.  don,  relates  to  a  theorem;  solving,  as  explana- 
tion, pertains  to  a  problem.  We  prove  a  theorem,  and  solve 
a  problem.  The  method  in  the  former  case  is  mainly  de- 
ductive, and  in  the  latter  chiefly  inductive. 

In  unfolding  the  theistic  proofs  this  distinction  must  be 
constantly  kept  in  view.  To  undertake  to  demonstrate  the 
existence  of  God  is  one  thing,  and  to  offer  the  theistic 
hypothesis  as  the  solution  of  the  problems  of  the  universe 
is  another.  In  the  former  case  we  undertake  to  prove  the 
existence  of  God,  without  direct  reference  to  the  native 
belief  in  him,  and  in  the  latter  we  proceed  to  vindicate  this 
native  belief,  as  a  valid  witness  to  the  existence  of  God. 
In  the  ontological  proofs  we  may  seem  to  be  often  following 
the  method  of  proving  or  demonstration.  Still,  in  this  case, 
even  after  we  have  reached  the  idea  of  an  infinite,  an  all- 


254 


APOLOGETICS. 


I  : 


perfect,  or  a  necessary  being,  we  must  presuppose  the  theistic 
concept  as  already  in  mental  possession  before  theistic  predi- 
cates  can  be  applied  to  this  object.    Thus  it  appears  that 
even  m  this  case  we  do  not  really  demonstrate  the  existence 
of  a  God  of  whom  we  have  no  antecedent  notion  or  belief 
But  m  presenting  the  theistic  proofs  we  shall  be  mainly  en- 
gaged m  showing  that  belief  in  the  existence  and  activity 
of  God  IS  a  reasonable  and  rationally  necessary  belief,  inas- 
much as  It  supplies  the  most  adequate  solution  of  the  varied 
problems  presented  by  man  and  the  universe.     If  theistic 
be  lef,  which  postulates  the  existence  of  God,  thereby  fully 
solves  all  these  problems,  we  are  justified  in  concluding 
tha    the  divine  existence  is  a  fact  which  is  rational  and 
well  grounded. 

This  gives  the  task  we  now  undertake  a  somewhat  dif- 
ferent form  from  that  which  it  had  in  the  hands  of  the 
older  natural  theology.    That  theology  proceeded  to  unfold 
the  arguments  for  the  divine  existence,  and  thereby  sought 
to  put  the  human  mind  into  possession  of  the  idea  of  or 
belief  in   God.     The  method  now  suggested  assumes 'the 
reality  of  the  subjective  and  con-natural  nature  of  the  belief 
in  God,  and  from  this  it  proceeds  to  vindicate  the  reality 
of  the  existence  of  God.     In  the  former  case,  the  reality 
of  the  existence  of  God  was  vindicated  as  the  ground  of 
the  subjective  belief;   in  the  latter,  the  reality  of  the  sub- 
jective belief  is  vindicated  as  the  rational  ground  for  believ- 
ing in  the  existence  of  God.    The  results  of  the  psychology 
of  theism  justify  this  conclusion. 

III.  The  Relations  of  the  Theistic  Proofs.    §  59. 

I.  In  entering  upon  the  exposition  of  the  theistic  proofs. 
It  IS  necessary  to  come  to  some  understanding  in  regard  to 
the  relaton  of  the  various  proofs  to  each  other.  There  are 
many  lines  of  reasoning  by  which  the  belief  in  the  existence 
of  God  u  vindicated,  and  these  differ  in  their  method  and 


INTRODUCTORY  TOPICS. 


255 


materials.  The  relation  of  these  to  each  otL-,i  is  an  im- 
portant question.  What  is  the  relation  of  the  so  called 
a  priori  and  a  posteriori  proofs?  How  do  the  deductive 
and  inductive  modes  of  reasoning  stand  related  in  the 
theistic  argument?  How  should  the  ontological,  cosmo- 
logical,  teleological  and  moral  proofs  be  construed  in  their 
mutual  bearing  upon  each  other  ?  To  understand  these  ques- 
tions is  necessary  to  clearness  of  exposition,  and  may  pave 
the  way  for  such  a  presentation  of  the  theistic  proofs  as  shall 
go  far  to  meet  certain  objections  to  them. 

2.  First  of  all,  these  proofs  are  to  be  regarded  as  cumu- 
lative in  their  nature.  This  means  that  the  many  lines  of 
reasoning  are  to  be  taken,  not  singly,  but  in  their  combined 
logical  force.  The  theistic  proofs  are  like  the  strands  of  a 
cable,  rather  than  the  links  of  a  chain.  If  they  be  regarded 
merely  as  links  in  a  chain,  the  strength  of  the  whole  is 
measured  by  the  strength  of  the  weakest  link;  but  if  they 
be  considered  to  be  strands  of  a  cable,  their  argvmientative 
force  is  equal  to  the  strength  of  all  the  strands  when  com- 
pacted into  the  cable.  One  strand  may  be  strong  and 
another  weak,  yet  each  adds  its  quota  of  logical  value  to 
the  force  of  the  whole.  One  strand  may  even  be  quite 
defective,  yet  the  theistic  argument,  as  a  whole,  may  stand 
quite  secure,  because  other  strands  ..re  sound  and  strong. 
This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  cumulative  nature  of  the 
argument  for  the  existence  of  God.  Hence,  after  we  have 
expounded  each  separate  proof,  and  shown  its  peculiar 
value,  we  shall  be  careful  to  bind  them  all  together  in  a 
legitimate  logical  synthesis,  and  thus  exhibit  their  combined 
and  convincing  force.  Thus  we  are  justified  in  speaking 
o*  tlie  theistic  proofs  collectively,  and  in  calling  them  the 
t  etstic  rgument.  The  proofs  are  many,  but  the  argument 
is  one. 

3.  Each  proof  should  be  carefully  estimated  in  accord- 
ance with  its  peculiar  logical  form.  In  doing  this,  it  is 
important  to  understand  clearly  what  the  logical  form  of 


25<5 


APOLOGETICS. 


ii 


any  particular  argument  is,  and  not  to  expect  any  conclu- 
sion from  it  which  it  is  not  fitted  to  supply.     We  should 
carefully  observe  whether  any  argument  is  deductive  or 
inductive,  a  priori  or  a  posteriori.    We  should  understand 
clearly  the  principle  of  each  form  of  reasoning,  whether 
it  be  ontological,  cosmological  or  teleological.    We  should 
observe  whether  we  start  from  the  idea  of  a  necessary  being, 
from  the  notion  of  the  infinite,  or  from  the  principle  of 
causation.    We  should  consider  whether  we  are  seeking  for 
a  first  cause,  or  trying  to  account  for  order  and  design  in 
the  universe.    Above  all,  care  should  be  taken  to  compre- 
hend the  method  of  immediate  inference  which  the  moral 
argument  exhibits.     Much  confusion  will  be  avoided,  and 
the  relation  of  the  several  theistic  proofs  will  be  better  under- 
stood if  this  point  be  kept  constantly  in  view. 

4.  In  like  manner,  the  subject-matter  of  each  proof  should 
be  diligently  considered.  The  subject-matter  of  the  various 
proofs  is  as  diflferent  as  their  logical  methods  are  diverse. 
In  this  respect  the  ontological,  cosmological,  teleological  and 
moral  proofs  widely  differ.  Diligent  observation  is  needed 
to  discover  whether  the  materials  of  any  given  proof  are 
drawn  from  the  contents  of  human  reason  and  its  modes 
of  cognition,  from  the  varied  facts  of  nature  about  us,  or 
from  man's  moral  nature  and  the  conditions  of  moral  order 
under  which  he  finds  himself  placed.  It  will  be  a  serious 
mistake  to  derive  from  the  materials  of  one  line  of  proof 
what  can  only  be  deduced  from  another.  To  expect  the 
teleological  argument  to  give  what  only  the  ontological  can 
would  be  a  serious  mistake. 

And  in  this  connection  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish 
between  the  native,  con-natural  factors,  and  the  empirical 
elements  in  theistic  belief,  in  order  to  clearly  comprehend 
the  significance  of  the  materials  of  the  several  proofs.  The 
material  of  some  of  the  proofs  is  more  directly  related  to 
the  con-natural  aspects  of  theistic  belief,  and  in  others  to 
its  empirical  factors.     To  keep  this  in  mind  is  necessary 


ililiiilH 


INTRODUCTORY  TOPICS. 


257 


in  order  to  make  a  legitimate  use  of  the  subject-matter  of 
the  varied  lints  of  reasoning  for  the  divine  existence. 

5.  It  must  be  further  borne  in  mind  that  some  of  the 
proofs  bear  directly  upon  the  being  of  God,  and  others  upon 
his  attributes  mainly.  The  being  of  God  denotes  his  real 
essential  nature  as  God;  the  attributes  of  God  are  those 
qualities  which  belong  to  his  essence,  or  are  exhibited  by 
his  manifold  activities.  Certain  proofs,  such  as  the  argu- 
ment for  a  necessary  being,  or  that  for  a  first  cause,  relate 
mainly  to  the  essential  nature,  the  very  being  of  God. 
Others,  like  the  arguments  from  order  and  design,  relate 
directly  to  the  attributes  of  knowledge,  wisdom  and  power. 
And  still  others,  such  as  the  varied  phases  of  the  moral 
argument,  bear  upon  the  moral  attributes  of  righteousness 
and  justice.  Then,  having  reached  these  attributes  by  varied 
lines  of  inference,  we  postulate  the  reality  of  the  being  to 
whom  these  attributes  necessarily  belong.  It  will  thus 
appear  that  certain  proofs  establish  the  reality  of  the  divine 
existence  in  its  essential  nature,  and  that  others  clothe  that 
being  with  certain  natural  and  moral  attributes.  In  the 
former  case  the  divine  existence  is  vindicated,  in  the  latter 
we  enlarge  our  idea  of  God.  In  the  one  case  we  are  assured 
that  God  is,  and  in  the  other  we  learn  something  of  what 
God  is.  Thus,  by  reasoning,  the  primitive  knowledge  of 
God  is  gfreatly  enlarged  and  enriched.  The  relation  of  the 
several  proofs  in  this  respect  should  be  faithfully  regarded. 

IV.  '^iie  Order  of  the  Theistic  Proofs.    §  60. 

I.  Opinions  differ  widely  as  to  the  best  order  in  which 
to  exhibit  the  different  theistic  proofs.  Some  think  one 
order,  and  some  another,  the  more  effective.  Shall  we 
begin  with  the  ontolofical,  the  cosmological  or  the  teleo- 
logical  proof?  Shall  we  begin  with  the  a  priori,  and  pass 
on  to  the  a  posteriori  modes  of  reasoning,  or  shall  we  invert 
this  order?  Shall  we  begin  with  the  contents  of  the  human 
17 


. 


as8 


APOLOGETICS. 


^ 

!        i 

1 

1 

!     ) 

1 1 

;   1 
1 

•mind,  or  shall  we  take  our  point  of  departure  from  external 
nature?    And  how  shall  we  relate  the  moral  proofs  to  the 
other  lines  of  reasoning?     Some  eminent  writers  pursue 
one  order,  and  some  another.     Flint  begins  with  certain 
phases  of  the  cosmological  argument,  passes  on  to  the 
design  and  moral  proofs,  and  finally  reaches  the  ontological. 
This  was  the  natural  order  for  Flint  to  pursue,  inasmuch 
as  he  allows  no  proper  place  for  the  con-natural  factor  in 
theistic  belief.    This  required  his  ijoint  of  departure  to  be 
empirical  in  his  presentation  of  the  theistic  proofs.    Writers 
of  the  Cartesian  and  intuitive  schools  usually  pursue  the 
opposite  course,  and  begin  with  some  aspects  of  the  psy- 
chical  or  ontological   proofs,   and   then   pass   on  to   the 
cosmological,  teleological  and  mora'  modes  of  reasoning. 
When  high  authorities  thus  differ,  it  is  not  easy  to  decide 
which  order  is  the  better  one  to  adopt.    Yet  it  is  of  some 
importance  to  come  to  an  understanding  as  to  the  order 
of  presenting  the  proofs,  so  that  their  exposition  may  be 
made  in  a  simple  and  natural  way. 

2.  The  positions  taken,  and  the  conclusions  reached  in 
the  psychology  of  theism,  naturally  suggest  that  the  exposi- 
tion of  the  proofs  should  connect  itself  closely  with  these 
conclusions.     In  dealing  with  the  nature  and  origin  of 
theistic  belief,  the  reality  of  the  con-natural  or  a  priori  factor 
in  that  belief  was  vindicated.     In  taking  up  the  ontology 
of  theism,  and  in  seeking  to  make  good  the  existence  of 
«God,  It  IS  natural  to  seek,  first  of  all,  to  interpret  the 
objective  validity  of  the  subjective  belief  in  God.     Con- 
sequently, we  are  led  to  begin  v  ith  the  psychical  proofs, 
whose  material  is  found  in  the  mind  itself,  and  then  to 
proceed  to  deal  with  those  proofs  whose  material  is  found 
m  various  aspects  of  the  universe.    For  a  natural  method 
of  exposition,  therefore,  we  begin  where  the  discussion  of 
the  psychology  of  theism  left  us,  and  proceed  to  establish 
the  objective  validity  of  the  native  'wlief  in  God.    We  begin, 
consequently,  with  the  a  priori  aspects  of  the  proof,  and 


INTRODUCTORY  TOPICS. 


259 


pe-ss  on  to  the  a  posteriori.  The  ontological  proofs  will  thus 
be  considered  before  t'le  teleological.  This  order  may  be 
the  best  for  another  reason.  In  all  the  proofs  there  is,  as 
we  shall  see,  an  a  priori  as  well  as  an  a  posteriori  factor. 
This  being  the  case,  it  may  be  an  advantage  to  have  the 
import  of  this  factor  clearly  brought  out  first  of  all.  Those 
who  fail  to  do  justice  to  the  native  or  con-natural  factor 
in  theistic  belief  cannot  so  consistently  follow  this  course. 
We  shall  begin  by  seeking  to  interpret  the  meaning  of  the 
native  theistic  belief.  We  shall  regard  this  con-natural 
appetency  to  believe  in  God  as  a  witness  to  his  actual  exist- 
ence. We  shall  inspect  its  credentials  and  weigh  its  testi- 
mony. 

V.  The  Classification  of  the  Proofs.    §  61. 

I.  This  is  also  a  question  concerning  which  the  authorities 
differ.  What  divisions  of  the  proofs  shall  be  made?  How 
shall  the  various  branches  of  the  theistic  argument  be 
classified?  Having  settled  the  order  of  their  treatment  in 
the  previous  section,  we  are  now  to  see  how  the  proofs  can 
be  best  marshalled  according  to  this  order.  What  principle 
of  classification  should  be  adopted,  and  what  titles  shall  be 
applied  to  the  various  strands  in  the  cable  of  proof?  The 
literature  of  tlie  theistic  discussion  does  not  afford  much 
help  on  this  point.  One  author  adopts  one  classification,  a 
second  follows  another,  and  a  third  may  give  the  question 
of  classification  but  little  consideration.  The  old  division 
into  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  does  not  aid  us  much,  because 
most  of  the  proofs  have  both  of  these  factors  in  their 
make-up.  The  division  into  deductive  and  inductive  is  much 
the  same  in  principle,  and  is  open  to  the  same  objection. 
The  scholastic  classification  into  ontological,  cosmological 
and  teleological  is  defective,  inasmuch  as  they  imply  each 
other,  and  the  two  latter  are  really  founded  alike  upon  the 
principle  of  causation  or  sufficient  reason.    This  fact  gives 


BsamtrnttlM 


26o 


APOLOGETICS. 


some  plausibility  for  the  merciless  assault  on  the  rational 
proofs  which  Kant  made.  A  classification  and  an  exposition 
of  these  proofs  which  turns,  in  some  degree,  the  edge  of 
this  criticism,  is  desirable.  Moreover,  this  threefold  division 
gives  no  proper  place  for  the  moral  proof,  upon  which  Kant 
and  many  others  have  laid  such  stress,  and  which  in  itself 
has  such  cogency  and  power.  A  classification  which  over- 
looks the  moral  arguments  is  surely  defective,  and  a  criticism 
which  fails  to  do  the  rational  proofs  justice  is  equally  at 
fault.  Both  classes  of  proofs  are  valid.  If  God  be  the 
postulate  of  conscience,  he  is  also  the  postulate  of  reason. 
Any  adequate  classification  must  recognize  this  fact. 

2.  It  may  also  be  well  to  avoid  the  use  of  the  terms  onto- 
logical,  cosmological  and  teleological,  as  far  as  possible. 
Recent  critical  theistic  discussions  justify  a  more  careful 
use  of  titles  than  these  historic  terms  supply.  The  various 
aspects  of  the  ontilogical  proof  merit  recognition;  the  cos- 
mological has  l)een  slu.wn  tu  be  ambiguous,  since  it  some- 
times means  the  argument  for  a  first  cause,  and  sometimes 
the  proof  from  order.  Then,  too,  the  arguments  from  order 
and  design  have  in  our  own  day  been  clearly  discriminated 
from  each  other.  And  the  several  aspects  of  the  moral  or 
anthropological  proof  have  also  been  elucidated  in  recent 
years.  All  of  these  considerations  should  have  pre  .-.• 
recognition  in  an  adequate  classification  of  the  l!  ;:;•,; 
proofs. 

3.  The  following  classification  is  suggested:  The  "a  >•  -!? 
proofs  are  divided  into  three  main  classes.  The  first  n\y 
be  termed  the  psychical  or  psychological.  Here  the  materiah 
of  exposition  and  proof  are  found  in  the  contents  of  the 
human  mind,  and  in  the  conditions  of  its  cognition.  The 
second  we  designate  the  cosmical  or  cosmological.  The 
principle  involved  in  these  proofs  is  that  of  causation,  and 
the  materials  are  found  in  various  aspects  of  the  universe 
of  nature  all  about  us.  The  third  class  is  denoted  the  moral 
or  anthropological.    Here  the  starting  point  and  the  mate- 


INTRODUCTORY       'PICS. 


261 


rials  of  the  reasonings  are  found  iri  min's  moral  nature, 
and  the  conditions  of  moral  gove^iment  under  which  he 
finds  himself  situated.  In  brief,  the  three  main  divisions 
of  the  theistic  proofs  are  the  psy  hical,  the  cosmical  and 
the  moral.  The  materials  of  the  first  he  mainly  in  the 
human  mind,  of  the  second  in  tht  external  world,  and  of 
the  third  in  the  sphere  of  man's  moral  expe.  iences.  As  the 
exposition  proceeds,  various  subdivisions  of  these  three  mam 
classes  of  proofs  will  be  opened  up.  Then,  when  this  is 
d^ne,  they  will  all  be  bound  together  logically,  to  supply 
one  irrefutable  argum  it,  which  abundantly  vindicates  the 
objective  validity  of  i  .eistic  belief  in  the  fact  if  the  exist- 
ence of  God. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS:  PROOF  FROM  THE  AUTOPISTIC 
NATURE  OF  THEI       ":  BELIEF. 

CONTBNV. 
Theiitic  Proofs.  — Starting  Point. -  Psychical  Proof..  —  SewrU 
Forms.— Theistic  Belief  Autopistic.— Two  Presuppositions.— Transition 
from  Psychology  to  Ontology  of  Theism.— Sutement  of  This  Proof.— 
The  Connatural  Nature  of  the  Belief  in  God.— Gives  Presumption  of 
His  Existence.— Lutbardt  and  Others  Confirm.— Exposition  of  This 
Proof.— Does  not  Strictly  Prove  nor  Really  Form  iu  Object— Theistic 
Belief  is  a  Messenger  and  a  Witness  to  the  Existence  of  God.— It  is 
God's  Testimony  in  th-;  Human  Soul  to  His  own  Real  Existence.— It  is 
Self-evidencing.— Vindication  of  This  Proof.— Important  to  Make  it 
Good.— The  Universality  of  Religion  Supports  it— Pagan  Peoples  In- 
stinctively Believe  in  the  Reality  of  Their  Gods.— Philosophical  Specu- 
Ution  Confirms  it.— So  does  the  Tendency  of  the  Soul  of  Man  Towards 
a  Unity.— The  Method  and  Conditions  of  Special  Revelation  also  Vin- 
dicate this  Proof. 

LrriBATURt. 
Lutiiardt's  Fundamtnlal  Truths,  Chap.  III.— Dabney's  Theology, 
Chap.  II.— Hodge  .  SyslemaHc  Theology,  Vol.  L,  Part  I..  Chap.  I.— 
Shedd's  Dogmatic  Theology.  Vol.  I.,  Div.  III.,  Chap.  II.— Strong's 
Systematic  Theology,  Part  II.,  Chaps.  I..  Il.-Orr's  Christian  View  of 
Cod  and  the  World,  Chap.  III.,  Appendix.— Lindsay's  Recent  Advances 
in  the  Theistic  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  V.— Mead's  Supernatural 
Revelation,  Chap.  II.— Ebrard's  Apologetics,  Vil.  I..  Part  I..  Book  I., 
Sec.  I.,  Chap.  III.— Fisher's  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief. 
Chap.  II.— Fiske's  Cosmic  Philosophy,  Vol.  II.,  Part  I.,  Chap.  II.— 
Knight's  Aspects  of  Theism.  Chap.  V^III.— Thomson's  Christian  Theism 
Book  II..  Chap.  VIII— Dale's  Christian  Doctrine,  Chaps.  I.,  II.-! 
Clarke's  Outline  of  Christian  Theology,  Part  I..  Chap.  II..  a.— H.  B. 
Smiths  Introduction  to  Theology.  Part  II.,  Chap.  III.,  3.— Fraser's 
Philosophy  of  Theism.  Vol.  I..  Chap.  II  -Karris'  Philosophical  Basis 
of  Theism,  Chap.  V— Calvin's  Institutes.  Book  I.,  Chaps.  I.-III.— Illing- 
worth's  Divine  Immanence.  Chap.  IV.— Descartes'  Method  and  Medita- 
rto»i*.-Augu.stines  The  Trinity.  Chap.  VII.-Frank's  System  of  Chris- 
tian Certainty.  Sec.  II.,  Chap.  I. 


I.  General  Statement.    §  62. 


I.  TN  this  chapter  the  formal  exposition  of  the  theistic 

A    proofs  is  begun.     .According  to  the  classification  of 

those  proofs  suggested  in  the  last  chapter,  the  psychical  or 


.aM 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


^ 


psychological  proofs  are  to  be  first  unfolded.  These  proofs 
take  their  point  of  departure  froin  certain  rational  contents 
of  the  human  mind,  and  find  their  materials  in  the 
fundamental  conditions  of  cognition.  Banning  with  the 
psydiical  proofs,  we  are  ^^' .  to  bring  the  ontology  of  theism; 
into  close  relation  with  its  psychology.  If  we  were  to  raise 
the  metaphysical  question  of  the  ground  of  the  con-natural 
theistic  aptitude  or  instinct  of  the  human  soul,  we  might 
find  the  best  answer  to  be  that  it  was  due  to  God  making 
his  presence  known  in  the  human  soul.  Theistic  belief,  in^ 
the  last  analysis,  would  then  be  grounded  on  the  testimony 
of  God  in  the  soul  of  man,  to  his  own  existence  This  view 
is  not  pressed  just  now,  but  it  is  merely  suggested  to  show^ 
how  the  subjective  and  objective  aspects  of  theistic  belief 
are  related. 

Th'j  psychical  proofs  assume  several  quite  distinct  forms. 
First,  the  autopistic  or  self -evidencing  nature  of  theistic 
belief;  secondly,  the  proof  from  the  idea  of  a  necessary 
being;  thirdly,  the  proof  growing  out  of  the  idea  of  the 
infinite;  and  fourthly,  the  inference  from  the  rational  prin- 
ciple of  intelligence  itself,  have  to  be  unfolded.  In  this 
chap  >•  attention  will  be  devoted  to  the  first  of  these.  This 
leads  to  a  careful  interpretation  of  the  autopistic  nature  of 
the  belief  in  God. 

2.  This  initial  theistic  proof  presupposes  two  important 
iwsitions  already  made  good  in  these  discussions.  '3ne  is 
the  rational  theory  of  knowledge.  This  theory  insists  on 
the  reality  of  the  a  priori  laws  of  thought,  and  asserts  that 
in  cognition  these  laws  come  into  rational  correspondence 
with  the  real  conditions  of  objective  existence.  The  other 
is  the  con-natural  or  instinctive  nature  of  theistic  belief. 
This  implies  that  this  belief  in  its  deepest  roots  is  a  priori 
or  native  to  the  human  constitution.  With  the  rational 
theory  of  knowledge  as  our  guide,  and  the  instinctive 
nature  of  theistic  belief  as  our  starting-point,  we  now  pro- 
ceed to  investigate  the  ontological  character  of  this  belief. 


264 


APOLOGETICS. 


I 


3.  By  this  means  we  may  hope  to  be  able  to  make  the 
passage  from  the  psychology  to  the  ontology  of  theism  in 
an  entirely  rational  way.  If  this  passage  can  thus  be  made, 
the  objective  validity  of  theistic  belief  will  be  securely  estab- 
lished. It  is  evident  that  this  is  a  matter  of  the  utmost 
importance.  How  is  the  passage  to  be  effected  in  an  entirely 
rational  way  from  the  subjective  belief  in  God,  which  is 
an  undoubted  psychical  fact,  to  the  objective  existence  of 
God  as  an  undoubted  reality?  To  show  that  this  can  be 
done  in  various  ways  is  to  go  far  to  vindicate  theistic  belief 
as  a  warrant  for  belief  in  the  exisu.ice  of  its  object.  In 
some  respects  the  autopistic  nature  of  this  belief  is  the  key 
to  the  situation.  This  may  be  termed  the  esotheistic  proof, 
and  we  now  enter  on  its  exposition. 

II.  Statement  of  this  Proof.    §  63. 

1.  The  starting  point  of  this  proof  is  the  nature  of  theistic 
belief  as  inherently  con-natural  or  intuitive.  By  intuitive, 
we  do  not  now  mean  a  direct  gaze  upon  the  very  being 
of  God.  It  is  rather  taken  to  denote  that  native  theistic 
endowment,  or  inborn  tendency  to  believe  in  God,  which 
the  human  soul  possesses.  It  is  now  assumed  that  the  soul 
of  man  has  this  constitutional  capacity  in  its  very  make-up. 
This  intuitive  factor  must  indeed  be  presupposed  in  order 
to  the  possibility  of  any  definite  theistic  experience.  Other- 
wise this  experience  would  have  to  be  explained  on  purely 
empirical  grounds,  and  from  materials  at  first  non-theistic 
in  tlieir  nature.  But  it  has  already  been  shown  that  this 
intuitive  factor  antedates  and  conditions  the  empirical  ele- 
ments which  enter  into  this  belief.  Now,  if  it  can  be  shown 
that  this  intuitive  or  con-natural  factor  in  theistic  belief 
is  in  rational  correspondence,  and  cognitive  relation  with 
its  object  in  the  existence  of  God.  a  very  important  step 
will  be  taken  towards  laying  the  foundations  for  belief  in 
the  divine  existence. 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


a6s 


2.  In  proceeding  to  show  this,  it  is  necessary  to  keep  in 
mind  the  fact  that  the  intuitive  factor  in  theistic  belief  is 
like  the  same  factor  in  other  aspects  of  human  cognition. 
They  all,  as  by  an  instinctive  conviction,  posttdate  their 
external  counterparts,  as  actually  existing  in  the  objective 
realm.    On  this  general  and  somewhat  abstract  ground,  we 
reach  the  presumption  that  the  theistic  intuition  has  objective 
validity.     In  this  connection,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
theistic  belief  is  not  of  the  nature  of  a  general  conception, 
but  rather  a  native  endowment  of  the  human  soul,  which 
^■\s  an  a  priori  quality  about  it.    Such  being  the  case,  it  is 
not  framed  by  the  mind  in  the  experiences  of  abstraction 
and  generalization ;   it  is  rather  possessed  by  the  mind  and 
given  to  that  experience  which  is  theistic.    This  wards  oflf 
the  objection  that  the  idea  of  God  has  not  any  necessary 
objective  validity,   since  the  human  mind  can  construct 
various  general  notions  which  have  no  real  existence  at  all, 
as,  for  example,  a  mermaid  or  a  centaur.    But  if  the  true 
intuitive  or  a  priori  factor  be  rightly  regarded,  it  conditions, 
rather  than  springs  from,  experience ;  and  it  thereby  pledges 
the  reality  of  the  object  to  which  it  rationally  stands  related. 
This,  then,  is  an  initial  presumption  in  favor  of  the  objective 
validity  of  theistic  belief. 

3.  This  presumption  enables  us  to  assume,  tentatively  at 
least,  that  the  theistic  intuition,  with  i.i  a  priori  quality, 
may  be  justly  regarded  as  an  abiding  witness  in  the  human 
soul  to  the  reality  of  the  existence  of  God.  The  con-natural 
theistic  factor  in  the  constitution  of  man  thus  becomes  God's 
testimony  therein  to  his  own  actual  existence;  and  it  also 
lays  the  foundation  for  the  autopistic  nature  of  theistic 
belief.  As  rational  intuition,  in  its  very  nature,  relates  the 
human  mind  to  objective  reality  of  some  kind,  so  the  theistic 
intuition  of  the  human  soul  may  relate  it  to  God  as  an 
actually  existing  object.  In  such  a  case  the  object  is  not 
formed  by  the  mind,  but  rather  given  to  it.  This  being  so, 
the  very  existence  and  character  of  this  subjective  factor 


I    f 

''     i 


att 


APOLOGETICS. 


postulates  its  object  as  really  existent  From  another  point 
of  view,  the  theistic  intuition  may  be  regarded  as  a  revela- 
tion of  God  in  the  soul.  The  con-natural  theistic  factor  is 
the  ear  of  the  soul  to  hear  the  voice  of  God;  it  is  his  con- 
scious presence  in  the  audience  chamber  of  the  soul.  Such 
revelation  certainly  presupposes  the  existence  of  the  being 
who  makes  it.  Hence,  man's  instinctive  belief  in  God  is  a 
valid  testimony  to  the  existence  of  God. 

Luthardt  expresses  almost  the  same  view  when  he  says 
tiiat  "to  think  of  God  is  to  be  certain  of  his  existence." 
This  simply  means  that  in  the  thought  of  God  his  existence 
IS  implied;   or  that  the  existence  of  God  is  necessary  to 
account  for  man's  native  belief  in  him.    Certain  aspects  of 
the  Cartesian  view  suggest  the  same  conclusion.     When 
Descartes  argues  that  the  only  proper  way  to  account  for 
the  presence  in  the  human  soul  of  the  idea  of  an  infinite 
self-existent  being,  is  to  presuppose  the  existence  of  such 
a  being,  he  makes  this  suggestion.    Thus,  the  existence  of 
God  becomes  the  guarantee  for  the  validity  of  human 
knowledge.    Malebranche  is  not  far  from  the  same  position 
when  he  says  that  we  perceive  all  things  in  God  when  we 
perceive  them  accurately.    Green,  Caird,  Royce  and  Watson 
certainly  suggest  the  same  view  when  they  assume  that  God 
IS  the  highest  goal  to  which  human  intelligence  can  attain. 
And  we  may  not  be  going  too  far  when  we  suggest  that 
the  witness  of  the   Holy   Spirit   in   Christian  experience 
implies  the  underlying  natural  relation  of  the  infinite  Spirit 
with  the  soul  of  man.    If  God.  by  his  Spirit,  sustains  this 
mward  relation  to  »he  believer's  experience,  may  we  not 
suppose  tha:  the  foundation  of  this  gracious  relation  is  the 
natural  re!ati..n,  on  the  ground  of  wliich  the  theistic  in- 
tuition  IS  regarded  as  the  testimony  of  God  in  the  human 
soul,  giving  assurance  tliat  he  is,  ami  that  we  are  under  his 
authority?    Even  thoHgl,  sin  may  have  marretl  this  relation, 
and  pervertcil  tliis  testimony,  still  it  is  not  utterly  destroyed; 
for  if  It  were,  man  would  no  longer  be  a  religious  being 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


ntff 


at  all.  At  root  this  may  be  called  the  religious  proof  for 
the  existence  of  God,  wherein  man's  religious  nature  as 
self-evidencing  testifies  to  the  existence  of  God.  In  other 
words,  the  theistic  intuition  is  native  and  autopistic. 

III.  Exposition  of  this  Proof .    §64. 

Some  further  exposition  may  more  fully  elucidate  this 
proof,  and  indicate  more  clearly  the  precise  results  which 
it  attains. 

1.  The  theistic  intuition  as  autopistic  does  not  prove  the 
existence  of  God  in  the  sense  of  a  strict  logical  demonstra- 
tion. This  con-natural  theistic  factor  does  not  do  the  work 
of  formal  logic.  It  does  not  proceed  deductively  to  reach 
by  logical  processes  the  conclusion  that  God  exists.  It 
operates  instinctively,  and  spontaneously  suggests  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  existence  of  God.  What  was  said  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  in  regard  to  the  function  of  proof  in 
relation  to  the  divine  existence  need  only  be  now  recalled, 
in  support  of  what  has  just  been  stated.  We  do  not  seek 
to  prove  the  existence  of  a  God  of  whom  we  have  no 
knowledge,  but  we  rather  undertake  to  interpret  our 
instinctive  conviction  in  regard  to  the  existence  of  such  a 
being. 

2.  Nor  is  it  admitted  that  the  theistic  intuition  forms  the 
object  to  which  it  relates.  If  it  did,  God  would  have  only 
a  conceptual  existence.  But  it  has  already  been  insisted 
that  primitive  theistic  lielief  is  not  of  the  nature  of  a  general 
notion  framed  in  the  mind  by  abstraction.  If  it  were,  the 
mind  would  be  the  virtual  creator  of  God,  and  his  existence 
would  be  purely  ideal.  The  theistic  intuition  rather  finds 
its  object  already  existing.  It  is  not,  therefore,  a  mechanic, 
but  rather  a  discoverer;  it  finds,  rather  than  makes,  its 
object.  In  the  light  ot  this  view,  the  contention  of  Kant, 
that  the  idea  of  God  is  merely  a  regulative  principle  of 
human  reason,  according  to  which  it  proceeds  in  dealing 


Vi 


368 


APOLOGETICS. 


with  the  totality  of  phenomena  in  the  cosmos,  is  entirely 
untenable.  The  position  of  Kant  upon  this  point  has  been 
hurtful  to  both  philosophy  and  theology.  But  if  it  be  firmly 
held  that  theistic  belief,  which  involves  the  idea  of  God, 
should  be  regarded  as  a  rational  intuition,  much  will  be 
gained.  The  idea  of  God  will  then  be  regarded,  not  merely 
as  a  regiilative  principle,  having  only  subjective  validity, 
but  it  will  be  looked  on  as  an  instinctive  and  constitutive 
belief,  carrying  in  its  very  nature  the  promise  and  pledge 
of  its  objective  validity. 

3-  The  theistic  intuition  rather  reveals  its  object  as  exist- 
ing. That  object  thus  revealed  is  God.  Hence,  man's  in- 
stinctive belief  in  God  becomes  a  messenger  in  the  human 
soul,  revealing  the  existence  of  God.  As  in  nature  we  say 
that  God  reveals  himself,  and  thus  the  heavens  declare  his 
glory,  so  in  the  human  soul  God  may,  in  like  manner,  be 
said  to  reveal  himself,  and  therein  declare  his  presence.  In 
both  cases  the  revelation  is  possible  only  on  the  supposition 
that  God  actually  exists.  The  con-natural  or  intuitive 
belief  in  God  is  the  fundamental  fact,  for  unless  we  have 
the  conviction  concerning  God  which  this  belief  implies, 
we  could  never  see  the  glory  of  God  in  the  starry  heavens,' 
nor  find  all  nature  vocal  with  his  praise.  Thus  the  intuitive 
factor  rather  reveals  than  forms  or  proves  its  object.  It  is 
needful  to  add  that  the  revelation  here  implied  is  not  ex- 
ternal, but  internal.  It  is  not  an  outward  special  revelaUon, 
but  an  inward  manifestation  of  God  to  the  soul. 

4-  The  theistic  intuition  further  attests  the  reality  of  its 
object.  It  is  an  abiding  attestation  in  the  soul  itself,  testify- 
ing  to  the  real  existence  of  God.  The  native  theistic 
endowment  of  the  human  soul  is  a  zvitness,  not  a  mechanic. 
It  testifies  to  the  reality  of  its  object,  which  consequently 
It  does  not  construct.  Thus,  as  it  is  a  messenger  to  the 
soul,  revealing  God  therein;  it  is  also  a  witness,  testifying 
from  within  the  soul  to  the  reality  of  the  existence  of  God. 
In  this  way  the  self-evidencing  nature  of  theistic  belief  is 


f 

ft 


monk 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


369 


vindicated,  and  its  objective  validity  securely  established. 
This  belief  is  not  at  first  fully  matured.  It  is  at  root  con- 
natural, but  needs  revelation  and  education  to  lead  it  out 
to  maturity. 

Thus  the  native  theistic  belief  of  the  soul  neither  proves 
nor  forms  its  object.  It  rather  reveals  and  attests  the  exist- 
ence of  that  object.  It  is  neither  a  logician  nor  a  mechanic. 
It  is  simply  a  messenger  and  a  witness.    It  is  autopistic 


IV.  Vindication  of  this  Proof.    §  65. 

As  the  conclusion  just  stated  is  of  much  significance  in 
itself,  and  in  relation  to  the  further  exposition  of  the  theistic 
proofs,  it  may  be  well  to  give  some  further  reasons  in  its 
support. 

I.  The  autopistic  nature  of  theistic  belief  is  supported  by 
the  facts  of  religion  among  men  generally.  If  the  con- 
natural nature  of  that  belief  be  denied,  it  is  not  easy  to 
see  how  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  universal  preva- 
lence of  religious  ideas  and  practices  can  be  given.  If  the 
phenomena  of  religion  depend  on  primitive  revelation,  and 
subsequent  education,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  religion 
would  die  out  altogether  in  certain  cases.  If  any  people 
should  entirely  lose  the  memory  of  the  revelation,  or  be 
deprived  of  the  necessary  religious  education,  the  proba- 
bility is  that  the  knowledge  of  God  would  fade  away  from 
them  entirely.  But  the  fact  is  that  there  are  no  tribes  of 
men,  no  matter  how  ntde,  but  retain  some  acquaintance 
with  deity.  It  may  often  be  sadly  perverted,  but  its  essential 
principle  is  present.  The  best  explanation  of  the  persistency 
of  religion  among  men  is  found  in  the  con-natural  nature 
of  theistic  belief.  This  implies  that  this  belief  is  an  essential 
element  in  the  very  nature  of  man,  just  as  truly  as  con- 
science is,  so  that  wherever  man  goes  he  carries  it  with  him. 
This  fact,  coupled  with  the  influence  of  revelation,  fully 
accounts  for  the  universality  of  religion.    That  it  does  so 


.270 


APOLOGETICS. 


in  turn  confirms  the  self-evidencing  nature  of  the  belief 
in  God. 

2.  In  this  connection,  it  is  worth  while  noting  the  fact 
that  the  religious  belief  of  the  different  pagan  systems  is 
a  belief  in  the  actual  existence  of  their  deities.  Their  gods 
are  not  to  them  imaginary,  but  real  beings.  This  persuasion 
prevails  so  widely  among  pagan  peoples  that  it  cannot  be 
called  in  question.  If  these  peoples  thus  assume  the  real 
existence  of  their  deities,  there  is  reason  to  conclude  that 
their  belief  in  them  is  self-evidencing  in  its  nature.  The 
native  belief  in  the  gods,  though  defective  and  perverted, 
is  acted  on  in  a  somewhat  unconscious  way  by  untutored 
peoples,  as  if  it  were  a  testimony  to  the  actual  existence 
of  their  deities.  Even  though  it  be  admitted  that  they 
are  in  error  as  to  the  precise  form  and  number  of  their 
gods,  yet  their  belief  in  them  is  a  testimony  to  the 
objective  validity  of  the  native  theistic  endowmenl  of 
mankind. 

3.  The  conditions  of  philosophical  speculation  further 
confirm  the  doctrine  announced  in  this  chapter.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  observe  how  intimately  theistic  and  philosophical 
speculation  have  always  been  related.  The  best  types  of 
ancient  Greek  philosophy  give  prominence  to  the  theistic 
element.  This  is  true  of  Anaxagoras,  Socrates,  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  In  patristic  and  scholastic  ages  philosophy  and 
theology  were  closely  allied.  In  modem  times  almost  every 
notable  philosopher  gives  prominence  to  the  theistic  view 
of  the  universe.  Descartes,  and  after  him  Spinoza  in  a 
quite  different  way,  combined  aspects  of  theism  with  their 
philosophy.  Leibnitz  and  Kant  wrestled  with  the  problem 
of  the  divine  existence  and  government.  Hamilton  and 
Hegel  speculated  profoundly  upon  the  nature  of  the  infinite 
and  absolute.  Ethical  monism  and  definite  theism  have  a 
large  place  in  the  philosophy  of  our  own  day.  Even  those 
whose  philosophy  is  anti-theistic  have  to  face  the  ver) 
problems  of  which  theisnj  provides  the  best  solution. 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


271 


Whence  arises  this  persistent  impulse  in  philosophical 
speculation  to  move  on  and  up  to  the  theistic  goal  ?  If  the 
native  and  autopistic  nature  of  theistic  belief  be  admitted, 
this  impulse  can  be  understood.  If  the  theistic  intuition 
be  regarded  as  an  abiding  attestation  in  the  human  soul  to 
the  existence  of  God,  then  it  is  easy  to  see  how  the  belief 
in  God  comes  to  be  used  as  the  solution  of  the  problems 
of  the  universe  in  the  hands  of  philosophy.  Thus  the  con- 
natural and  self-evidencing  nature  of  theistic  belief  explains 
the  prevalence  of  the  theistic  element  in  philosophy.  In 
turn,  the  prevalence  of  this  element  in  human  thought  goes 
far  to  confirm  the  autopistic  nature  of  the  be!  in  God 
when  it  affirms  the  existence  of  the  object  of  this  belief. 

4.  The  fact  that  all  the  powers  of  the  human  soul  find 
unity  for  their  activities  in  God,  further  confirms  the  doc- 
trine of  this  chapter.  Thus  it  comes  to  pass  that  cognition, 
faith,  feeling,  moral  experiences  and  religious  instinct,  all 
fin. I  the  goal  of  their  noblest  exercise  in  the  postulate  of 
God.  The  highest  thinking,  the  most  exalted  faith,  the 
most  elevated  emotion,  the  deepest  moral  experiences,  and 
the  loftiest  religious  aspirations  of  the  human  soul,  reach 
to,  and  rest  in,  God.  These  all  lead  out  and  up  to  God, 
and  when  they  rest  in  him  they  find  unity  and  satisfaction. 
As  Augustine  has  said,  "the  soul  is  restless  till  it  rests  in 
God."  Thus.  God,  is  the  true  home  of  the  soul,  and  aU 
its  activities  find  their  highest  forms  of  exeicise  in  relation 
to  him.  This,  again,  is  in  harmony  with  the  doctrine  that 
theistic  belief  is  autopistic  in  its  nature. 

The  dire  effects  of  sin  have,  of  course,  to  be  taken  into 
account  in  these  reasonings.  The  intellect  !ias  been  dark- 
ened, the  eye  of  faith  has  been  blinded,  the  feelings  have 
been  per\'erted,  conscience  has  been  aulled,  and  the  religious 
sentiments  have  been  turned  into  wrong  channels.  But  this 
does  not  destroy  the  force  of  the  contention  here  made, 
because  the  Gospel  comes,  with  its  remedy  frr  the  evil.i  of 
sin  in  all  t'lese  elements  of  man's  nature,  so  that  they  may 


:^^     ^ 


37a 


APOLOGETICS. 


be  brought  into  harmonious  action  again.  The  return  to 
God  ,s  associated  with  the  restoration  of  this  harmony,  and, 
indeed.  «)ndit.ons  it.  In  redeemed  men  the  self-evidencing 
nature  of  theistic  belief  is  clearly  seen,  for  in  them  the  native 

of  the  Spirit  that  he  is.  and  that  they  are  his  children. 

S.  The  doctrine  of  this  chapter  is  further  confirmed  by 
the  way  m  which  the  Scriptures,  as  a  divine  revelation, 
come  to  men,  and  are  received  by  them.    There  must  be 
a  channel  of  communication  between  God  and  man,  and 
there  must  be  a  door  of  access  in  the  soul  of  man  for  outward 
revelation,  in  order  to  the  possibility  of  revelation  address- 
ing Itself  to  him  at  all.    Unless  man  has  a  spirtual  nature, 
and  a  con-natural  theistic  endowment,  he  cannot  sustain 
spiritual  relation  with  the  infinite  Spirit,  nor  receive  any 
special  communications  from  him.     In  other  words,  the 
condition  of  the  possibility  of  any  kind  of  outward  special 
revelation  from  God  to  men,  lies  in  the  fact  that  God  is 
still  m  contact  with  men  in  the  inner  chambers  of  their  souls. 
This  implies,  not  only  that  men  are  made  in  the  image  of 
God  but  also  that  men  "are  not  far  from  him,"  and  that 
He    hath  not  left  himself  without  witness."     Even  "that 
which  may  be  known  of  God  is  manifest  in  them,  for  God 
nath  showed  it  unto  them." 

That  God  has  made  outward  revelations,  such  as  are 
recorded  in  the  Scriptures,  is  assured  historical  fact;  and 
that  men  may  understand  and  receive  this  revelation  is  also 
undoubted  experimental  fact.    This  plainly  implies  that  in 
the  very  constitution  of  man  there  is  a  native  theistic  factor 
by  which  man  is  related  to  God.    It  also  justifies  the  con- 
elusion  that  this  factor  may  rightly  be  regarded  as  a  divine 
messenger  m  the  human  soul,  and  as  a  testimony,  in  the 
audience  chamber  of  the  spirit  of  man,  to  the  objective 
existence  of  God.     This  further  confirms  the  doctrine  of 
this  chapter,  and  vindicates  the  self-evidencing  nature  of 
theistic  belief. 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


a73 


In  this  way  the  transition  is  securely  made  from  the 
psychology  to  the  ontology  of  theism.  Given  the  idea  of 
God  as  a  fact  in  the  human  soul,  the  presumption  is  that 
he  actually  exists.  Given  the  con-natural  quality  of  theistic 
belief,  the  reality  of  the  object  of  this  belief  is  at  least  sug- 
gested. This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  autopistic  nature  of 
theistic  belief.  With  this  presumption,  and  this  suggestion, 
we  seek  further  confirmation  of  it  in  the  proofs  that  are 
to  follow. 

By  some  it  may  be  thought  that  if  primitive  theistic  belief 
is  autopistic,  the  presentation  of  further  proofs  is  not  neces- 
sary, so  that  the  discussion  might  be  ended  at  this  stage. 
But  if  we  keep  in  mind  the  true  nature  and  relation  of  the 
theistic  proofs,  it  will  be  evident  that  this  would  be  a 
mistake.  These  proofs  are  cumulative,  and  each  gfives  its 
share  of  logical  result.  The  autopistic  nature  of  theistic 
belief  is  the  first  contribution  to  that  result,  and  we  proceed 
to  confirm  and  expand  the  suggestion  of  this  proof  by  un- 
folding others. 


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MKXOCOPr   RBOWTION   TBST   CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


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CHAPTER  III. 

THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS:    PROOF  FROM  THE  IDEA  OF  A 
NECESSARY  BEING. 

Contents. 

TT  J'""  .°*   "'''    Proof.-Kanfs    Relation    to    it-Reaction     B^t„ 
Understand  n«   of   it.— Various    Tvn..   „«    ■.     <-        Reaction.— Better 

Scholasticism    extremes.-f  ruth    brtween  S     I     ^°'^-^''"'    ''"'' 
Human  Thought.-It.  underlying  S^e  tu„d  '^^"""™^'^ 

Literature. 
Augustine's  City  of  God,  Chao   XII  — Aii.«i«,'.  d      i     ■ 

S'r'a"'„rr''  ^"'^""  ''^ss  .frrT« 

Vol.   I     Part   I     rh,n    IT     c^    '-Hodges    Sistcnmtic    Theology, 
ChL   II  J"      .  '^;  "—Strong's  5jr,*<.ma/,c   rA«-ofo«y    Part   II 

Chap.  II..  4.-Foster's  Systematic  Theology.  Part  II    Chan   I     Mi    •' 
Systematic   Theology.  Vol.    I     Part   I     rL?   iin'^.     "*''*'' ' 

^ll.ip.    IV.— Mirlings   P/ll/0J0/>/lir   owrf    rAfo/opv     Chan     V       TI, 

Christian  Theism   Book  f    rh,„   r       j  ^u      */,        "^^  '^—Thomson  s 

I-  Preliminary,    §  66. 
I.  'T^HIS  chapter  deals  with  the  second  as,«;ct  of  the  nsy- 
J.     chical  proofs.     In  general,  it  may  .,e  described  as 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


27s 


the  proof  from  the  idea  of  a  necessary  being  as  it  is  found  in 
the  human  mind.  It  is  often  called  the  a  priori  proof  for 
the  existence  of  God,  and  it  is  sometimes  known  as  the 
deductive  argument  for  the  divine  existence.  These  two 
terms  are  now  seen  to  be  rather  too  general  to  denote  quite 
clearly  this  aspect  of  the  psychical  argument.  Strictly 
speaking,  it  is  the  ontological  proof  in  its  historic  and  classic 
form  that  we  are  now  to  consider.  And  even  this  term 
has  to  be  taken  in  the  sense  which  recent  criticism  has  eluci- 
dated and  made  definite. 

The  literature  of  this  proof  would  fill  many  a  library 
shelf,  so  that  no  outline  of  it  can  be  given  here.  At  times 
Aristotle  and  Plato  are  almost  on  this  ground,  though  they 
often  mingle  cosmological  elements  with  their  ontological 
reasonings.  Some  of  the  early  Christian  Fathers,  like 
Tertullian  and  Augustine,  lay  the  foundations  for  this  argu- 
ment; and  many  of  the  Scholastics,  like  Anselm  and 
Aquinas,  elaborate  it  with  much  acuteness.  Indeed,  it  took 
its  definite  form  in  their  hands.  Boethius  was  the  forerunner 
of  Anselm,  and  Anselm  is  the  typical  exponent  of  this  proof 
among  the  Scholastics.  Descartes,  in  his  philosophy,  gave 
great  prominence  to  the  a  priori  proofs  for  the  divine  exist- 
ence, and  in  one  of  his  proofs  he  follows  very  closely  the 
lines  marked  out  by  Anselm.  Clarke  presents  the  dedi'ctive 
proof  for  the  exists  e  of  God  in  a  very  elaborate  way.  In 
its  preliminary  steps,  his  argument  is  chiefly  a  priori,  but 
in  its  later  stages  a  posteriori  factors  are  introduced  into  it. 
This  illustrates  the  fact  that  the  a  priori  and  a  posteriori 
proofs  cannot  be  entirely  separated  from  each  other;  and 
it  suggests  the  additional  fact  that  in  the  cosmological  proof 
there  is  an  ontological  element.  Gillespie,  and  many  other 
writers  up  to  our  own  day,  have  expounded  and  criticised 
this  proof  in  various  ways. 

2.  In  recent  times  Kant's  trenchant  criticism  of  the 
rational  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  was  directed  very 
specially  against  the  logical  validity  <if  the  ontological  argu- 


.1 


i  '.4 

':  J. 


ii 


276 


APOLOGETICS. 


:* 


i  i 


ment.  He  also  sought  to  reduce  the  other  rational  proofs 
to  the  principle  of  the  ontological  mode  of  reasoning  with 
a  view  to  expose  the  dialectic  inadequacy  of  them  all  Ever 
since  Kants  day.  and  as  the  result  of  his  criticism,  the 
ontological  argument  has  fallen  more  or  less  into  disrepute. 
HarmUons  doctrine  of  the  unconditioned  betrays  signs  of 
the  influence  of  this  criticism.  Both  Mansel  and  dlder- 
Zt  J"  ^^u^  ""''^  '^'  philosophy  of  the  Infinite,  show 

Sitv^f  fh    T'  '"'"^""'  ^"^  ^p^"-^  — -  th" 

ofKll  %"'"^''"''  ^"^  P'-°<=«eds  to  enlist  the  services 
Sded  wly  '"  ^'^°'"  °^  ^^°«t'<='«'"  in  a  one- 

In  our  own  day  a  reaction  is  setting  in.  Thinkers  are 
gettmg  over  the  first  shock  of  the  KantiL  critidsm.  Thus 
we  find  that  writers  like  Flint.  Caird  and  Pfleiderer.  flm 
different  view-points  and  with  much  caution,  are  sUking 
to  restore  this  classic  argument  to  its  proper  placTand 
nghtful  authority.  In  not  .  few  cases  an'attempt  "made 
to  give  a  somewhat  different  form  to  tl .  argument  so 
that  It  may  be  more  effective.  No  write.  ,n  Amerf,^  has 
done  more  than  Shedd.  in  the  early  chapters  of  his  D^Za^ 
Theology,  to  vindicate  this  argument  and  to  indicate  is 
true  nature  and  value.  "la'caie  its 

Kant's  criticism  has  not  been  an  unmixed  evil.    It  has 
compelled  a  closer  scrutiny  of  this  classic  argument.    I  ha 
mark«,  out  its  scope  more  clearly,  it  has  repealed  its  im  ! 

Snenls  At  th  "'"°"'  '"^  '^  ""^•"  '"^^'^'-^^ 
elements.  At  the  same  time,  the  principle  of  this  argu- 
ment, as  It  IS  implied  in  the  idea  of  a  necessarily  exis^e 
being  of  some  sort,  is  not  destroyed,  though  the  fo"   of 

ts  statement  may  be  modified.  We  are  inclined  to^ink 
that  at  he  present  day  we  have  a  clearer  view  and  a  firmer 
^asp  of  the  real  rational  objective  validity  of  the  ar^u^ 

.^htxrthttr''^^^  -'-  ^--  ^'^^  -"  ■^^- 

3.  It  IS  evident  that  we  have  not  space  here  to  sketch  the 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


277 


various  forms  of  this  proof,  nor  can  we  undertake  to  trace 
out  the  history  of  this  type  of  theistic  speculation.  Certain 
selections,  therefore,  must  be  made.  It  will  be  proper  to 
choose  for  exposition  the  clearest  t)rpes  of  this  proof,  and 
then  unfold  its  real  principle.  The  core  of  this  proof  lies 
in  the  fact  that  the  existence  of  God  is  properly  inferred 
from  the  very  idea  we  have  of  him.  Given  the  idea  of  God, 
his  existence  is  assured. 

The  idea  of  God  is  differently  described  by  various  expo- 
nents of  this  argument.  Some  say  that  it  is  the  idea  of  a 
necessarily  existing  being,  others  that  of  an  all-perfect  being, 
and  still  others  that  of  a  being  than  whom  a  greater  cannot 
be  thought.  It  is  assumed  that  the  human  mind  does  possess 
such  an  idea,  and  it  is  from  this  psychical  content  that  the 
ontotheistic  proof  proceeds.  If  this  description  of  the  idea 
of  God  implied  in  this  proof  be  kept  in  mind,  several  forms 
of  a  priori  and  deductive  reasonings  will  appear  to  be  not 
strictly  ontological  in  their  nature.  The  ontological  proof 
has  an  a  priori  factor,  but  the  two  are  not  to  be  entirely 
identifi'  i.  O'her  proofs  have  also  an  a  priori  element  in 
them,  lie  prt  of  from  the  universe  as  contingently  existing 
to  God  as  necessarily  existent ;  the  inference  from  the  finite 
to  the  infinite,  or  from  the  dependent  to  the  independent, 
though  they  be  deductive  and  possess  an  a  priori  element, 
are  not  strictly  ontological.  This  ,..  of  proceeds  to  infer 
the  existence  of  God  from  the  very  idea  of  him  which  is 
native  to  the  human  mind.  The  two  names  which  best 
represent  this  pure  form  of  the  proof  are  Anselm  and  Des- 
cartes.   With  these  we  now  '".a],  taking  Descartes  first. 


.    .!■*•<'! 

\^-il 


II.  The  Cartesian  Form  of  the  Proof.    §  67. 

I.  Cartesian  philosophy  is  essentially  theistic.     It 

postulates  the  existence  of  God  as  the  condition  and  guar- 
antee of  the  trustworthiness  of  all  human  knowledge.  In  a 
word,  its  epistemology  is  founded  on  its  theism.    Descartes 


278 


APOLOGETICS. 


I 

I 

h 


1, 

; 

1  ! 

1 

' 

\i 

y 

1 

\ 

begins  with  doubt,  by  which  he  means  that  all  prepossessions 
must  be  laid  aside.  He  first  finds  that  ho  thinks,  and  this 
even  when  he  doubts.  From  the  fact  of  thought  he  infers 
his  own  existence,  which  means  that  in  the  fact  of  his  think- 
ing his  existence  is  involved.  He  next  proceeds  to  establish 
the  existence  of  God,  so  as  thereby  to  provide  the  assurance 
that  the  human  faculties  are  reliable,  and  give  us  certain 
knowledge.  If  there  be  a  God,  and  if  he  has  made  us,  then, 
bemg  such  a  God  as  he  is  assumed  to  be,  he  cannot  have 
made  us  to  be  the  victims  of  faculties  which  are  constantly 
deceivmg  us.  Thus  the  reality  of  the  divine  existence  is  a 
fundamental  fact  in  the  Cartesian  philosophy. 

2.  Descartes  employs  three  distinct  modes  of  reasoning 
m  establishing  the  -eality  of  the  divine  existence.  Only 
cne  of  them  is  oniological,  and  presents  itself  for  study  in 
this  chapter. 

First,  he  argues  that  the  idea  of  God  in  the  human  mind 
requires  the  postulate  of  the  existence  of  God  to  account 
for  It.  That  idea  is  of  an  infinite  or  all-perfect  being.  This 
Idea  cannot  arise  from  myself,  or  any  other  finite  cause- 
hence  it  must  be  due  to  God  alone,  who,  therefore,  must 
exist.    The  principle  of  causation  underlies  this  proof. 

Secondly,  he  reasons  for  the  existence  of  God  from  the 
fact  that  contingent  forms  of  being  require  us  to  assume  a 
necessary  being,  which  means  that  forms  of  being  which 
may  or  may  not  be.  do  not  possess  in  themselves  the  reasons 
for  their  being,  but  require  the  hypothesis  of  a  being  who 
must  be,  and  who  has  the  ground  of  his  own  existence 
and  of  the  existence  of  all  other  things  in  himself.  This 
requires  a  first  cause. 

Thirdly,  he  infers  that  the  existence  of  God  is  implied 
in  the  very  idea  the  human  mind  has  of  him.  This  is  the 
Cartesian  ontological  argument.  Given  the  idea,  and  it 
posits  the  existence  of  God. 

3-  The  third  of  these  proofs  is  now  to  be  briefly  con- 
sidered.   Descartes  held  that  the  idea  of  God  is  innate  in 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


279 


much  the  same  sense  as  the  idea  of  our  own  existence.  We 
cannot  help  having  it.  The  precise  doctrine  of  innate  ideas, 
which  Descartes  held,  is  not  easily  understood,  for  he  has 
stated  it  in  several  ways,  and  it  has  been  variously  inter- 
preted. It  may  suffice  to  say  *hat  he  held  that  the  mind 
possesses,  in  its  very  nature,  certain  subjective  principles 
or  primary  convictions,  which  are  con-natural,  and  not 
derived  from  experience.  In  this  sense  the  idea  of  God  is 
innate.  Descartes  does  not  always  make  it  plain  whether 
this  innate  idea  is  the  fully  developed  notion  of  God,  or 
whether  experience  may  be  necessary  to  give  it  its  maturity. 
His  views  have  generally  been  taken  to  favor  the  former 

idea. 

The  idea  of  God  with  which  Descartes  sets  out  is  that  of 
"an  all-perfect  being."    God  is  the  infinite,  independent,  self- 
existent  substance.    Such  a  being  possesses  all  possible  per- 
fections.   In  many  respects  this  conception  resembles  that  of 
Anselm's  "being  than  whom  a  greater  cannot  be  thought." 
The  inference  made  from  the  idea  of  such  a  being  is  that 
he  must  be  thought  to  exist.    The  very  idea  of  God  involves 
the  reality  of  its  object.    The  being  which  corresponds  to 
this  idea,  and  to  which  it  relates,  must  exist.    His  existence 
is  not  contingent,  but  necessary.    For  if  we  were  to  think 
of  such  a  being  existing  only  contingently  we  would  be 
thinking  of  it  minus  one  element  of  its  perfection,  and  that 
is  its  necessary  existence,  or  its  actual  reality  of  being.    It 
would  then  no  longer  be  the  idea  of  the  all-perfect  being 
with  which  we  set  out  at  first.     Necessary  objective  exist- 
ence is  an  essential  element  in  the  very  idea  of  an  all-perfect 
being,  and  hence  the  being  to  which  this  idea  relates  must 

really  exist. 

4.  This  inference  is  subtile,  has  often  been  misunderstood, 
and  has  suffered  severe  criticism.  It  has  been  charged  that 
a  mere  notion  in  the  mind  never  justifies  belief  in  ^he  exist- 
ence of  the  object  of  it,  that  existence  is  in  no  pi  'r  sense 
a  quality  of  any  object,  and  that  Descartes'  di  ;trine  of 


111 


H  I 


28o 


APOLOGFTICS. 


i  II 


■^ 


I  <' 


r  ...  T"""'-  ^^  "^  "°'  ""^^'•^^'^^  to  answer 
these  and  other  objections  to  this  argument  at  length  We 
are  content  to  point  out  that  the  idea  of  God  is  not  a  general 
conception  at  all.  but  a  con-natural  conviction  of  the  mind 
in  regard  to  the  existence  of  God.  The  idea  of  God  involves 
a  necessity  of  thought,  which  requires  us  to  think  God  as 
necessanly  existent.  In  relation  to  an  all-perfect  being  such 
necessity  IS  operative.    Hence,  the  object  of  this  idea  fxists. 

*in  u  .  T'  P^^'^^P''  ^  ""^"  unfortunate  in  the  iUustra- 
t^n  he  used,  though  it  might  be  shown  that  his  critics  have 
been  even  more  unfortunate  in  their  attack  upon  his  argu- 
ment He  used  the  illustration  of  a  triangle,  saying  that 
d^  Idea  of  the  equality  of  the  angles  of  alilngfe  to  two 
right  angles  is  involved  in  the  very  notion  of  a  trianrfe 
Given  a  triangle,  the  equality  of  its  angles  to  two  righi 

exttirTr '?  'f  °"^-    '°  ""'  ''^'^  -  -^^<^  *o  the 
existence  of  God.    Given  the  idea  of  such  a  being  as  he 

wav  tLTf "''  '!  Z'"'''^  "P  '"  '^''  ^'^  >d«^  •"^"<=h  a 
way  that  it  cannot  be  rationally  denied 

This  illustration  has  been  criticised  on  the  ground  that 
It  does  not  prove  anything  in  regard  to  the  actual  existence 

of  Cn'^T^  \  '  '"'"'"'  '^^  ^'^™«"t  for  the  existence 
of  God  from  the  very  idea  of  him  proves  nothing  as  to  his 
existence.  It  is  doubtful  if  Descartes  intended  by  his  illus- 
ra  ion  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  triangle,  or  to  make  the 
fact  of  existence  the  feature  common  to  the  two  cases     It 

LT./''T^'V°  '"PP°''  '^'''  ^'  ^•'"P'y  '"tended  to 
say.  that  just  as  the  quality  of  having  its  angles  equal  to 

t«o  nght  angles  is  involved  in  the  very  notion  of  a  triangle 

ideaof  God  "^-^.^  """T'^  '"'^^^"^^  P^*-*^'"^  ^°  the  vfr; 
Idea  of  God.  i  hus  understood,  the  illustration  has  a  degree 
of  pertinency  not  to  be  ignored. 

A^Ztlu^-l  ^°'"'"-  °^  '^'  "''^'"^"*  '^^'  Kant  assailed. 
Aga  nst  the  illustrat.cn  especially  he  made  his  assault.    As 

fn'tn  n  "T"""  ^''  ^""""^^^^  ^^^"  ^^^^^^^  as  fatal  to  all 
ontological  reasomng,  it  may  be  well  to  discover  its  precise 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


-ji 


force.  The  criticism  runs  as  follows:  If  a  triangle  exists, 
its  angles,  of  course,  are  equal  to  two  right  angles;  but 
the  existence  of  the  triangle  must  be  first  assumed.  So  he 
says  that  if  God  exists  he  is  an  all-perfect  being;  but  his 
existence  must  be  assumed,  and  cannot  be  proved. 

5.  In  the  light  of  the  real  meaning  of  the  illustration 
used,  this  criticism  may  not  be  entirely  fatal  to  this  argu- 
ment. The  real  point  in  the  illustration  is  that  any  quality 
which  is  necessary  to  the  completeness  of  the  idea  must  be 
supposed  to  have  reality.  Having  the  two  angles  equal  to 
two  right  angles,  and  necessary  existence,  are  features  neces- 
sary to  the  completeness  of  their  respective  ideas.  The  fact 
of  existence  or  non-existence  is  not  the  feature  in  which 
the  illustration  and  the  thing  illustrated  agree.  In  addition, 
to  say  that  there  may  be  no  existing  triangle,  that  is,  to 
annul  the  predicate  in  the  proposition,  "a  triangle  exists," 
still  leaves  the  idea  of  a  triangle  in  the  possession  of  the 
mind.  So,  to  annul  the  predicate  in  the  proposition,  "God 
exists,"  still  leaves  unaffected  the  fact  that  the  mind  pos- 
sesses the  idea  of  an  all-perfect  being,  in  which  idea  exist- 
ence is  taken  to  be  a  component  part.  Hence,  whether  we 
assert  or  deny  the  existence  of  God,  the  idea  remains  in 
the  mind.  So  long  as  this  is  left  intact,  the  Cartesian  proof 
is  protected  from  the  Kantian  criticism,  unless  it  can  be 
shown  I  .  '^tence  is  an  incident,  and  not  an  essential 

elemen  lea  of  God.    The  real  force  of  this  argu- 

ment 1    ;  *act  that  the  con-natural  nature  of  the  idea 

of  Gou  .6  it  ineradicable  in  the  nature  of  man;   and 

being  so,  it  finds  its  objective  validity  in  the  existence  of 
God. 


1 
i 

i  a 


M 


M 


III.  The  Anselmian  Form  of  the  Proof.    §  68. 

I.  Anselm  of  Canterbury  presents  the  ontological  argu- 
ment in  its  typical  form.  Many  since  his  day  have  stated 
and  restated  it,  yet  its  essential  principle  has  never  been 


282 


APOLOGETICS. 


j 


I  ' 


more  clearly  exhibited  than  by  Anselm.  In  his  Proslogium 
especially,  he  btites  the  proof,  and  in  his  Apology  he  defends 
It.  In  his  Mouologium  he  also  alludes  to  this  proof  but 
there  dwells  chefly  on  others  aspects  of  the  theistic  argu- 
ment. * 

It  is  not  easy  to  give  a  concise  statement  of  Anselm's 
reasoning,  thou^^h  the  argument  itself  is  very  compact     He 
professedly  undertakes  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  from 
the  t'^ry  idea  we  have  of  him.    He  sets  out  with  the  idea 
of  God  as  of  a  being  than  whom  a  greater  cannot  be  thought 
This  IS  really  the  idea  of  a  being  who  possesses  all  possible 
perfections.    This  idea  must  be  supposed  to  be  in  the  mind 
alike  of  the  theist,  who  asserts  the  existence  of  God,  and 
of  the  atheist,  who  denies  that  existence.     Then  Anselm 
argues  that  the  being,  whose  idea  is  of  a  being  than  whom 
a  greater  cannot  be  thou-ht,  must  exist  in  reality  as  well 
as  in  thought.     Hence,  a  being  than   -  hom  a  greater 
cannot  be  thought,  must  exist  in  re,  that  is,  objectively 
as  well  as  in  intellectu.  that  is,  subjectively.    This  simp'y 
rneans  that  the  existence  of  God  must  be  postulated,  as 
the  object  to  which  the  idea  of  him  necessarily  relatt^s 
Itself.  ' 

2.    Anselm  seeks  to  confirm  this  inference  by  indirect 
proof.     He  says  that  if  we  suppose  that  the  being  than 
whom  a  greater  cannot  be  thought,  does  not  exist  in  re, 
that  IS,  actually,  we  could  still  think  of  him  as  so  existing. 
This  would  then  be  the  thought  of  a  greater  being  than 
the  one  from  which  we  set  out,  and  yet  we  set  out  from 
the  ,dea  of  a  being  than  whom  a  greater  cannot  be  thought. 
This  would  give  the  idea  of  a  being  than  whom  a  greater 
cannot  be  thought,  and  also  the  idea  of  a  still  greater  being, 
which  IS  absurd.    Hence,  it  must  be  concluded  that  the  being 
than  whom  a  greater  cannot  be  thought  does  actually  exist; 
and  that  h,s  existence  is  necessary,  not  merely  contingent. 
In  this  way  Anselm  deduces  the  existence  of  God  from  the 
very  Idea  the  human  mind  has  of  him.    As  that  idea  requires 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


283 


the  quality  of  the  existence  of  its  object  to  make  it  com- 
plete, so  it  at  the  same  time  postulates  the  actual  existence 
of  God  as  its  object. 

3.  This  proof  has  beeti  interpreted  in  so  many  ways,  and 
criticised  from  so  many  points  of  view,  that  some  further 
exposition  of  it  is  necessary  to  unfold  its  true  significance. 
First  of  all,  the  terms  used  by  Anw  m  should  be  carefully 
noted.  He  uses  the  word  cogitare,  not  concipere.  Hence, 
we  translate  think,  rather  than  conceive.  This  indicates 
that  Anselm  is  not  thnking  of  a  general  conception  which 
the  mind  forms,  when  he  describes  the  idea  of  God,  as  that 
of  a  being  than  whom  a  greater  cannot  be  thought.  The 
view  he  evidently  has  is  that  the  idea  of  God  is  a  product 
of  rational  thought,  not  a  mere  concept  of  the  under- 
standing. 

With  this  verbal  explanation  to  guide  us,  we  now  seek 
to  ascertain  the  real  significance  of  the  proof.    And  in  doing 
so  we  are  greatly  aided  by  the  acute  hints  given  by  Patton, 
in  his  Syllabus  of  Theism.    The  starting  point  of  the  proof 
is,  that  the  actual  existence  of  God  is  somehow  implied  in 
the  native  idea  of  him  in  the  human  mind.    The  force  of 
the  inference  involved  in  the  proof  lies  in  the  statement, 
that  what  exists  in  re  is  greater  than  what  exists  tH  intellectu, 
which  means  that  the  idea  of  a  being  which  is  necessarily 
thought  to  exist,  is  a  ri'-'^er  or  more  complete  idea  than  is 
the  idea  of  a  being  wb"        .  not  thought  to  so  exist.    Then, 
since  we  have  the  idea  of  a  being  than  whom  a  greater 
cannot  be  thought,  such  a  being  is  the  most  complete  of 
all  beings;   and,  as  necessary  existence  is  essential  to  that 
completeness,  the  being  to  whom  the  idea  in  question  relates 
cannot  but  exist.    This  being  is  God,  whose  existence,  there- 
fore, is  necessary.    The  core  of  the  inference  is  that  necessity 
in  thouglit  and  necessity  in  existence  are  somehow  bound 
up  with  each  other.     The  ground  of  the  proof  is  that 
whatever  is  necessarily  thou    it  to  exist  objectively  does 
so  exist.     But  even  on  this  point  different  expounders 


u  I. 


1 1 


h ' 


284 


I 


f 


1  11 


111;  !* 


^1 


i     I 


APOLOGETICS. 


and^critics  of  Anselm  give  various  interpretations  of  his 

4.    First,  some  explain  it  in  a  superficial  way.     What 
exists  m  thought  also  exists  in  fact.    But  a  being  than  whom 

JrT-  '^""°'  ^  '^''''^^'  ^""'''^  '"  thought.     Therefore 
such  a  bemg  exists  m  fact    Only  superficial  critics  state  the 

IZi  V  u'\  '''^  *''"'  '"^^  *h«y  have  refuted  the 
proof  when  they  show  that  many  things  may  exist  in  the 

l^c^iZrTW  .'°"?'°"^'  ^hich  have  no  existence  in 
crk  dL  n.  J'^'^'^«^>d«"tly  the  view  Gaunilo  took  i„  his 
crmasm  of  Anselm's  reasoning.  Gaunilo  says  that  he  can 
.magine  an  island,  and  so  the  island  exists  in  thought.    But 

AnZ  I'f  u  "  T  r°°*  ''''  ^"  '^'^"d  «-t^  •"  f-t. 
Anselm  naturally  replied  that  the  idea  of  God  is  not  like 

other  mental  concepts.    It  is  unique,  as  the  idea  of  a  being 

than  .horn  a  greater  cannot  be  thought.    So  he  added  that 

whent       Gaunilo  presented  an  island  than  which  a  greater 

cannot  be  thought,  his  objection  would  have  weight     If 

Anselm  had  indicated  more  clearly  that  the  idea  of  God  is 

not  a  generalization,       hered  from  reflection  upon  a  num- 

made  f?l'' .?  1'°""^'  °^  ""  '^'""^  »^  ^  generalization, 
made  from  the  observation  of  a  number  of  islands,  his 
answer  would  have  been  still  more  complete  to  this  ob- 

5-  Secondly,  others  give  another  turn  to  the  proof.    That 
which  necessarily  exists  in  thought  exists  in  fact.    A  being 
than  whom  a  greater  cannot  be  thought  necessarily  exists 
m  thought.     Therefore  such  a  being  does  exist  I  TcJ 
bome  critics  assail  the  proof  as  thus  stated.     This  inter- 

the  mLd  n  "^-    ^'''  '''"  '^  ^^^^'•^^d  ''  °-  -hich 

the  mind  necessarily  possesses    and  from  the  idea  thus 

regarded  the  existence  of  tl  Ject  is  inferred.  This  inter- 
pretation shows  a  truer  appreciation  of  the  proof  than  the 
foregoing  one,  and  the  inference  from. an  iSea  which  he 
mind,  by  virtue  of  its  inherent  nature,  necessarily  possesses 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


285 


to  the  actual  existence  of  its  object  may  be  legitimate.  Still 
the  chasm  between  necessity  in  thought  and  actuality  in 
existence  is  not  very  easily  bridged  over  by  this  inierpreta- 
tion  of  Anselm's  argument,  so  we  hesitate  to  accept  it. 

6.  Thirdly,  this  may  be  a  truer  construction  of  the  proof 
Anselm  propounds.  That  which  is  necessarily  thought  to 
exist  in  fact  does  so  exist.  A  being  than  whom  a  greater 
cannot  be  thought  is  necessarily  thought  to  exist  in  fact. 
Therefore,  such  a  being  does  so  exist.  This,  as  Patton 
shows,  may  be  accepted  as  the  correct  interpretation  of  the 
Anselmian  proof.  Anselm  himself  may  not  always  have 
held  closely  to  this  meaning  of  his  proof,  yet  we  are  per- 
suaded that  this  is  what  underlies  the  type  of  reasoning 
which  he  initiatea.  The  gist  of  I'e  inference  is  that  what 
is  necessarily  thought  to  exist  in  fact,  does  actually  exist. 
This  means  that  in  any  idea  wherein  necessity  of  existence 
is  an  essential  faclor,  the  object  to  which  that  idea  relates 
does  exist  in  fact.  Such  an  object  is  not  only  a  necessity  of 
thought,  but  is  also  thought  to  have  necessary  existence. 

When  thus  stated,  this  proof  has  rational  force.  It  would 
be  interesting  to  follow  this  profound  type  of  theistic 
speculation  as  it  appears  in  subsequent  writers.  The  fact 
that  it  has  always  attracted  the  earnest  attention  of  minds 
of  a  high  order,  argues  that  t  cannot  be  entirely  without 
logical  and  rational  value.  One  can  scarcely  suppose  chat 
a  mode  of  reasoning  that  was  entirely  illogical  and  irratiin^l 
would  be  treated  with  so  much  respect  by  human  rcas('"  as 
this  has  been. 

7.  Many  and  varied  are  the  objections  i.i.kJ*  against  -:. 
Some  say  that  the  fallacy  of  four  terms,  or  of  reasoning 
in  a  circle,  lurks  somewhere  in  this  proof.  Others  say  that 
it  is  useless  to  try  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  syllo- 
gistically;  and  still  others  allege  that  this  proof  simply 
assumes  the  existence  of  God,  and  then  seeks  to  justify  it 
to  human  reason.  But  it  has  never  been  shown  what  the 
four  terms  are,  or  how  the  reasoning  in  a  circle  takes  place. 


% 


{■; 


286 


APOLOGETICS. 


[ 
I 


Then,  strictly  speaking,  it  does  not  profess  to  prove  the 
existence  of  God  syllogistically,  nor  can  it  be  truly  said  that 
it  assumes  the  existence  of  God.  It  simply  argues  that 
since  the  idea  of  God  in  the  mind  implies  the  existence  of 
Its  object,  the  existence  of  God  may  be  legitimately  inferred 
from  the  very  idea  we  have  of  him. 

The  main  objection  which  can  be  made  against  this  gen- 
eral proof  lies  in  the  statement  that  to  exist  in  fact  is 
greater  than  to  exist  in  thought  only.    The  real  questions 
here  raised  are:  Whether  existence  is  a  quality  or  attribute 
of  any  object,  and  whether  the  fact  of  existence  adds  any- 
thing to  the  idea  of  the  thing.    While  we  might  hesitate 
to  say  that  existence  is  a  quality  in  the  strict  sense,  yet 
most  minds  instinctively  feel  that  the  idea  of  an  existing 
object  is  a  richer  notion  than  the  idea  of  a  non-existing 
object.    There  is  a  factor  in  the  one  that  is  not  in  the  other. 
This  factor  is  the  predicate  of  existence.    No  doubt  this  is 
what  Anselm  had  chiefly  in  view  when  he  said  that  the 
idea  of  God  is  unique,  in  that  the  fact  of  the  existence  of 
God  is  involved  in  the  very  idea  of  him  which  the  mind 
possesses.     It  is  of  the  very  nature  of  God  to  have  real 
existence,  and  the  idea  of  him  in  the  human  mind  so  regards 
him. 

8.  Taking  it  all  in  all,  Anselm's  exposition  of  the  onto- 
logical  proof  is  the  purest  and  most  effective  form  in  which 
It  has  ever  been  presented.    As  we  have  seen,  the  Cartesian 
form  is  not  so  effective.    And  other  forms  of  this  proof 
such  as  that  presented  by  Clarke  and  Gillespie,  though 
a  prton,  are  not  strictly  ontological,  and  must  be  treated 
in  another  place  later  on  in  our  discussion.    While  we  may 
hesitate  to  a  'mit  the  complete  logical  validity  of  the  onto- 
theistic  proof,  we  may  equally  hesitate  to  concede  that  it 
has.  when  clearly  stated,  ever  been  successfully  refuted.    Its 
real  value  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  shows  that  in  the 
o  priori  factors  of  the  human  mind  we  have  the  premises 
of  what  may  be  called  a  transcendental  logic  which  ration- 


A 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


287 


ally  justifies  the  inference  that  the  objects  to  which  these 
factors  relate  exist;  in  a  word,  that  the  a  priori  factors 
have  objective  validity. 


IV.  General  Estimate  of  this  Proof.    §  69. 

I.  It  is  not  easy,  in  a  few  concluding  sentences,  to  give 
an  estimate  of  the  real  cogency  and  value  of  this  proof.  It 
naturally  has  more  weight  with  some  minds  than  others. 
Minds  of  a  speculative  turn  may  recognize  its  full  force, 
while  those  of  a  more  practical  temper  may  think  it  of  little 
value.  The  scholastics  of  the  middle  ages  no  doubt  laid 
too  much  stress  upon  it,  while  the  criticism  of  Kant,  a 
century  ago,  certainly  led  to  an  undue  depreciation  of  it. 
At  the  present  day.  theistic  speculation  is  slowly  restoring 
this  mode  of  reasoning  to  its  proper  place,  and  presenting 
a  more  just  and  balanced  view  concerning  it.  The  precise 
nature  and  scope  of  its  inference  is  more  clearly  understood, 
and  modes  of  reasoning  not  strictly  ontotheistic  are  set  in 
another  place.  Hence,  we  are  enabled  to  rest  in  a  middle 
view  between  Kant  and  the  scholasticism  he  criticised. 
While  this  historic  proof  may  not  be  regarded  as  a  strict 
demonstration  by  means  of  the  processes  of  formal  logic, 
it  may  still  be  held  to  be  a  rational  inference  in  accordance 
with  transcendental  logic  which  presupposes  a  ground  of 
unity  for  thought  and  reality.  This  simply  means  that, 
from  certain  fundamental  factors  in  the  human  mind  and 
its  modes  of  cognition,  we  may  justly  conclude  that  their 
counterparts  have  objective  reality. 

2.  The  pc'inancnt  place  which  the  ontotheistic  mode  of 
reasoning  for  the  existence  of  God  lias  ever  had  in  the 
activity  of  human  reason,  certainly  suggests  that  it  must 
have  some  true  rationality  about  it.  It  appears  in  the 
philosophy  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  among  the  Greeks.  It 
is  discovered  in  the  theology  of  TertuUian  and  .\ugustine 
among  the  patristic  writers.    Among  the  scholastics,  where 


I'; 


HI 


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288 


APOLOGETICS. 


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1 1^ 


philosophy  and  theology  are  blended,  it  reaches  its  high- 
water  mark.     The  great  theologians  of  the  Reformation, 
though  they  parted  with  the  scholastics  in  many  things, 
often  rely  on  the  ontotheistic  form  of  reasoning  in  regard 
to  the  existence  of  God.    And  at  the  present  day  it  is  slowly 
recovering  from  the  effects  of  the  Kantian  criticism,  and 
both  philosophy  and  theology  are  aiding  in  this  recovery. 
This  reaction  may  be  very  properly  regarded  as  an  evidence 
of  the  rational  right  of  this  proof  to  have  a  permanent  place 
in  human  thought.     The  duty  of  the  philosopher  and 
theologian  alike  is  to  try  to  interpret  the  real  significance 
of  this  mode  of  reasoning.    With  the  advent,  in  our  own 
day,  of  a  sounder  epistemology  than  either  empiricism  or 
idealism  can  supply,  the  psychical  basis  for  this  proof  is 
made  more  evident.    It  is  now  more  and  more  clearly  seen 
that  a  sound  interpretation  of  the  principles  of  human  reason 
goes  in  the  direction  of  sustaining  the  validity  of  the  onto- 
logical  proof  for  the  divine  existence. 

3.  Hence,  without  pronouncing  upon  the  logical  sound- 
ness of  all  the  forms  in  which  this  proof  has  been  stated, 
we  are  inclined  to  think  that  there  is  a  valid  principle  of 
inference  underlying  them.     This  principle  is  that  there 
is  a  rational  unity  lying  at  the  very  root  of  both  human 
thought  and  objective  existence.    This  does  not  mean  that 
thought  and  being  are  in  any  sense  to  be  identified,  nor  does 
it  suggest  the  view  that  matter  and  spirit  do  not  belong 
to  different  categories  of  existence.    It  rather  suggests  that 
human  reason,  in  its  fundamental  principles  or  a  priori 
elements,  relates  itself  rationally  in  a  real  cognitive  manner 
to  forms  of  existence  which  are  objective  to  it.     On  this 
basis  the  knowledge  of  the  external  world  is  real  and 
rational,  and  on  the  same  basis  the  existence  of  God  is 
guaranteed  as  real  and  our  knowledge  of  him  rational. 
And,  as  we  shall  see  in  another  form  of  the  psychical  proofs. 
It  shall  appear  that  the  postulate  of  God  is  the  ground  of 
rational  unity  for  human  reason  and  the  external  world. 


it 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


289 


Descartes  stated  this  in  another  way  when  he  made  the 
important  assertion  that  the  existence  of  God  as  an  all- 
perfect  being  is  the  pledge  of  the  validity  of  human 
cognition.  And,  in  more  modern  phrase,  this  implies  that 
the  a  priori  or  necessary  elements  in  the  human  mind 
rationally  postulate  the  real  existence  of  their  objects ;  and, 
further,  that  in  both  the  mind  and  the  world  there  is  an 
element  of  rationality  which  forms  the  basis  of  their  union 
in  cognition.  This  is  the  very  important  doctrine  which 
the  Common  Sense  philosophy  grasped,  but  did  not  fully 
interpret.  The  belief  in  God,  containing  the  a  priori  element 
of  necessary  existence  which  cannot  be  cast  out  of  it,  justifies 
the  inference  that  he  actually  exists.  This  we  take  to  be 
the  profound  truth  in  the  ontological  argument. 


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I'    : 


V  U 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS:    PROOF  FROM  THE  IDEA  OF 

INFINITY. 

Contents. 

The  Infinite  and  the  All-perfect  Compared.— The  Infinite  and  Abso- 
lute in  Philosophy.— The  Human  Mind  has  these  Ideas.— They  are 
Native  or  a  priori.— The  Unconditioned,  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute.— 
The  Idea  of  the  Infinite  defined.— Not  the  Sum  Total  of  Finite  Things.— 
Not  the  most  Abstract  Conception.— Not  the  Concept  of  Pure  Being.— 
Other  Views  defective  also.— True  Doctrine.— The  Terms  Adjectives, 
not  Substantives.— They  are  not  Empiiical.- The  Mathematical  In- 
finite.—The  Metaphysical.— And  the  Dynamical.— Must  include  all.— 
Includes  the  Absolute.— Theistic  Import  of  the  Idea.— The  Idea  of  the 
Infinite,  being  a  priori,  has  Objective  Validity.— It  is  Congruous  with 
the  Idea  of  God.— Illustrated  by  Clarke's  Reasoning.— Confirmed  by 
that  of  Descartes.— The  Qualitative  and  Quantitative  Aspects  enlarge 
the  Idea.— The  Personality  of  the  Infinite  as  related  to  God. 

Literature. 
Encyclopaedia  article  on  The  Infinite.— Howe's  Living  Temple,  Chap. 
IV.— Charnocke's  Attributes  of  God,  Chaps.  I.,  II.— Hamilton's  Meta- 
physics, Chaps.  XXXIX.,  XL.— Mansel's  Limits  of  Religious  Thought— 
Calderwood's  Philosophy  of  the  /n/Ini<c.— Mill's  Examination  of  Hamil- 
ton, Vol.  I.,  Chaps.  VI.,  VII.— Hodge's  Systematic  Theology,  Vol.  I., 
Part  I.,  Chap.  III.— Shedd's  Dogmatic  Theology,  Vol.  I.,  Chap.  III.— 
Clarke's  Demonstration.— Thomson's  Theism.  Book  II..  Chap.  IV.— 
Harris'  Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism,  Chap.  X— Martineau's  Study 
of  Religion,  Vol.  II.,  Book  II..  Chaps.  II.,  III.— Knight's  Aspects  of 
Theism,  Chaps.  IX.-XI.— Diman's  The  Theistic  Argument,  Chap.  I.— 
Bowne's  Philosophy  of  Theism.  Chap.  IV.— Conder's  Basis  of  Faith, 
Chap.  II.— Patton's  Syllabus  of  Theism.— Ca'nd'i  Philosophy  of  Re- 
ligion, Chap.  VIII.— Royce's  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Supple- 
mentary Essay  on  The  One,  The  Many,  and  The  Infinite.— Edward 
Caird's  Evolution  of  Rcligicn,  Chaps.  IV,  V.— Miiller's  The  Origin  of 
Religion,  Chap.  I.— Spencer's  First  Principles,  Chaps.  I.-V. 

I.  Preliminary.    §  70. 

i.TN  this  chapter  an  attempt  is  made  to  give  an  inter- 

X    pretation  of  the  theistic  significance  of  the  ideas  of 

the  infinite  and  the  absoKite.     In  some  respects  the  proof 


«^9*' 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


291 


for  the  existence  of  God  based  on  these  ideas  resembles 
the  ontological  mode  of  reasoning,  and  they  are  often  dis- 
cussed as  if  they  were  identical.  Thus,  the  idea  of  an 
all-perfect  being,  such  as  Descartes  and  oth-rs  describe,  is 
sometimes  identified  with  the  idea  of  the  infinite.  Many 
criticisms  of  the  ontotheistic  proof  assume  this  identity. 
But  the  abstract  notion  of  the  infinite  or  of  the  absolute 
ought  not  to  be  identified,  at  once  and  entirely,  with  that 
of  God,  as  an  all-perfect  being,  and  this  for  two  reasons. 
First,  the  idea  of  God  is  of  a  real  personal  being,  while 
the  abstract  idea  of  the  infinite  is  not.  Secondly,  the  notion 
of  infinity,  in  soinc  sense,  is  applicable  to  other  things  vhan 
God,  such  as  space  and  time,  knowledge  and  power.  Heice, 
the  idea  of  the  infinite,  and  its  related  n  ition  of  the  absolute, 
require  a  separate  interpretation  in  order  to  discover  their 
theistic  significai.ee.  If  the  ontotheistic  proof  rightly  infers 
the  existence  of  God,  as  a  necessarily  existent  and  real  being, 
from  the  contents  of  the  idea  of  him,  then  the  proof  from 
the  notions  of  the  infinite  and  absolute  may  enable  us  to 
endow  this  being,  already  vie->;ed  as  really  existing,  with 
the  characteristics  of  infinity  and  absoluteness. 

2.  Reflection  concerning  the  infinite  and  absolute  has  had 
a  large  place  in  speculation  in  all  ages.  The  foiupov  of 
Anaximander,  600  B.  C,  seems  to  have  been  a  hint,  at 
least,  of  the  infinite.  In  the  Eleatic  philosophy,  the  one 
and  the  all  had  the  quality  of  infinity.  In  the  atomic  Mate- 
rialism of  Democritus  and  Epicurus,  the  atoms  were  infinite 
in  number,  and  the  vacuum  was  infinite  in  extent.  And 
Plato  and  Aristotle  were  not  strangers  to  these  notions.  In 
modem  times  these  ideas  run  all  through  the  philosophy 
of  Descartes,  and  they  are  one  of  the  essential  features  of 
the  pantheism  of  Spinoza.  Kant  and  later  Germans,  on  to 
Hegel,  gave  much  prominence  to  tlic  notion  of  the  absolute. 
Hamilton's  philosophy  of  the  imconditioned  deals  almost 
entirely  with  these  notions,  and  Mansel  and  Calderwood 
gave  much  attention  to  the  same  speculations.    J.  S.  MilU 


mmm 


292 


APOLOGETICS. 


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and,  later  on,  Spencer,  criticised,  from  different  view-points, 
the  philosophy  of  Hamilton;  while  Mtiller,  Caird  and  Green 
have  all  wrestled  earnestly  with  the  problems  of  the  infinite 
and  the  absolute  in  our  own  day. 

3.  That  the  mind  of  man  possesses  these  ideas  or  con- 
victions is  generally  admitted.  There  is,  however,  much 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  how  the  mind  obtains  them,  and 
as  to  what  their  essential  nature  really  is.  The  sound 
rational  psychology  usually  maintains  the  a  priori  character 
of  these  notions  or  persuasions  of  the  human  mind.  And 
the  usage  of  terms  to  denote  these  notions  is  not  always 
consistent.  English  writers  generally  use  the  term,  infinite, 
while  the  Germans  seem  to  prefer  the  title,  absolute.  Hamil- 
ton hai  sought  to  use  these  words  in  a  well-defined  sense. 
The  unconditioned  is  his  general  term;  and  under  it  he 
includes  both  the  infinite  and  absolute.  The  infinite  is  that 
which  has  no  limits,  and  the  absolute  is  the  independent. 
The  former  is  mainly  a  quantitative,  and  the  latter  a  quali- 
tative, notion.  The  infinite,  then,  is  that  which  is  conceived 
as  incapable  of  ever  being  completed  by  any  finite  additions ; 
and  the  absolute  is  that  which  is  regarded  as  unrelated  to 
anything  else  and  complete  in  itself.  The  former  is 
unconditionally  unlimited,  and  the  latter  is  unconditionally 
limited. 

This  is  perhaps  making  a  rather  rigid  distinction  between 
these  two  ideas.  They  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  two 
things,  for  they  are  not  really  entities  at  all.  They  seem 
rather  to  denote  two  ways  of  regarding  certain  things. 
The  infinite  regards  its  object  as  over  agains  finite  things, 
and  as  without  iimits  of  any  sort;  while  the  absolute  Icoks 
upon  its  object  as  independent  and  self-sufficient.  The  term 
ideal,  now  coming  into  use  in  certain  quarters,  seems  a 
better  term  than  the  unconditioned  to  embrace  both  of  these 
ideas.  It  is  with  the  idea  of  the  infinite  that  we  are  to  be 
mainly  occupied  in  this  chapter. 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


293 


II.  The  Idea  of  the  Infinite  Defined.    §  71. 

In  seeking  to  discover  the  theistic  import  of  the  idea  of 
the  infinite,  it  is  very  necessary  to  define,  as  clearly  a: 
possible,  what  that  idea  really  is.    Several  inadequate  views 
must  be  understood  and   set  aside,   and  the  distinction 
between  the  mathematical  or  quantitative,  and  the  meta- 
physical or  qualitative  infinite,  must  be  made  definite  and 
lain.    Nor  must  the  dynamical  aspect  of  it  be  overlooked. 
I.  Some  have  made  the  infinite  consist  in  the  sum  total 
of  all  finite  things.    According  to  this  view,  the  notion  of 
the  infinite  is  reached  by  adding  together  the  totality  of  all 
existing  finite  things.    The  vast  variety  of  existing  things 
in  the  heavens  and  on  the  earth,  of  every  grade  and  order, 
viewed  as  a  great  whole,  constitutes  the  infinite.     These 
finite  things  are  simply  parts  or  parcels  of  the  infinite.    The 
same  sort  of  substantial  reality  pertains  to  both,  and  they 
do  not  belong  to  different  categories  of  being. 

This  is  in  principle  a  monistic  view,  and  makes  the  infinite 
purely  quantitative.  It  is  the  fundamental  error  in  Spinoza's 
pantheism.  In  a  somewhat  diflferent  way,  it  is  the  mistake 
of  those  who  identify  the  infinite  with  the  ens  realissimum. 
And  even  the  idea  of  an  all-perfect  being,  as  criticised  by 
Kant,  was  conceived  of  as  mathematical  and  quantitative, 
rather  than  dynamical  and  qualitat"    ;. 

The  infinite  is  not  the  sum  total  of  all  existing  finite 
things,  for  by  no  possible  addition  of  finite  things  can  the 
infinite  ever  be  reached.  At  best,  we  can  only  reach  the 
indefinite,  or  a  very  great  finite,  by  this  pathway  of  reflec- 
tion. Some  phase  of  monism,  with  materialistic  tendencies, 
must  be  the  logical  result  of  this  view  of  the  infinite ;  and 
it  surely  leads  to  pantheism  rather  than  to  theism. 

2.  Others  take  the  infinite  to  be  the  most  general  con- 
ception. A  general  conception  is  the  product  of  the 
discursive  powers  of  the  human  mind.    By  means  of  these 


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APOLOGETICS. 


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powers  in  the  operations  of  abstraction  and  generalization, 
general  notions  are  formed,  and  these  are  expressed  by 
general  terms.  This  process  begins  with  individual  things 
wherein  there  are  resemblances;  these  resemblances  are 
abstracted,  and  then  all  the  individuals  having  these  resem- 
blances are  formed  into  a  class,  and  a  class  name  is  given 
to  it.  Then,  from  these  general  notions,  by  the  same  process 
of  abstraction  and  generalization,  the  mental  activity  is 
carried  on,  till  the  very  highest  possible  notion  is  reached. 
This  leads  to  the  most  general  conception,  and  this  is  taken 
to  be  the  infinite. 

This  is  an  entirely  inadequate  conception,  alike  of  the 
nature  of  the  infinite  and  of  the  way  in  which  the  idea  of 
it  is  realized.  The  infinite  is  not  the  most  general  concep- 
tion to  which  the  understanding  may  attain  in  a  purely 
empirical  way.  It  is  an  a  priori  idea  of  the  reason,  and 
its  object  is  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  finite  things 
existing  as  a  totality.  This  idea  i:  ^  ven  to  the  mind,  not 
framed  by  it.  Moreover,  if  the  notion  of  the  infinite  were 
a  general  concept  of  the  understanding,  it  would  have  a 
purely  conceptual  existence,  and  its  objective  validity  could 
not  be  vindicated  at  all. 

3.  Still  others  have  sought  to  identify  the  infinite  with 
the  notion  of  pure  being.  Concrete  existing  things  are 
manifold,  and  qualitatively  distinct  from  each  other.  In 
this  way,  iron,  stone,  wood,  water  and  other  material 
things  are  distinct  from  each  other.  There  are  also  various 
grades  of  existing  things,  such  as  the  material  and  spiritual, 
the  inorganic  and  organic,  the  vegetable  and  animal.  Now, 
by  thinking  away  all  qualitative  distinctions  that  diflfer- 
entiate  things  from  each  other,  there  remains  only  the  bare 
and  empty  fact  of  existence.  This  is  said  to  be  pure  being, 
which  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  an  entity  of  any  kind. 
It  is  at  most  the  empty  abstract  conception  of  mere  exist- 
ence. 

Nor  is  this  a  proper  exposition  of  the  infinite.    At  best, 


THE  PSYCHICAL  P^^OOFS. 


295 


this  view  makes  the  infinite  consist  in  the  mere  fact  of 
existence,  which  is  common  to  all  forms  of  being  that  have 
reality.  So  far  as  its  entity  is  concerned,  i.  is  pure  nothing. 
It  is  as  empty  of  real  content  as  the  most  general  notion 
of  the  preceding  view  is,  if,  indeed,  it  is  not  really  the  same 
thing  regarded  in  a  somewhat  different  way.  The  highest 
possible  abstraction  of  being  in  general,  which  can  be 
nothing  more  than  the  simple  fact  of  existence,  is  a  totally 
inadequate  view  of  the  infinite.  The  infinite  is  a  positive 
idea,  and  not  entirely  devoid  of  content.  In  certain  respects 
it  is  a  richer  idea  than  that  of  the  finite. 

4.  Other  opinions  concerning  the  infinite  can  only  be  men- 
tioned. Kant  and  his  school  were  inclined  to  regard  it  as 
"the  thing  in  itself,"  and  to  conceive  of  it  as  the  absolute. 
The  Hegelian  absolute  was  the  culmination  of  this  general 
view.  Miiller  and  Cousin  regard  it  as  merely  the  correla- 
tive of  the  finite,  but  do  not  define  very  dearly  what  it 
really  is.  Spencer  identifies  it  with  the  inscrutable  or 
unknowable  which  underlies  phenomena.  Those  who  take 
an  empirical  view  of  the  way  in  which  the  mind  acquires 
the  idea  of  the  infinite  can  only  regard  it  as  the  indefinite. 
Miiller  is  a  good  example  of  this  statement. 

5.  In  seeking  to  unfold  the  true  idea  of  the  infinite  we 
have  a  difficult  task,  and  the  utmost  care  must  be  taken  to 
guard  against  serious  error. 

a.  First  of  all,  a  verbal  remark  must  be  made.  The 
terms  infinite  and  absolute  are  to  be  regarded  as  adjectives 
rather  than  substantives.  This  may  seem  to  be  a  superficial 
remark,  yet  it  is  of  much  importance.  If  we  regard  these 
terms  as  substantives,  we  are  in  danger  of  being  compelled 
to  regard  them  as  real  existent  forms  of  being.  If  we  take 
them  to  be  adjectives,  we  can  then  look  upon  them  as 
attributes,  or  as  the  conditions,  of  the  existence  of  certain 
things.  The  infinite  is  not  an  existing  entity,  having  a 
real  being  of  its  own  apart  from  all  other  things.  Nor  is 
the  absolute  to  be  thought  of  as  an  actually  existing  thing 


^  * 


296 


APOLOGETICS. 


i 


i  ', 


ii     • 


in  itself.  If,  therefore,  we  regard  these  terms  as  adjectives, 
then  they  properly  qualify  some  forms  of  being  or  activity! 
Thus  we  may  rightly  speak  of  infinite  space  and  time,  of 
infinite  wisdom  and  power,  and  of  a  being  which  is  both 
infinite  and  absolute.  This  remark,  if  kept  in  mind,  will 
ward  off  many  errors. 

b.  As  to  the  nature  of  the  idea  itself,  and  the  mode  by 
which  it  is  acquired,  it  need  only  be  stated  that  empiricism 
cannot  supply  the  explanation.    The  idea  has  an  a  prion 
quality  about  it,  so  that  neither  individual  experience,  nor 
association,  nor  even  the  accumulated  hereditary  experience 
of  the  human  race  can  account  for  it.    Hence,  no  experience 
of  finite  things,  no  process  of  abstraction,  or  negation,  or 
analysis,  can  in  any  empirical  way  lead  us  into  the  heart 
of  the  idea  of  the  infinite.    This  idea  is  native  to  the  mind, 
and  it  conditions  all  our  thought  of  the  finite  in  a  rational 
way.    It  is  intuitive,  and  cannot  be  reached  by  any  empirical 
process,  nor  is  its  complete  significance  exhausted  in  the 
experience  of  finite  things.     Instead  of  being  the  idea  of 
the  totality  of  finite  things,  it  is  rather  the  rational  con- 
dition of  the  possibility  of  thinking  of  finite  things  as  a 
totality.    Instead,  therefore,  of  being  an  empty  or  negative 
idea,  it  is  positive  and  rich  in  its  contents. 

c.  The  whole  significance  of  the  idea  of  the  infinite  is 
not  exhausted  in  the  mathematical  infinite.  This  aspect  of 
the  idea  is  quantitative,  and  consists  in  the  process  of 
adding  finite  parts  indefinitely,  with  the  possibility  of  find- 
ing something  ever  beyond  our  greatest  endeavors.  The 
fact  that  the  mind  can  entertain  the  convictions  of  a  some- 
thing beyond  the  greatest  possible  addition  of  finite  parts, 
is  a  hint,  at  least,  that  the  idea  of  the  infinite  has  something 
about  it  which  is  not  empirical.  This  is  the  meaning  of 
the  term  infinite  which  is  most  frequently  associated  with 
Its  usage.  In  mathematics  this  meaning  prevails,  and  this 
is  the  main  thing  implied  when  space  i»  said  to  be  infinite 
m  extent  and  time  infinite  in  continuance.     The  scientific 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


297 


conception  of  all  infinite  regression  oi  causes  and  effects 
illustrates  the  same  usage. 

d.  The  other  and  deeper  aspect  of  the  infinite  is  the  meta- 
physical and  qualitative.     This,   in  many  respects,   is  a 
different  idea  than  the  mathematical.     It  is  qualitative 
instead  of  quantitative.     Instead  of  asking,  How  much? 
it  asks.  What  kind?   is  the  object  of  the  idea  denoted  by 
the  term  infinite.     This  is,  perhaps,  the  truest  conception 
of  the  infinite.    It  raises  the  question  of  the  real  nature  of 
any  object  to  which  the  term  infinite  is  properly  applicable. 
And  if  this  aspect  of  the  infinite  be  given  its  proper  place, 
it  really  embraces  what  is  denoted  by  the  term  absolute 
as  well.     Thus,  any  form  of  being  or  mode  of  activity 
which  is  described  by  the  term  infinite,  in  this  metaphysical 
and  qualitative  sense,  is  also  properly  regarded  as  absolute 
or  independent  in  its  mode  of  existence.    As  to  its  nature, 
such  a  form  of  being,  and  such  an  activity,  are  without 
limits,  and  are  independent.    Thus  the  infinite,  as  qualita- 
tive, denotes  certain  characteristics  which  pertain  to  that 
which  is  called  infinite. 

e.  Perhaps  it  would  not  be  amiss  to  connect  the  dynamical 
idea  with  the  metaphysical  aspect  of  the  infinite,  in  order 
to  make  the  explanation  of  it  complete.     This  expresses 
the  idea  of  agency  and  activity,  wherein  power  and  resource- 
fulness are  implied.     That  which  is  infinite  and  absolute 
is  not  to  be  thought  of  as  boundless  extension  merely,  or 
as  only  abstract  endlessness.     It  is  more,  even,  than  the 
rational  unity  which  lies  at  the  root  of  all  finite  things.    It 
is  also  the  dynamical  agency  which  is  involved  in  all  the 
finite  changes  and  onward  progress  which  are  seen  in  the 
universe  of  thought  and  of  things.     This  aspect  of  the 
inrinite,  which  suggests  causality  as  well  as  rationality,  is 
exceedingly  important,  for  a  causality  that  is  rational  and' 
not  merely  mechanical   implies   self-determination.     And 
this  brings  us  within  sight  of  will  and  personality  in  con- 
nection with  the  infinite. 


i 

I 


298 


APOLOGETICS. 


Hence,  to  get  a  complete  view  of  the  infinite,  we  need 
to  take  the  mathematical,  the  metaphysical,  and  the 
dynamical  aspects  of  it.  Quantity,  quality  and  causality 
are  all  implied  in  it,  and  any  object  which  is  termed  infinite 
and  absolute  exhibits  these  three  related  qualities.  This  is 
true,  whether  that  object  be  a  form  of  being  or  a  mode  of 
activity.  If  the  infinite  be  the  ground  of  unity,  it  is  also 
the  ground  of  change  in  the  world.  If  it  be  inde- 
pendent in  itself,  it  must  be  the  basis  for  all  that  is 
dependent.  If  it  he  self-sufficient,  it  must  be  the  source 
of  the  sufficiency  of  all  else  save  itself.  This  view  we  carry 
with  us. 


III.  The  Theistic  Import  of  the  Infinite.    §  72. 

^    I.  The  careful  exposition  of  the  idea  of  the  Infinite  given 
m  the  last  section,  paves  the  way  for  an  interpretation  of 
Its  theistic  significance  in  this.     The  metaphysical  and  the 
dynamical,  as  well  as  the  mathematical,  aspects  of  the  infinite 
are  still  to  be  kept  clearly  in  mind.    At  the  very  outset,  care 
must  be  exercised  not  to  identify,  in  an  immediate  way    he 
infinite  and  absolute  with  God.     The  infinite  relates  to  a 
quality  or  condition  of  certain  existing  things,  while  God 
is  a  well-defined  existent  being.    To  vindicate  the  true  doc- 
trine of  the      'inite  is  not  to  prove  the  existence  of  God 
Nor  should  we  forget  that  the  tenn  infinite,  in  the  mathe- 
matical sense,  applies  to  other  things  than  God.    But  havin^r 
arrived  at  the  existence  of  God  on  other  grounds,  we  have 
in  that  fact  a  form  of  being  and  modes  of  activity  with 
which  the  ideas  of  infinity  and  absoluteness  do  properly 
claim  kinship.    Our  main  task  now  is  to  so  connect  infinity 
with  God  as  thereby  to  give  the  theistic  interpretation  of 
the  infinite,  and  at  the  same  time  confirm  our  belief  in  the 
existence  of  God.     In  doing  so,  it  will  clearly  appear  that 
the  metaphysical  and  dynamical  aspects  of  the  infinite 
though  they  supply  the  ground  and  provide  the  interpreta- 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


299 


tion  of  finite  forms  of  ex  .tence,  yet  do  not  find  their  full 
significance  in  relation  to  those  forms  of  being  «hich,m  their 
very  nature,  are  limited  and  dependent.    This  leads  naturally 
to  the  supposition  that  the  full  significance  of  these  aspects 
of  the  infinite  is  to  be  discovered  in  the  necessarily  existent 
and  independent  being,  whose  reality  was  established  in  the 
last  chapter.     The  result  of  the  reasonings  now  entered 
on  will  be,  not  so  much  to  prove  the  existence  of  God,  as 
to  invest  him  with  the  attributes  of  infinity  and  absolute- 
ness, which  are  congruous  with  no  being  except  God.    We 
shall  not  prove  t*  e  existence  of  God  from  the  idea  of  the 
infinite;   nor  shall  we  vindicate  the  reality  of  the  infinite 
from  the  existence  of  God.     But  having  both  the  idea  of 
God  and  of  the  infinite  in  mental  possession,  we  shall  show 
their  rational  kinship,  and  in  this  way  confirm  the  reality 
of  both.    In  view  of  this  position,  it  seems  clear  that  some 
of  the  older  theologians  undertook  to  do  too  much  in  seek- 
ing to  prove  the  existence  of  God  from  the  idea  of  the 
infinite.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  not  possible  to  apyly 
theistic  predicates  to  the  infinite,  unless  the  idea  of  God  be 
already  in  the  mind.     All  that  can  be  done,  therefore,  in 
the  present  reasonings,  is  to  show  how  the  two  ideas  are 
to  be  rationally  correlated. 

2.  The  first  step  in  the  theistic  interpretation  of  the  idea 
of  the  infinite  is  to  understand  its  real  psychological  nature. 
It  is  not  the  product  of  experience  in  relation  to  finite  things, 
though  experience  may  be  the  occasion  when  it  is  realized 
as  a  native  mental  law.  Nor  is  it  the  result  of  mental 
abstraction  in  any  way.  so  that  it  has  more  than  a  con- 
ceptual reality.  It  is  a  priori  in  its  nature,  and  hence  given 
by  the  mind  itself  to  certain  of  its  experiences.  In  a  word, 
it  conditions  the  activity  of  the  mind  in  relation  to  finite 

things.  . 

The  idea  of  the  infinite,  being  a  prion,  leads  to  the  inter- 
ence  that  it  has  objective  validity,  and  that  it  postulates 
a  reality  of  some  kind,  other  than  the  mind  which  is  its 


J    T 


dift 


300 


APOLOGETICS. 


I    1 


V  U 


i 


iHj 


11 
W 


n 

i 
I  I 


source,  and  other  than  finite  things  which  are  the  occasion 
of  Its  realization.  The  idea  of  the  infinite,  being  neither 
empirical  nor  conceptual,  is  rather  rational,  and,  as  such 
It  has  objective  validity.  It,  therefore,  postulates  an 
obj«:t  to  which  it  properly  belongs.  That  object  cannot 
be  finite  things,  either  in  part  or  in  their  totality.  It 
may  be  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  finite  things 
existing  as  a  totality,  and  of  their  being  so  apprehended 
by  reason. 

This  is  illustrated  by  one  stage  in  Clarke's  Demonstration. 
He  finds  space  and  time  to  be  facts  for  the  human  mind 
Reflection  upon  them  shows  that  they  are  neither  substances 
nor  agents;    so  he  concludes  that  they  must  be  attributes 
of  some  substance  or  subject  which  possesses  the  qualitv 
of  infinity  that  space  and  time  exhibit.    He  concludes  that 
such  a  being  is  God.    While  we  may  hesitate  to  agree  with 
Clarke  that  space  and  time  are  attributes  of  some  substance, 
and  while  we  do  not  now  argue  whether  they  are  merely 
subjective  conditions  of  certain  forms  of  human  cognition, 
yet  It  may  be  doubted  if  the  quality  of  infinity,  which  Clarke 
here  presents,  is  wholly  exhausted,  when  viewed  only  sub- 
jectively.   In  other  words,  the  purely  empirical  explanation 
of  It  is  not  sufficient. 

This  is  further  confirmed  by  reflecting,  after  the  manner 
of  Descartes,  upon  the  causal  origin  of  the  idea  of  the 
mfin.te  in  the  human  mind.  That  cause,  or,  more  properly, 
ground,  cannot  be  myself,  nor  things  about  mc;  for  I  am 
finite,  and  .so  are  they.  Hence,  its  ground  must  be  beyond 
me,  and  other  t  an  finite  things.  It  must,  therefore,  be 
connected  with  .some  proper  objective  reality  wliicli  con- 
stitutes at  r>nce  its  ground  in  relation  to  reason,  and  the 
ground  for  finite  things  existing  as  a  totality  for  cognition 
In  this  way  the  objective  reality  of  the  idea  of  the  infinite 
as  a  prwrt  may  be  vindicated. 

3.  Then,  when  the  qualitative  aspects  of  the  infinite  are 
considered,  we  get  a  still  deeper  view,  and  are  able  to 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


30I 


rationally  relate  the  idea  of  the  infinite  with  God.    These 
aspects  of  it  lead  us  to  lay  aside  all  quantitative  notions 
of  the  infinite.    In  doing  so,  we  get  rid  of  some  of  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  subject  which  grow  out  of  the  idea  of  the 
infinite,  as  extensive  boundlessness.     We  think  of  it  now 
in  terms  of  quality,  and  have  regard  to  its  intensive  aspects. 
The  inner  reality  and  resources  of  the  infinite,  rather  than 
its  boundlessness,  are  now  considered.    The  intensive  unity, 
the   self-sufficiency,   and   the  complete   rationality  of  the 
infinite  are  what  we  now  consider.     These,  without  any 
limitation  pertaining  to  them,  give  the  infinite  under  our 
present  vision  of  it.    This  idea,  as  infinite,  having  objective 
validity,  very  naturally  connects  itself  with  God,  as  a  neces- 
sarily existent  being.    This  enables  us  also  to  regard  God 
as  the  ground  of  unity  and  system  in  finite  things,  and  to 
clothe  God  with  the  qualities  of  independency  and  self- 
sufficiency.     In  this  way  the  theistic  significance  of  the 
intensive  infinite  appears. 

4.  This  interpretation  becomes  richer  still  when  we  take 
into  account  the  dynamical  aspects  of  the  infinite.     This 
view  of  the  infinite  associates  the  quality  of  activity  and 
efficiency  with  it.     In  addition  to  the  intensive,  we  have 
now  the  causal  aspect  of  the  infinite  before  us.    We  observe 
constant  change  taking  place  within  and  without  us.    We 
instinctively  postulate  a  causality  for  these  changes.     We 
at  the  same  time  instinctively  conclude  that  the  resources 
of  causality  operative  in  the  universe  are  not  exhausted  in 
all  the  finite  changes  wliich  take  place  in  it.     We  think  of 
the  wealth  of  this  causality  as  without  limit.     This  is  the 
idea  of  infinite  power  or  efficiency,  and  it  presents  an  aspect 
of  the  infinite  which  is  dynamical.    Here,  again,  the  a  priori 
nature  of  the  idea  of  the  infinite  enables  us  to  postulate  a 
proper  object  for  this  idea.    The  natural  association  of  this 
idea  with  the  necessarily  existent  lieing.  God.  is  readily 
effected.    Here,  in  its  deejiest  aspects,  the  idea  of  the  infinite 
fg5.eives  its  theistic  interpretation,  and  the  necessarily  ex- 


302 


APOLOGETICS. 


istent  God  is  thereby  shown  to  be  the  source  of  infinite 
causality  in  the  cosmos. 

S.  The  personality  of  the  infinite  remains  for  brief  dis- 
cussion.   This  is  confessedly  a  difficult  question.    Its  diffi- 
culty arises  largely  from  the  fact  that  the  infinite  has  been 
regarded  chiefly  in  its  quantitative  aspects.     To  connect 
personality  with  the  merely  boundless  is  by  no  means  easy. 
And  the  difficulty  has  not  been  lessened  by  regarding  as 
merely  an  abstract  quality,  for  it  is  virtually  impossible  to 
associate  personality  with  an  abstraction  of  any  sort.    But, 
if  we  regard  the  infinite  as  a  quality  or  condition  of  the 
existence  of  some  form  of  being,  it  may  be  comparatively 
easy  to  assert  personality  of  these  forms  of  being  to  which 
the  quality  of  infinite  is  properly  applicable.     Let  this  be 
made  plain. 

If  we  give  the  metaphysical  and  dynamical  aspects  of  the 
idea  of  the  infinite  their  proper  place,  we  shall  find  little 
difficulty  in  binding  infinity  and  personality  together  in  a 
rational  way.    We  have  already  found  the  being  called  God 
to  be  the  proper  object  of  the  a  priori  aspects  of  the  idea 
of  the  infinite.     If  we  regard  this  infinite  being  as  the 
rational  ground  of  the  totality  of  finite  things,  infinity  and 
rationality  are  associated  in  this  being.    And  if  we  regard 
this  infinite  being  as  the  ground  of  the  causality   that  is 
implied  in  the  changing  of  finite  things,  we  further  associate 
mfinity  and  causality  together  in  this  infinite  being.    Then, 
if  this  infinite  causality  be  also  rational,  we  have  the  main 
factors  of  personality  provided.     These  are  causality  or 
efficiency,  and  rationality  or  intelligence.     These  provide 
what  may  be  regarded  as  the  rational  self-determination 
which  personality  demands.    The  qualitative  aspect  of  the 
infinite  supplies  the  factor  of  rationality,  the  dynamical 
aspect  of  it  provides  the  element  of  agency  or  power.    R.>th 
of  these,  associated  with  the  form  of  being  that  the  urm 
God  denotes,  gives  an  infinite  being  who  is  also  personal. 
In  this  way  it  is  made  plain  that  the  infinite  and  personality 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


303 


do  not  exclude  each  other.  And  the  conclusion  may  be 
confidently  rested  in,  that  the  infinite,  as  qualitative  and 
dynamical,  in  connection  with  God,  provides  the  richest 
form  of  personality,  with  limitless  rational  self-determina- 
tion, as  its  inherent  endowment  and  crowning  glory. 

This  is  a  conclusion  of  much  importance  in  itself,  and  m 
the  controversy  with  pantheism.  Pantheism  always  denies 
personality  to  the  ground  of  all  things.  It  insists  that  the 
absolute  form  of  being  must  be  undifferentiated  and  imper- 
sonal. The  main  error  here  is  in  construing  the  infinite  and 
absolute  under  the  concept  of  quantity  almost  entirely.  But 
if  the  qualitative  and  causal  aspects  of  the  infinite  and 
absolute  ground  of  all  finite  things  be  kept  in  view,  the 
difficulty  vanishes.  Hence  infinite  power  and  absolute  rea- 
son are  lOt  only  consistent  with  personality,  but  really 
supply  its  highest  form. 


I  '• 


i  t 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS:    PROOF  FROM  THE  PRINCIPLE 
OF  INTELLIGENCE. 

Contents. 

Interpretatio„.-The  real  Vr.U.rn^ZJ:ZX^ZS:ZZ 
Theory  of   Knowledge  accepted.-The   Laws   of   ThoS-R^es   o 
Mental  SpontaneUy.-The  Spiritual  Principle  in  Man.-TL  Unity  o 

Silr"Trr"~'';'r.  ^  ^'^'^'^  °^  R*'»'^'»  Things  for  cog 
n.t.on.-The  Laws  and  Unities  of  Nature-Modern  Scientific  View- 
The  Laws  of  Nature  Rational  at  Root.-Hence  Intelligibl  -How  arc 
the  Laws  of  Thought  and  Laws  of  Nature  related  fn  CogSt°o„?I 

LlTEHATUBE. 

5- Jm**  ChCIrtv  '  ^''v"",  '"^  ^'•^''W'c.-Cudworth's  Intellectual 
SotT  S'^P/V-Hegel's   Z.o^,r.-Green's   Prolegomena  to   Ethics 

XII  RovS'-  r^'*"'  ^'""'^  ^"''""''"'  "f  ^^"•^""•.  Vol.  I..  Chap' 
piJ;"7  p  u  r  :'""'r  "^  ^'"''  ^''^P-  I-Ebrard's  Apologetics 
Part  I..  Book  I     Sec.  L.  Chap.  Il.-Schurman's  Belief  in  Cod   Chap 

JnTtrl  )■  ^iTr'  ?'"''•  '^-  ^"'^  ^.-Lindsays  Lee„tAdrS^^!s 
•«  the  Theisttc  Philosophy  of  Religion  Chan  XI  P,..»»,>  f"""-"""^ 
TheoioBv    Part  II     Ch,,.   t     e.        ■ '  o     '^^  ■^'•-'^°«'«r  s  Systematic 

Chap.  S:  ?-Red'foS^''-75i7?SL^^^^^^^ 

Fa,f/^  Chap   VII.-Thomson's  Christian  Theism.  Book  II..  Chap  III- 

Jian  Befi'Jru'  T  ''^"•'  "-Fisher's  Crounrf,  ^^  rA.,-,/,c  and  Chris- 
twn  Belef.  Chap.   I.-G.rardeau's   Discussions,   Chip.    XI -Leibnitz's 

vor'?i..Ss.i.'a;d^ir"''  '"^ """"  "^  '"^  ^'•^••^"-  ^^"■-•-'' 

I.  Preliminary.    §  73. 
'T^HE   fourth  phase  of  the  psychical  proofs   remains 
A      for  exposition.     The  first  sought  to  interpret  the 
autopisfc  nature  of  t.,eistic  belief,  and  found  thereby  a 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


305 


presumption  for  the  existence  of  God.  The  second  made 
an  inference  concerning  the  existence  of  God  from  the  very 
idea  of  him  which  the  human  mind  possesses.  The  third 
tried  to  discover  the  theistic  import  of  the  idea  of  the  infinite 
and  absolute. 

1.  In  this  chapter  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  ascertain 
whether  the  principle  of  human  intelligence  itself  has  any 
theistic  significance.  This  leads  to  an  inquiry  in  regard  to 
the  essential  nature  and  fundamental  activities  of  human 
reason.  The  main  question  thus  raised  is  as  to  whether  any 
theistic  inference  may  be  i»roperly  made  from  the  principle 
of  human  intelligence  and  its  rational  activities.  We  are 
now  to  interrogate  that  principle  in  order  to  find  out  whether 
it  supplies  a  valid  ground  for  asserting  the  existence  of 
God.  If  it  shall  turn  out  that  the  deepest  interpretation  of 
human  intelligence  implies  the  reality  of  a  supreme  intel- 
ligence, much  will  be  done  to  vindicate  the  existence  of  God. 

2.  The  point  of  departure  for  the  reasoning  now  to  be 
entered  on  is  the  rational  epistemology,  or  theory  of  know- 
ledge, expounded  in  the  fourth  chapter  of  the  Introduction. 
This  theory  holds'  that  while  experience  may  be  the  occasion, 
the  human  mind  itself  is  the  source  of  rational  knowledge, 
inasmuch  as  it  supplies  the  rules  according  to  which  the 
manifold  units  of  experience  arc  bound  together.  This 
means  that  there  are  a  priori  or  pre-empirical  factors  in 
all  true  knowledge.  These  factors,  viewed  generally,  are 
those  necessary  laxi'S  of  thought  which  condition  the  possi- 
bility, and  determine  the  form  of  our  cognition.  These 
factors  the  mind  always  contributes  to  experience.  They 
presuppose  certain  mental  rules,  according  to  which  the 
rational  activity  of  the  principle  of  intelligence  takes  place. 

This  theory  of  knowledge  also  maintains  ihat  in  cognition 
the  laws  of  thought  find  themselves  rationally  correlated 
with  certain  abiding  laws  in  the  things  which  become  the 
objects  of  cognition.  These  laws  are  regarded  as  the 
rational  conditions  under  which  the  universe  exists  for 


il 


,306 


APOLOGETICS. 


"human  cognition.  This  implies  that  the  world  is  a  system 
of  related  things,  and  that  in  cognition  the  laws  of  intelli- 
gence and  the  laws  of  nature  are  correlated  in  a  truly 
rational  way.  We  are  now  to  inquire  what  theistic  implica- 
tions, if  any,  are  involved  in  this  view  of  human  intelligence 
and  of  its  activity  in  rational  cognition.  Is  human  reason, 
as  its  root,  theistic  or  atheistic? 


[I  !( 

I' ''' 
i  I 


h  t< 


II.  This  Inquiry  in  the  History  of  Speculation.    §  74. 

I.  This  type  of  speculation  has  had  a  prominent  and 
permanent  place  in  the  history  of  the  activity  of  human 
reason.    It  appears  in  ancient  Greek  philosophy.     Its  key- 
note was  sounded  by  Socrates,  who,  against  the  Sophists 
of  his  day,  asserted  the  eternal  and  immutable  reality  of 
the  principles  of  truth  and  right.    This  truth  and  right  are 
not  individual  and  subjective,  but  universal  and  objective. 
As  such,  they  determine  true  knowledge  and  right  action. 
Plato,  in  his  lofty  idealism,  put  the  Socratic  doctrine  into 
more  definite  form,  and  thereby  gave  permanency  to  a 
type  of  thought  which  has  produced  much  that  is  best  in 
philosophy.     The  universal   principles   of   Socrates   were 
transmuted  into  the  ideas  of  Plato.     These  ideas  are  the 
eternal  rational  unities,  according  to  which  things  are  made, 
and  by  means  of  which  the  mind  arrives  at  a  knowledge 
of  things.     Viewed  subjectively,   these  ideas  become  the 
a  priori  principles  of  knowledge  which  determine  cognition, 
•'iewed  objectively,  they  are  the  fundamental  conditions  of 
tlie  reality  of  things.    The  world  of  things  is  framed  accord- 
ing to  these  ideas,  and  this  world  becomes  an  object  of 
knowledge  by  means  of  the  same  ideas.     These  ideas  are 
of  different  grades,  and  they  appear  as  determining  various 
forms  of  being.     The  h-ghest  idea  is  that  of  the  good, 
which  is  the  complete,  or  the  perfect.    This  is  usually  iden- 
tified with  God,  and  it  virtually  includes  all  the  other  idcaj. 
Hence,  the  ideas  all  pertain  to  God,  and  in  a  sense  they 


ijg^M 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


307 


are  all  in  him.  With  him  they  are  the  archetypes  accord- 
ing to  which  things  are  framed  as  unities  out  of  matter, 
which  is  also  held  to  be  eternal.  These  ideas  thus  become 
the  unchanging  realities  in  things,  and  the  fixed  elements 
in  human  knowledge.  They,  in  turn,  are  all  unified  in  God, 
whose  existence,  therefore,  is  the  goal  of  all  Platonic 
speculation. 

Though  there  is  much  in  Platonic  idealism  that  must 
now  be  discar '  '  yet  its  central  principle,  that  the  rational 
is  the  abiding  and  real  both  in  thought  and  in  things,  must 
be  regarded  as  of  great  value  in  all  sound  philosophy.  And 
it  may  be  pointed  out  that,  though  Aristotle  differed  widely 
from  Plato  in  his  philosophy,  yet  his  doctrine  of  the  eternal 
forms,  according  to  which  the  world-former  framed  the 
world  out  of  eternal  matter,  is  a  testimony  to  the  persist- 
ence of  that  type  of  thought,  which  asserts  the  reality  of 
the  permanent  amid  the  changing,  and  of  the  one  and  the 
abiding  among  the  many  and  the  fleeting.  Aristotle  con- 
ceived of  these  unchanging  unities  as  mechanical  rather 
than  rational,  while  Plato  regarded  them  as  mainly  rational. 
As  against  the  materialists  and  empiricists,  the  sophists 
and  sceptics  of  ancient  and  modem  times,  this  general  type 
of  philosophy  is  of  the  utmost  value. 

2.  In  the  noblest  aspects  of  philosophy  during  the  Chris- 
tian era  this  type  of  thought  frequently  appears.  Augus- 
tine reasons  from  the  fact  of  truth  to  the  existence  of  God. 
Cudworth,  the  great  English  Platonist,  reproduced  the 
idealism  of  the  Greek  philosophy  in  his  elaborate  system. 
Descartes,  in  all  of  his  speculation,  gives  a  foremost  place 
to  the  rational,  and  announces  the  important  position  that 
the  postulate  of  tne  existence  of  God  is  the  necessary  guar- 
antee for  the  validity  of  human  knowledge.  Malebranche's 
supposition  that  we  see  all  things  in  God,  is  neither  so 
superficial  nor  so  mystical  as  it  is  sometimes  supposed  to 
be,  if  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  general  type  of  thought 
we  are  now  considering.    It  simply  means  that  both  thought 


II 


t 


if 


308 


APOLOGETICS. 


l! 


and  things  have  their  source  and  their  solution  in  relation 
to  God.  The  monadology  of  Leibnitz,  according  to  which 
all  things  are  looked  on  as  active  and  possessing  ideas,  has 
its  real  meaning  given  to  it  in  the  light  of  Plato's  idealism. 
The  monads  are  of  varying  grades,  but  each  has  an  element 
of  rationality  at  its  core;  and  God  is  the  highest  monad, 
having  perfect  rationality,  and  giving  rational  reality  to 
all  the  other  monads. 

3.  In  more  recent  times  the  wonderful  movement  of 
idealistic  speculation  which  appears  in  the  transition  from 
Kant,  through  Fichte  and  Schelling,  to  Hegel,  exhibits  the 
same  type  of  thought  on  a  large  scale.  Plato  and  Hegel 
have  many  points  in  common,  and  in  some  respects  the 
idealism  of  the  former  is  less  abstract  than  that  of  the 
latter.  In  spite  of  all  its  defects,  it  may  be  safely  admitted 
that  the  idealism  of  Hegel  has  been  fruitful  in  giving  a 
vantage  ground  for  philosophy  which  makes  materialism 
rationally  impossible. 

In  other  systems  of  philosophy  distinct  traces  of  the 
Platonic  unities  appear.  As  against  Locke's  moderate  em- 
piricism, Berkeley  in  one  way,  and  the  Scottish  school  in 
another,  sought  to  preserve  the  rational  element  in  human 
knowledge,  the  former  by  a  one-sided  idealism,  and  the 
latter  by  a  rather  rigid  dualism  between  mind  and  matter. 
Then,  writers  like  Green  and  Caird,  Watson  and  Royce, 
have  done  not  a  little  to  avoid  the  errors  of  Hegel,  and  to 
present  an  idealism  which  professes  to  do  justice  to  the 
reality  of  both  thought  and  things.  And  many  others,  like 
Cocker  and  Harris,  Bowne  and  Strong,  Ferrier  and  Seth, 
Flint  and  Fischer,  Baader  and  Krause,  have  done  good 
service  on  this  ground,  some  critically  and  others  con- 
structively. It  is  evident  that  many  of  the  leading  workers 
in  the  field  of  philosophy  at  the  present  day  are  in  sympathy 
with  some  phase  of  modified  idealism.  It  may  be  yet  too 
soon  to  pronounce  a  final  judgment  on  its  claims  to  be 
the  true  philosophy.    Still  one  of  the  cheering  and  attractive 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


309 


features  of  this  type  of  speculation  is  that  it  seeks  to  con- 
strue the  universe,  finally,  in  terms  of  spirit  and  thought, 
rather  than  of  atoms  and  force.  In  this  way  the  rational, 
rather  than  the  mechanical,  is  made  fundamental  in  the 
universe,  and  a  spiritual  principle  is  assumed  to  lie  at  the 
very  heart  of  things.  As  against  pure  empiricism,  and 
absolute  dualism  between  mind  and  matter,  many  of  the 
foremost  thinkers  of  our  day  are  inclined  to  hold  that  a 
modified  idealism,  which  places  a  rational  and  spiritual  prin- 
ciple at  the  core  of  things,  and  which,  at  the  same  time, 
gives  to  finite  things  in  the  universe  their  proper  dependent 
reality,  is  on  the  path  which  leads  to  a  sound  philosophy. 
There  is  great  difficulty  in  framing  any  theory  which  binds 
thought  and  things  together  in  the  unity  of  a  single  system. 
It  seems  clear  that  many  earnest  minds  are  ready  to  con- 
clude that  the  diftn-ulties  of  a  modified  idealism  are  less 
formidable  than  those  which  lie  against  any  other  system. 
They  think  that  it  opens  the  way  to  construe  the  universe 
with  reference  to  a  spiritual  principle,  and  then  to  interpret 
that  principle,  in  turn,  by  the  theistic  postulate. 


f 


•i' 


III.    The  Theistic  Significance  of  the  Principle  of  Intelli- 
gence.   §75. 

I.  If  there  be  a  spiritual  principle  at  the  heart  of  things, 
and  if  human  intelligence  be  rational  in  its  nature,  the 
inquiry  naturally  arises  whether  any  theistic  inference  can 
be  properly  made  from  this  principle  of  intelligence?  Does 
this  principle,  rightly  interpreted,  justify  the  theistic  postu- 
late? If  so,  the  fourth  aspect  of  the  psychical  proof  for 
the  existence  of  God  is  vindicated. 

In  the  last  section  the  tendency  in  human  thought  towards 
a  rational  and  spiritual,  rather  than  an  empirical  and  me- 
chanical, explanation  of  the  universe  was  pointed  out.  The 
inadequacy  of  the  materialistic  philosophy,  with  its  em- 
pirical psychology,  has  been  repeatedly  revealed  by  these 


3IO 


APOLOGETICS. 


W  ! 


:  t 

1 


more  spiritual  types  of  speculation.    The  soundness  of  that 
philosophy  which,  in  varying  modes,  asserts  that  a  spiritual 
principle  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  things,  and  that  our  know- 
ledge is  not  only  sensuous,  but  also  rational,  has  been  made 
very  plain.    To  make  inquiry  whether  this  better  philosophy 
gives  good  reason  to  postulate  God,  as  the  final  ground  of 
the  spiritual  principle  in  the  universe,  and  as  the  basis  of 
the  rational  factor  in  human  intelligence,  is  our  present  task. 
2.    In  opening  up  this  inquiry,  the  implications  of  the 
human  mind  and  its  cognitive  activity  must  first  be  ascer- 
tained.   In  the  light  of  previous  discussions,  we  feel  justified 
in  setting  aside  the  empirical  theory  of  cognition,  alike  in 
its  cruder  sensational  forms  and  in  its  more  refined  asso- 
ciationalist  types.     In  like  manner,  we  feel  justified  in 
accepting  the  rational  epistemology  in  its  general  outlines. 
For  our  present  purposes,  an  exposition  of  the  rational, 
intuitional  or  a  priori  factor  in  human  knowledge  is  our 
point  of  departure.    Speaking  generally,  this  factor  is  what 
the  mind  itself  contributes  to  the  fabric  of  cognition.    Such 
cognition  is  itself  possible  only  because  the  a  priori  factor, 
as  a  rational  rule  or  law  of  the  mind's  activity,  is  given 
to  experience  by  human  reason.     Mere  isolated  facts  of 
experience  are  not  knowledge,  for  they  become  knowledge 
only  when  the  mind  binds  them  together  according  to 
certain  rules  which  it  itself  supplies.    No  collection  of  sense 
impressions,  after  the  manner  of  Hume,  nor  any  grouping 
of  mental  facts,  in  the  way  Mill  suggests,  can  ever  become 
a  rational  unity  in  cognition,  unless  there  be  first  presup- 
posed a  principle  of  unity  in  human  reason,  and  definite 
laws  of  intelligence  according  to  which  the  unity  itself  is 
effected.    This  spiritual  principle,  and  these  a  priori  rules 
are  necessary  to  the  possibility  of  true  knowledge.     Kant 
and  his  school,  with  their  doctrines  of  the  unity  of  self- 
consciousness  in  the  ego,  Pnd  of  the  a  priori  factor  in  human 
cognition,  are,  in  principle,   r    ":t,  as  against  Hume  and 
the  Sceptics;  and  the  Comm.  '.  ^tme  philosophy,  with  its 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


3" 


fundamental  laws  of  thought,  is  on  safe  ground,  as  against 
empiricism  generally.  Hence,  the  real  source  of  cognition 
is  the  inherent  power  of  the  mind  by  which  it  spontaneously 
unifies  the  scattered  items  of  experience  according  to  a  rule 
which  the  mind  itself  supplies.  No  analysis  of  conscious- 
ness which  does  not  reach  this  result  goes  to  the  root  of 
the  problem.  These  a  priori  rules  must  be  presupposed  in 
order  to  the  possibility  of  knowledge. 

The  laws  of  thought  thus  come  into  view.  These  are 
rational  subjective  rules  which  inhere  in  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  the  human  mind.  They  underlie  and  give  direction 
.  to  all  the  activities  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man.  They 
are  involved  alike  in  the  acuvities  of  sense-perception,  in 
the  operations  of  the  understanding,  and  in  the  exercises 
of  the  reason.  In  the  activity  of  the  spiritual  principle  in 
man  in  all  these  spheres,  there  are  certain  rules  or  unities, 
according  to  which  that  activity  is  determined. 

We  may  call  these  rules  the  lazvs  of  thought,  or  the  first 
principles  of  knowledge,  or  the  a  priori  conditions  of  cog- 
nition, or  the  rational  unities  for  experience,  as  we  please. 
Their  main  feature  is  that  they  belong  to  the  spontaneity 
of  the  mind  itself,  and  are  necessary  to  cognition.    They 
really  lie  deeper  than  consciousness,  and  give  form  to  experi- 
ence, making  it  this  or  that,  as  the  case  may  be.    Without 
them  human  knowledge  would  be  isolated,   chaotic  and 
unstable.    By  means  of  them  that  knowledge  becomes  real, 
stable  and  rational.     They  cannot  arise  out  ol  experience, 
since  they  antedate  and  condition  it.     The  supposition  of 
Herbert    Spencer,    and   the   evolutionists    generally,    that 
heredity  has  contributed  that  stable  element  which  we  call 
the  a  priori  factor  in  human  knowledge,  does  not  meet  the 
case,  for  the  reason,  mainly,  that  unless  we  assume  the 
validity  of  certain  rules  which  determine  the  experience 
there  could  not  arise  any  permanent  factor  to  be  transmitted 
by  heredity. 

In  addition,  the  supposition  of  a  basis  of  unity  other  than 


1 

i 


( 


312 


APOLOGETICS. 


the  manifold  of  experience  must  also  be  made.    The  ele- 
ments of  experience  are  many,  and  yet  they  are  found  to 
be  bound  together  in  a  rational  way.     We  have  already 
seen  how  the  a  priori  rules  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man 
explain  the  order  and  unity  of  experience.    We  now  further 
find  that  all  these  experiences,  together  with  the  rules  that 
condition  them,  are  to  be  unified  in  relation  to  a  principle 
which  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  cognition.    This  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  the  spiritual  principle  in  man,  which  is  the  seat 
of  the  inner  unity  of  self-consciousness.    The  seat  of  this 
unity  cannot  be  any  one  of  the  0  priori  rules,  nor  even  the 
sum  total  of  them.    Still  less  can  it  be  one  of  the  elemental 
factors  in  experience,  nor  all  of  them  combined.    In  a  word, 
from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  the  seat  of  the  unity  of 
self-consciousness  must  be  a  unitary  spiritual   principle. 
Hence,  our  knowledge  becomes  a  rational  unity  on  the  basis 
of  a  spiritual  principle,  and  according  to  certain  a  priori 
rules  which  are  involved  in  the  spontaneous  activity  of  that 
principle.     This  is  the  initial  stage  in  the  theistic  inter- 
pretation of  the  principle  of  intelligence  in  man. 

3.  The  second  stage  turns  our  attention  to  the  world  of 
external  realities  in  nature,  as  an  object  of  cognition.  What 
is  this  external  world  with  which  the  mind  come?  l-^to 
cognitive  relation?  What  is  the  nature  of  the  non-ego 
which  stands  related  to  the  ego  in  cognition?  As  it  is 
cognized,  is  it  a  collocation  of  unrelated  things  without  any 
order  or  connection?  Or  is  it  a  system  of  related  things 
having  a  rational  unity?  Or  must  we  go  further,  and  say 
that  nature  is  constituted  a  system  by  the  mind  itself  through 
the  act  of  cognition  ?  Does  the  understanding  make  nature, 
as  Kant  suggests,  or  does  the  mind  discover  that  nature  is 
already  a  definite  system  for  cognition? 

All  we  need  now  say  is  that  in  cognition  we  find  nature 
a  system  of  related  things.  For  thought  it  is  a  cosmos, 
not  a  chaos.  Therein  we  discover  certain  laws  or  unities. 
These  constitute  the  laws  or  uniformities  of  nature.    It  is 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


313 


only  on  this  supposition  that  a  scientific  knowledge  of  nature 
is  possible.  If  there  be  no  order  or  unity  in  nature,  it  would 
not  be  intelligible.  But  if  it  be  regarded  as  a  system  of 
related  things,  it  becomes  an  intelligible  object  for  intelli- 
gence, and  a  science  of  nature  is  possible. 

It  would  be  interesting,  did  space  permit,  to  show  that 
scientific  inquiry  consists  largely  in  a  search  for  these  laws 
or  unities  in  nature.  The  facts  lie  open  before  us  for 
observation.  At  first  they  seem  to  be  isolated,  but  search 
is  instituted  for  the  unities  or  laws,  by  means  of  which 
nature  may  be  construed  in  a  rational  way.  Hence,  the  laws 
of  motion,  the  principle  of  gravitation,  the  modes  of 
chemical  combination,  and  the  laws  of  organic  being,  are 
discovered.  By  this  means  modern  scientific  reflection  has 
opened  up  a  splendid  vision  of  the  rational  unity  of  nature. 
Nature  becomes  a  real  system  of  related  things  for  cognition. 
This  gives  a  deeper  meaning  an-'  a  more  rational  interpreta- 
tion to  the  laws  of  nature  than  empiricism  can  possibly 

supply-  ,  . . 

The  question  at  once  arises  as  to  the  significance  of  this 
view  of  nature  as  a  system  of  related  things.    Are  these 
laws  to  be  regarded  as  merely  physical  and  mechanical  in 
their  nature,  or  do  they  really  imply  a  rational  factor?    Is 
there  a  spiritual  principle  associateJ  with  nature,  whose 
rational   activity   is   the  true  philosophy   of   the   laws   of 
nature?    It  can  scarcely  be  supposed  that  the  laws  which 
bind  nature  into  an  intelligible  system  are  in,  and  of,  the 
things  themselves.     Then,  if  this  bond  be  other  than  the 
things  themselves,  the  question  at  once  arises  as  to  whether 
it  is  mechanical  or  rational  in  its  nature.    The  intelligibility 
of  nature  suggests  that  it  has  at  least  a  rational  factor  about 
it.    Then,  if  it  be  rational  in  some  sense,  we  may  justly 
presuppose  a  spiritual  principle  to  be  associated  with  nature 
as  a  system  of  related  things.    There  is  evidently  force  in 
the  reasoning  of  Green  in  his  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  as  he 
proceeds  to  show  that  a  spiritual  principle  must  be  associated 


i  4 

»  '''1 

I  m 

f  m 


\    II 


I 


{i 


■ 

W' 

i-'U 

il'l 

l^tm^ 


mamim 


3H 


APOLOGETICS. 


I  ? 


with  nature  as  the  basis  of  the  unity  and  intelligibility  which 
human  intelligence  discovers  therein. 

4.  This  le-ci  to  the  third  stage  in  this  exposition.  What 
interpretation  must  now  be  given  of  the  relation  between 
the  laws  of  thought  and  the  laws  of  things,  as  they  are 
bound  together  in  cognition?  Are  they  connected  in  a 
merely  external  way?  Or  is  one  set  of  laws  to  be  subordi- 
nated to  the  other?  If  so,  then  are  we  to  conclude  that 
the  laws  of  thought  produce  the  laws  of  nature,  and  commit 
ourselves  fully  to  idealism?  Or  are  we  to  hold  that  the 
laws  of  nature  produce  the  laws  of  thought,  and  capitulate 
to  empiricism?  Or  shall  we  say  that  there  is  no  rational 
relation  at  all  between  them,  and  rest  in  an  irreconcilable 
dualism?  Or  shall  we  assume  that  the  two  sets  of  laws 
are  to  be  unified  on  the  supposition  of  an  impersonal  ground 
that  really  contains  both,  and  thus  make  a  treaty  with  pan- 
theism? What  shall  we  say?  If  the  laws  of  thought  do 
not  produce  the  laws  of  nature,  and  if  the  laws  of  nature 
do  not  produce  the  laws  of  thought,  how  shall  wc  regard 
these  two  sets  of  laws  in  their  relation  in  cognition? 

If  we  say  that  the  laws  of  thought  and  the  laws  of  nature 
are  rationally  correlated  in  cognition,  we  may  be  not  far 
from  the  truth.  According  to  this  view,  neither  set  of  laws 
produces  the  other,  but  in  cognition  the  two  sets  of  laws 
come  into  rational  relation  with  each  other.  Hence,  we 
find  two  sets  of  laws  which  are  ontologicaily  independent 
of  each  other,  yet  they  are  related  by  a  rational  bond  in 
cognition.    This,  then,  is  their  relation. 

5.  The  final  stage  of  exposition  remains.  This  is  the 
definite  theistic  inquiry  as  to  whether  these  two  sets  of  laws 
may  not  he  taken  to  postulate  a  higher  spiritual  and  rational 
unity  which  is  their  common  source.  If  neither  set  of 
laws  is  to  be  subordinated  to  the  other,  they  may  both  'e 
subordinated  to  a  higher  rationality,  from  which  they  both 
spring.  If  the  laws  of  thought  have  been  set  by  a  higher 
intelligence,  and  if  the  laws  of  nature  have  been  organized 


THE  PSYCHICAL  PROOFS. 


315 


by  the  same  intelligence,  then  that  intelligence  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  basis  of  unity  for  both  sets  of  laws.  This 
would  be  the  postulate  of  intelligence  and  a  spiritual  prin- 
ciple in  its  highest  form.  This  would  be  the  highest  aspect 
of  rationality  of  which  we  can  think. 

By  this  means  we  are  abi-  lu  rno :  w  the  infinite  and  neces- 
sarily existent  being  wit  .  the  qualities  c  f  spirituality  and 
rationality.  This,  then,  =s  tre  theisdc  .nference  we  make 
from  the  spiritual  princi  >  .^  ip  mm.  jiven  this  principle 
as  the  seat  of  intelligence,  with  its  a  p:  on  rules  in  cognitive 
relation  with  nature  as  a  system  of  related  things,  we  may 
justly  infer  a  higher  intelligence  which  constitutes  the 
ground  of  unity  for  both. 

6.  The  fact  of  personality  is  also  suggested  by  the  infer- 
ence just  made.  The  reality  of  self-consciousness  which  is 
involved  in  the  spiritual  principle  in  man  implies  personality. 
And  the  principle  of  intelligence  is  not  to  be  regarded  as 
merely  passive  and  unconscious.  It  is  rather  found  to  be 
endowed  with  spontaneity  and  consciousness,  and  this 
furtHf  implies  personality.  An  impersonal  spirit  is  a  con- 
tradiction, and  an  unconscious  intelligence  is  impossible. 
The  rational  unities  in  the  human  mind  and  in  nature  postu- 
late a  higher  unity,  which  is  properly  identified  with  the 
divine  being,  the  reality  of  whose  existence  has  been  estab- 
lished by  former  proofs. 


1  i 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS:    CAUSATION,  AND  THE  PROOF 
FROM  COSMIC  ORIGIN. 

Contents. 

The  Principle  of  Causation.— The  Basis  of  Theistic  Proofs.— De- 
fective Theoriej.— Not  merely  Invariable  Succession.— Nor  all  Concomi- 
tant Antecedent  Circumstances.— Nor  merely  the  Mental  Law  of  the 
Conditioned.-Nor  only  a  Category  of  the  Understanding.— Nor  simply 
Inscrutable  Force.— Nor  Volitional  Agency  alone.— True  Doctrine.— 
An  a  priori  Rule  of  the  Mind.— Connection  between  Cause  and  Effect 
necessary.— Includes  Efficiency.— Also  sufficient  Reason.— Rests  on  an 
Uncaused  Cause.— Four  Phases  of  Causal  Proof.— That  for  a  First 
Cause—Aitiological  Proo'  -The  Problem—The  entire  Universe  in  its 
Totality.— Solved  by  the  Principle  of  Causality.— The  Universe  not 
necessarily  Infinite  and  Eternal.— Hence  may  be  Finite  and  Contin- 
gent-Infinite Regress  untenable.— Reasons.— The  Theistic  Postulate 
needed.— God  the  Uncaused  Cause.— And  the  Abiding  Ground. 

LiTERATins. 

Flint's  Theism,  Chap.  IV.— Watts'  Reign  of  Causality.— Kzttt'$ 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason:  Transcendental  Dialectic,  Book  II.,  Chap. 
II.— Diman's  The  Theistic  Argumtnt,  Chap.  III.— Dabney's  Theology, 
Chap.  II.— Hodge's  Systematic  Theology,  Vol.  I.,  Part  I.,  Chap  II.— 
Thornwell's.  Collected  Writings.  Vol.  I.,  Chap.  II.— Shedd's  Dogmatic 
Theology,  Vol.  I..  Div.  III.,  Chap.  Li-Foster's  Systematic  Theology. 
Part  II.,  Chap.  I.,  2.— Miley's  Systematic  Theology,  Part  I.,  Chap. 
II.,  a.— Fisher's  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief.  Chap  II  — 
Martineau's  A  Study  of  Religion.  Vol.  I.,  Book  II.,  Chap.  I.-Pressense's 
Ortgtns,  Book  II.,  Chap.  I.— Lindsay's  Recent  Advances  in  the  Theistic 
Philosophy  of  Religion.  Chap.  Vl.-Orr's  Christian  yiew  of  God  and 
the  World.  Chap.  III.,  a.— Fraser's  Philosophy  of  Theism.  Vol.  II., 
Chap.  III.— Stirling's  Philosophy  and  Theology.  C'.^ps.  VII.,  VIII.— 
Conder's  Basis  of  Faith.  Chap.  Il.-Schurman's  L  ief  in  God  Chap. 
IV.— Fiskc's  Cosmic  Philosophy,  Vol.  II.,  Part  III.,  Chap  III.— 
Knight's  Aspects  of  Theism.  Chap.  VII.— Ebrard's  Apologetics.  Vol.  I., 
Chap.  II,,  Sec.  ge.-Hamilton's  Metaphysics,  Chap.  XXX.— Mill's  Sys- 
tem of  Logic.  Book  III.,  Chaps.  V.,  Vl.-Spencer's  First  Principles— 
Kaftan  s  The  Truth  of  the  Christian  Religion.  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  I. 

FOUR  chapters  have  been  devoted  to  as  many  branches 
of  the  psychical  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God.    In 
all  aspects  of  these  proofs  the  materials  of  reasoning  lie  in 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


317 


the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  The  self-evidencing 
nature  of  the  bel'  f  in  God,  the  inference  irom  the  idea  of 
a  necessarily  exigent  being,  the  import  of  the  notion  of 
the  infinite,  and  the  significance  of  the  principle  of  human 
intelligence  itielf,  have  yielded  certain  important  theistic 
results  which  we  now  carry  forward  with  us,  as  we  take 
up  the  second  main  class  of  proofs  for  the  reality  of  the 
divine  existence.  The  proofs  now  to  be  considered  are 
all  based  on  the  principle  of  causation  broadly  viewed  and 
rightly  interpreted  in  relation  to  the  cosmos,  and  it  is  in 
this  class  that  some  of  the  most  cogent  theistic  proofs  are 
to  be  found. 


I.  Defective  Views  of  the  Principle  of  Causation.    §  76. 

I.  As  the  principle  of  causation  underlies,  in  some  way, 
all  forms  of  the  proofs  now  to  be  expounded,  a  clear  under- 
standing of  this  important  principle  is  necessary  at  the 
outset.  How  far  the  theistic  inference  depends  upon  any 
particular  doctrine  of  causation,  or  whether  that  inference 
is  really  independent  of  any  definite  view  of  the  causal 
relation,  are  questions  of  some  importance  in  theistic  dis- 
cussion. While  we  r^-''-  not  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the 
validity  of  the  theis  "nee  is  conditioned  upon  a  sound 

metaphysic  of  causal.  may  be  sure  that  a  correct  doc- 

trine of  causation  maKCS  the  basis  of  the  inference  more 
secure.  Hence,  some  exposition  of  causation  must  first  be 
made,  and  certain  defective  views  of  the  causal  relation 
must  be  set  aside  by  a  brief  critical  statement. 

Few  questions  in  philosophy  have  given  rise  to  more 
debate  than  that  of  causality.  It  has  been  discussed  at  great 
length  alike  in  its  psvchological  and  ontological  aspects. 
The  question  as  to  -iher  we  arrive  at  the  idea  by  an 
a  priori  method,  or  by  an  a  posteriori  process,  has  Ijcen  earn- 
estly debated,  and  the  -oblem  of  the  real  connection  between 
things  which  stand  i'    ihe  causal  relation  has  been  much 


\\\ 


318 


APOLOGETICS. 


discussed.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  doctrine  of  causation 
held  will  largely  give  color  to  the  type  of  philosophy  adopted. 
2.  The  cruder  types  of  empiricism  make  causation  consist 
merely  in  the  uniform  succession  of  physical  phenomena. 
The  invariable  antecedent  is  the  cause,  and  the  invariable 
consequent  is  the  effect,  in  the  order  of  changes  which  take 
place.  The  a  priori  factor  is  denied  to  the  idea,  and  the 
feature  of  necessary  connection  is  not  admitted  to  have  a 
place  in  the  causal  relation.  The  sphere  of  causation  is  the 
mere  sequence  of  physical  phenomena,  and  the  idea  of 
causality  is  obtained  in  a  purely  empirical  way. 

This  theory  has  had  its  advocates  in  all  ages.  The  Greek 
sensationalists  and  sceptics  first  sounded  its  note.  Mate- 
rialists cannot  consistently  hold  any  other  view,  nor  can 
they  admit  any  other  efficiency  than  that  of  m  'unical 
energy.  Hume  regards  the  idea  of  cause  as  the  .csult  of 
custom,  or  association  of  things  together  in  frequent  suc- 
cession. Brown,  in  nearly  the  same  way,  looks  upon  causa- 
tion PS  the  product  of  habit,  or  of  an  induction  from  experi- 
ence on  the  basis  of  association.  And  empiricists  generally 
must  discover  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  causation  in 
experience,  and  they  cannot  consistently  assert  that  there 
is  any  necessary  relation  between  cause  and  effect. 

This  explanation  of  the  causal  relation  is  far  from  ade- 
quate. The  idea  of  causation  involves  a  great  deal  more 
than  mere  observed  succession,  for  we  Oi'ten  observe 
invariable  succession  when  we  never  think  of  predicating 
causation.  We  do  not  think  of  saying  that  day  is  the  cause 
of  night,  or  that  night  is  the  cause  of  day,  though  they 
succeed  each  other  with  incessant  regularity.  But  we  almost 
instinctively  say  that  a  spark  applied  to  gunpowder  produces 
an  explosion,  or  that  a  blow  on  the  head  causes  death,  when 
we  observe  only  single  cases  of  this  nature.  Observed  suc- 
cession does  not  account  for  the  idea  of  causation,  nor  is 
it  a  proper  explanation  of  the  real  connection  between  cause 
and  effect. 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


319 


Not  only  is  the  fact  of  the  necessary  connection  between 

cause  and  effect  not  accounted  for  by  this  theory,  but  the 

quaHty  of  efficiency  associated  with  the  fact  of  causation  is 

not  properly  explained.    This  quality  is  of  the  very  essence 

of  causation,  and  the  mere  sequence  of  events,  no  matter 

how  invariable,  cannot  alone  supply  it.    Yet  consciousness 

instinctively  discovers  the  quality  of  power  or  efficiency  in 

the  very  conception  of  causation.    In  a  word,  the  dynamical 

aspects  of  causality  must  be  taken  into  account,  and  this 

involves  more  than  sequence,  no  matter  how  invariable  that 

may  be.    That  this  is  the  case  is  really  confessed  by  Locke, 

who  is  usually  regarded  as  an  empiricist.    He  says,  in  effect, 

that  the  senses  do  not  make  known  to  us  the  features  of 

necessity  and  efficiency,  yet  we  must  suppose  that  these 

features  do  pertain  to  events  that  stand  in  the  causal  relation 

to  each  other.     Now,  this  supposition,  which  Locke  says 

the  mind  must  make,  is  not  the  result  of  habit  or  association, 

but  the  offspring  of  the  mind  itself.    And  Spencer,  in  his 

attempt  to  account  for  the  factor  of  necessity  by  the  law 

of  heredity,  and  the  fact  of  efficiency  by  the  hypothesis  of 

an  inscrutable  force,  also  makes  an  incidental  confession 

of  the  insufficiency  of  this  theory.     It  may,  therefore,  be 

rejected. 

3.  A  second  theory  of  causation  is  conn^aed  with  the 
name  of  John  Stuart  Mill.  Mill's  doctrine  is  an  enlarged 
edition  of  the  empirical  theory.  He  denies  the  a  priori 
factor  in  causation,  and  falls  back  on  experience  for  the 
origin  of  the  idea  of  cause  and  effect.  But  Mill  does  not 
regard  any  single  immediate  antecedent  of  an  event  as  its 
cause.  His  conception  of  cause  includes  all  the  antecedent 
concomitant  circumstances  that  are  related  to  the  event.  All 
that  goes  before,  and  has  anything  to  do  with  the  production 
of  any  event,  is  the  cause  of  that  event.  Mill  holds  that 
this  is  true  alike  of  physical  and  mental  sequences;  and 
his  theory  thus  becomes  mechanism  in  the  former,  and 
determinism  in  the  latter,  sphere.     The  whole  problem  of 


-:  it 


'  B'1 


f 


320 


APOLOGETICS. 


cause  and  effect  is  solved  only  when  we  consider  the  complex 
antecedent  circumstances  of  any  event,  so  that  any  attempt 
to  reason  to  a  first  cause  is  needless,  if  not  invalid.  Then 
the  features  of  necessity  and  efficiency,  according  to  Mill, 
are  explained  on  the  usual  ground  of  repetition,  habit  and 
association.  Wundt  practically  agrees  with  Mill  in  this 
explanation. 

Interesting  as  this  explanation  is,  it  can  hardly  be  held 
to  be  adequate.  On  the  psychological  side  it  does  not  do 
justice  to  the  a  priori  nature  of  the  idea  of  causation.  Then, 
it  makes  it  practically  impossible  to  obtain  a  clear  and  com- 
plete view  of  the  cause  of  anything,  for  it  would  require 
virtual  omniscience  to  ascertain  all  the  concomitant  circum- 
stances which  make  up  the  cause  of  any  event.  In  addition, 
its  explanation  of  necessity  and  efficiency  as  associated  with 
causation  is  entirely  defective,  since  it  is  made  on  an  em- 
pirical basis.  We  insist  that  any  doctrine  of  causation 
which  is  adequate  must  do  full  justice  to  these  two  essential 
features  of  causality. 

4.  A  third  explanation  of  the  causal  relation,  which  views 
it  mainly  on  its  psychological  side,  is  that  of  Hamilton.  In 
some  respects,  Hamilton's  doctrine  is  like  that  of  Mill,  and 
yet  there  are  features  in  which  they  widely  differ.  In  many 
ways  Hamilton's  doctrine  is  unique,  and  merits  separate 
consideration.  His  somewhat  peculiar  theory  of  the  idea 
of  cause  and  eflfect  is  the  outcome  of  his  philosophy  of  the 
conditioned  and  unconditioned.  The  unconditioned  is  that 
whicli  is  entire'^  independent  of  anything  else  for  its  exist- 
ence and  continuance.  As  such,  when  viewed  in  relation 
to  human  cognition,  it  is  alike  inconceivable  and  incog- 
noscible.  The  infinite  and  absolute  are  two  aspects  of  the 
unconditioned.  The  infinite  is  the  unconditionally  un- 
limited, and  the  absolute  is  the  unconditionally  limited. 
Both  are  in  contrast  with  the  conditioned,  and  both  are  to 
be  regarded  as  the  negative  of  the  limited  or  conditioned, 
which  is  both  conceivable  and  knowabie. 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


321 


The  doctrine  of  causation  arises  in  this  connection. 
Hamilton  says  that  we  cannot  conceive  of  an  absolute  com- 
mencement or  of  an  absolute  non-commencement,  such  as 
change,  succession  and  causality  imply.  Some  explanation 
of  the  causal  relation  in  harmony  with  this  philosophy  of 
the  unconditioned  must  be  given.  This  explanation  is  to 
be  found  only  in  the  sphere  of  the  conditioned,  and  in  the 
mean  between  extremes  which  are  mutually  exclusive.  This 
implies  that  neither  ::n  absolute  commencement  nor  an 
absolute  non-commencement  is  conceivable;  yet  one  of 
them,  on  the  principles  of  contradiction  and  excluded 
middle,  must  be  admitted  to  be  necessary.  Applying  this 
general  teaching  to  the  doctrine  of  causation,  it  implies  that 
we  cannot  conceive  of  an  absolute  beginning,  or  an  absolute 
non-beginning  of  anything  in  the  sphere  of  the  uncon- 
ditioned. Thus  the  idea  of  cause,  which  is  entirely  nega- 
tive, arises.  Its  application  is  confined  to  the  realm  of 
the  conditioned  which  is  conceivable  and  cognizable. 
Causation  thus,  in  a  somewhat  negative  way,  becomes 
the  mental  lazv  of  the  conditioned  wherever  change  takes 
place. 

This  doctrine  is  not  unlike  that  of  Kant.  Hamilton  him- 
self acknowledges  this  in  a  measure.  On  the  subjective  side, 
Kant  makes  causation  one  of  the  categories  of  the  under- 
standing. As  such  it  is  a  regulutivc  principle,  according  to 
which  the  manifold  phenomena  of  sense  perception  are 
unified  in  cognition.  The  kinship  of  Kant  and  Hamilton 
thus  appears.  Hamilton's  unconditioned  is  like  Kant's 
thing  in  itself,  and  Hamilton's  conditioned  resembles  Kant's 
phenomena.  The  sphere  of  the  conditioned,  according  to 
Hamilton,  and  the  realm  of  phenomena,  according  to  Kant, 
is  the  area  of  experience.  And  to  this  region  causation 
belongs.  Hamilton  makes  it  the  mental  laxv  of  the  con- 
ditioned, Kant  makes  it  a  category  of  the  understanding  in 
relation  to  phenomena.  In  both  cases  its  a  priori  nature  is 
maintained,  but  in  neither  case  has  the  law  of  causation 
at 


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322 


APOLOGETICS. 


Tiny    /alid   application   beyond   the   conditioned   and   the 
phenomenal. 

Both  phases  of  this  doctrine  are  much  better  than  those 
empirical  theories  which  deny  the  a  priori  factor  in  causa- 
tion. Yet  they  are  both  defective.  Hamilton's  distinction 
between  the  conditioned  and  the  unconditioned,  and  Kant's 
separation  between  noumena  and  phenomena  are  both  too 
rigid.  Both  are  in  error  in  placing  the  world  of  realities 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  principle  of  causation.  Both  vir- 
tually close  the  door  against  the  postulate  of  a  cause  which 
lies  outside  the  line  of  phenomenal  or  conditioned  sequences, 
and  this  comes  perilously  near  casting  us  adrift  on  the  shore- 
less ocean  of  the  infinite  regress  of  cause  and  effect.  Hamil- 
ton errs  in  supposng  that  the  causal  judgment  arises  from 
the  impotency  of  the  mind  in  relation  to  apparent  contra- 
dictories. Kant  also  errs  in  confining  the  principle  of  causa- 
tion so  rigidly  to  the  realm  of  phenomena. 

5.  A  fourth  type  of  causation  brings  Spencer  into  view. 
Speaking  generally,  Spencer  is  an  empiricist  in  his  psy- 
chology, yet  in  his  ontology  he  makes  a  great  deal  of  force 
and  its  persistence.  On  this  ground  he  has  a  place  for  an 
efficiency,  which,  however,  is  mechanical;  but  out  of  the 
fact  of  force,  Spencer's  doctrine  of  causation  arises.  Ac- 
cording t(  I  iiis  view,  all  phenomenal  changes  are  the  product 
of  a  power  wliich  is  infinite  and  inscrutable,  and  by  means 
of  this  postulate  he  proposes  to  harmonize  science  and 
religion.  As  to  this  inscrutable  and  infi  ite  energy  which 
Mes  behind  phenomena,  we  only  know  that  it  is,  but  not 
what  it  is.  This,  again,  is  almost  like  Hamilton's  uncon- 
ditioned, and  Kant's  thing  in  itself.  This  inscrutable  energy 
is  the  ground  for  all  change  in  the  universe,  and  it  supplies 
the  root  of  the  notion  of  cause.  But  when  Spencer  expounds 
th«  principle  of  causation,  he  moves  almost  exclusively  in 
the  i>!»^*hway  of  empiricism. 

This  .-'  not  a  sufficient  account  of  causation.  Spencer 
confesses  tlwt  tiiere  is  an  infinite  energj'  which  is  the  ground 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


333 


m 


of  all  phenomenal  change  in  the  universe.  But  this  non- 
phenomenal  ground  is  not  in  the  sequence  of  the  phenomenal, 
and  this  is  really  inconsistent  with  Spencer's  empiricism. 
Then,  at  most,  the  energy  in  Spencer's  doctrine  is  physical 
and  mechanical,  and  it  gives  no  proper  place  for  dependent 
second  causes  with  finite  efficiency.  There  is  only  one 
cause,  and  that  is  mechanical,  and  the  observed  sequences 
of  phenomena  are  devoid  of  any  dependent  efficiency. 
Spencer's  system,  therefore,  is  mechanical  monism,  which 
makes  a  true  doctrine  of  causation  really  impossible.  Then, 
Spencer's  attempts  to  explain  the  feature  of  necessity  in 
the  causal  relation  are  unsatisfactory.  He  makes  it  arise 
from  the  results  of  habit  and  association,  working  through 
long  ages,  and  handed  down  by  heredity  from  one  genera- 
tion to  another.  As  heredity  can  originate  nothing,  the 
diff.culty  of  producing  the  factor  of  necessity  by  habit  or 
custom  is  very  great.  Spencer's  theory  is  insufficient,  and 
has  in  it  a  strong  tendency  towards  materialism,  mechanism 
and  monism. 

6.  A  fifth  theory  of  causation  is  quite  different  from 
those  already  noted.  It  has  an  able  advocate  in  Maine  De 
Biran.  This  theory  deals  almost  exclusively  with  the  psy- 
chological aspects  of  the  problem.  According  to  this  view, 
the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  causation  is  found  in  man's  con- 
scious volitional  agency.  Will  is  the  only  efficient  cause. 
In  our  conscious  free  agency  we  realize  the  fact  of  efficiency 
in  certain  changes  in  ^ur  experience.  Then,  we  instinc- 
tively postulate  efficiency  when  we  observe  change  in  the 
world  about  us.  Will  thus  becomes  the  type  of  causa- 
tion. 

So  far  as  the  psychical  explanation  of  the  idea  of  efficiency 
is  concerned,  there  is  much  that  is  true  in  this  theory.  Still, 
even  here  we  must  be  careful  not  to  give  the  law  of  causality 
an  entirely  experimental  origin,  for  we  must  not  forget 
that  the  mind  itself,  even  in  such  cases,  provides  the  a  priori 
rule,  according  to  which  events  that  sustain  the  causal 


m 


324 


APOLOGETICS. 


relation  in  our  experience  are  held  together.  But  this 
theory  deals  only  with  the  subjective  aspects  of  causation. 
The  question  still  remains  as  to  how  things  in  the  objective 
sphere  which  are  construed  under  the  causal  relation  are 
really  connected  with  each  other.  While  it  may  be  per- 
fectly true  that  we  get  our  first  impression  of  efficiency  from 
our  own  volitional  agency,  we  may  yet  have  to  inquire 
concerning  the  way  in  which  things  in  the  outward  world, 
which  we  call  cause  and  effect,  are  related.  This  inquiry 
is  necessary  to  unfold  clearly  to  us  what  the  principle  of 
causality  really  is,  and  to  make  it  plain  that  we  are  justified 
in  applying  the  causal  judgment  to  anything  beyond  the 
sequences  of  psychical  phenomena.  It  is  doubtful  if  any 
merely  subjective  explanation  of  causation,  or  even  of  the 
element  of  efficiency  in  it,  is  sufficient  to  justify  an  inference 
from  the  order  of  sequences  in  the  cosmos  to  a  cause  of 
these  sequences  which  lies  outside  the  cosmos  of  experience. 
And  while  Biran's  theory  shows  that  the  physical  sequences 
may  be  effected  by  a  spiritual  cause,  in  the  influence  of  will 
on  members  ^he  body,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  a 
deeper  phiior  uhy  of  causality  is  not  needed  to  provide  a 
valid  objective  ground  for  Flint's  forceful  reasoning  that 
the  universe  is  an  effect  whose  cause  is  God.  In  a  word, 
the  principle  of  causality  requires  an  objective  as  well  as 
a  subjective  exposition,  for  it  has  its  ontology  as  well  as 
its  psychology. 


II.  The  True  Doctrine  of  Causation.    §  yy. 

The  exposition  of  defective  views  in  the  foregoing  section 
makes  it  now  possible  to  state  the  true  doctrine  of  causation 
quite  briefly  in  this  section.  In  making  this  statement,  care 
must  be  taken  to  give  it  its  proper  scope,  and  to  include  all 
its  constituent  elements.  Five  important  particulars  com- 
plete the  analysis. 

I.  As  in  the  mind,  the  principle  of  causation  is  a  priori 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


325 


in  its  nature.  On  its  subjective  side,  causality  is  a  funda- 
mental law  of  thought.  This  means  that  it  does  not  arise 
in  the  mind  from  experience,  but  is  given  by  the  mind 
itself  to  experience.  On  the  psychological  side,  therefore, 
empiricism  does  not  go  to  the  root  of  the  problem  of  causa- 
tion ;  for  while  experience  may  be  the  occasion  upon  which 
this  fundamental  law  of  thought  is  elicited  into  conscious- 
ness, yet  it  is  not  the  source  whence  it  springs.  Hence, 
neither  in  its  psychological  nature  or  origin  is  the  principle 
of  causation  empirical.  Its  true  rational  and  a  priori  nature 
must  not  be  forgotten.  It  is  at  root  one  of  those  a  priori 
rules  of  the  spontaneity  of  the  human  mind,  according  to 
which  the  experience  in  question  is  regfulated. 

2.  As  between  things,  the  causal  bond  is  necessary,  not 
contingent.  On  its  objective  side,  causality  finds  the  events 
which  are  construed  under  the  causal  relation  bound 
together  by  an  inward  bond.  This  means  that  mere  suc- 
cession, no  matter  how  invariable,  is  not  the  deepest  reality 
in  causation;  but  that  wherever  we  construe  events  in  the 
causal  relation,  we  presuppose  an  inner  objective  tie  between 
them.  This  feature  of  necessity  belongs  inherently  to  the 
principle  of  causation,  for  we  instinctively  associate  it  with 
the  causal  judgment,  whenever  that  judgment  is  made. 
Certain  events  may  be  observed  in  frequent  succession,  and 
yet  the  fact  of  necessity  may  not  be  connected  with  their 
sequence ;  but  whenever  they  are  construed  under  the  prin- 
ciple of  causality,  the  feature  of  necessity  is  implied  in  that 
very  construction.  The  causal  relation,  therefore,  has 
objective  reality. 

3.  As  in  the  mind,  and  as  between  things,  the  principle 
of  causality  implies  power  or  efUciency.  Both  objectively 
and  subjectively,  efficiency  is  an  essential  factor  in  causation. 
Biran,  in  his  idea  of  the  efficiency  of  the  will,  gives  the 
hint  of  this  on  the  subjective  side;  and  on  the  objective 
side,  we  instinctively  assume  that  there  is  some  power  in 
that  which  is  a  cause,  such  as  is  .lOt  asserted  of  what  may 


iiHl 


326 


APOLOGETICS. 


i'l 


be  merely  antecedent.  Even  Locke,  who  is  so  much  of  an 
empiricist,  associates  the  ideas  of  power  and  of  cause  very 
intimately.  And  both  technical  and  applied  science  proceed 
upon  the  assumption  of  real  efficiency  in  the  causal  relation. 
It  is  thus  evident  that  succession  is  not  all  there  is  in  that 
relation.  Power,  agency  or  efficiency  is  the  very  essence  of 
causality.    If  that  be  removed,  causality  is  destroyed. 

4-  As  in  the  mind  and  as  between  things,  causation 
implies  the  fact  of  sufficient  reason  or  adequate  ground. 
This  is  a  very  important  aspect  of  causation  in  itself,  and 
especially  in  the  theistic  discussion.  Leibnitz  was  the  first 
to  give  this  principle  definite  form,  though  the  germs  of 
it  are  in  the  Greek  philosophy.  By  some  it  is  separated 
from  causation  almost  entirely,  and  treated  as  a  separate 
principle.  We  incline  to  the  opinion  that  it  is  best  to  discuss 
the  fact  of  sufficient  reason  in  close  connection  with  the 
principle  of  causation.  This  would  make  sufficient  reason 
a  quality  of  the  principle  of  causality,  just  as  necessity  and 
efficiency  are. 

This  feature  of  the  causal  relation  implies  that  there  is 
something  in  every  cause  which  makes  the  effect  which 
follows  it  what  it  is  and  not  otherwise.  There  is  some 
kinship,  therefore,  between  cause  and  effect.  The  cause 
always  contains  a  factor  which  determines  what  the  effect 
will  be.  This  means,  not  merely  that  there  is  power  or 
efficiency  in  the  cause  to  produce  the  effect,  but  that  there 
is  also  an  impulse  which  gives  form  and  direction  to  the 
effect.  In  other  words,  there  is  in  the  cause  the  reason 
which  adequatelv  accounts  for  the  effect  being  just  what 
it  is.  Thus,  there  is  something  in  the  spark  which  produces 
the  explosion  of  the  gunpowder  rather  than  its  fusion.  This 
is  an  aspect  of  the  principle  of  causation  of  great  value  in 
the  exposition  of  some  of  the  theistic  proofs. 

5.  In  addition  to  all  this,  the  principle  of  causation  leads 
us  to  posit  a  cause  which  is  not  also  an  effect.  In  the  last 
analysis,  causality  postulates  an  uncaused  cause.     This  is 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


3*7. 


a  f^ature  of  causation  sometimes  overlooked.  Some  ex- 
positors of  the  philosophy  of  causation  are  content  to  think 
only  of  sequence  or  regress.  But  causation  is  more  than 
sequence,  or  regress  of  cause  and  effect.  Even  an  infinite 
regress  does  not  satisfy  the  principle  of  causation.  That 
principle  forbids  such  a  regress  and  demands  a  resting- 
place.  Causation  thus  requires  a  cause  which  is  not  also 
an  effect  of  an  antecedent  cause.  Only  by  this  supposition 
is  the  logical  demand  of  causation  finally  satisfied. 

6.  In  addition,  causation,  rightly  understood,  requires  us 
to  postulate  a  ground  outside  the  series  of  events  which 
stand  in  the  causal  relation,  in  order  to  its  complete  inter- 
pretation. Any  one  event  in  the  series  does  not  in  itself 
contain  all  that  tlie  principle  of  causation  implies.  That 
which  effects  the  passage  from  one  event  in  the  series  to 
another  must  be  taken  into  account.  A  ground  to  effect 
the  change  from  one  stage  to  another  in  the  series  must 
be  provided.  Change  implies  a  great  deal  more  than 
sequence.  It  implies  an  efficiency,  and  a  sufficient  reason 
to  effect  it,  and  to  give  it  its  particular  form.  This  ground 
for  change,  this  agency  which  effects  the  passage  from  one 
event  to  another  in  the  series,  must  lie  outside  the  series 
itself.  Aristotle's  hypothesis  of  a  first  mover,  who  himself 
is  unmoved,  illustrates  this  position,  which  we  take  to  be 
of  vital  importance  in  the  doctrine  of  causation.  Therefore, 
we  conclude  that,  in  the  last  analysis,  the  basis  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  causality  is  an  uncaused  cause,  which  has  its  ground 
outside  the  causal  series. 

III.  Proof  from  a  First  Cause:  The  Problem.    §  78. 

I.  The  principle  of  causation  just  expounded  forms  the 
basis  of  four  phases  of  theistic  proof.  The  first  is  the  proof 
based  on  the  logical  demand  for  a  first  cause  of  the  universe ; 
the  second  consists  in  the  reasonings  which  grew  o:it  of 
certain  specific  facts  in  the  cosmos;    the  third  is  derived 


MOBi 


3^-8 


APOLOGETICS. 


from  the  marks  of  order  to  be  seen  everywhere  in  the  uni- 
verse; and  the  fourth  is  the  inference  which  is  justified 
by  the  evidences  of  design  which  abound  in  the  world.  In 
the  older  natural  theology,  three  of  these  were  included 
under  the  cosmological  proof  for  the  existence  of  God. 
But  now  more  careful  distinctions  are  made  among  these 
four  phases  of  the  causal  proofs.  The  first  may  be  called 
the  aitiologicd  proof,  the  second  the  cosmological,  the  third 
the  eutaxiologicd,  and  the  fourth  the  teleological.  They  all 
involve  certain  applications  of  the  principle  of  causality  to 
various  problems  which  the  universe  presents  for  rational 
solution.  In  this  chapter  the  proof  for  the  reality  of  the 
divine  existence  founded  on  the  reasonings  for  a  first  cause 
of  the  universe  of  existing  things  is  discussed. 

2.  The  problem  presented  is  a  vast  one,  yet  it  can  be 
stated  in  a  few  sentences.     That  problem  is  the  existing 
universe  regarded  in  its  totality.     This  includes  the  sum 
total  of  all  finite  things  in  the  cosmos.     This  totality  of 
finite  things  is  viewed  as  existing  not  necessarily,  but  con- 
tingently.    The  materials  of  reasoning  from  which  this 
proof  proceeds  consists  in  the  sum  of  '^''pendent  existing 
things  regarded  as  contingent.     This  includes  the  whole 
vast  frame  of  the  material  universe,  in  all  its  complexity 
and  immensity.    It  embraces  suns  and  planets,  moons  and 
stars,  in  all  their  magnitude  and  grandeur,  and  viewed  in 
their  totality  as  a  mighty  system.     In  addition,  the  system 
of  natural  laws  involved  in  the  universe,  viewed  in  all  their 
complex  totality,  has  also  to  be  taken  into  account  in  making 
up  the  problem.    And,  further,  all  the  complex  forces  and 
agencies  operative  throughout  the  vast  universe  constitute 
an  additional  element  in  the  problem.     And  we  must  not 
omit  to  take  into  actount  all  the  various  grades  of  being 
in  the  universe,  from  the  material  and  inorganic  up  to  the 
sentient  and  spiritual.     Even  men  and  angels,  regarded  as 
part  of  finite  existing  things,  are  a  part  of  the  problem 
presented  by  the  universe  in  its  totality.    This  vast  complex 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


3*9 


of  existing  things,  in  its  aggregate,  is  the  problem  which 
presents  itself  for  solution. 

With  this  vast  problem  before  us,  we  have  now  to  make 
an  application  of  the  principle  of  causation  to  it  in  its 
totality.  That  something  has  always  existed  must  be  as- 
sumed. If  the  universe  exists  contingently,  we  may  think 
of  it  as  not  always  existing.  And  if  the  universe  be  finite, 
no  matter  how  vast,  it  is  not  necessarily  self-existent.  We 
do  not  need  to  settle  the  question  of  the  original  condition 
of  the  universe  just  when  it  began  to  be.  It  is  simply  the 
fact  of  its  beginning  that  has  to  be  considered.  If  it  had 
a  beginning,  how  came  it  to  be?  It  could  not  have  origi- 
nated itself.  What  was  its  first  cause?  What  was  its 
uncaused  cause?  Then,  what  is  the  ground  of  all  the 
changes  which  take  place  in  it?  Is  this  ground  within  or 
without  the  series  of  changes? 

3.  This  proof  is  sometimes  called  the  cosmological  argu- 
ment, but  it  is  better  to  term  it  the  aitiological.  Many 
writers  have  presented  it  in  varying  forms.  Aristotle  and 
Cicero  both  have  it.  The  former  argues  from  the  fact  of 
motion  in  the  universe.  Motion  is  a  fact,  and  it  presup- 
poses, in  the  last  analysis,  a  first  mover,  who  himself  is 
unmoved,  though  the  cause  of  all  motion.  One  of  the 
Cartesian  proofs  reasons  from  the  universe  as  contingently 
existing,  to  God  as  necessarily  existent  as  its  first  cause. 
In  Clarke's  celebrated  argument  certain  aspects  of  this  proof 
appear.  Some  writers  confuse  this  proof  with  that  from 
order,  and  expound  it  under  the  title  of  the  cosmological 
proof.  It  is  better  to  confine  it  strictly  to  the  one  fact  of 
an  uncaused  cause  of  the  universe  as  a  whole.  This  is  the 
aitiological  proof  in  its  simplest  terms.  Based  on  the  logical 
demand  of  causation  for  a  cause  which  is  not  also  an  effect, 
it  postulates  God,  for  the  solution  of  the  origin  of  the  uni- 
verse as  contingently  existing.  Flint  gives  fine  scope  to 
this  proof  when  he  speaks  of  the  universe  being  an  effect 
of  which  God  is  the  cause.    The  universe  of  contingently 


it 


330 


APOLOGETICS. 


existing  finite  things,  taken  in  their  complete  totality,  is 
the  problem  to  be  solved.  How  is  its  origin  to  be  accounted 
for? 


IV.  The  Proof  from  a  First  Cause:  The  Solution.    §  79. 

There  are  really  only  two  possible  solutions  of  the 
problem.  One  is  to  suppose  that  the  universe  is  eternal 
and  self-contained;  the  other  is  that  it  had  a  beginning 
and  is  dependent.  In  the  former  case,  the  present  condition 
of  the  universe  is  due  to  an  infinite  regression  of  causes 
and  eflfects  moving  ceaselessly  on.  In  the  latter,  the  uni- 
verse has  its  origin  in  a  first  cause,  and  its  present  state  is 
grounded  upon  this  cause  as  its  abiding  basis.  These  two 
alternatives  must  be  briefly  considered  in  their  contrasts. 

I.  The  theory  of  the  eternity  of  the  universe,  and  of  the 
infinite  regress  of  causes  and  effects  in  it,  must  be  first 
examined.  This  theory,  in  assuming  the  eternity  of  the 
tmiverse  in  some  form,  takes  for  granted  the  very  question 
in  debate.  Is  the  universe  eternal?  Does  it  exist  neces- 
sarily? 

As  to  the  ceaseless  changes  which  are  constantly  taking 
place  in  the  universe,  it  is  evident  that  they  are  not  eternal, 
but  originated  by  some  cause.  Then,  the  various  orderly 
combinations  of  things  in  the  universe  are  also  temporal, 
and  require  a  cause  to  account  for  their  origin.  This  leaves 
the  material  basis  of  the  universe  as  the  only  apparently 
eternal  factor  in  it.  But  is  matter  eternal  ?  The  first  thing 
to  do,  in  answering  this  question,  is  to  decide  what  matter 
is.  What  is  the  atom  of  matter?  Is  matter  only  the  per- 
manent possibility  of  sensations,  as  Mill  says?  Is  the  atom 
simply  a  point  or  centre  of  energy,  as  Faraday  suggested? 
Is  matter  non-corporeal,  as  the  idealists  assert  ?  Is  the  atom, 
after  all,  a  manufactured  article,  as  Herschel  intimated? 
Does  the  atom  bear  the  marks  of  supernatural  agency,  as 
Clerk  Maxwell  thinks? 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


331 


In  general,  it  may  safely  be  said  that  the  tendency  of 
many  physicists  is  towards  the  conclusion  that  matter,  in 
its  constitution,  does  not  possess  those  elements  of  per- 
manency which  the  hypothesis  of  its  eternity  implies.  Lord 
Kelvin's  vortex-atom  theory  of  matter  requires  a  cause  to 
account  for  the  rotatory  motion  which  it  implies ;  and  his 
hypothesis  of  the  gradual  dissipation  of  heat  in  the  universe, 
implies  that  it  is  not  in  a  condition  of  permanency  such  as 
its  eternity  would  require.  Hence,  just  in  proportion  as 
the  permanency  of  the  universe,  or  of  the  material  basis 
of  it,  may  be  doubted,  so  its  eternity  may  be  called  in 
question. 

The  same  conclusion  may  be  deduced  from  the  nature 
of  the  case.  Unless  the  universe  be  infinite  in  extent,  it  is 
not  necessarily  eternal  as  to  time;  for  if  it  be  finite  in  one 
respect,  it  is  likely  finite  in  the  other.  We  are  inclined  to 
think  that  its  infinity  as  to  space  can  never  be  proved. 
Then,  if  it  be  neither  infinite  in  regard  to  space,  no;  Infinite 
in  relation  to  time,  it  is  not  likely  necessarily  existent.  And 
unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  universe  has  in  it  the  ele- 
ments of  permanency  and  self-sufiiciency,  it  can  hardly  be 
said  to  have  self-existence  and  eternity.  Its  finitude  and 
consequent  contingency  seem  the  more  reasonable  conten- 
tions. This  leaves  the  universe  open  for  the  application 
of  the  principle  of  causality  to  it,  in  the  form  of  an  inquiry 
for  its  first  cause  and  abiding  ground. 

2.  The  hypothesis  of  all  infinite  regress  of  events  in  the 
universe  cai'sally  related,  is  the  more  popular  form  in  which 
the  theory  of  the  universe  which  rejects  a  first  cause  is 
usually  presented.  The  universe,  as  it  exists  in  its  totality 
now,  is  the  effect  of  the  i  iverse  as  it  was  the  preceding 
moment;  and  the  univfer?  in  that  moment  is  the  eflfect  of 
it  as  it  existed  in  a  still  er  ;er  moment,  and  so  on  infinitely. 
In  the  regression  of  the  causal  series  there  is  no  halting 
place,  and  the  universe  at  any  given  time  is  adequately 
explained  when  its  successive  changes  are  construed  in 


:4 

•II 


_ 


1}  ( 


ir 


' 


332 


APOLOGETICS. 


accordance  with  the  principle  of  this  infinite  causal  regress. 
Usually  this  regression  is  applied  mainly  to  physical 
sequences;  but  to  be  complete,  it  must  include  all  forms 
of  sequence,  physical,  vital,  mental  and  moral,  in  the  cosmos. 
A  few  critical  remarks  may  show  the  insufficiency  of  this 
endless-chain  scheme. 

First,  it  does  not  satisfy  the  logical  demand  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  causation  for  a  ground  of  the  causal  series.  That 
demand  calls  for  an  uncaused  cause,  and  it  is  not  satisfied 
with  the  oflFer  of  an  infinite  regress,  no  matter  how  long 
continued  that  may  be.  Causation  means  more  than  that 
every  change  must  have  a  proper  cause.  It  also  requires 
that  a  ground  which  is  unchanging  must  be  provided  for 
the  fact  of  change.  After  the  regression  has  been  pursued 
a  million  stages  backward,  the  demand  of  causation  for  an 
uncaused  cause,  and  an  unchanging  ground,  is  still  unsat- 
isfied and  as  loud  as  ever. 

Secondly,  the  hypothesis  of  infinite  regress  gives  no  ac- 
count of  the  beginning  of  the  series  of  changes.  It  rather 
assumes  that  it  had  no  beginning.  It  gives  no  ground  for 
believing  that  this  series  exists  contingently.  It  rather 
assumes  that  it  exists  necessarily.  The  hypothesis  in  ques- 
tion gives  no  place  for  a  beginning  of  the  causal  series. 
But  if  the  universe  exists  contingently  because  finite,  and 
if  it  be  not  necessarily  eternal,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
the  causal  series  is  not  necessarily  eternal.  This  means  that 
it,  in  all  probability,  had  a  beginning.  This  is  the  very 
thing  which  the  hypothesis  of  infinite  regress  persistently 
denies. 

Thirdly,  even  if  we  admit  that  che  theory  of  infinite 
regress  has  some  plausibility  in  regard  to  purely  physical 
sequences,  it  would  still  have  great  difficulty  to  account  for 
the  sequences  which  appear  in  the  vital,  mental  and  moral 
spheres.  Can  an  infinite  regress  explain  these  sequences? 
Do  we  not  come  to  a  time  when  the  sequences  end  ?  Was 
there  not  a  time  when  life  and  mind  did  not  exist  on  this 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


333 


earth?  If  we  say  that  the  regress  passes  over  into  the 
physical,  then  we  are  on  the  ground  of  the  materialist,  and 
must  prove  that  the  vital  came  from  the  non-vital.  In  this 
way  the  theory  of  an  infinite  regress  breaks  down  entirely, 
if  an  attempt  is  made  to  apply  it  in  a  definite  way  to  every 
phase  of  the  series  of  causes  and  effects. 

Fourthly,  this  theory  at  best  could  only  place  a  cause  at 
the  beginning  of  the  causal  series.  The  first  cause  would 
then  be  merely  the  first  in  the  series  whose  sequences  con- 
tinue afterwards.  It  would  not  lay  any  ground  for  the 
changes  involved  in  the  series,  nor  provide  any  reason  for 
the  movement  of  the  series  in  any  gfiven  direction.  In  a 
word,  the  hypothesis  of  an  infinite  regress,  even  if  a  certain 
sort  of  beginning  in  the  series  were  allowed,  does  not  pro- 
vide an  uncaused  cause,  which  is  also  the  abiding  gfround 
of  the  vv  'lole  series.  From  this  it  is  evident  that  we  would 
be  compelled  to  give  the  universe  a  deistic  construction  on 
this  hypothesis. 

3.  The  true  doctrine  can  now  be  stated  in  very  brief  and 
simple  terms.  The  only  adequate  explanation  of  the  uni- 
verse existing  contingently  in  its  totality  is  the  theistic 
postulate.  This  means  that  the  infinite  and  necessarily 
existent  being,  of  whose  reality  we  have  already  been 
assured  by  previous  reasonings,  is  the  adequate  first  cause 
and  abiding  ground  of  the  universe,  with  all  its  complex 
changes  and  sequences.  This  provides  an  uncaused  cause 
of  the  universe,  and  thus  fully  accounts  for  its  beginning. 
It  also  provides  an  unchanging  ground  for  all  its  changes, 
and  thus  accounts  for  its  continuance.  This  is  the  theistic 
postulate  as  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  commence- 
ment of  the  universe.  It  also  constitutes  the  principle  of 
the  aitiological  proof  for  tht  existence  of  God. 

4.  This  postulate  fully  satisfies  the  logical  demands  of 
the  principle  of  causation.  The  logical  faculty  rests  content 
with  an  uncaused  cause.  And  the  hypothesis  of  an  absolute 
cause  outside  the  series  of  sequences  in  the  universe  supplies 


334 


APOLOGETICS. 


1 


I 


1 


hf: 


the  element  of  permanency  which  further  satisfies  reason. 
That  it  is  not  one  of  the  series  of  causal  sequences  is  implied 
in  the  supposition  of  an  uncaused  cause,  for  every  event 
in  this  series  may  be,  in  turn,  both  ca  jse  and  effect.  If, 
therefore,  a  cause  which  is  not  also  an  effect  is  assumed, 
we  have  a  cause  which  is  outside  the  series,  and  independent 
of  it,  though  related  to  it.  On  this  cause  the  series  is  de- 
pendent for  its  origin  and  continuance.  It  is,  consequently, 
fully  adequate  to  account  for  all  the  sequences  of  physical, 
vital,  mental  and  moral  events  which  come  to  pass  in  the 
universe  viewed  in  its  totality. 

5.  It  is  important  to  observe  that  it  also  provides  for 
the  profound  doctrine  that  this  uncaused  cause  is  related 
not  only  to  the  origin  of  the  series,  but  also  to  each  factor 
in  the  series.  God,  therefore,  is  not  only  the  eternal  first 
cause  of  the  universe  in  its  totality,  but  he  is  also  its  change- 
less ground,  so  that  he  is  in  intimate  relation  with  the 
universe  in  its  totality  from  moment  to  moment.  As  such 
changeless  ground,  he  is  in  contact  with  each  factor  in  every 
causal  series  in  all  the  complex  activity  of  the  universe,  and 
he  is  as  near  to  it  now  as  when  he  first  brought  it  into 
existence,  as  its  uncaused  cause.  This  is  the  true  theistic 
doctrine.  It  lays  the  ground  for  the  divine  transcendence, 
as  against  pantheism,  for  God  is  outside  the  causal  series. 
It  also  provides  the  basis  for  the  divine  immanence,  as 
against  deism,  for  God  is  in  relation  with  each  stage  in  the 
causal  series  of  changes  through  which  the  universe  passes. 
This  is  the  result  to  which  the  aitiologicai  proof  surely 
brings  us.  God  is  the  uncaused  cause,  and  ever-present 
ground  of  the  universe,  alike  as  to  its  origin  and  continued 
existence. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

« 

THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS:    THE  PROOF  FROM  COSMIC 
PROGRESS. 


Contents. 

Relation  to  the  Previous  Proof.— The  Cosmological  Proof.— Its  Re- 
lation to  other  Causal  Proofs.— The  Principle  of  the  Proof.— Sufficient 
Reason.— Relations  of  Cause  and  Effect. — Kinship,  but  not  necessarily 
Identity. — This  Problem  in  Philosophy.— Descartes. — Guelinx.— Leib- 
nitz.— Spinoza.— Coleridge  quoted. — The  Problem  of  the  Proof. — The 
Universe  in  its  Cosmic  History  and  Progress.— Stages  in  its  History. — 
The  Inorganic  Stage  primal.— The  Organic— The  Sentient. — The  Intel- 
ligent. —  Self-consciousness. —  Moral  and  Religious.  —  At  each  stage 
certain  Specific  Facts.— The  Problem  consists  in  these. — The  Solution  of 
the  Problem.— Two  Proposed  Solutions.— First  by  the  Principle  of  Con- 
tinuity and  Evolution. — But  this  transgresses  the  Principle  of  Causation. 
—The  true  Solution  is  by  Efficiency  and  Sufficient  Reason.— This  results 
in  the  Theistic  Postulate.— Adequate  Solution. 

Literature. 
The  Bridgewater  Treatises  by  Kidd,  Roget,  Buckland,  Chalmers, 
Proat  and  Kirby.— Flint's  Theism,  Notes  VII.,  XL,  XXII.— Lindsay's 
Recent  Advances  in  Theism,  laps.  VII.  and  X.— Knight's  Aspects  of 
Theism,  Chap.  XIII.— Bowne  s  Studies  in  Theism,  Chaps.  V.-X.— 
Locke's  Human  Understanding,  Book  IV.,  Chap.  X.— Strong's  Syste- 
matic Theology,  Part  II.,  Chap.  II.,  3.— Thomwell's  Collected  Writings. 
Vol.  I.,  Chap.  II.— Eraser's  Philosophyof  Theism,  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  VIII.— 
Fisher's  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief,  Chap.  II.— Iverach's 
Theism,  Chap.  III.— Conder's  Basis  of  Faith,  Chap.  V.— Boyce's  Ab- 
stract of  Systematic  Theology,  Chap.  II.— Barry's  Some  Lights  of 
Science  on  the  Faith,  Chap.  III.— Shaler's  The  Interpretation  of  Nature, 
Chap.  II.— D.iwson's  The  Origin  of  the  World,  Chaps.  V.-X.— Tulloch's 
Theism,  Sec.  II.,  Chaps.  I.-IIL— Cooke's  Religion  and  Chemiitry,  Chaps. 
I.-VII. — Chapman's  Preorganic  Evolution  and  the  Idea  of  God,  Chaps. 
II.,  III. 

I.  The  Principle  of  this  Proof.    §  80. 

i.'T^HE  line  of  reasoning  now  to  be  followed  out  is 

X      closely  related  to  that  of  'he  foregoing  chapter. 

There  the  universe  was  viewed  in  its  totality,  now  certain 

specific  features  in  it  are  to  be  interpreted.    There  it  was 


336 


APOLOGETICS. 


V 


the  origin,  now  it  is  the  progress  of  the  universe  whicf- 
has  to  be  considered.  The  specific  facts  now  to  be  inter- 
preted are  found  in  the  universe,  viewed  as  a  cosmos  of 
organically  related  things  marked  by  progress.  The  theistic 
proof  which  thus  emerges  may  be  properly  termed  the  cos- 
mological,  since  it  deals  with  certain  inherent  features  of 
the  cosmos.  This  gfives  a  much  more  definite  meaning  to 
the  scope  of  this  term  than  it  usually  has.  But  in  the  more 
thorough  theistic  discussions  of  the  present  day  this  limita- 
tion is  just  and  necessary.  It  gives  the  four  causal  proofs 
their  well-defined  spheres,  and  greatly  increases  the  logical 
value  of  these  proofs.  The  aitiological  proof  vindicates 
an  uncaused  cause  and  abiding  ground  for  the  universe  as 
a  whole.  The  cosmological  seeks  a  cause  and  sufficient 
reason  for  certain  facts  in  the  cosmos  as  progressive.  The 
cutaxiological  proof  reasons  towards  God  from  the  phe- 
nomena of  law  and  order  in  the  universe;  and  the 
teleological  proof  argues  towards  the  same  conclusion  from 
the  features  of  design  which  the  world  exhibits.  This 
classification  of  the  causal  proofs  gives  harmony  and  com- 
pleteness of  view.  Each  branch  of  proof  has  its  aspect 
of  causation  and  its  proper  subject-matter.  The  cosmo- 
logical aspect  of  the  causal  proofs  seeks  to  interpret,  by  the 
principle  of  sufficient  reason,  certain  aspects  of  the  universe 
as  an  organized  cosmos. 

2.  At  the  very  outset  a  clear  grasp  of  the  principle  of  this 
proof  is  needed.  This  principle,  in  general,  is  that  of  causa- 
tion, but  the  aspect  of  this  principle  which  is  prominent 
is  that  of  suMcient  reason  or  adequate  ground.  This  feature 
of  causation  was  briefly  explained  in  the  previous  chapter, 
but  this  explanation  needs  a  little  more  illumination  in  con- 
nection with  the  proof  now  under  consideration.  According 
to  Leibnitz,  as  quoted  by  Thomson  in  his  Outlines  of  the 
Laws  of  Thought,  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  means 
that  "whatever  exists,  or  is  true,  must  have  a  sufficient 
reason  why  the  thing  or  proposition  should  be  as  it  is  and 


..Jl 


■■■M 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


337 


not  otherwise."  In  its  logical  meaning,  this  signifies  that 
any  inference  or  conclusion  in  reasoning  must  rest  on  ade- 
quate grounds.  There  must  be  good  evidence  for  any  infer- 
ence which  is  made.  The  premises  of  any  conclusion  must 
be  reliable  and  assured.  Then,  in  its  ontological  significance, 
the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  implies  that  there  must  be 
in  the  cause  of  anything  something  by  reason  of  which  it 
is  what  it  is,  and  not  otherwise.  This  is  the  feature  of 
causality  now  mainly  in  view.  It  means  that  there  is  some- 
thing pertaining  to  every  cause  by  virtue  of  which  the 
effect  assumes  its  well-defined  character.  It  is  thus  a 
definite  aspect  of  the  principle  of  causation,  and  it  may 
be  called  sufficient  reason  or  adequate  ground.  It  is  this 
which  constitutes  the  nerve  of  the  cosmological  proof. 

3.  An  important  and  very  difficult  problem  meets  us  on 
the  threshold  of  this  exposition.    As  this  problem  emerges 
again  later  on  in  these  discussions,  it  may  be  well  to  give 
attention  to  it  at  this  stage.    As  has  been  pointed  out,  the 
principle  of  causality  involves  the  two  features  of  efficiency 
and  sufficient  reason.    In  every  cause  there  is  that  which 
effects  the  change  implied  in  the  causal  relation;  and  there 
is  also  that  which  makes  the  effect  just  what  it  is  and  not 
something  else.     The  question  which  arises  in  this  con- 
nection relates  to  the  identity  in  nature  between  cause  and 
effect.    How  far  must  cause  and  effect  be  like  each  other? 
May  they  be  quite  diverse  in  their  essential  nature?    Can 
things  affect  each  other  causally  only  when  they  are  alike? 
Is  the  feature  of  sufficient  reason  especially  conditioned 
upon  some  sort  of  identity  between  the  cause  and  effect? 
These  seem  simple  inquiries,  yet  in  some  of  their  applications 
they  are  of  the  deepest  import.     Mind  and  matter,  for 
example,  are  different  substances,  yet  the  soul  and  body 
seem  to  interact  on  each  other.    The  volitions  of  the  soul, 
at  least,  affect  the  movements  of  the  body.     How  is  this 
effected?     Must  we  say  that,  at  root,  body  and  soul  are 
the  same,  and  hence  must  be  reduced  to  unity  on  the  basis 


I 


33 


J38 


APOLOGETICS. 


': 


' 


ti 


! 


) 


leither  of  materialism  or  idealism?  This  must  not  be  done, 
so  that  some  other  construction  must  be  given  to  their  rela- 
tion. That  the  soul  and  body  do  act  on  each  other  is  an 
undoubted  fact.  It  seems  clear,  "lerefore,  that  in  some 
way  mind  can  act  on  matter  so  as  to  produce  changes  which 
are  of  the  nature  of  effects  in  the  material  sphere.  So  in 
regard  to  the  relation  of  God  to  the  universe  the  same 
problem  arises.  Must  God  and  the  universe  be  of  the  same 
essential  nature,  in  order  to  the  exercise  of  divine  activity 
in  the  cosmos?  If  so,  then  some  type  of  monism  is  the 
only  philosophy.  In  order  to  think  of  God  as  the  first  cause 
of  the  universe,  must  we  postulate  identity  of  essence  be- 
tween the  universe,  as  an  effect,  and  God  its  cause?  If  so, 
that  one  essence  must  be  either  material  or  ideal,  and  the 
abyss  of  monism  opens  wide  before  us.  Such  examples 
s'.ow  how  serious  a  problem  this  is,  and  exhorts  us  to  dis- 
cover a  secure  basis  whereon  the  kinship  of  cause  and  effect 
may  be  held,  and  the  possibility  of  spiritual  forms  of  being 
producing  changes  in  material  modes  of  existence  may  be 
vindicated. 

4-  Still  another  turn  must  be  given  to  this  problem.  Does 
It  follow,  from  what  has  just  been  suggested,  that  there 
must  always  be  as  much  of  reality,  if  not  more,  in  the  cause 
as  there  is  in  the  effect  ?  It  has  just  been  suggested  that  the 
effect  may  not  be  essentially  the  same  in  nature  as  the  use, 
which  leaves  the  way  open  for  the  view  that  a  p  ica'l 
sequence  may  be  produced  by  a  spiritual  cause.  Nr  •  does 
it  follow  that  there  must  be  as  much  of  real  conten.  in  the 
•cause  as  appears  in  the  effect?  Does  it  come  to  pass  that 
if  we  find  certain  qualities  in  the  effect,  that  these,  in  at 
least  corresponding  degree,  must  be  found  in  the  cause? 
Thus,  if  life  or  thought  be  present  in  the  effect,  must  these 
qualities  be  asserted  of  the  cause  producing  them?  In  a 
word,  can  the  non-vital  produce  the  vital;  can  the  non- 
intelligent  c  se  the  intelligent  to  arise:  can  water  rise 
higher  than  ..o  level?    Must  there  be,  in  short,  a  suMcient 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


339 


reason  in  the  cause  of  anything,  which  determines  what  the 
character  and  corents  of  the  effect  shall  be?  Are  we 
justified,  when  we  find  that  certain  features  are  in  an  effect, 
in  concluding  that  these  features  must  find  their  counter- 
part in  its  cause?  It  seems  reasonable  to  maintain,  in  the 
light  of  the  efficiency  and  sufficient  reason  implied  in  the 
principle  of  causality,  that  there  must  be  at  least  as  much 
richness  of  content  in  the  cause  as  appears  in  the  effect, 
even  though  their  strict  identity  may  not  be  asserted.  If 
there  be  not  efficiency  enough  in  the  cause,  the  effect  would 
never  arise;  and  if  there  be  no  sufficient  reason,  everything 
would  be  entirely  contingent,  and  we  could  never  know  that 
any  particular  cause  would  produce  any  given  effect. 
Hence,  we  may  safely  conclude  that  there  must  be  at  least 
as  much  in  the  cause  as  in  the  effect,  and  that  there  must 
be  a  degree  of  kinship,  though  not  necessarily  identity, 
between  them.  In  no  case  is  it  to  be  supposed  that  the 
cause  is  exhausted  in  the  effect,  or  that  in  essential  nature 
they  are  to  be  identified.  There  is  likeness  without  identity, 
efficiency  without  exhaustion,  and  sufficient  reason  without 
contingency  in  the  causal  relation,  as  now  viewed.  This 
is  the  principle  of  the  cosmological  proof. 

5.  This  problem  of  unlikeness  between  cause  and  effect 
has  given  color  to  many  things  in  philosophy.  It  was  im- 
plied in  the  crude  Greek  materialism  and  sensationalism,  in 
which  the  conclusion  was  drawn  that  the  soul  must  be 
material  in  order  to  be  the  subject  of  sensations  produced 
by  impressions  from  material  objects.  In  the  Cartesian 
philosophy,  the  view  held  of  the  essential  difference  between 
mind  and  matter  had  much  influence  upon  that  philosophy 
itself,  and  upon  subsequent  speculation.  Out  of  this  sprang 
the  occasionalism  of  Guelinx,  the  preestablished  harmony 
of  Leibnitz,  and  the  pantheism  of  Spinoza.  They  all 
wrestled  with  the  causal  relation  between  soul  and  body 
in  man.  Guelinx  supposed  that  on  the  occasion  of  an  affec- 
tion in  the  body,  a  corresponding  affection  arose  in  the 


'1' 


I 


I  ! 
I 


340 


APOLOGETICS. 


mind.  Leibnitz  assumed  that  there  was  a  harmony  estab- 
lished from  all  ettinity  between  the  sequences  in  the  body 
and  those  in  the  mind.  And  Spinoza  held  that  the  two 
series  of  sequencer  had  a  common  ground,  in  a  unitary 
basis  which  he  den-  *  '  eternal  substance  and  identified  with 
God.  And  th  -  :mi;ii  .  ism  and  idealism  of  our  own  day 
have  both  fel^  t:  >  .^iTtct  ^  of  this  speculation,  which  entirely 
separates  sou'  yC  fjd} .  and  is  in  danger  of  divorcing  God 
from  the  uni\(i  <'  In  both  cases  the  relations  are  apt  to 
be  construed  in  a  v  ..-  r'  and  mechanical  way,  which  leads 
to  the  theories  ji  .  tr-^r/,:  •nor'  •  •■':^'ng  the  relation  between 
the  soul  and  b  •<!'_,  in  mi  ■  .  J  lo  deistic  and  mechanical 
views  in  regard  .■  u.c  v  ■  .;  of  God  to  the  universe.  The 
utmost  care  is  1  jcded  !ie'\  to  avoid  materialism,  idealism, 
pantheism  and  d:  sm  uj  n  :  r  ixjint.  They  may  be  avoided 
if  we  hold  to  kinship  without  identity  in  regard  to  the  causal 
relation. 

6.  When  Coleridge  says  that  "the  law  of  causality  only 
holds  between  things  that  have  some  common  property,  and 
that  it  cannot  be  extended  from  one  world  to  another,"  he 
implies  the  problem  we  have  been  discussing.  In  his  state- 
ment there  is  real  truth  and  serious  error.  The  truth  is  that 
there  must  be  some  kinship,  or  common  property,  between 
cause  and  effect.  His  error  is  in  suggesting  that  in  no 
case  can  the  causal  relation  be  extended  from  the  spiritual 
to  the  material  world.  For  this  is  true  neither  of  the  con- 
nection between  the  soul  and  the  body  in  man,  nor  of  the 
relation  which  God  sustains  to  the  universe.  To  agree  with 
Coleridge  is  to  present  an  insuperable  barrier  between  mind 
and  body,  and  between  God  and  the  vvorkl.  As  both  mind 
and  matter  have  in  them  rational  factors,  and  both  are  to 
be  construed,  finally,  in  relation  to  God  as  infinite  lationality, 
they  need  not  be  absolutely  separated  from  each  other.  They 
are  not  so  much  two  worlds,  as  two  sections  of  one  universe 
ef  finite  things.  We  do  not  require,  therefore,  to  hold  the 
absolute  identity  of  cause  and  effect,  nor  that  the  cause  is 


^Bfii^a 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


341 


either  exhausted  in,  or  transmuted  into,  the  eflfect.  All  we 
need  to  maintain  is  that  there  is  a  something  in  the  cause 
which  gives  to  the  effect  its  well-marked  character,  and 
that  there  must  be  at  least  as  much  of  resource  or  content 
in  the  cause  as  appears  in  the  effect.  This  is  the  vital  aspect 
of  the  principal  of  causality  which  underlies  the  theistic 
proof  now  in  hand. 

II.  The  Problem  of  this  Proof .    §81. 

I.  In  general,  this  problem  consists  in  certain  aspects  of 
the  universe,  viewed  as  an  organized  graded  cosmos.  In 
this  cosmos  there  are  certain  weil-defined  phenomena,  and 
these  constitute  the  materials  of  the  proof.  The  cosmos  is 
regarded  now,  not  in  its  totality,  but  rather  in  its  course 
and  constitution.  The  problem  relates  to  the  view  which 
is  to  be  taken  of  the  cosmos  in  this  asj)ect  of  it.  The  whole 
cosmic  liistorv  of  the  universe  opens  up  before  us,  in  all 
its  boundless  duration,  magnitude  and  complexity.  Its 
cosmic  history  and  progress  are  to  be  considered  in  the 
light  of  the  causal  principle,  especially  in  its  aspect  of  suffi- 
cient reason.  The  higher  stages  of  the  cosmos  are  to  be 
interpreted  in  relation  to  the  lower,  and  the  problem  of  the 
way  by  which  the  passage  from  the  lower  to  the  higher 
was  effected  has  to  be  solved. 

Whatever  view  may  be  adopted  of  the  continuity  of  the 
universe,  or  of  the  inner  principle  of  that  continuity,  it  is 
clear  that  there  has  been  progressive  development  in  tl-.e 
organization  of  the  cosmic  whole.  The  question  at  on<e 
arises  as  to  whether  the  principle  of  causa  ity  in  th?  "orm 
of  sufficient  reason  is  properly  applicable  to  the  cosmos  thus 
regarded.  And  if  it  be  applicable,  does  it  justify  tl'c  theistic 
postulate  as  its  necessary  explanation?  We  lavi  space  to 
mark  out  only  the  great  stages  which  the  pi  ogress  of  the 
universe  exhibits. 

2.    First,  the  universe,  so  far  as  tlK  best    ight  which 


342 


APOLOGETICS. 


ij  ■ 


modem  science  sheds  upon  it  shows,  was  in  an  unorgan- 
ized inorganic  condition  when  it  began  its  career.  There 
was  a  time  when  our  earth  at  least,  and  probably  the  other 
planets,  and  possibly  the  stellar  systems  also,  existed  in  their 
simplest  material  and  mechanical  elements.  And,  if  we  in- 
dulge in  scientific  speculation,  we  may  even  go  further  back, 
and  think  of  the  star  dust,  or  of  the  luminiferous  ether,  or  of 
the  homogeneous  of  the  nebular  hypothesis,  where  we  find 
the  universe  in  its  simple"*-  'erms.  Just  what  that  condition 
may  have  been,  or  how  long  it  lasted,  we  cannot  now  tell. 
Nor  is  it  necessary  to  do  so.  All  we  need  now  assert  is 
the  fact  that,  in  its  early  stages,  so  far  at  least  as  our  earth 
is  concerned,  atomic  matter  and  mechanical  energy  alone 
existed. 

3.  Secondly,  we  may  think  of  the  time  when  organic 
forms  of  being  arose.  Here  we  observe  that  the  transition 
was  somehow  made  from  the  non-vital  to  the  vital.  The 
living  was  superimposed  upoa  the  non-living  by  some 
agency  within  or  without  ♦he  cosmos.  The  atom  gave  way 
to  the  cell,  and  the  crystalloid  to  the  colloid,  in  certain  forms 
of  being,  and  mechanical  energy  became  by  some  means 
vital  energy.  At  the  same  time,  the  chemistry  of  inorganic 
modes  of  existence  became  the  chemistry  of  the  organic, 
or  entirely  new  forms  of  chemical  action  were  introduced 
into  the  cosmos.  Tl^nce,  arose  various  organic  processes, 
known  as  assimilation,  nutrition,  growth  ani  reproduction, 
in  incessant  succession.  In  addition,  various  grades  of 
organic  beings  have  come  into  existence,  with  ever-increas- 
ing complexity  of  structure,  till  the  highest  was  reached. 
The  problem  is  as  to  how  all  these  facts  are  to  ht  explained. 

4.  The  third  stage  to  be  noted  here  is  the  sentient.  This 
is  a  new  form  of  being,  and  constitutes  a  set  of  specific 
facts.  It  came,  no  doubt,  after  the  organic  in  its  non- 
sentient  forms.  This  includes  all  forms  of  being  capable 
of  distinct  sensations  of  pleasure  or  pain.  In  this  there  is 
•omething  not  in  the  merely  vital,  nor  in  the  inorganic  in 


■ai 


If 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


343 


any  degree.  Here,  too,  may  be  observed  various  grades  of 
sentient  being,  from  those  wherein  it  is  scarcely  perceptible 
up  to  those  where  it  is  most  acute.  Here,  too,  we  may  take 
into  account  the  remarkable  facts  of  animal  instinct,  which 
are  both  like  and  unlike  intelligence.  The  facts  here  are 
very  many  and  very  varied,  and  the  complexity  of  the 
problem  to  be  solved  is  greater  than  at  any  previous  stage. 
How  has  the  passage  from  unconscious  to  conscious  forms 
of  being  been  effected,  and  how  has  even  the  organic  passed 
on  from  non-sentient  to  sentient  stages? 

5.  A  fourth  well-marked  stage  in  the  progress  of  the 
cosmos  is  that  of  intelligence  and  reflection.  Here  all  dis- 
tinctly spiritual  forms  of  finite  being  arise.  This  is  the 
sphere  of  man,  at  least  so  far  as  this  earth  is  concerned. 
The  realm  of  finite  spirit  as  distinct  from  that  of  matter 
now  clearly  emerges.  The  phenomena  of  self-conscious 
knowing  beings,  capable  of  reflection,  are  before  us  at  this 
stage  of  the  cor.mos.  Memory,  imagination,  abstraction, 
reflection,  and  all  other  mental  activities  make  up  the 
problem.  Almve  all,  the  f.i  ts  of  self-consciousness  come 
distinctly  into  view.  The  problem  here  again  is.  How  did 
these  specific  facts  come  to  be?  Did  they  arise  by  the  law 
of  continuity  and  progress  from  the  lower  stage  of  merely 
sentient  being,  or  have  we  here  a  new  effect,  which,  accord- 
ing to  the  principle  of  causation,  must  be  accounted  for  by 
a  new  cause  ? 

6.  A  final  stage  need  only  be  mentioned.  This  is  the 
stage  wherein  moral  and  religious  facts  emerge.  Here  we 
have  important  facts  before  us.  Judgments  of  duty,  the 
sense  of  obligation,  the  feeling  of  moral  approbation,  and 
all  that  arises  in  a  moral  experience,  have  to  be  here  con- 
sidered. Then,  too,  the  elevated  instinct  of  worship,  the 
sense  of  the  supernatural  world,  and  the  feeling  after  God, 
are  great  facts  which  await  interpretation  in  this  discussion. 
What  must  that  interpretation  be,  and  what  is  its  key?  Are 
these  facts  self-e.xplanatory,  or  can  they  be  explained  by 


il 


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344 


APOLOGETICS. 


simply  referring  them  to  the  lower  antecedent  stagje  of 
being? 

Such,  then,  is  the  problem.  It  lies  in  the  course  and 
constitution  of  the  cosmos.  That  cosmos  exhibits  all  these 
distinct  grades  of  being,  and  evident  marks  of  progress. 
What  is  the  philosophy  of  that  progress?  What  is  the 
sufficient  reason  for  these  specific  facts? 

Ill,  The  Solution  of  the  Problem  of  this  Proof.    §  82. 

Two  radically  different  solutions  of  this  problem  of  the 
cosmological  proof  claim  attention.  The  one  is  based  en- 
tirely on  the  principle  of  continuity  and  the  law  of  natural 
evolution.  The  other  rests  on  the  principle  of  causation 
and  sufficient  reason.    Each  must  now  be  considered. 

1.  The  explanation  which  is  based  on  the  principle  of 
continuity  and  evolution  argues  that  the  specific  facts  of 
the  cosmos  which  constitute  the  problem  of  this  proof  are 
sufficiently  explained  when  a  natural  history  of  them  is 
given,  in  accordance  with  their  order  and  succession.  The 
moral  facts  succeed  ihe  intellectual,  the  intellectual  the 
sentient,  the  sentient  the  vital,  and  the  vital  the  non-vital ; 
and  when  their  continuity  is  traced  out,  their  explanation 
is  fully  made.  No  inference  towards  any  cause  or  sufficient 
reason  outside  of  the  facts  is  needed,  ami  hence  none  should 
be  made. 

2.  It  will  be  observed  that  this  is  a  scheme  of  ontological 
evolution.  Its  inner  principles  are  material  and  mechanical, 
and  the  law  of  continuity  runs  throughout.  Matter  and 
force  must  account  for  all  the  facts,  and  for  the  progress 
in  complexity  which  they  exhibit.  There  is  no  other 
causality,  and  there  can  scarcely  be  any  sufficient  reason 
at  all. 

It  is  evident  that  this  scheme  is  entirely  inconsistent  with 
the  principle  of  causality,  as  already  so  fully  explained. 
There  must  be  at  least  as  much  in  the  cause  as  appears  in 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


345 


the  effect.    But  in  the  case  before  us,  each  new  stage  in 
the  progress  of  organization  in  the  cosmos  presents  new 
factors,  which  were  not  in  the  previous  stages.    Of  these 
new  facts  no  adequate  cause  is  provided  by  simply  referring 
them  to  the  preceding  stages  in  a  purely  descriptive  way. 
Nor  does  this  theory  do  justice  to  sufficient  reason.    There 
is  nothing  necessarily  in  the  preceding  stages  which  ade- 
quately accounts  for  the  succeeding  stages  being  just  what 
they  are.     This  proposed  solution,  therefore,  is  entirely 
insufficient.     At  every  step  in  the  stages  of  the  cosmos 
already  described,  where  there  is  advance  in  complexity  of 
organization,   the  prmciple  of  causation,  both  as  to  its 
efficiency  and  sufficient  reason,  is  utterly  ignored,  or  boldly 
transgressed.    Neither  an  agency  nor  a  reason  is  given  for 
the  new  factors  which  appear  in  the  more  complex  stages. 
Even  if  the  validity  of  the  hypothesis  of  evolution  be 
admitted,  as  a  description  of  the  process  in  itself  considered, 
the  principle  of  causation  would  still  be  needed  to  effect 
the  passage  from  one  stage  to  another,  and  to  account  for 
the  distinctly  new  factors  which  appear  in  the  more  com- 
plex stages.    Thus  it  at  once  appears  that  so  long  as  evolu- 
tion he  made  identical  with  progress,  as  it  should  only  be, 
the  thpistic  postulate  is  still  needed  to  explain  the  progress 
of  the  cosmos  on  its  pathway  of  continuity.    Evolution  in 
this  strict  sense  does  not  destroy  theism;    it  rather  de- 
mands it. 

3.  The  other  explanation  is  found  in  the  thcislic  postulate. 
It  is  based  on  the  principle  of  causation,  in  its  application 
to  the  cosmic  problem  of  progressive  orgfanization  in  the 
universe.  This  postulate  fully  meets  the  case.  In  God, 
the  self-existent  and  intelligent  causality  which  we  have  in 
former  reasonings  seen  him  to  be,  we  have  an  efficiency  and 
a  sufficient  reason,  which  fully  meet  t..e  demands  of  the 
problem.  He  exists  necessarily,  not  contingently;  he  is 
unchanging,  amid  all  the  changes  of  the  cosmos;  and  he 
has  infinite  resources  and  causality.    The  postulate  of  his 


I 


346 


APOLOGETICS. 


existence  and  activity,  in  causal  relation  with  the  cosmos, 
fully  accounts  for  the  problem  in  hand.  He  possesses  every 
quality  in  abundant  measure  that  appears  in  the  universe, 
and  in  him  there  is  provided  a  cause  that  is  not  merely  in 
the  cosmos,  but  also  without  it,  as  the  ground  of  its  change 
and  progress. 

Many  isolated  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  are  all 
gathered  up  under  this  head.  The  proof  from  biogenesis 
in  biology,  of  a  living  source  of  life;  the  argument  of  Locke 
that  the  existence  of  knowing  beings,  like  men,  argues  an 
intelligent  first  cause,  which  is  God,  and  the  inference  from 
the  idea  of  God  in  the  human  soul  to  the  existence  of  God 
as  its  only  adequate  cause,  as  presented  by  Descartes,  all 
illustrate  this  cosmological  proof,  as  we  conceive  it.  They 
all  imply  that  from  certain  features  in  various  facts,  which 
are  viewed  as  effects,  that  the  counterparts  of  these  features 
must  be  found  in  th  .-ir  cause.  This  is  simply  an  application 
of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  to  these  specific  facts. 

4.  In  the  light  of  modem  scientific  and  semi-philosophical 
views  of  the  cosmos  in  its  progress,  this  proof  has  very 
much  value.  Rightly  understood,  it  makes  any  merely 
materialistic  and  mechanical  explanation  of  the  universe 
not  rationally  possible.  Moreover,  it  enables  us  to  clothe 
God  with  certain  attributes,  in  analogy  with  the  qualities 
which  we  discover  in  the  facts,  for  which  he  supplies  the 
sufficient  reason.  And  while  this  argimient  may  not  of  itself 
justify  the  inference  *z  an  infinite  creator;  still,  having 
tliis  aspect  of  God  supplied  by  other  proofs,  we  vindicate 
the  force  of  these  proofs  by  this  one,  and  at  the  same  time 
endow  God  with  certain  obvious  qualities  or  attributes, 
which  make  him  much  more  rationally  real  to  the  human 
understanding.  In  these  simple  terms,  we  venture  to  give 
a  somewhat  new  version  of  the  cosmological  proc.  for  the 
divine  existence. 


ii; 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS:    PROOF  FROM  COSMIC  ORDER. 

Contents. 

The  four  Causal  Proofs  distinguished.— The  Principle  of  this  Proof. 
—An  Aspect  of  Causality.— Various  Views.— McCosh.— Flint.— Hicks.— 
Eutaxiological  Proof.— Sufficient  Reason  for  Unities  and  Laws  in  the 
Cosmos.— Speculation.— Efficiency  and  Invariableness.- The  Problem  of 
this  Proof.— The  entire  Sphere  of  Cosmic  Order.— Instances  in  A»- 
tronomy.— In  Physics.— In  Chemistry.— In  Crystallography.— In  Optics. 
—  In  Acoustics.  —  In  Thermodynamics.  —  In  Electrodynamics.  —  In 
Biology.— In  Psychology.— In  Morals.— Solution  of  the  Problem.— 
Three  possible  Solutions.— Chance  and  Fate  inadequate.— Immanent 
Order  subtile,  but  insufficient.— The  Theistic  Postulate  meets  the  case.— 
An  Extramundance  Intelligence  in  God.— Limits  of  this  Proof. 

Literature. 
McCosh's  Typical  Forms  and  Siecial  Ends  in  Creation,  Part  I.— 
Hicks'  Critique  of  Design  Arguments,  Introduction.— Diman's  Th« 
Theistic  Argument,  Chap.  IV.— Flint's  r/i<;wm,  Chap.  IV.— Tfc*  Bridge- 
water  Treatises.— Chalmer' 3  Astronomical  Discourses.— H.  B.  Smith's 
Apologetics.  Chap.  IV.— Ebrard's  Apologetics,  Vol.  I.,  Part  I.,  Book  II., 
Sec.  I.— Fisher's  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief,  Chap.  II.— 
Lindsay's  Recent  Advances,  Chap.  XIV.— Hodge's  Systematic  Theology, 
Vol.  I.,  Part  I.,  Chap.  II.— Shedd's  Dogmatic  Theology,  Vol.  I..  Div. 
III.,  Chap.  III.— Strong's  Systematic  Theology,  Part  II.,  Chap.  II.,  I.— 
Thornwell's  Collected  IVritings,  Chap.  II.— Miley's  Systematic  The- 
ology, Part  I.,  Chap.  II.,  a.— Boyce's  Abstract  of  Systematic  Theology, 
Chap.  II.— Fraser's  Philosophy  of  Theism,  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  III.— Stir- 
ling's Philosophy  and  Theology,  Chap.  VII.— Kaftan's  The  Truth  of  th* 
Christian  Religi.n,  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  IV.— Paley's  hfatural  Theology.— 
McCosh's  Divine  Government,  Book  II.,  Chap.  I.— Steams'  The  Evi- 
dence of  Christian  Experience,  Chap.  II. 

WE  now  reach  a  very  important  b.anch  of  the  cavisal 
argtiment.  It  is  concerned  with  the  facts  of  order 
as  they  appear  in  the  cosmos,  and  seeks  to  discover  their 
theistic  significance.  Some  writers  make  this  proof  the 
main  feature  of  the  cosmological  argument,  while  otheis 
construe  the  facts  of  order  under  the  teleological  mode  of 
reasoning.     McCosh  represents  the  former,  and  Flint  the 


^am 


mk 


348 


APOLOGETICS. 


latter  type  of  view.  H.  B.  Smith,  with  much  breadth  of 
vision,  inclines  to  give  this  proof  a  very  wide  scope,  and 
to  thereby  include  the  facts  of  order  found  in  nature,  mind 
and  morals  under  it.  Hicks,  on  the  other  hand,  gives  it  a 
much  more  definite  application,  and  thus  limits  it  almost 
exclusively  to  the  cosmic  order  of  material  things.  In  our 
own  day  the  sphere  of  thi  pertinent  proof  has  been  pretty 
clearly  marked  out,  and  it  has  been  differentiated  from  the 
proof  founded  on  the  marks  of  design  in  the  world.  Order 
and  design  are  now  properly  distinguished  from  each  other. 


I.  The  Principle  of  this  Proof .    §83. 

1.  The  principle  of  the  proof  lies  in  the  causal  relation, 
and  its  process  consists  in  an  application  of  the  law  of 
causation  to  the  phenomena  of  order  in  the  universe,  with 
a  view  to  their  adequate  rational  interpretation.  At  this 
stage  the  relations  of  the  four  cosmical  proofs  must  be 
clearly  apprehended.  The  aitiological  seeks  the  first  cause 
and  ground  of  the  universe  as  a  whole.  The  cosmological 
proposes  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  cosmic  progress  observed 
in  the  universe.  The  eutaxiological  inquires  for  an  adequate 
cause  of  the  law  and  order  seen  in  the  cosmos;  and  the 
teleological  does  the  same  thing  in  regard  to  the  marks 
of  design  exhibited  in  the  world.  The  universe,  in  its 
cosmic  origin,  in  its  cosmic  progress,  in  its  cosmic  order, 
and  in  its  cosmic  design,  is  the  subject  of  interpretation 
under  these  cosmical  proofs.  With  the  third  of  these  we 
are  to  be  engaged  in  this  chapter. 

2.  It  is  important  to  observe  the  precise  aspects  of  cau- 
sality which  are  involved  in  each  of  these  proofs.  In  par- 
ticular, it  is  very  necessary  to  understand  the  difference 
between  the  facts  of  order  and  of  design,  that  we  may  con- 
struct aright  the  argument  based  upon  each  of  these  sets 
of  facts.  McCosh.  with  much  insight,  makes  the  distinction 
between  typical  forms  and  special  ends  in  creation;  and  by 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


349 


this  distinction  he  suggests  the  difference  between  order  in 
general  and  design  in  particular.  Some  writers,  in  a  rather 
clumsy  way,  term  the  one  set  of  facts  general  order,  and 
the  other  special  order.  But  the  words  order  and  design 
more  accurately  describe  these  facts.  In  the  former  case, 
we  have  before  us  the  facts  of  law  and  order,  of  unity  and 
system,  of  sequence  and  coexistence,  such  as  may  be  con- 
strued under  mathematical  relations.  In  the  latter  we  have 
in  view  the  features  of  purpose  and  design,  of  adaptation 
and  adjustment,  of  means  and  ends  as  seen  in  the  universe 
of  related  things.  In  the  one  case  we  have  regard  merely 
to  the  relations  of  the  factors  which  constitute  the  cosmos 
as  it  now  exists;  and  in  the  other  we  are  to  consider  the 
ends  which  certain  factors  in  the  cosmos  serve  in  relation 
to  other  factors.  The  one  is  the  proof  from  order;  the 
other  that  from  design. 

Flint,  in  his  excellent  discussion,  does  not  quite  clearly 
make  this  distinction,  and  on  this  account  somewhat  weakens 
the  logical  force  of  his  reasoning.  Bu«-  Diman,  who  is  a 
follower  of  Flint  at  many  points,  opens  up  this  distinction 
in  a  lucid  way,  and  carries  it  with  him  into  his  discussion. 
Hicks,  also,  very  strongly  emphasizes  the  essential  dis- 
tinction between  these  two  forms  of  proof,  but  his  polemical 
attitude  towards  the  ideological  proof  somewhat  mars  an 
otherwise  informing  exposition.  We  regard  the  distinction 
between  order  and  design  to  be  a  valid  one ;  and  we  believe 
that  the  facts  involved  in  each  supply  the  materials  for  a 
sound  theistic  inference.  We  would,  therefore,  distinguish 
more  clearly  than  Flint  does  between  laws  and  ends  in  the 
cosmos.  But  we  are  very  far  from  agreeing  with  Hicks 
that  there  is  more  logical  value  in  the  eutaxiological  than 
in  the  teleological  proof.  We  Ijelieve  that  while  order  and 
design  provide  diflferent  forms  of  the  cosmical  proof,  yet 
each  yields  a  valid  theistic  inference. 

3.  But  the  principle  of  the  eutaxiological  proof  must  now 
be  more  clearly  exhibited.    In  doing  this,  we  have  to  show 


I"' 


mgi 


mk 


350 


APOLOGETICS. 


■i! 


what  aspect  of  causation  conies  into  view  in  it.  Order  and 
sequence  are  seen  eveiTwhere  in  the  cosmos.  It  appears 
on  the  earth  and  we  behold  it  in  the  heavens.  It  holds 
universal  sway  in  the  universe.  The  question  at  once  arises 
as  to  the  relation  between  this  order  and  sequence,  this  law 
and  harmony,  and  the  principle  of  causation.  Is  the  law 
of  causality  in  some  form  involved  in  the  cosmos,  viewed 
as  an  orderly  and  harmonious  system?  And  is  it  efficiency, 
or  adequate  ground,  or  sufficient  reason,  which  is  prominent 
in  this  proof? 

A  general  inspection  of  the  cosmos  as  a  system  of  related 
things  shows  two  aspects  of  it.  There  are  comprehensive 
unities  and  pervasive  laws  in  it.  Under  the  former  of  these 
aspects  we  observe  groups  of  kindred  things  organized 
together  in  nature.  These  constitute  the  great  natural  types 
of  things  in  the  universe.  The  homologies  of  comparative 
anatomy  illustrate  these  unities  or  types  in  one  sphere. 
Then  the  definite  groups  of  living  things,  known  as  bio- 
logical species  in  the  vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms,  afford 
further  examples  of  these  groups  in  nature.  So,  too,  those 
resemblances  which  render  the  morphological  classification 
of  any  forms  of  Deing  possible  give  additional  instances  of 
these  unities  m  nature.  Now,  an  adequate  ground  or  suffi- 
cient reason  for  these  features  of  the  cosmos  must  be  found, 
and  to  provide  this  the  principle  of  causation  is  required. 
In  the  application  of  this  principle  to  these  unities  the  prin- 
ciple of  this  proof  is  implied. 

The  other  aspect  of  order  which  is  observed  in  the  cosmos 
consists  in  the  laws  and  uniformities  of  nature.  These  laws 
in  manifold  f(  rms  express  the  order  and  sequences  which 
appear  in  the  cosmos.  These  laws  are  simply  expressions 
of  the  uniformities  of  nature,  in  themselves  they  have  no 
inherent  efficiency,  nor  do  they  in  their  own  resources  con- 
tain the  reason  for  the  uniformities  which  they  exp- 
These  laws  of  nature  are  simply  formulae  which  de; 
certain  ser,'"jnces  and  coexistences  in  the  cosmos.    They  ti 


ii 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


3St 


not  produce  the  facts  whose  sequences  they  express,  nor 
do  they  cause  those  coexistences  which  they  denote.  In  a 
word,  they  have  no  causal  agency.  This  being  the  case, 
they  invite  and  require  an  application  of  the  principle  of 
causation  in  order  to  account  for  them.  The  implication 
is  that  the  sequences  in  nature  which  these  laws  express  are 
grounded  in  agencies  which  act  uniformly.  These  agencies 
involve  the  principle  of  causation.  It  is  evident,  therefore, 
that  the  principle  of  causation  comes  properly  into  view 
in  relation  to  these  laws  and  uniformities  in  the  cosmos. 
In  this  fact  is  found,  again,  the  principle  of  the  proof  for 
the  existence  of  God  based  on  order  in  the  universe.  The 
features  of  efficiency,  adequate  ground  and  sufficient  reason 
are  all,  in  some  degree,  brought  into  play  as  the  principle 
of  causation  is  applied  to  the  facts  of  order  in  the  cosmos. 

4.  Phi'osophical  speculation  has  been  quite  busy  with  this 
problem,  and  opinions  differ  as  to  the  precise  view  to  be 
taken  of  the  relation  of  causation  to  the  facts  of  order. 
Hume  and  Reid,  who  differ  very  greatly  as  to  the  exact 
nature  of  the  causal  relation,  agree  in  resting  the  theistic 
proof  from  order  on  the  principle  of  causation.  McCosh, 
and  many  more  recent  writers,  hold  the  same  view.  Flint 
is  substantially  on  the  same  ground,  though  he  uses  the 
term  cause  in  a  somewhat  general  sense.  Kant's  criticism 
of  the  cosmolog^cal  argument,  as  the  proof  from  the  facts 
of  order,  assumes  that  the  inference  in  it  is  grounded  on 
the  causal  relation.  And  many  rjecent  writers  who  are  under 
the  influence  of  the  evolutionary  philosophy,  though  they 
may  admit  the  causal  relation  in  the  sequences  of  the  cosmos, 
are  unwilling  to  allow  the  validity  of  any  inference  from 
tliese  to  an  extra-cosmic  ground  or  cause.  The  reasonings 
of  ontological  evolution  at  this  point  are  very  subtile,  and 
need  to  be  carefully  considered  in  the  interests  of  this  theistic 
proof. 

5.  Another  point  emerges  here.  There  has  been  debate 
as  to  whether  the  theistic  inference  based  on  the  facts  of 


li 


^itammdM 


352 


APOLOGETICS. 


order  requires  efficiency  in  the  principle  of  causation  in- 
volved in  the  inference,  or  whether  that  inference  is  valid 
on  the  basis  of  invariable  succession  in  that  principle.  We 
incline  to  he  view  that,  so  far  as  the  doctrine  of  causation 
is  concerned,  the  feature  of  efficiency  is  an  essential  factor 
in  it,  so  that  wherever  the  causal  relation  exists,  there 
efficiency  is  present.  Hence,  if  causation  underlies  the 
argiunent  from  order,  efficiency,  and  sufficient  reason,  too, 
are  involved  in  it.  If  this  be  maintained,  the  ground  of 
the  causality  may  also  be  outside  the  mere  facts  of  order. 
At  the  same  time,  we  are  inclined  to  believe  that  the  facts 
of  invariable  sequence  supply  a  sufficient  basis  for  the  theistic 
inference.  We  have,  even  on  this  view,  certain  unities  and 
sequences,  which,  apart  from  all  reference  to  their  efficient 
causation,  require  to  be  explained,  by  means  of  that  aspect 
of  causality  which  we  have  called  sufficient  reason.  Hence, 
the  fact  of  invariable  sequence  has  to  be  accounted  for,  even 
though  efficiency  be  denied;  so  that,  while  the  feature  of 
efficiency  is  essential  to  causation  rightly  understood,  yet 
it  is  not  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  theistic  inference 
from  the  phenomena  of  order.  This,  then,  is  the  principle 
of  this  proof.  It  consists  in  an  application  of  the  principle 
of  causation  to  the  unities  and  laws  of  the  cosmos. 


II.  The  Problem  of  this  Proof.    §84. 

I.  In  unfolding  the  principle  of  this  proof  its  problem  has 
been  partly  indicated.  The  problem  consists  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  cosmic  order  in  all  their  boundless  scope  and 
endless  multiplicity.  Its  materials  are  found  in  the  instances 
of  unity,  system,  law,  sequence  and  uniformity  observable 
everywhere  in  the  heavens  above  and  in  the  earth  beneath. 
To  give  even  the  barest  outline  of  these  facts  would  require 
a  survey  of  the  broad  fields  of  all  the  sciences,  and  would 
lead  us  to  transcribe  many  a  page  from  treatises  on  natural 
theology.    As  we  look  out  upon  the  varied  face  of  nature 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


353 


in  any  sphere,  we  observe,  amid  ceaseless  change  and  endless 
variety,  order,  system  and  harmony  everywhere.  Scientific 
research  is  constantly  enlarging  the  range  of  our  vision 
over  these  splendid  and  inviting  fields.  Philosophers  and 
poets  alike  have  been  sensible  of  this  all-pervading  cosmic 
order,  and  the  painter  has  been  moved  to  represent  it  in 
his  works  of  art.  Only  a  few  general  instances  of  the 
problem  of  order  whose  varied  facts  constitute  the  materials 
of  the  theistic  proof  now  under  consideration  can  be  given. 
The  student  can  easily  increase  and  amplify  the  hints  we 
now  g^ve  by  his  own  reflection  or  by  consulting  accessible 
treatises  on  natural  theology. 

2.  The  following  instances  may  suffice  to  illustrate,  if 
nothing  more,  the  problem  of  cosmic  order.  The  almost 
boundless  uniformities  of  which  the  law  of  gravitation  is 
the  expression,  and  according  to  which  the  heavenly  bodies 
hold  their  relations  and  conduct  their  movements,  at  once 
come  into  view.  Here  the  music  of  the  spheres  is  tuned 
to  the  key  of  the  theistic  inference.  Then,  all  the  additional 
facts  of  order,  which  may  be  construed  under  Newton's 
laws  of  motion,  as  illustrated  in  the  parallelogram  of  forces, 
and  in  all  the  wonders  of  statics  and  d)mamics,  form  part 
of  the  vast  problem.  So,  too,  the  wonderful  and  mysterious 
unities  which  emerge  in  chemistry,  under  the  operation  of 
chemical  affinity,  and  which  can  be  expressed  in  mathe- 
matical formulie,  together  with  the  subtile  and  still  more 
mysterious  activities  of  electricity,  further  illustrate  the 
problem.  And,  in  a  very  definite  way,  the  wonderful  geo- 
metrical relations  of  the  sides  and  angles  of  crystallim  sub- 
stances, to  which  trigonometry  can  be  applied,  reveal  unities 
which  make  a  striking  part  of  the  problem.  In  addition, 
the  wonderful  phenomena  of  light,  as  revealed  in  the  science 
of  optics,  and  as  made  radiant  in  the  colors  of  the  rainbow, 
the  striking  facts  which  heat  exhibits  as  unfolded  in  the 
science  of  thermodTOamics,  and  the  transporting  re  -ilts  of 
sound  as  set  forth  in  the  science  of  acoustics  or  exhibited 
»3 


;1 


I 


H 


,t 


! 


;'^> 


i 


U 


354 


APOLOGETICS. 


in  the  grand  oratorio,  have  all  to  be  included  in  the  problem 
of  cosmic  order.  Nor  is  this  all.  The  regular  recurrence 
of  the  seasons,  with  the  complex  uniformities  therein  in- 
volved ;  the  ceaseless  succession  of  day  and  night,  with  the 
changing  moment  of  sunrise  and  sunset,  as  it  is  set  down 
beforehand  in  the  almanac;  the  orderly  succession  of 
vegetable  and  animal  life,  with  the  laws  of  nutrition,  growth 
and  reproduction  which  they  exhibit;  and  the  great  unities 
of  species  and  type  in  the  realm  of  organic  things  as  shown 
in  the  science  of  biology,  are  a  further  part  of  our  present 
problem.  Nor  must  we  exclude  from  view  the  uniformities 
which  appear  in  the  operations  of  the  human  mind,  as  ex- 
pressed in  the  principles  of  reasoning  and  the  laws  of 
thought  with  which  logic  and  psychology  are  concerned. 
And  we  may  even  take  into  account  the  great  uniformities 
which  appear  in  the  moral  world,  and  in  all  the  relations 
which  men  sustain  as  expounded  in  ethics  and  sociology, 
as  part  of  this  immense  problem. 

These  are  but  a  few  general  illustrations  of  the  problem 
of  the  eutaxiological  proof  for  the  existence  of  God.  They 
may  serve  to  illustrate  the  nature  of  the  problem,  and  to 
show  its  boundless  magnitude.  The  aggregate  of  these  and 
similar  instances  provide  the  problem  of  the  proof  from 
order.  These  remarkable  facts,  which  have  been  the  theme 
of  the  poet  and  the  philosopher,  of  the  naturalist  snd  the 
theologian,  in  all  ages,  form  the  basis  of  the  theistic  infer- 
ence, which  we  are  now  unfolding.  Never  before  has  the 
vision  of  philosophical  observation  been  able  to  reach  as 
far  as  now,  nor  has  the  inspection  of  science  ever  been  able 
to  look  so  deeply  into  this  great  problem  as  at  the  present 
day.  Order,  harmony,  law  and  uniformity  stretch  far  and 
wide  on  every  hand.  Theism  and  Christianity  have  nothing 
to  fear,  but  much  to  gain,  from  the  enlarged  vision.  We 
may  welcome  and  ever  use  the  telescope  and  the  microscope, 
the  observatory  and  the  laboratory,  in  getting  a  clear  vision 
of  this  wonderful  problem. 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


355 


III.  The  Solution  of  the  Problem  of  this  Proof.    §  85. 

This  solution  leads  us  to  inquire  concerning  the  best  ex- 
planation of  the  facts  of  order  in  the  cosmos.  There  are 
at  least  three  possible  solutions,  each  of  which  has  its  advo- 
cates. The  first  is  the  theory  of  chance,  with  which  the 
theory  of  fate  may  be  connected.  The  second  is  the  sup- 
position of  germinal  order  inherent  in  the  universe  itself. 
And  the  third  is  supplied  by  the  tbeistic  postulate.  The 
first  and  second  will  be  criticised  witii  a  view  to  the  con- 
firmation of  the  third. 

I.  The  theory  of  chance  and  that  C)f  fate  may  be  taken 
together,  for  though  they  are  apparently  very  different,  they 
are  not  really  so  in  principle.  Both  deny  the  need  of  intelli- 
gence to  explain  order.  Both  are  purely  niecliai.Icil ;  the 
one  mechanical  contingency,  and  tv  other  mechanical 
necessity.  What  happens  by  chance  cannot  be  otherwise 
than  it  is,  which  means  that  it  is  necessary.  And  what 
happens  by  fate  just  happens  so,  without  any  reason  for  it. 

This  theory,  whose  principle  is  mechanical  contingency, 
undertakes  to  explain  all  the  facts  of  order  in  the  universe 
by  supposing  that  a  succession  of  fortunate  chances  brought 
it  all  into  existence.  Through  infinite  time  this  process  of 
contingency  had  gone  on  by  slow  degrees,  and,  without  any 
guiding  wisdom,  things  began  to  fall  into  unity,  order  and 
harmony,  till  in  the  course  of  time  the  orderly  universe  now 
existing  came  to  be  what  it  is. 

This  scheme  seems  scarcely  worthy  of  serious  con- 
sideration, and  yet  it  has  a  considerable  place  in  human 
speculation.  It  was  the  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms  with 
Democritus,  Epicurus  and  Lucretius  among  the  ancients. 
In  modern  times  it  is  represented  by  the  cruder  current 
materialism  of  our  own  day.  According  to  the  ancients 
and  moderns  alike,  all  the  wonderful  facts  of  law,  system, 
order  and  harmony  observable  in  the  cosmos  are  the  result 


• 


I 


*S'i 


il 


,^t»m 


356 


APOLOGETICS. 


of  an  endless  number  of  happy  hits  which  have  been  taking 
place  during  countless  ages.  By  this  method,  cosmos  o-  tie 
out  of  chaos  by  chance  or  fate. 

2.  A  little  reflection  surely  shows  that  chance  cannot 
really  account  causally  for  anything.  In  its  very  idea  it  is 
inadequate.  Chance  is  simply  a  process,  and  requires  a 
causality.  Hence,  in  and  of  itself  it  can  really  explain 
nothing.  A  process  cannot  account  for  itself,  unless  we 
hold  to  empiricism  and  phenomenalism,  where  description 
takes  the  place  of  philosophy.  Chance  is  only  the  mode  in 
which  certain  events  come  to  pass,  oftentimes  with  a  con- 
fession of  ignorance  as  to  the  causality  which  bnngs  them 
to  pass.  To  say  that  events  happen  by  chance,  or  according 
to  fate,  is  simply  to  say  nothing  at  all  in  the  way  of  explana- 
tion. To  assert  that  order  was  produced  by  chance,  or  that 
law  arose  from  fate,  is  to  darken  counsel  by  words  without 
any  real  meaning. 

A  single  example  may  expose  the  absurdity  of  this  theory. 
Suppose  a  man  had  all  the  letters  of  the  great  poem.  Paradise 
Lost,  printed  singly  on  little  bits  of  paper.  Then  suppose 
that  he  put  them  all  into  a  bag,  and  then  went  with  them 
to  the  brow  of  a  high  hill  overlooking  a  level  valley.  And 
then,  suppose  that  he  scattered  them  out  on  the  wings  of 
the  wind,  to  bo  swept  over  the  valley,  that  they  might  all 
i-est  on  the  green  grass  somewhere.  How  often  would  he 
have  to  repeat  the  process  before  he  would  find  them  fall 
by  chance  into  the  very  order  they  have  in  Milton's  great 
poem?  Humanly  speaking,  it  could  never  be  done.  Now, 
this  is  a  simple  problem  compared  with  that  which  the 
system  and  order  of  the  universe  presents.  Without  further 
discussion,  therefore,  this  theory  may  be  set  aside  as  irra- 
tional and  absurd. 

3.  The  second  theory  is  much  more  subtile,  and  of  greater 
danger  to  the  theistic  inference  from  the  facts  of  order. 
It  is  Dased  on  certain  dynamical  and  ontological  evolutionary 
views  of  the  cosmos.    It  admits  that  the  principle  of  order 


I  •  i 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


357 


is  inherent  in  the  cosmos,  and  that  chance  alone  does  not 
solve  the  problem.    But  it  holds  that  this  principle  is  simply 
within  tht  universe,  and  that  it  neither  needs  nor  justifies 
the  inference  to  any  extra-mundane  causality  or  inte*     -nee. 
According  to  the  dynamical  view  of  matter  wh        this 
theory  holds,  there  is  supposed  to  be  latent  in  matter  certain 
potencies  which  provide  the  agency  by  which  the  facts  of 
order  are  wrought  out.    It  also  holds  that  there  is  an  evolu- 
tionary endowment  in  matter,  according  to  which  these 
potencies  operate  in  producing  the  facts  of  order  every- 
where.    This  general  theory  assumes  many  special  forms, 
and  appears  alike  in  ancient  and  modern  times.     The  old 
Stoic  doctrine  of  the  world  as  a  great  living  thing,  animated 
by  a  soul  or  life,  and  the  later  Platonic  conception  ot  a 
plastic  principle  in  the  cosmos,  moulding  it  into  order,  repre- 
sent this  theory.  All  modern  hylozooistic  views  of  the  nature 
of  matter,  and  the  refined  materialism  of  our  own  day,  that 
professes  to  discover  "the  promis.  ^  and  potency"  of  all  things 
in  matter,  are  also  exponents  of  this  theory.    Systems  which, 
like  that  of  Spencer,  hold  to  the  eternity  of  matter,  the 
persistence  of  force,  the  continuity  of  motion,  and  the  reality 
of  the  evolutionary  principle,  are  necessarily  on  this  ground, 
especially  if  agnosticism,  as  is  usually  the  case,  be  coupled 
with  them.    All  the  phenomena  of  order  which  the  universe 
reveals  are  explained  from  within  rather  than  from  without 
it.    The  principle  of  order  is  immanent  in  the  cosmos,  and 
as  it  emerges  in  the  universe  it  is  self -produced.     Hence, 
there  is  no  rational  ground  to  infer  an  extra-cosmic  intelli- 
gence, nor  is  there  any  need  for  the  theistic  postulate. 

A  more  refined  type  of  this  theory  admits  that  divine 
wisdom  ano  ^r  were  involved  in  the  origin  of  those 

potencies  am.  forniities  which  are  inherent  in  nature, 
and  that  exhibit  themselves  in  the  manifold  facts  of  order 
in  the  universe.  But  it  oenies  that  tliese  facts  as  they  now 
are  need  any  explanation,  save  their  deistic  origin  just  indi- 
cated.    But  this  practically  concedes  the  point,  and  puts 


358 


APOLOGETICS. 


asi 


the  fact  of  intelligence  only  a  step  further  back.  It  thus 
confesses  that  something  extra-mundane  must  be  admitted 
somewhere  to  account  for  the  genesis  of  order,  if  not  for 
its  present  reality.  The  argument  for  the  first  cause,  at 
least,  is  legitimate,  even  if  we  admit  the  force  of  this  theory. 
4.  But,  concerning  all  these  aspects  of  this  general  theory, 
it  need  only  be  pointed  out  that  they  either  assume  the 
reality  of  intelligence  to  account  for  order,  or  they  con- 
travene the  principle  of  causation,  which  is  implied  in  the 
proof  now  under  discussion.  If  they  admit  that  intelligence 
originated  germs  of  order  in  the  cosmos,  the  inference  to 
intelligence  from  order  holds  good.  It  is  practically 
assumed.  If  this  inference  be  denied,  both  the  efficiency 
and  sufficient  reason  of  causality  are  ignored.  As  the  facts 
of  order  arise,  a  causal  agency  of  some  sort  must  be  assumed 
to  account  for  them.  And  a  sufficient  reason  must  also 
be  adduced  to  e.xpla'n  the  precise  nature  of  the  law  and 
order  which  arise.  Unless,  therefore,  the  inference  from 
order  to  intelligence  is  invalid  and  needless,  th<?  theistic 
postulate  from  the  facts  of  order  is  both  sound  and  neces- 
sary to  account  for  them. 

5.  This  leads  to  the  third  theorj',  which  holds  that  the 
theistic  postulate  is  the  necessary  and  adequate  explanation 
of  the  problem  of  order  in  the  cosmos.  The  order  in  the 
cosmos  implies  intelligence,  and  intelligence  is  provided  by 
this  hypothesis.  The  analogy  between  this  order  and  that 
of  human  mechanism  aflfords  a  pertinent  illustration  of  this 
inferejice.  In  any  piece  of  complicated  machinery,  where 
all  the  parts  are  carefully  fitted  together  and  move  smoothly, 
we  instinctively  suppose  that  intelligence  had  something  to 
do  with  it.  So,  when  we  see  order  and  harmony  on  a  far 
larger  scale  in  the  cosmos,  we  naturally  infer  an  intelligence 
which  operated  on  the  cosmos,  as  well  as  in  it,  to  make  it 
what  it  is.  This  reasoning,  when  thus  applied  to  the  cosmos, 
justifies  the  inference  of  an  extra-mundane  intelligence 
which  shall  afford  an  adequate  reason  for  the  facts  of  order 


f 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


359 


in  the  universe.    This  fully  meets  the  demand  of  causation, 
for  it  provides  an  uncaused  cause,  and  a  sufficient  reason 
for  certain  phenomena  in  the  cosmos.    The  validity  of  this 
inference    turns   on   the   legitimacy   of   the   inference   of 
intellii-ence  from  order.     Are  we  justified  in  makmg  this 
inference?    We  justly  make  it  in  regard  to  problems  of 
order  which  human  mechanism  presents.    Are  we  justified 
in  making  a  similar  inference  in  regard  to  the  evident  and 
extensive  order  exhibited  in  what  may  be  called  the  me- 
chanism of  nature?    We  are  inclined  to  believe  that  such 
an  inference  is  legitimate,  if  no  other  hypothesis  meet    :hc 
case     It  has  already  been  shown  that  neither  chance,  nor 
fate,  nor  immanent  order  affords  a  rational  explanati^. 
so  that  we  are  urged  on  by  the  rational  demand  for  a  suffi- 
cient reason  and  adequate  ground,  to  adopt  the  theistic 
postulate  as  the  only  rational  solution  of  the  problem.     In 
this  we  securely  rest. 

It  is  proper  to  add  that  this  proof  has  its  Itmtts,  and  it 
has  to  be  construed  along  with  those  already  expounded. 
It  does  not  prove  a  creator  of  the  universe,  nor  does  it 
justify  the  conclusion  that  the  intelligence  which  it  postu- 
lates is  infinite.  It  simply  announces  that  an  intelligence 
adequate  to  explain  all  the  facts  must  be  assumed.  Then 
other  proofs  already  opened  up  having  given  us  the  pre- 
sumption of  a  being  corresponding  to  the  idea  we  have  of 
him,  and  that  such  a  being  is  necessarily  existing  and 
infinite,  we  find  in  this  notion  of  God  the  theistic  postulate, 
which  we  use,  in  harmony  with  the  principle  of  causation, 
to  give  a  truly  rational  solution  of  the  problem  of  order 
in  the  cosmos. 


i 


CHAPTER  IX. 
THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS:    PROOF  FROM  COSMIC  DESIGN. 

Contents. 

Fourth  Cosmical  Proof.— Design  Argument  old  and  strong.— Its 
History  of  interest.— Has  been  severely  Criticised.— This  Criticism  has 
done  good.— The  Principle  of  the  Proof. — Aristotle's  Four  Causes. — 
Efficient  and  Final  distinguished.— We  argue  to  and  from  Design. — 
Design  implies  Ends  and  Means.— Relation  of  Finality  to  Causality. — 
Not  distinct,  but  related.— Sufficient  Reason  prominent.— Relation  of 
Finality  to  Analogy. — Argument  from  Design  is  not  Proof  by  Analogy 
merely.— Yet  Analogy  illustrates  and  confirms  Finality  in  Nature. — 
The  Problem  of  the  Proof.— All  Cases  of  Means  and  Ends  in  the 
Cosmos. — Instances  given. — Care  needed  not  to  posit  Finality  where 
it  does  not  exist. — Finality  in  Nature  a  fact. — This  the  Problem. — Its 
Solution.— Theories. — Chance.— Subjective  Finality.— Immanent  Tele- 
ology.— Organic  and  Cosmic  Evolution.— Defective. — The  Theistic 
Postulate  needed. — Its  Limitations.  , 

LlTCKATtniE. 

Janet's  Fwal  Causes. — McCosh's  Typical  Forms  and  Sfeeial  Ends 
in  Creation,  Part  II.— Flint's  Theism,  Chaps.  V.,  VI.— Diman's  The 
Theistic  Argument,  Chaps.  IV.-VII.— Patton's  Syllabus  of  Theism.— 
Fisher's  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief,  Chap.  II. — Paley's 
Natural  Theology. — Hicks'  Critique  of  Design  Arguments,  Chaps. 
I.-XVIII.— r*r  Bridgewater  Treatises.— UnAizy's  Recent  Advances, 
Chap.  VII.— Bowne's  Studies  in  Theism.  Chap.  IV.— Orr's  Christian 
yieui  of  God  and  the  World,  Chap.  III.,  3-— Rishell's  The  Founda- 
tions of  the  Christian  Faith,  Div.  VII.,  Chap.  II.— Dabney's  Theology, 
Chaps.  I.,  II.— Hodge's  Systematic  Theology,  Vol.  I.,  Part  I.,  Chap.  II.— 
Foster's  Systematic  Theology,  Part  II.,  Chap.  I.,  3.~Shedd's  Dogmatic 
Theology,  Vol.  I.,  Div.  III.,  Chap.  III.— Strong's  Systematic  Theology, 
Part  II.,  Chap.  II.,  2.— Thornwell's  Collected  Writings,  Vol.  I.,  Chap. 
II.— Miley's  Systematic  Theology,  Part  I.,  Chap.  II.,  3.— Conder's  Basis 
of  Faith,  Chap.  IV.— Frascr's  Philosophy  of  Theism,  Vol.  II.,  Chap. 
III.— Mill's  Three  Fssays  on  Religion,  Part  I. — Stirling's  Philosophy 
and  Theology,  Chaps.  IV.-VI.— Ebrard's  Apologetics,  Vol.  I.,  Part  I., 
Book  I..  Sec.  I.,  85.  and  Book  II.,  Sees,  I.  II.— Stokes'  Natural  Theology, 
Chaps.  I.,  II,— Beattic's  Methods  of  Theism,  Part  II.,  Chap.  V.— Thom- 
son's Christian  Theism,  Book  II.,  Chap.  VI.,  1. 


'   I 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


361 


I.  Preliminary.    §  86. 

,.  rr^HE  fourth  phase  of  the  cosmical  argument  remains 
X      for  exposition  in  this  chapter.     We  are  now  to 
enter  the  wide  domain  of  what  older  writers  called  natural 
theology.    We  are  to  consider  the  proof  for  the  existence  of 
God  based  on  the  traces  of  design  which  appear  in  the  uni- 
verse.   It  is  often  designated  the  argument  from  Anal  causes. 
In  some  respects  this  is  one  of  the  most  venerable  of  all  the 
theistic  proofs,  and  its  directness  and  force  have  been  very 
generally  recognized.    On  this  account  it  has  a  very  large 
place  in  the  writings  upon  this  subject.     It  is  the  only 
proof  which  has  a  definite  place  in  the  Scriptures,  where  it 
is  found  especially  in  the  Book  of  Job.     Its  influence  on 
ordinary  minds  is  evidently  greater  than  that  of  any  of 
the  proofs,   except  perhaps  the  moral  argument.     Kant 
frank'y  acknowledges  its  force  and  effectiveness ;   for  when 
he  is  whetting  the  sword  of  his  destructive  criticism  against 
it,  he  admits  that  it  is  an  old  argument  worthy  of  much 
respect.    And  modern  mechanical  and  evolutionary  theories 
of  the  universe  are  expending  much  efifort  in  our  own  day 
to  explain  away  design  or  finality,  and  to  account  for  the 
facts  in  nature  which  these  terms  denote  without  assuming 
intelligence.    This  proof,  therefore,  is  of  crucial  importance 
to  the  theistic  view  of  the  universe. 

2.  The  history  of  this  proof  is  full  of  interest.  Tt  is  as 
old  as  Socrates  at  least,  thougli  the  doctrine  of  k'^t,  sug- 
gested by  Anaxagoras  to  account  for  certain  features  in 
the  cosmos,  seems  to  have  been  an  anticipation  of  the 
teleology  of  Socrates.  Plato,  with  great  l>eauty,  unf  Ids 
the  same  proof  in  the  Timicus,  and  Aristotle,  who  lays  so 
much  stress  on  the  proof  for  a  first  cause,  is  not  without 
allusions  to  the  proof  from  design  also.  In  the  middle 
ages,  Selwnde  reasrmed  in  a  teleolngical  way  at  a  time 
when  the  schoolmen  were  chiefly  occupied  with  ontological 


V 


36a 


APOLOGETICS. 


speculations.  In  modem  times,  Niewentyt  in  Holland 
appears  as  the  forerunner  of  Paley  in  England.  And  Paley, 
in  turn,  is  usually  regarded  as  the  founder  of  that  teleological 
method  of  natural  theology  which  appears  in  the  Bridge- 
water  Treatises,  and  in  many  other  writings,  wherein  this 
proof  is  elaborated  in  various  forms,  and  illuminated  by 
numerous  instances  of  design  in  nature.  For  a  time  after 
Paley,  and  especially  among  English  apologists,  this  proof 
had  a  very  wide  scope  given  to  it,  and  it  was  relied  on 
very  generally  to  vindicate  the  reality  of  the  divine  exist- 
ence. In  our  own  day,  it  is  very  much  more  clearly  defined, 
and  has  its  proper  place  given  to  it  beside  the  other  lines 
of  proof. 

3.  Hosts  of  critics,  especially  in  recent  times,  have  risen 
up  in  arms  against  the  argument  from  design.  It  is  very 
evident  that  the  opponents  of  theism  recognize  this  proof 
for  the  exstence  of  God  to  be  one  of  the  strongholds  of 
theism.  The  result  is  that  the  principle  of  final  cause,  and 
the  theistic  inference  based  upon  it,  have  been  subjected  to 
the  severest  scrutiny.  But  at  the  present  day,  those  who 
support  the  validity  of  the  theistic  argument  have  every 
reason  to  be  satisfied  with  the  results  of  this  criticism,  for 
much  good  has  come  out  of  it.  The  admission  is  freely 
made  that  many  writers  on  natural  theology  half  a  century 
ago  were  more  eloquent  than  logical,  and  sometimes  mistook 
illustration  for  proof.  Yet  it  does  not  follow  that  the  prin- 
ciple which  underlies  their  reasonings  is  not  sound.  Even 
if  we  grant  that  the  early  writers  on  natural  theology  put 
more  theistic  content  into  the  conclusion  than  the  premises 
warranted,  when  they  inferred  an  infinite  creator  from  the 
facts  of  design,  still  it  can  be  successfully  maintained  that 
they  did  splendid  service  against  atheism  and  deism.  The 
criticism  to  which  this  proof  has  been  subjected  has  ex- 
hibited its  central  principle  more  clearly,  and  has  confined 
its  inference  more  strictly  to  the  facts  of  the  problem  it 
solves.    On  this  account  the  argument  from  design  has  been 


m 


J 


Vk 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


363 


made  more  effective  than  ever.  Janet,  in  his  great  treatise 
on  Final  Causes,  amply  justifies  this  statement.  The  pres- 
ence of  teleology,  as  inherent  in  the  universe,  is  now  more 
fully  assured  than  ever,  and  the  necessity  for  a  proper 
explanation  of  it  is  even  more  urgent  than  a  generation 
ago.  It  is  also  worth  while  noting  the  fact  that  modem 
evolutionary  doctrines,  which  profess  to  supersede  teleology 
altogether,  can  scarcely  express  themselves  without  using 
the  language  of  design,  adaptation,  or  adjustment.  Tele- 
ology, therefore,  cannot  be  discarded,  but  must  be  properly 
explained. 

II.  The  Principle  of  this  Proof.    §  87. 

I.  By  some  writers  this  principle  is  called  that  of  special 
order.  McCosh  applies  the  term  special  ends  to  it.  as  dis- 
tinguished from  typical  forms.  As  the  latter  is  the  proof 
from  order,  so  the  former  is  the  argument  from  design. 
But  this  is  only  a  general  statement,  and  we  must  endeavor 
to  show  more  clearly  the  principle  involved  in  design,  or 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  as  it  appears  in  nature.  That 
principle  may  be  called  teleology  or  finality,  for  these  terms 
mean  the  same  thing.  Perhaps  the  best  term  to  denote 
the  principle  of  this  proof  is  that  of  final  cause.  This  title 
has  the  advantage  of  signalizing  the  idea  of  ends  in  nature, 
and  of  associating  this  argtiment  with  the  principle  of 

causation. 

2.  To  bring  out  cleariy  the  aspect  of  causation  involved 
in  the  principle  of  this  proof,  Aristotle's  fourfold  view  of 
causation  may  be  noted.  According  to  the  Greek  polymath, 
the  cause  of  anything  may  be  viewed  as  formal,  material, 
efficient  or  final  cause.  Its  formal  cause  is  the  scheme  or 
plan  according  to  which  it  is  framed;  its  material  cause  is 
the  material  out  of  which  it  is  constructed ;  its  efficient  cause 
is  the  agency  involved  in  its  production ;  and  its  final  cause 
is  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  brought  into  existence.     In 


I 


3^ 


APOLOGETICS. 


1^ 


the  case  of  a  house,  for  example,  the  plan  of  the  architect 
is  its  formal  cause,  the  materials  of  which  it  is  built  make 
its  material  cause,  the  workmen  who  build  it  are  its  efficient 
cause,  and  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  intended  is  its  final 
cause.  It  is  evident  that  the  last  aspect  of  causality  has 
some  relation  to  all  the  others;  for  the  purpose  we  have 
in  view  determines  the  plan  of  the  house,  and  the  plan  affects 
the  materials,  and  the  materials  modify  the  agency  of  the 
builders.  So,  in  nature,  the  principle  of  finality,  if  its 
presence  be  admitted,  has  a  wide  sweep. 

Without  .admitting  the  value  of  all  that  is  implied  in  Aris- 
totle's doctrine,  it  is  evident  that  it  serves  to  bring  out  the 
real  diFrinction  between  the  efficient  and  the  Anal  aspects 
of  causality.  The  former  denotes  the  agency  which  effects 
any  change;  the  latter  suggests  the  purpose  for  which  the 
change  is  brought  about.  In  the  one  case,  the  power  pro- 
ducing an  event,  and  in  the  other  the  reason  for  it,  is 
expressed.  The  first  is  mainly  a  dynamical  and  the  latter 
chiefly  a  rational  conception.  In  this  way  agency  and  end 
are  distinguished.  It  is  further  evident  that  the  aspect  of 
causation  which  is  prominent  in  the  principle  of  this  proof 
is  that  of  sufficient  reason.  On  this  account  final  cause  and 
sufficient  reason  are  closely  related.  If  there  be  design,  or 
adaptation,  or  final  cause  in  nature,  a  sufficient  reason  for 
it  must  be  provided.  If  there  be  teleology  in  the  world,  it 
must  be  rationally  accounted  for.  If  there  be  finality  in 
things,  an  adequate  explanation  of  this  fact  must  be  given. 
a;-  )f  which  shows  that  final  cause  and  sufficient  reason 
imply  each  other. 

3.  But  the  principle  of  this  proof,  thus  suggested  in  a 
general  way,  has  had  various  interpretations  given  to  it. 
Some  say  that  it  bids  us  argue  to  design,  and  others  contend 
that  it  leads  to  an  inference  from  design.  In  the  former 
case,  we  have  mainly  to  vindicate  the  fact  that  desi^jn  or 
finality  pertains  to  nature,  and  in  the  latter  we  undertake 
to  infer  an  extra-cosmic  intelligence  from  design  or  finality. 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


365 


It  may  be  nearer  the  truth  to  maintain  that  the  principle 
of  the  proof  now  under  discussion  embraces  both  of  these 
views.    We  may  be  said  to  reason  to  design  when  we  show 
that  finality  or  teleology  is  a  fact  inherent  in  nature,  and 
we  argue  from  design  when  we  proceed  to  infer  intelligence 
from  this  finality.    Some  writers,  like  Hicks,  contend  that 
we  cannot  state  the  teleological  proof  without  taking  for 
granted  the  very  intelligence  we  are  seeking  to  prove.    But 
this  is  a  mistake  from  which  we  may  be  saved  if  we  keep 
the  distinction  just  noted  in  mind.     So  far  as  finality  is 
concerned,  it  simply  means  that  in  nature  things  seem  to 
be  fitted  for  each  other,  and  that  certain  ends  are  related 
to  certain  means.    At  this  stage  we  need  not  decide  whether 
the  means  determine  the  ends,  or  the  ends  bring  the  means 
into  play.    The  simple  fact  that  they  are  linked  together 
in  nature  is  what  design,  or  finality,  expresses.     At  this 
stage,  it  cannot  be  said  that  intelligence  is  simply  assumed 
in  finality.    But  when  the  fact  of  finality  in  nature  has  been 
established,  a  sufficient  reason  for  this  feature  of  the  cosmos 
must  be  discovered.     The  postulate  of  an  extra-cosmic 
intelligence  supplies  it  for  this  proof,  just  as  it  affords  the 
sufficient  reason  for  the  facts  of  order  in  nature  according 
to  the  eutaxiological  proof.    In  a  word,  we  find  finality  in 
nature,  and  infer  intelligence  from  finality. 

4.  But  what  is  this  design  or  adaptation?  What  par- 
ticular feature  of  the  cosmos  does  teleology  or  finality 
denote?  The  proper  answer  tc  these  queries  gives  the 
principle  of  this  proof.  In  general,  it  may  be  said  that 
design  or  teleology  implies  an  end,  a  plan  or  an  ideal  which 
is  forecast  and  realized  in  nature.  This  general  statement 
implies  two  related  things.  First,  we  observe  in  nature 
what  looks  like  ends  towards  which  its  activities  are  directed. 
An  ideal  future  result  seems  to  be  forecast,  and  in  nature 
there  appears  a  tendency  towards  its  realization.  It  might 
almost  be  called  nature's  prediction  and  fulfilment.  This 
is  what  Ebrard  fittingly  calls  design-setting  in  nature.    This 


'  *  1 


IHita 


366 


APOLOGETICS. 


I    i.l 


simply  means  that  somehow  nature  seems  to  have  what 
looks  like  purpose  and  forethought.  Secondly,  we  also  ob- 
serve in  nature  that  certain  means  come  into  play,  and  are 
made  effective  towards  securing  the  forecast  ends.  By 
virtue  of  these  means  the  plan  is  matured,  and  the  ideal 
realized.  In  some  remarkable  way  the  means  and  the  end, 
the  tendency  and  the  ideal,  the  resources  and  the  plan,  seem 
to  be  linked  together  in  such  a  manner  that  the  end  is 
attained,  the  ideal  is  realized,  and  the  plan  is  completed. 
This  is  what  nature  exhibits  to  obs.   vation. 

These,  then,  are  the  two  main  features  of  design  or 
finality.  A  design  seems  to  be  set  for  nature,  and  conditions 
arise  which  bring  it  into  effect.  Certain  ends  seem  to  be 
projected,  and  agencies  operate  to  effect  those  ends.  The 
analogy  between  chis  aspect  of  nature  and  human  activity 
is  often  used  to  illustrate  this  principle  and  its  application. 
While  analogy  is  useful  for  purposes  of  illustration,  tare 
must  be  taken  not  to  look  upon  the  proof  from  design  as 
merely  an  analogical  mode  of  reasoning. 

5.  The  precise  relation  of  design  or  finality  to  amsality 
has  been  much  discussed  and  variously  understood.  Sonic 
writers  look  upon  them  as  entirely  distinct  principles;  others 
construe  one  in  relation  to  the  other.  Some  hold  that  both 
finality  and  causality  are  a  priori  in  their  nature;  while 
others  deny  the  a  priori  nature  of  one  or  both  of  these  facts. 
Reid,  Porter,  and  intuitioi.alists  generally,  regard  the  prin- 
ciple of  design  as  a  priori,  or  intuitive,  while  Mill  and  Janet, 
in  quite  different  senses,  look  upon  finality  as  inductive  or 
analogical.  What,  then,  is  the  relation  of  finality  to  causa- 
tion? In  our  classification  of  the  theistic  proofs,  we 
construed  the  proof  from  design  under  the  principle  of 
causality.  This  implies  a  close  relation  between  these  two 
facts.  Th«  fact  that  we  classify  the  proof  from  design 
under  causation  implies  a  certain  a  priori  character  about 
it,  for  causation  has  this  character.  The  elements  of  causa- 
tion which  enter  into  final  cause  are  efficiency  and  sufficient 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


367 


reason.  The  fact  of  efficiency  is  involved  in  the  efficacy 
of  means  to  attain  the  projected  ends,  for  thereby  the  ideal 
or  design-setting  is  realized.  To  effect  the  changes  involved 
in  this  process  certain  agencies  are  needed.  These  are  pro- 
vided by  the  fact  of  efficiency  implied  in  causation.  But 
this  is  not  the  main  aspect  of  causality  involved  in  finality. 
This  efficiency  takes  a  given  direction  as  the  means  realize 
the  end.  This  implies  that  there  is  something  in  the  means 
which  makes  the  end  just  what  it  is  and  not  otherwise. 
This  is  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  and  it  implies  some 
sort  of  kinship  between  the  means  and  the  end.  Hence, 
finality  is  causation  looking  towards  and  realizing  an  end, 
and  the  principle  of  the  teleological  proof  consists  in  an 
application  of  the  principle  of  causality  to  the  facts  in  nature 
which  the  term  finality  denotes.  This  we  take  to  be  a 
impler  and  clearer  view  than  to  make  finality  and  causality 
entirely  distinct  principles. 

6.  The  relation  of  the  principle  of  this  proof  to  analogy 
needs  to  be  clearly  understood.  What  is  the  relation  of 
Unality  to  analogy?  Is  the  theistic  inference  from  design 
merely  an  arg^ument  from  analogy?  Analogy,  it  may  be 
first  explained,  consists  in  the  resemblance  of  relations 
between  things  that  have  something  in  common.  Thus  the 
foot  of  a  chair  is  analogous  to  the  foot  of  a  horse,  because 
the  object  denoted  by  the  term  foot  sustains  a  like  relation 
to  the  chair  that  it  does  to  the  horse.  Though  the  objects 
themselves  are  very  different,  their  relations  are  similar. 
Those  who  make  the  theistic  proof  from  design  turn  on 
analogy  argue  from  certain  features  in  works  of  man's 
agency  and  skill  to  the  adaptations  of  means  to  ends  in 
nature.  The  inference  is  thereby  made  that  since  it  is  very 
evident  that  intelligence  is  involved  in  works  of  human 
skill,  so  also  may  similar  intelligence  be  implied  in  the  marks 
of  design  observed  in  nature.  This  use  of  analogy  is  promi- 
nent in  Paley;  and  Janet,  in  the  first  part  of  his  treatise, 
with  acute  discrimination,  gives  analogy  a  place  in  con- 


I  • 


!    '     , 


ill 

1 


HKXOCOn   RBOUITION   TBT  CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHAUT  No.  2) 


^PPLJED  KVMGE    I 

1653  c„i  y„,„   ^'^,  ~ 


368 


APOLOGETICS. 


! 


nection  with  finality.  Kant's  criticism  of  the  teleological 
proof  assumes  that  analogy  has  much  to  do  with  the  theistic 
inference  it  makes. 

Careful  discrimination  is  needed  here.     It  is  freely  ad- 
mitted that  analogy  may  be  of  service  in  illustrating  this 
argument,  and  in  answering  objections  to  it.    At  the  same 
time,  we  incline  to  the  opinion  that  mere  analogy  is  not 
the  real  principle  of  the  teleological  proof.    In  that  proof 
there  are  two   tages.    The  first  is  the  vindication  of  finality 
as  inherent  in  nature,  and  the  other  is  the  theistic  inference 
from  that  finality.     In  making  good  the  former,  analogy 
has  much  value.     Here  the  analogy  between  what  Janet 
calls  "the  industry  of  men"  and  "the  industry  of  nature" 
is  valid  and  of  force.     If  in  the  former  case  we  see  that 
means  are  used  to  effect  certain  projected  ends,  so  in  the 
latter  we  may  rightly  conclude  that  a  similar  adaptation 
exists.     But  in  both  cases  we  simply  establish  finality  in 
the  two  spheres  in  question,  and  the  facts  in  the  human 
sphere  illustrate,  by  analogy,  the  facts  in  the  sphere  of 
nature.     But  the  question  still  arises  as  to  the  cause  or 
sufficient  reason  of  finality  in  both  cases.     Here  we  pass, 
in  both  cases,  from  analogy  to  causation,  when  we  make 
the  inference  from  finality  to  intelligence.    Causal  efficiency 
is  involved  in  the  agency  which  renders  the  mea*  ^  effective 
for  the  ends  in  view,  alike  in  the  case  of  man's  agency  and 
skill,  and  in  that  of  nature.     And  the  feature  of  sufficient 
reason  must  also  be  assumed  to  account  for  the  precise 
nature  of  the  ends  in  view,  and  to  exhibit  the  relation 
between  the  means  and  the  ends  where  finality  is  present. 
Instead,  tlierefore,  of  reasoning  by  analogy  from  human  to 
divine  intelligence,  we  rather  infer,  by  virtue  of  causation, 
that  the  postulate  of  intelligence  is  needed  to  provide  a 
sufficient   reason    for   marks   of   design   in   both   spheres. 
Hence,  the  form  of  logical  inference  from  a  watch,  and 
from  the  eye,  with  their  respective  marks  of  finality,  to  an 
adequate  intelligence,  is  precisely  the  same  in  both  cases. 


r 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


369 


The  fact  that  the  agency  and  intelligence  are  more  evident 
in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other  does  not  affect  t'le  prin- 
ciple of  this  proof.  This  principle,  therefore,  is  not  mere 
analogy.  Analogy  may  vindicate  and  illustrate  finality  in 
nature,  but  causation  is  necessar>'  to  make  the  theistic  infer- 
ence from  finality  in  nature.  That  this  is  true  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that  even  after  finality  is  shown  to  be  inherent 
in  nature,  the  quertion  still  remains  as  to  whether  this 
finality  implies  mechanism  or  intelligence  to  account  for  it. 
And  if  intelligence  is  necessary  to  explain  finality  in  a 
rational  way,  the  further  question  at  once  arises  as  to 
whether  this  intelligence  is  intra-cosmic  or  extra-cosmic. 
To  answer  these  quesMons,  the  principle  of  causation  is 
required,  as  will  !)e  more  fully  shown  in  the  last  section 
of  this  chapter. 

It  is  very  important  to  keep  this  distinction  in  mind.  It 
protects  the  teleological  arj^aunent  from  certain  objections 
which  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  merely 
analogical.  It  also  shows  that  the  theistic  inference  of  this 
proof  rests  on  the  principle  of  causation,  and  that  it  is  a 
legitimate  application  of  that  principle.  Hence,  we  conclude 
that  the  theistc  inference  of  the  teleo-theistic  proof  is  neither 
inductive  nor  analogical,  but  causal.  Induction  and  analogj' 
may  establish  and  illustrate  finality  as  a  feature  of  nature, 
but  the  theistic  inference  here  made  consists  in  an  application 
of  the  principle  of  causality  to  the  facts  of  design,  that 
is,  finality,  in  nature. 


'   f 


i 


M 

4 


■ 


1i' 


III.  The  Problem  of  this  Proof.    §  88. 

I.  This  problem  is  of  vast  extent  and  great  variety.  It 
includes  all  the  marks  of  design,  all  the  instances  of  the 
adaptation  of  means  to  crds,  observed  in  nature.  It  em- 
braces all  those  combinations  in  nature  where  finality,  as 
distinguished  from  mere  order,  appears.  These  features  of 
the  cosmos  constitute  the  materials  or  the  proof,  and  present 
34 


f.;< 


¥i1 


i 


'I    ! 


370  APOLOGETICS. 

the  problem  now  to  be  solved.    Two  things  have  to  be  done 
in  exhibiting  the  problem  in  a  definite  way.    The  facts  have 
to  be  sketched  in  outline,  and  the  reality  of  the  design  or 
finality  therein  implied  has  to  be  vindicated.     In  the  older 
natural  theology  the  first  of  these  things  was  the  mam  factor 
in  this  problem;  but  in  our  own  day,  owing  largely  to  the 
influence  of  the  hypothesis  of  evolution,  the  second  has  come 
to  be  a  matter  of  vital  importance  m  connection  with  this 
proof.     In  regard  to  the  first,  only  the  hem  of  nature  s 
garment  can  be  touched  in  setting  forth  the  facts  which 
constitute  the  problem.    Limitations  of  space  compel  great 
condensation,  and  cause  us  to  direct  the  reader's  attention 
to  current  f^atises  on  natural  theology,  and  in  respect  to 
the  second  phase  of  the  problem  not  much  need  be  said 
here,  inasmuch  as  the  bearing  of  evolution  on  finality  will 
be  considered  more  fully  in  the  third  main  division  of  this 
treatise     It  is  the  less  necessary  to  set  forth  a  vast  array 
of  ihe  facts,  since  the  force  of  the  inference  made  from 
them  does  not  depend  so  much  on  *he  number  of  the  facts 
as  upon  their  nature  and  meaning.     A  trw  well  assured 
instances  of  design,  or  cases  of  finality,  really  constitute 
the  problem,  and  justify  the  theistic  inference.    Nor  is  there 
urgent  need  to  follow  out  at  any  length  the  mechanistic 
explanation  whicli  modern  evolution  gives  of  these  facts, 
since  that  very  evolution  can  neither  state  its  case  nor  make 
its  assault  upon  the  teleology  of  nature  without  using  terms 
such  as  end,  adaptation,  and  adjustment,  which  carry  with 
them  a  teleological  meaning,  in  spite  of  all  the  protestations 
J3f  naturally  Lie  evolution  to  the  contrary. 
'    2.  In  setting  forth  certain  of  the  facts  which  constitute 
the  problem  of  this  proof  some  of  the  larger  instances  of 
finality  in  nature  may  first  be  n-         ned.     Here  we  come 
within  sight  of  the  facts  of  order  in  me  cosmos ;  for  in  many 
cases  the  law  and  harmony  therein  seems  to  have  an  end 
or  purpose  in  view.     In  such  cases  order  and  design  are 
both  present,  and  it  is  the  latter  with  which  we  are  now 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


J7I 


concerned.  All  that  is  involved  in  the  fact  ot  gravitation, 
in  the  way  of  effecting  the  end  of  a  stable  universe,  is  part 
of  the  problem.  The  position  and  power  of  the  sun  in 
relation  to  the  planets  of  our  soiar  system  to  the  end  that 
it  is  the  centre  of  regular  motion,  the  fountain  of  light, 
and  the  source  of  heat,  so  that  the  solar  system  may  be 
preserved,  and  the  life  upon  this  earth  be  perpetuated,  supply 
many  instances  of  finality.  The  procession  of  the  equinoxes, 
and  the  revolution  of  our  earth  upon  its  axis,  to  the  end 
that  there  may  be  successive  seasons,  and  recurring  day  and 
night,  are  pertinent  cases  of  adaptation  of  means  to  ends. 
The  qualities  of  the  ether  in  relation  to  light,  and  the 
atmosphere  with  reference  to  sound,  supply  many  striking 
instances  of  design  The  phenomena  of  evaporation,  con- 
densation and  precipitation,  to  the  end  that  the  waters  of 
the  sea  may  oe  carried  to  the  fields  and  forests  of  the  dry 
land,  so  as  to  keep  it  fertile  and  render  it  fruitful,  are 
striking  instances  of  the  facts  of  this  problem.  The  relation 
of  the  anim?.l  and  vegetable  kingdoms,  in  the  matter  of  the 
interchange  of  oxygen  and  carbon,  and  the  various  recupera- 
tive resources  of  nature,  reveal  instances  of  finality. 

3.  The  observation  of  organisms  in  the  animal  kingdom 
shows  that  in  particular  organs  there  are  many  striking 
instances  of  finality,  wherein  the  adaptation  of  the  various 
parts  of  the  organ  realizes  an  end  wiiose  purpose  can  hardly 
be  mistaken.  The  eye,  with  its  varied,  complex  and  delicate 
organization,  and  the  remarkable  combination  of  its  entire 
structure  to  the  end  that  vision  may  be  realized,  is  the  classic 
instance  of  finality  in  single  organs.  Then  the  human  hand, 
with  its  palm,  and  fingers,  and  thumb,  and  joints,  and  the 
evident  combirntion  of  all  of  these  to  certain  well-defined 
ends;  the  wings  of  the  bird,  combining  strength,  rapid 
motion  and  little  weight  in  a  very  high  degree,  to  the  end 
that  flight  may  be  realized ;  the  webbed  feet  in  water-fowl, 
the  fins  of  fishes,  the  ear  in  various  animals,  and  ten 
thousand  instances  of  which  full  descriptions  may  be  found 


f< 


I'  I 


! 


372  APOLOGETICS. 

in  books  on  natural  theology,  present  another  group  of  the 
facts  composing  this  problem. 

A    The  organic  kingdom  exhibits  many  mstances  of  the 
correlation  of  organs  with  each  other  for  certain  evident 
purposes.     Here  the  adjustments  are  often  very  niarked. 
The  relation  of  the  heart  to  the  lungs  for  the  purification 
of  the  blood  is  a  pertinent  case  of  finality.     As  the  blood 
is  forced  into  the  lungs  it  comes  into  contact  with  the  fresh 
air  which  respiration  brings  into  their  cells,  and  there,  by 
a  curious  chemical  process,  the  excess  of  carbon  is  given 
off,  and  certain  elements  of  oxygen  taken  in,  so  that  the 
blood  is  sent  on  its  way  through  the  body  purified.     The 
teeth  and  the  digestive  organs  of  various  animals  are  fitted 
-or  each  other  in  a  most  undoubted  way.    In  carnivorous, 
herbivorous  and  omnivorous  animals,  respectively,  the  teeih 
and  digestive  apparatus  are  so  adjusted  to  each  other  that 
the  one  could  scarcely  subsist  on  the  food  of  the  other.    Even 
the  appropriation  of  food  would  be  difficult,  save  m  harmony 
with  this  adjustment.     The  short  neck  and  long  trunk  of 
the  elephant,  the  long  legs  and  long  neck  of  the  crane,  the 
thumb  in  relation  to  the  fingers  of  the  hand,  and  the  eye- 
brows with  reference  to  the  eyes,  are  familiar  instances  of 
this  group  of  facts  exhibiting  finality. 

c  Then  the  adaptation  of  organs  to  certain  functions  ^i 
equally  evident,  and  introduces  some  new  factors  into  the 
problem.  Here  organs  are  not  sc  much  coordinated  with 
each  other,  as  associated  with  some  function  which  they 
are  suited  to  serve,  for  the  welfare  of  the  organism.  The 
feet  of  man,  or  beast,  or  bird,  seem  to  have  been  constructed 
for  the  purpose  of  walking,  and  this,  in  each  case,  according 
to  its  own  definite  type.  The  case  of  the  wmgs  of  birds 
is  very  remarkable,  as  may  be  seen  in  the  humming-bird 
or  the  eagle.  Here  the  industry  of  nature  far  surpasses 
the  industry  of  man,  for  man  has  never  yet  made  a  really 
successful  flying-machine.  The  same  is  true  of  the  fins 
of  fishe«  for  swimming,  the  eyes  01  animals  for  seeing,  the 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


373 


ears  for  hearing,  the  heart  for  the  circulation  of  the  blood, 
the  hands  for  grasping,  the  nose  for  smelling,  and  number- 
less other  cases,  are  all  instances  of  adaptation  which  belong 
to  this  problem. 

The  objection  which  organic  evolution  makes  to  these 
facts,  to  the  effect  that  the  function  produced  the  organ, 
need  only  be  mentioned  here,  and  dismissed  with  the  single 
remark  that  function,  at  first,  according  to  the  evolutionist, 
could  only  mean  sense  of  need ;  and  that  sense  of  need  has 
never  yet  been  clearly  proved  competent  to  produce  an 
entirely  new  organ.  It  may  be  admitted  that  organ  and 
function  are  closely  related,  and  that  function  may  modify 
organ  to  some  extent,  yet  it  must  be  held,  in  the  light  of  all 
the  facts,  that,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  organ  logically 
conditions  function  and  makes  it  possible. 

6.  The  adaptation  of  organs  to  environment  gives  another 
group  of  instances  of  finality.  Here  we  find  organs  ad- 
justed in  various  ways  to  the  medium  w'nerein  their  destiny 
is  to  be  worked  out.  The  lungs  to  the  air,  the  eye  to  light, 
the  ear  to  the  atmosphere,  fins  to  the  water,  oil  for  the 
feathers  of  water-fowl,  warm  fur  for  animals  in  cold  coun- 
tries, the  summer  and  winter  plumage  of  birds  in  certain 
climates,  the  feature  of  mimicry  in  certain  insects  and 
animals,  whereby  the  color  of  their  bodies  comes  to  resemble 
their  immediate  environment,  the  formation  of  organs  in 
young  mammals  for  a  prospective  environment  very  dif- 
ferent from  that  of  their  embryonic  state,  and  scores  of 
similar  cases,  illustrate  this  group  of  the  facts  where  finality 
is  to  be  observed.  The  objection  here  made  by  organic 
evolution,  that  environment  may  have  produced  the  organ 
and  the  function,  noed  only  be  noted  here,  and  set  aside 
with  the  remark  that,  while  environment  may  modify  exist- 
ing organs,  it  has  never  been  known  to  produce  entirely  new 
org.'  1  .  Much  less  can  it  account  for  organs  originating 
in  c  ,  environment,  with  the  end  in  view  of  discharging 
functions  in  an  entirely  different  environment,  as,  for  ex- 


1- 


U, 


pfSi 


374 


APOLOGETICS. 


ample,  the  eyes  and  ears  of  a  young  mammal.  This  must 
suffice  as  a  brief  survey  of  the  facts  where  the  problem  of 
finality  lies.  What  looks  like  means  and  ends  is  in  nature. 
7.  Before  we  pass  to  the  solution  of  the  problem,  the 
reality  of  design,  as  inherent  in  the  facts  of  this  problem 
as  briefly  recited,  must  be  assured,  for  if  there  be  no  finality 
there  might  be  no  real  problem,  and  consequently  no  basis 
for  the  theistic  inference. 

Three  remarks  may  serve,  first  of  all,  to  limit  our  view 
of  the  problem  to  its  proper  materials.     First,  we  do  not 
feel  cal'ed  upon  to  show  that  everything  in  nature  must 
have  some  final  cause  in  order  to  make  good  the  reality  of 
the  problem  of  finality.     Some  of  the  older  writers  on 
natural  theology  perhaps  erred  in  this  respect,  in  seeking 
to  find  finality  in  everything.    It  may  not  be  possible  to  do 
this,  and  it  certainly  is  not  necessary  to  the  reality  of  the 
problem.     Secondly,  we  shall  be  careful  not  to  postulate 
finality  where  it  does  not  really  exist  in  the  combinations 
of  nature.    To  say  that  noses  were  made  to  wear  spectacles, 
that  trees  were  made  for  squirrels  to  climb,  or  that  the  tide 
rises  for  sea-bathing  purposes,  illustrates  this  limitation. 
These  and  many  similar  cases  are  no  part  of  the  problem 
of  finality.     And,  thirdly,  instances  w'.iere  nature's  com- 
binations produce  pain  are  not  necessa'-'  parts  of  finality, 
unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  pro  '  *  pain  is  the 

end  nature  has  in  view  by  the  ci  .in  question. 

The  ner\'e  of  the  tooth  is  not  for  th    ■  .  of  producing 

toothache,  arsenic  does  not  exist  in  -.. . ..  to  cause  death, 
nor  does  the  appendix  form  part  of  the  human  system  with 
a  view  to  the  production  of  disease.  If  due  consideration 
be  given  to  Uiis  point,  the  objection  to  teleology  in  nature, 
based  on  the  fact  of  pain,  will  be  greatly  minimized.  These 
three  observations  lead  us  to  confine  the  materials  of  the 
problem  strictly  to  cases  wherein  finality  is  an  assured  fact. 
The  combinations  in  nature  must  clearly  have  in  view  the 
securing  of  some  definite  end  before  design  or  finality  can 


'    i 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


375. 


be  asserted  of  any  combinations.    This  limits  the  problem 
to  its  legitimate  sphere. 

8.  But  even  in  this  sphere,  is  design  a  fact,  is  finality 
really  present,  is  teleology  inherent  in  cases  in  nature  where 
means  and  ends  seem  to  be  rationally  related  ?  Those  who 
give  a  purely  mechanical  interpretation  of  nature,  and  those 
who  hold  a  definite  monistic  theory  of  real  existence,  are 
ready  to  deny  that  there  is  any  finality  which  requires  an 
extra-cosmic  explanation.  As  this  point  comes  up  still 
more  definitely  in  the  next  section  of  this  chapter,  all  we 
need  now  say  is  that  the  cofnm(.)n  instinctive  judgments 
of  men  are  in  favor  of  the  postulate  of  fitiality  in  nature. 
Many  of  the  mythological  interpretations  of  nature  imply 
this ;  and  much  of  the  scientific  and  economic  uses  to  which 
the  resources  of  nature  are  put  in  our  own  day  involve 
finality.  And  the  evolutionary  hypothesis,  neither  in  its 
Darwinian,  Spencerian  nor  Weissmanian  form,  has  been 
able  to  exorcise  teleology  from  nature.  We  are  pretty  safe 
in  assuming  that  in  nature  there  is  design  as  well  as  order, 
finality  as  well  as  law,  and  teleology  as  well  as  agency. 

IV.  The  Solution  of  the  Problem.    §  89. 

That  design  or  finality  is  inherent  in  nature  is  now  taken 
for  granted.  That  certain  things  in  the  cosmos  are  con- 
nected in  a  teleological  way  may  be  assumed.  This  being 
the  case,  we  have  a  problem  to  solve.  The  various  theories 
presented  for  its  solution  must  be  passed  under  review.  In 
particular,  we  must  see  whether  the  theistic  inference  is 
needed  for  its  adequate  solution. 

I.  From  the  nature  of  the  case  materialists  must  hold 
that  there  is  no  finality  in  nature,  and  that  what  appears 
to  be  design  is  simply  mechanism.  This,  of  course,  leaves 
no  basis  for  intelligence  or  the  theistic  inference.  Ac- 
cording to  this  general  view,  the  facts  of  design  must  be 
explained  as  matters  of  chance  or  necessity.     Things  just 


f 


t    <r 


I 


4  -.k 


m 


I! 


ii-J 


\\'\ 


t;(a 


1 


iin< 


376 


APOLOGETICS. 


happen  so,  or  they  must  be  so.  There  is  in  nature  no  such 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends  as  to  imply  purpose  and 
intelligence.  There  is  really  no  spiritual  princip!  in  the 
cosmos,  and  all  the  facts  of  supposed  finality  must  be  con- 
strued in  terms  of  matter  and  force.  Then,  since  matter 
is  dead  and  force  blind,  mechanical  contingency  or  necessity 
must  account  for  those  features  in  nature  which  look  like 
design.  Nature,  by  a  series  of  happy  hits  through  long 
ages,  finally  succeeded  in  producing  the  phenomena  of 
finality.  In  a  word,  this  theory  puts  chance  in  the  place 
of  design.    There  is  no  finality  and  no  theistic  inference. 

The  only  remark  we  need  now  make  concerning  this 
theory  is  that  if  chance  cannot  account  for  the  order  of  the 
cosmos,  much  less  can  it  explain  design.  We  saw  in  the 
foregoing  chapter  that  neither  chance  nor  fate  can  account 
for  law  and  order  in  the  universe;  and  now  we  may  say 
that  much  less  can  it  supply  a  rational  explanation  of  the 
finality  which  constitutes  the  problem  of  this  proof.  If  the 
fact  of  finality  be  admitted,  then  chance  cannot  explain  it; 
and  if  finality  be  denied,  then  everything  in  nature  is  me- 
chanism without  rationality.  Then  difficulties  arise.  How 
many  happy  hits  would  it  take  to  produce  an  eye,  )r  to 
construct  the  organs  of  digestion?  Reason  practically 
refuses  to  believe  that  it  could  ever  be  done.  Indeed,  we 
might  go  further,  ^  "  say  that  if  finality  be  excluo  from 
nature,  science  would  be  impossible.  There  c.  je  no 
science  of  absolute  chaos,  or  of  things  that  are  entirely 
contingent.  In  a  word,  teleology  and  ccience  are  not  only 
consistent,  but  they  imply  each  other.  And,  in  addition  to 
all  these  considerations,  the  theory  of  chance  to  account 
for  finality  is  open  to  all  the  objections  which  lie  against 
materialism. 

2.  A  second  theory  is  advanced  by  those  who  are  under 
the  influence  of  various  types  of  idealism  or  phenomenalism. 
They  deny  that  finality  has  any  objective  reality  at  a. . 
Design  is  merely  subjective,  and  is  thought  into  things. 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


377 


This  general  theory  may  grow  out  of  Kant's  phenomenalism 
or  Mill's  empiricism,  though  it  is  usually  connected  with 
the  former.  According  to  this  view,  finality,  like  causality, 
is  simply  a  rule  of  the  understanding,  which  is  valid  for 
phenomena  alone.  In  the  region  of  noumena  there  is  no 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends.  We  construe  nature  under 
certain  subjective  laws,  whereby  it  assumes  the  appearance 
of  finality.  Finality  is  a  law  of  thought,  but  not  a  law  of 
things.  In  this  way  finality  is  excluded  from  nature,  unless 
we  hold  that  the  only  nature  there  is  consists  in  that  which 
the  understanding  itself  constructs,  and  into  which  the  mind 
projects  its  own  finality. 

This  theory  is  marked  by  all  the  defects  of  empiricism 
and  subjective  idealism.  The  wide  separation  between 
phenomena  and  noumena  made  by  Kant  is  unreal,  and  his 
contention  that  the  human  mind  does  not  come  into  rational 
relation  with  reality,  is  dangerous  to  a  sound  epistemology. 
If  nature  be  held  to  be  a  system  of  related  things,  then 
subjective  finality  is  an  inadequate  theory,  for  the  reason, 
mainly,  that  finality  is  both  a  law  of  thought  and  a  law  of 
things.  Hence,  we  do  not  so  much  think  finality  into  nature 
as  find  it  already  there.  Its  presence  in  natui  has  to  be 
accounted  for ;  and  the  denial  of  its  presence  is  no  explana- 
tion of  its  nature. 

3.  A  third  attempt  to  avoid  the  theistic  inference  as  the 
solution  of  design  in  nature  is  what  Janet  calls  mmancnt 
finality.  The  fact  that  means  are  adapted  to  en  >  in  natur 
is  admitted.  There  is  finality  in  nature,  theix  is  teleology 
in  the  cosmos.  Nature  does  seem  to  set  ends  or  make  plans 
for  herself,  anvl  then  she  appears  to  proceed  to  work  them 
out.  But  the  wiiole  process  is  confined  to  nature,  and  does 
not  justify  any  inference  to  an  extra-cosmic  ground.  If 
the  process  postulates  intelligence,  this  intelligence  is  still 
within  the  cosmos,  and  consequently  there  is  no  ground 
upon  which  to  make  the  theistic  inference.  This  is  based 
on  certain  aspects  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy,  according 


1  *■ 


378 


APOLOGETICS. 


to  which,  in  a  monistic  way,  an  inner  principle  of  logical 
development  in  the  cosmo?  produces  the  features  of  finality 
which  it  exhibits.  This  principle,  in  some  sense,  is  rational, 
yet  it  is  little  more  than  a  blind  and  unconscious  tendency 
that  brings  forth  results  which  look  like  purpose  and  design. 
But  it  is  all  within  the  cosmos,  which  is  taken  to  be  self- 
contained  and  self-explanatory.  The  anima  mundi  of  the 
old  Stoics,  the  Plastic  nature  of  the  later  Platonists,  and 
the  unconscious  rationality  of  recent  Hegelians  illustrate  the 
views  of  nature  with  which  this  theory  to  explain  finality 
is  associated.  The  finality  is  immanent  in  nature,  and  re- 
quires no  extra-cosmic  explanation.  The  theistic  inference, 
therefore,  is  not  needed. 

This  theory  is  not  adequate,  mainly  because  the  philoso- 
phy which  underlies  it  is  one-sided  and  incompetent.  The 
idea  of  unconscious  finality  is  almost  a  contradiction  in 
terms.  We  must  at  last  construe  the  facts  of  design  under 
either  mechanism  or  intelligence.  If  we  do  the  former, 
we  are  on  the  ground  of  the  theory  of  chance ;  if  the  latter, 
we  open  up  the  way  for  an  extra-cosmic  intelligence,  and 
the  theistic  inference.  Hence,  if  the  fact  of  finality  in  nature 
be  admitted,  as  it  is  by  this  theory,  then  the  law  of  causality, 
which,  as  sufficient  reason,  is  the  principle  of  this  proof, 
demands  the  postulate  of  an  intelligent  ground,  which,  as 
an  uncaused  cause,  transcends  the  cosmos  wherein  the 
facts  lie. 

4.  A  fourth  theory  arises  from  an  application  of  the 
hypothesis  of  evolution  to  the  facts  of  design  in  nature.  It 
usually  presupposes  the  deistic  view  of  the  relation  of  God 
to  the  world,  and  holds  that  the  world  now,  under  the 
operation  of  natural  laws,  is  working  out  its  own  destiny. 
The  method  of  this  working  is  evolution.  We  do  not  now 
require  to  discuss  the  scientific  validity  of  the  evolutionary 
hypothesis,  but  rather  to  consider  its  bearing  upon  the  tele- 
ological  proof.  Does  evolution  eliminate  finality  from 
nature,  and  so  destroy  the  basis  of  the  theistic  inference 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


379 


founded  thereon?  Various  types  of  evolution,  of  course, 
er.erge  here.  We  have  that  of  Lamarck,  Wallace  and 
Darwin,  which  confines  the  hypothesis  of  transformism  to 
the  organic  sphere,  and  that  of  Comte,  Spencer  and  V  .:ke;, 
which  gives  it  universal  application. 

The  Darwinian  type  of  this  theory  deals  with  the  facts 
of  biology,  where  many  instances  of  design  are  supposed 
to  lie.  Darwinism  supersedes  finality  by  natural  selection, 
and  puts  the  survival  of  the  fittest  in  the  place  of  teleology. 
In  this  way  nature's  adaptations  -■■  all  to  be  explained, 
and  no  theistic  interpr»tation  of  '  ■■  .^s  is  required.  The 
Spencerian  type  of  evolution  is  n-  more  pretentious.  It 
claims  to  be  a  philosophy  of  all  existence.  At  root  it  is 
materialistic  monism,  wherein  the  principle  of  mechanical 
evolution  becomes  at  once  the  architect  and  the  builder  of 
the  cosmos.  It  takes  the  atomic  homogeneous,  and  differ- 
entiates it  int^  heterogeneous  forms  of  being,  having  even 
life  and  consciousness.  It  professes,  by  the  method  of 
natural  history,  to  give  an  explanation  of  all  the  features 
of  design  in  the  universe,  without  any  intelligent  extra- 
cosmic  key.  Matter,  force  and  motion  account  for  every- 
thing under  the  magic  operation  of  ontological  evolution. 
In  a  word,  cosmic  evolution  dispenses  with  finality  ''Ito- 
gethei . 

Not  much  d  now  be  said  to  show  that  this  theory  is 
insufficient.  Darwinism,  while  professing  to  supersede 
desigr  by  natural  selection,  and  teleology  b^  survival,  con- 
stanti;  i  lis  back  on  design  and  adaptation  as  a  feature 
of  nature.  It  constantly  uses  the  terms  "designed,"  "adapta- 
tion," "adjustment."  "fitness,"  terms  which  very  clearly 
imply  finality  in  nature.  Then,  if  unlimited  variation  hap- 
pening by  chance  be  the  starting  point  of  the  theory,  it  is 
virtually  on  the  ground  of  the  theory  of  chance,  and  exposed 
to  the  objections  already  stated.  If  purpose  or  design  be 
admitted  anywhere  in  the  working  of  the  hypothesis  of 
evolution,  then  finality,  in  nature  at  least,  is  conceded.    Then 


in 


'm 


380 


APOLOGETICS. 


the  process  involved  in  its  working  needs  an  efficient  cause, 
and  the  direction  of  the  process  towards  a  certain  goal 
requires  a  sufficient  reason.  This  again  leads  to  the  postu- 
late of  an  uncaused  cause.  And  Spencer's  scheme  is  open 
to  the  same  objections.  A  ground,  a  cause  and  a  reason 
for  the  evolutionary  process  is  needed,  even  if  we  admit 
the  validity  of  the  process  itself.  A  purely  mechanical  inter- 
pretation of  the  cosmic  finality,  which  makes  our  present 
problem,  is  inherently  inadequate.  At  best,  evolution  is 
but  a  process  and  a  method;  the  process  needs  a  cause,  and 
the  method  a  reason.    The  theistic  postulate  supplies  both. 

5.  The  conclusion  to  which  we  are  thus  surely  led  is  that 
neither  mechanical  chance,  nor  subjective  finality,  nor  im- 
manent teleology,  nor  cosmic  evolution,  solves  our  problem. 
We  are,  thereiore,  shut  up  to  the  only  remaining  postulate, 
and  that  is  the  supposition  of  a  purposive  intelligence,  which 
holds  an  immanent  and  transcendent  relation  to  the  cosmic 
finality  to  be  explained.  This  gives  a  sufficient  reason  for 
the  facts  of  design.  Then,  in  accordance  with  the  principle 
of  causation,  this  intelligence  must  be  extra-cosmic.  And 
this  intelligence  demands  a  spiritual  reality  in  which  it  rests 
and  of  which  it  is  an  expression.  Hence,  the  explanation 
of  cosmic  teleology  is  an  extra-cosmic  intelligence,  and  this 
extra-cosmic  intelligence  requires  a  spiritual  being  as  its 
ground.  This  being  is  found  in  the  infinite,  necessary  and 
rational  being  of  whose  real  existence  other  theistic  proofs 
have  assured  us.  This  is  the  theistic  inference  to  solve  the 
problem  of  finality  in  the  universe. 

Like  the  argument  from  order,  this  proof  has  its  logical 
limitations,  it  does  not  prove  a  creator,  nor  does  it  lead 
to  an  infinite  intelligence.  Strictly  speaking,  it  does  not 
prove  the  existence  of  God.  It  rather  takes  the  theistic 
postulate  which  the  human  mind  can  frame,  and  finds  in  this 
the  solution  of  a  well-defined  cosmic  problem.  This  in  turn 
greatly  confirms  belief  in  the  existence  of  God.  This  proof 
further  enables  us  to  clothe  God  with  certain  attributes. 


THE  COSMICAL  PROOFS. 


381 


Knowledge,  foresight,  wisdom,  skill,  power  and  goodness 
can  now  be  rationally  associated  with  the  infinite  and  neces- 
sary being,  whose  existence,  as  a  real  being,  was  established 
in  the  psychical  proofs. 

This  concludes  the  exposition  of  the  cosmical  proofs,  and 
brings  us  well  on  our  way.  The  principle  of  causation  is 
the  key  of  inference  in  each  case.  The  universe  in  its  cosmic 
origin,  its  cosmic  progress,  its  cosmic  order,  and  its  cosmic 
design,  has  been  studied.  In  each  case  an  extra-cosmic 
agent  and  a  supra-cosmic  intelligence  was  required.  This 
was  discovered  in  the  theistic  postulate,  whose  rational 
validity  is  thereby  greatly  confirmed. 


:  '  I 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  MORAL  PROOFS:    MORAL  THEORY: 
THE  IDEA  OF  RIGHT. 


PROOF  FROM 


Contents. 
The  Moral  Argument.— Cogent  and  Efifective.— Yet  not  alone  to  be 
relied  on.— Rests  on  facts  of  Man's  Moral  Nature  and  Moral  Govern- 
ment.—Moral  Theory  and  Theistic  Inference  related.— Yet  Theistic 
Inference  not  dependent  on  Moral  Theory.— Types  of  Ethical  Theory.— 
Four  Classes.— Morality  founded  on  Legal  Restraint.— Morality  based 
on  Pleasure  or  Utility.— Morality  the  outcome  of  Evolution.— These 
defective— Co- rect  Doctrine.— Conscience  original.— Right  and  Obliga- 
tion ultimate.— Morality  has  universal  Validity.— The  problem  of  this 
Proof.— The  Moral  Faculty.— The  idea  of  Right.— The  fact  of  Moral 
Ijvir.- These  facts  are  not  self-explanatory.— They  need  a  ground.— 
This  is  found  in  God  as  Moral  Ruler.— Moral  Law  in  Man.— Moral 
Order  over  him.— Neither  Produces  the  Other.— Both  unified  in  God. 

Literature. 
Flint's  Theism,  Chap.  VII.— Diman's  The  Theistic  Argument,  Chap. 
VIII.— i  i^her's  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief,  Chap.  VI.— 
Pressense's  Origins,  Book  IV.,  Chap.  I.— Lindsay's  Recent  Advances, 
Chap.  IX.— Orr's  Christian  View  of  God  and  the  World,  Chap.  III.,  3.— 
Dabney's  Theology,  Chap.  I.— Foster's  Systematic  Theology,  Part  II., 
Chap.  I.,  2.— Shedd's  Dogmatic  Theology,  Vol.  I.,  Div.  III.,  Chap.  III.— 
Redford's  The  Christians  Plea,  Part  II.,  Chaps.  II.,  III.— Bowne's 
Philosofhy  of  Theism,  Chap.  VI.— Caldcrwood's  Hand-book  of  Moral 
Philosophy,  Part  V.,  Chap.  V.— Harris'  Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism, 
Chap.  IX.— Kant's  Metaphysics  of  £flii«.— Johnston's  Outline  of  Sys- 
tematic Theology,  Part  II.,  Se,  XI.,  Chap.  V.— Dale's  Christian  Doc- 
trine, Chap.  II.— Seth's  Ethical  Principles,  Part  II.,  Chaps.  I.-III.— 
Fraser's  Philosophy  of  Theism,  Chap.  I.— Davis'  Elements  of  Ethics, 
Prolegomena,  Chap.  II.— Bowne's  Studies  in  Theism,  Chap.  XI.— 
Luthardt'.s  Fundamental  Truths,  Chap.  III.— Butler's  Sermom,  T.-III.— 
Mackenzie's  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  II.,  Chap.  III.— Bradley's  Ethical 
Studies,  Chap.  IV.— Muirhcad's  Elements  of  Ethics,  Book  III.,  Chap.  II. 

I.  Preliminary.    §  90. 

i.rr^HE  third  class  of  theistic  proofs  is  now  reached. 

J.      This  consists  in  the  different  phases  of  the  moral 

proof  for  the  existence  of  God.    This  is  one  of  the  most 

cogent  and  efifective  of  all  the  theistic  proofs,  and  it  is 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


383 


perhaps  less  open  to  assault  than  any  of  them.  Some 
writers  are  inclined  to  rely  on  it  almost  exclusiv'  y  to 
establish  the  fact  of  the  divine  existence.  Such  writers 
sometimes  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  moral  faculty  in 
man  is  the  religious  organ  of  the  soul,  and  that  the  dictates 
of  conscience  are  the  voice  of  God  in  the  human  spirit. 
By  means  of  this  faculty,  some  contend  that  man  has  an 
immediate  intuition  of  deity.  The  Kantian  criticism  is  no 
doubt  chiefly  responsible  for  this  emphasis  on  the  moral 
side  of  the  theistic  proof,  for  after  ths  great  critical  idealist 
had  shown,  as  he  thought,  that  all  the  intellectual  proofs 
were  inconclusive  or  contradictory,  he  fell  back  with  a 
great  deal  of  confidence  on  the  moral  proof  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God.  He  discovers  in  the  moral  law,  with  its 
categorical  imperative  uttered  in  man's  nature,  a  sure 
ground  for  believing  in  God,  freedom  and  immortality. 
Hamilton  takes  nearly  the  same  view  when  he  says  that 
for  the  belief  in  immortality  and  in  the  existence  of  God 
we  must  rest  on  the  ground  of  man's  moral  nature.  It 
may  be  now  safely  said  that  Kant  and  Hamilton  separated 
the  intellectual  and  the  moral  basis  of  the  theistic  inference 
too  widely.  That  inference  is  valid  in  both  spheres.  God 
is  the  po«tulaie  equally  of  the  intellect  and  the  conscience, 
for  he  is  absolute  truth  as  well  as  absolute  right.  Flint 
is  much  nearer  the  sound  position  than  Hamilton,  and 
Luthardt  than  Kant. 

2.  In  unfolding  the  moral  proofs,  wf  must  keep  in  mind 
the  fact  that  the  theistic  argument  is  complex  and  cumula- 
tive. The  moral  proof,  in  its  several  forms,  is  not  the 
only  valid  reasoning  for  the  e*-istence  of  God.  It  is  one 
of  the  many  converging  lines  of  proof,  and  has  great 
logical  force.  But  it  is  a  mistake  to  rely  on  it  alone  to 
establish  the  reality  of  the  divine  existence.  Other  valu- 
able theistic  allies  should  also  be  called  into  service.  In 
this  way  the  psychical,  the  cosmical  and  the  moral  proofs 
are  all  to  have  their  proper  place,  and  they  are  all  to  be 


I'mI 


T.  ,  I  ;l 


11 


384 


APOLOGETICS. 


bound  together  in  a  cumulative  way,  in  what  may  be  termed 
the  theistic  argument.  The  moral  proofs  have  a  very  im- 
portant place  in  this  argument,  but  we  are  not  compelled 
to  rest  upon  them  alone.  This  is  now  generally  recog- 
nized. 

3.  The  moral  proofs  rest,  in  general,  upon  the  facts  of 
man's  moral  nature,  and  upon  the  conditions  of  moral 
government  under  which  he  is  placed.  This  being  the  case, 
it  is  evident  that  moral  theory  and  t'.:''istic  proof  are  very 
closely  related.  Writers  differ  as  to  ti.»  nature  of  this 
relation.  Some  think  that  the  validity  of  the  theistic 
inference  does  not  depend  upon  any  particular  theory  as  to 
the  nature  of  moral  distinctions,  and  of  the  origin  of  the 
moral  faculty.  Others  incline  to  the  view  that  the  force 
of  this  inference  is  dependent  upon  a  sound  moral  theory. 
We  are  inclined  to  agree  with  Flint,  who  takes  a  middle 
view.  His  position,  in  substance,  is  that  if  we  take  the 
facts  of  man's  moral  nature  as  we  find  them,  and  seek  to 
interpret  the  ideas  of  rightness  and  oughtness  as  they  are 
in  moral  experience,  we  are  justified  in  making  the  theistic 
inference  therefrom,  irrespective  of  any  particular  theory 
as  to  their  real  nature  and  origin.  At  the  same  time,  we 
are  persuaded  that  while  this  position  is  substantially  sound, 
it  may  also  be  true  that,  if  we  hold  an  empirical  thei:)ry  of 
morals,  and  make  morality  derivative,  the  theistic  basis  of 
inference  is  not  so  secure  as  if  we  adopt  some  form  of  the 
rational  or  intuitive  theory,  and  regard  moral  distinctions 
as  ultimate,  and  the  moral  faculty  as  original  in  man's 
nature.  If,  therefore,  the  cogency  and  force  of  the  theistic 
proof  is  affected  by  the  type  of  moral  theory  adopted,  theism 
cannot  afford  to  be  entirely  indifferent  to  the  theory  of 
morals  on  which  its  inference  rests.  This  being  the  case, 
a  brief  sketch  of  moral  theories,  and  a  careful  statement  of 
the  sound  doctrine,  should  be  made  at  the  outset. 


rf   >, 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


38s 


II.  Types  of  Ethical  Theory.    §  91. 

In  a  somewhat  general  way,  all  tjrpes  of  ethical  theory 
may  be  classified  under  four  main  heads,  each  of  which 
has  a  distinct  principle  underlying  it.  Three  of  these  deny 
that  the  moral  faculty  in  man  is  an  original  factor  in  his 
constitution,  or  that  the  ideas  of  rightness  and  oughtness 
are  ultimate  and  irreducible  in  their  nature,  while  the  fourth 
asserts  that  they  are  so. 

I.  To  the  first  class  of  theories  belong  all  those  that  dis- 
cover the  origin  of  moral  distinctions  and  of  obligation  in 
some  form  of  outward  lazv  or  external  authority.  Hobbes 
and  Bain,  in  different  ways,  represent  this  type  of  moral 
theory.  Hobbes  held  a  bald  empirical  theory.  He  asserted 
that  the  original  of  all  the  thoughts  of  man  is  to  be  found 
in  the  senses,  and  that  there  is  no  conception  in  man's  mind 
which  has  not  first,  in  whole  or  in  all  its  parts,  come  from 
the  organs  of  sense.  In  morals  personal  happiness  plays 
a  large  part,  and  no  common  rule  of  good  and  evil  is  to 
be  found  in  the  nature  of  things.  Where  there  is  no  civil 
authority,  every  man  must  be  his  own  arbiter  of  what  is 
good,  and  thus  might  makes  rigiit.  Where  civil  autliority 
is  set  up  among  men,  that  authority  is  the  absolute  judge 
of  what  is  good  and  evil,  and  his  sentence  is  the  rule  of 
right  and  wrong.  In  this  way  th;  law  of  the  land  becomes 
the  ground  of  morality.  According  to  Bain,  conscience 
has  an  empirical  origin,  and  moral  distinctions  are  the 
product  of  external  restraints,  in  which  parental  authority 
plays  a  large  part.  The  first  lesson  the  child  learns  is  obedi- 
ence, and  with  ihis  is  often  associated  pain  or  penalty  for 
disobedience.  Out  of  this  experic  ^he  distinction  between 
good  and  evil  grows,  and  in  lat  .fe  social  and  civil  re- 
straints mature  the  moral  experience. 

According  to  this  theory,  law  conditions  right,  and  moral 
distinctions  arc  originated  out  of  the  relation  to  external 
H 


386 


APOLOGETICS. 


H 

i 

1 

! 

l^^B 

f 

f!;i 


restraint,  and  the  pain  which  conflict  with  this  restraint 
may  produce.  The  sense  of  obligation,  in  the  first  instance 
at  least,  is  nothing  more  than  fear  of  pain,  which  springs 
from  a  violation  of  external  restraint  of  some  sort.  It  is 
<:lear  that  all  such  theories  either  presuppose  the  idea  of 
right  in  the  fact  of  law  and  restraint,  or  they  place  moral 
distinctions  on  an  entirely  arbitrary  basis.  In  such  case 
there  can  be  no  fixed  standard  of  right,  and  no  absolute 
basis  for  obligation.  If  law  be  not  founded  on  right,  it  is 
only  arbitrary  commanu,  and  the  unethical  position  is 
reached  that  will  and  might  make  right  and  duty.  In  a 
word,  it  professes  to  perform  the  impossible  task  of  bringing 
an  ethical  experience  out  of  a  non-ethical  state. 

2.  In  a  second  class  may  be  placed  all  those  ethical  sys- 
tems which  find  the  source  of  morality  and  the  basis  of 
obligation  in  some  form  of  self-love,  pleasure  or  utility. 
This  general  theory  assumes  various  forms,  and  has  had 
many  advocates  in  ancient  and  modern  times.  Here  we 
have  hedonism,  and  egoism,  and  altruism,  and  many  types 
of  each;  but  they  all  agree  in  denying  that  conscience  is 
an  original  faculty,  or  that  moral  distinctions  are  simple 
and  ultimate.  The  moral  good  is  identified  with  pleasure, 
and  moral  evil  with  pain.  The  right  is  that  which  is  useful 
to  me  or  to  men  generally;  the  wrong  is  that  which  is 
devoid  of  egoistic  or  altruistic  utility.  The  basis  of  obliga- 
tion lies  in  the  fact  that  I  should  follow  the  dictates  of  the 
pleasant  and  the  useful.  My  own  welfare,  or  the  general 
^good,  marks  out  the  path  of  duty  for  me. 

It  is  evident  that  hedonists  and  utilitarians  do  not  show 
how  facts  in  human  experience  which  are  first  expressed  in 
terms  of  pleasure,  happiness  or  utility,  come  to  be  stated 
in  terms  of  right,  duty  and  obligation.  They  do  not  clearly 
show  how  the  notions  of  rightness  and  oughtness,  which 
may  be  called  ethical  atoms,  are  to  be  reduced  to  lower 
terms.  Above  all,  we  are  convinced  that  none  of  these 
hedonistic  or  utilitarian  schemes  can  fully  explain  the  fact 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


387 


of  obi.^ation.  They  may  postulate  it  and  lay  stress  upon 
it,  but  thfy  can  give  no  proper  philosophy  of  it.  They 
can  f  "-'ei  show  how  the  pleasurable  or  the  useful,  which 
is  n-  wly  optional,  can  ever,  on  their  principles,  be  trans- 
formed into  the  dutiful,  which  is  obligatory.  Nor  can  they 
make  it  plain  how  the  self-interestedness,  from  which  they 
set  out,  can  ever  be  transmuted  into  the  disinterestedness 
which  appears  in  human  conduct,  without  violating  the 
principles  of  their  own  theory.  We  may  very  freely  admit 
that  in  the  long  run  the  useful  and  the  right,  utility  and 
obligation,  will  agree;  but  we  must  refuse  to  concede  that 
the  basis  of  morality  is  utility.  In  a  word,  the  right  con- 
ditions the  useful,  not  the  useful  the  right. 

3.  A  third  class  of  moral  theories  includes  those  modern 
schemes  which  connect  morality  with  the  modem  hypothesis 
of  evolution.  These  theories  are  of  quite  recent  origin. 
They  all  agree  in  denying  the  ulti; .. .  -ature  of  moral 
distinctions,  and  they  refuse  tc  '.^nscience  any  a  riori 
quality.  According  to  'lesf  :heories,  al'  '^  -m*  .>t-  -)f 
the  moral  experiences  of  the  inui  >'!"'  -e  »..  c 

to  be  accounted  for  by  the  principles  of  t  ioccune  of 
evolution.  Spencer  gives  this  scheme  defi"VA.  *orm  in  his 
Data  of  Ethics,  and  many  writers  have  followtd  in  his 
steps.  In  general,  this  theory  contends  that  man,  whether 
he  came  from  the  brute  or  no,  was  ?"  first  in  a  non-moral 
state.  By  slow  degrcv  ,  as  men  mingled  together  in  the 
exercise  of  simple  social  instincts,  the  idea  of  right  and  a 
sense  of  duty  gradually  dawned  within  them.  The  laws 
of  natural  selection,  of  competition,  and  of  environment, 
had  their  influence  in  bringing  this  about,  and  the  principle 
of  heredity  handed  down  the  gain  of  one  generation  as  an 
ethical  inheritance  to  another.  In  this  way,  by  slow  degrees 
through  countless  ages,  the  notion  of  right  became  clearly 
defined,  and  the  basis  of  obligation  was  securely  laid.  It 
may  be  observed  that  some  of  the  features  of  the  utilitarian 
theory  pertain  to  this  scheme,  because  the  operation  of  the 


388 


APOLOGETICS. 


laws  of  the  evolutionary  process  are  supposed  to  be  working 
for  the  highest  good  of  the  whole. 

The  only  remark  we  make  upon  this  general  theory  is, 
that  thorough-going  evolutionists  have  never  yet  presented 
an  adequate  philosophy  of  moral  facts.  An  absolute 
standard  of  right,  and  an  obligatory  basis  of  duty,  are  not 
yet  provided  by  this  scheme,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  it  ever 
can  be.  Some  advocates  of  evolutionary  ethics  come  very 
near  to  the  denial  of  an  immutable  right  and  an  absolute 
basis  of  obligation.  Spencer's  attempt  to  show  how  the 
conduce  of  the  dog  at  his  master's  feet  has  been  transmuted, 
during  long  ages,  into  the  ethical  conduct  of  the  man, 
cannot  be  regarded  as  satisfactory.  And  while  we  may 
admit  that  the  advocates  of  this  theory  have  done  good 
service  in  certain  respects,  in  giving  a  natural  history  of 
moral  experience,  yet  it  must  be  confessed  that  they  give 
no  adequate  philosophy  of  the  facts  of  that  experience.  The 
natural  history  they  give  has  value  only  on  the  supposition 
that  right,  duty  and  obligation  are  simple,  ultimate  and 
irreducible  factors  in  human  nature  and  experience. 

4.  In  a  fourth  class  there  may  be  placed  those  theories 
which  hold,  in  one  way  or  another,  that  conscience  is  an 
original  faculty  of  human  nature,  that  moral  distinctions 
are  immutable  and  ultimate,  and  that  obligation  is  absolute 
in  moral  experience.  This  gives  the  true  philosophy  of 
moral  facts.  Right  and  ought  are  ethical  atoms,  and  cannot 
be  transmuted  or  reduced  to  lower  terms.  They  are  ethical 
ultimates.  Socrates  against  the  Sophists,  and  intuition- 
alists  against  the  empiricists,  are  on  the  ground  of  a  sound 
moral  philosophy.  Three  simple  statements  make  this 
philosophy  plain. 

First,  it  is  held  that  conscience  or  practical  reason  is  an 
original  factor  in  the  constitution  of  man.  It  is  not  the 
product  of  any  sort  of  moral  experience  or  education,  but 
it  is  necessary  to  that  experience  and  education.  It  matters 
not  whether  we  call  it  the  moral  sense,  or  the  ethical  faculty, 


i 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


389 


or  conscience,  or  the  power  of  making  moral  judgments, 
this  sense,  faculty  or  power  is  a  connatural  factor  in  the 
nature  of  man.  Here  the  old  distinction  between  the 
rational  and  empirical  theories  of  human  knowledge  appears 
in  the  sphere  of  morals. 

Secondly,  the  distinction  between  good  and  evil,  right 
and  wrong,  is  an  eternal  and  immutable  distinction.  The 
idea  of  rightness  and  the  fact  of  oughtness  are  simple  and 
ultimate.  They  cannot  be  reduced  to  lower  terms,  because 
they  are  not  derived  from  any  other  facts  or  ideas.  It 
matters  not  how  men  may  differ  in  the  application  of  moral 
distinctions,  the  fact  remains  that  they  make  the  distinc- 
tion, and  this  fact  lies  at  the  foundation  of  a  moral 
experience.  The  right  gives  an  ultimate  standard,  and 
the  ought  supplies  an  absolute  authority  for  a  moral 
life. 

Thirdly,  moral  distinctions  have  universal  validity.  By 
this  is  meant  that  right  and  wrong  are  not  individual  or 
relative  notions.  They  have  universal  application  and 
authority.  The  right  is  not  merely  for  me,  or  for  a  few, 
but  for  all  moral  agents.  If  there  be  an  eternal  and  im- 
mutable right,  then  man  is  not  the  measure  of  all  things 
in  the  region  of  morals.  What  is  right  here  is  right 
everywhere;  what  is  right  on  earth  is  right  in  heaven. 
These  eternal  principles  of  rectitude  are  revealed  in  and 
through  the  moral  nature,  and  they  supply  the  norm  for 
the  moral  lif-  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  I  do  not  con- 
struct them,  but  that  they  instruct  me,  and  bind  me  in 
matters  of  my  moral  experience. 


■I 


I 


III.  The  Proof  from  the  Right:  Its  Problem.    §  92. 

I.  Having  set  forth  in  three  particulars  the  elements  of 
a  correct  ethical  theory,  the  foundation  is  laid  to  unfold 
the  theistic  proofs  which  rest  securely  upon  it.  That  con- 
science is  an  original  faculty,  that  moral  distinctions  are 


39° 


APOLOGETICS. 


ultimate,  and  that  moral  law  has  universal  validity,  is  now 
assumed  as  the  basis  of  certain  theistic  inferences.  Several 
lines  of  reasoning  open  up.  The  idea  of  moral  law,  the 
fact  of  moral  obligation,  the  notion  of  a  moral  good,  and 
the  phenomena  of  a  moral  history,  suggest  these  lines. 
The  first  of  these  now  engages  attention,  and  in  this  section 
a  statement  of  its  problem  is  to  be  made. 

2.  Conscience,  or  the  moral  faculty,  perceives  the  dis- 
tinction between  things  right  and  things  wrong.  This 
distinction  implies  a  standard  or  rule  which  we  call  moral 
law.  The  idea  of  a  morally  right  implies  moral  law,  and 
if  that  right  is  an  ultimate  idea  the  fact  of  moral  law  is 
a  fixed  fact.  This  further  implies  a  moral  order,  in  which 
the  factors  in  a  moral  life  constitute  a  system  of  related 
things  just  as  surely  as  nature  is  a  system  of  related  things 
under  natural  law.  Moral  law  is  not  merely  a  subjective 
rule,  but  it  is  also  an  objective  fact  having  universal  validity. 
Moral  law  is  objective,  therefore,  and  hence  emerges  what 
may  be  called  a  moral  government,  under  which  man  finds 
himself  placed.  This  constitutes  the  problem  of  this 
proof. 

3.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  while  the  sound  theory 
of  morality  gives  this  problem  its  most  definite  form,  and 
provides  the  most  secure  basis  for  the  theistic  inference,  yet 
the  problem  remains  on  any  ethical  theory  that  admits  the 
reality  of  the  fact  of  a  moral  experience.  If  men  are  found 
making  the  distinction  between  right  and  wrong  with  refer- 
ence to  some  standard,  and  if  they  are  conscious  of  a 
moral  experience  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  problem  still 
exists.  There  is  here,  in  a  certain  sense,  a  moral  order 
under  which  I  find  myself,  and  of  this  some  proper  explana- 
tion must  be  given.  Here  is  the  basis  of  an  inference,  and 
the  materials  of  a  line  of  reasoning  which  seeks  a  solution 
of  the  problem  presented  by  the  notion  of  right  and  moral 
law.  Conscience  must  be  accounted  for,  the  moral  dis- 
tinctions of  which  it  makes  us  aware  are  to  be  properly 


i'  !     i 


in 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


39» 


explained,  and  the  moral  order  which  it  shows  that  we 
are  under  has  to  be  interpreted.  This  is  the  problem  which 
here  awaits  solution. 


IV.  The  Proof  from  the  Right:  Its  Solution.    §  93. 

1.  The  inquiry  now  to  be  made  is  as  to  the  theistic  sig- 
nificance of  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong,  and  of  the  fact 
of  moral  law  and  government.  This  is  simply  a  phase  of 
the  old  question  as  to  the  foundation  of  virtue.  Is  con- 
science an  entirely  self-contained  fact  ?  Is  the  idea  of  right 
self-explanatory?  Is  the  fact  of  moral  law  and  order  self- 
interpreting?  Are  the  conditions  of  a  moral  experience 
the  product  of  man  himself,  or  does  he  find  himself  in  that 
experience  related  to  a  moral  order  and  government?  Does 
this  moral  order  require  a  ground  beyond  itself  as  its  ade- 
quate explanation  ? 

2.  The  reply  which  we  make  to  these  inquiries  is  that 
the  theistic  postuMe  is  needed  to  explain  the  facts.  Con- 
science is  not  self-explanatory.  The  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong  does  not  account  for  itself.  And  the 
fact  of  moral  law  and  moral  order  is  not  self-interpreting, 
but  the  postulate  of  the  existence  of  God  and  of  his  rela- 
tion to  man  by  means  of  moral  government  is  needed. 
The  metaphysics  of  ethics  leads  to  theism.  Man's  moral 
nature  finds  its  secure  ground  in  God.  Moral  law  and 
order  would  have  no  rer'ity  apart  from  God.  Moral  gov- 
ernment would  be  witiiout  foundation  if  there  were  no 
moral  governor.  Conscience  needs  an  author,  moral  law  a 
lawgiver,  and  moral  government  a  moral  governor. 

3.  The  theistic  postulate  fully  solves  the  problem,  and 
that  postulate  is  needed  to  solve  it.  Having  the  fact  of 
the  existence  of  God  fully  confirmed  by  the  proofs  already 
unfolded,  we  are  in  a  position  to  present  this  fact  for  the 
solution  of  the  problem  now  under  consideration.  That 
necessary  infinite  being  who  is  the  uncaused  cause  and 


t 


EM 


■ 


392 


APOLOGETICS. 


abiding  ground  of  the  cosmic  order  and  process  nay  be 
presented  as  the  solution  of  the  moral  order  and  process. 
In  this  way  God  is  the  postulate  of  moral  law  and  order 
as  he  is  of  natural  law  and  order.  He  is  the  ground  of 
the  right  as  well  as  of  the  true,  the  presupposition  of  the 
practical  as  well  as  of  the  pure  reason. 

Empiricists  of  both  agnostic  and  positivist  types  deny 
the  validity  of  this  inference.  They  tell  us  that  in  moral 
science  we  are  to  deal  only  with  the  psychology  and  natural 
history  of  moral  facts.  In  this  way  we  construct  what  is 
a  moral  science  rather  than  a  moral  phi'  sophy.  Then 
they  insist  that  we  should  go  no  further,  and  that  we  have 
no  right  to  "make  any  philosophical  deduction  or  theistic 
inference  from  the  facts  of  our  moral  life.  It  is  easy  to 
see  that  empiricism  is  logically  driven  to  this  untenable 
position  by  the  necessities  of  its  own  theory.  If  we  are 
to  deal  only  with  facts  in  their  coexistences  and  sequences, 
and  never  raise  inquiry  as  to  causes  or  grounds,  we  are 
shut  up  to  a  self-contained  explanation  of  the  facts  of  our 
moral  life,  and  are  debarred  from  making  any  philosophical 
or  »<stic  inference.  But  we  reject  empiricism,  and  refuse 
to  allow  its  claim  against  the  validity  of  the  theistic  infer- 
ence we  are  now  making.  Moral  facts  call  not  only  for 
scientific  treatment  and  classification,  but  also  for  philo- 
sophical treatment  and  interpretation.  That  interpretation 
is  supplied  by  the  theistic  postulate  which  asserts  that  the 
nature  of  God  is  the  foundation  of  morality,  and  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  a  moral  life.  In  this  way  the 
moral  rule  of  God  affords  the  key  which  rightly  interprets 
that  moral  order  under  which  man  is  placed,  and  of  which 
he  finds  himself  a  part.  Thus  my  moral  life,  through 
moral  law  and  order,  discovers  a  moral  governor,  who 
himself  is  not  a  moral  subject. 

4.  This  phase  of  the  moral  argument  may  have  another 
turn  given  to  it.  This  arises  from  the  analogy  between 
this  proof  and  that  form  of  the  psychical  argument  which 


■mil 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


393 


is  derived  from  the  principle  of  intelligence  in  man.     In 
that  proof  the  laws  of  nature  and  the  laws  of  thought  were 
correlated  in  cognition  in  such  a  way  that  neither  produced 
the  other,  but  that  both  pointed  to  and  found  unity  in  God, 
who,  as  supreme  intelligence,  is  the  author  and  ground 
of  both  sets  of  laws.     So  we  may  argue  in  the  sphere  of 
our  moral  life.    Moral  law  revealed  in  man's  moral  nature 
is  correlated  in  his  moral  experience  with  the  moral  order 
under  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  finds  himself  placed. 
This  subjective  law  and  this  moral  order  do  not  produce 
each  other,  yet  they  are  correlated  in  man's  moral  life. 
Hence,  the  moral  law  revealed  in  conscience  does  not  con- 
stitute the  moral  order  to  which  man  is  related,  nor  does 
that  moral  order  generate  the  law  of  right  revealed  in  con- 
science.    Yet  they  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  in  irrecon- 
cilable dualism,  for  they  are  correlated  in  moral  experience, 
and  bound  together  in  moral  life  and  progress.    How,  then, 
is  the  problem  of  their  correlation  to  be  solved  ?    If  we  say 
that  the  subjective  rule  produced  the  objective  order,  we 
have  idealism  in  ethics.     If  we  argue  that  the  objective 
moral  order  produced  the  subjective  moral  nile,  we  have 
ethical  empiricism.    How  can  we  avoid  these  alternatives? 
We  reply  that  the  theistic  postulate  provides  the  ground  of 
unity  for  both.     If  we  hold  that  both  the  objective  and 
subjective  ?  v  and  moral  order  are  unified  in  God,  who  is 
at  on:e  the  author  and  ground  of  both  aspects  of  moral 
law  and  order,  we  may  be  near  the  truth.     This  gives  a 
turn  to  this  proof  which  brings  it  abreast  of  the  best  in 
recent  ethical  speculation,  and  provides  a  secure  basis  for 
the  theistic  inference  in  the  moral  sphere.     It  shows  that 
God  has  instituted  a  moral  order  and  government  in  the 
universe,  which  is  other  than,  though  related  to,  the  natural 
order  therein.    He  has  placed  man  under  this  government, 
made  him  a  part  of  this  moral  order,  and  has  given  him  a 
nature  suitable  to  this  relation.    God  then  reveals  his  moral 
law  and  order  in  man's  moral  life,  and  man  discovers  this 


I 
■f 


I  i 


:? 


i    )  i 


■lit 


I  t 


394 


APOLOGETICS. 


law  in  his  moral  experience.  In  this  way  the  problem  of 
a  moral  life  and  experience  from  one  point  of  view  is 
solved  by  the  theistic  postulate.  Moreover,  this,  in  turn, 
confirms  our  belief  in  the  reality  of  the  divine  existence, 
and  enables  us  to  clothe  the  first  cause  and  ground  of  the 
universe  with  moral  attributes.  And  subsequent  moral 
proofs  will  further  enlarge  our  vision  upon  this  point. 

This  turn  given  to  the  moral  proofs  reveals  the  important 
fact  that  the  natural  and  moral  orders  are  not  entirely 
unrelated  to  each  other.  If  the  spiritual  principle  which  is 
immanent  in  nature  constitutes  the  ground  of  intelligibility 
in  nature,  that  same  principle  immanent  in  the  moral  order 
may  be  the  ground  of  r  lorality.  Hence  both  the  natural  and 
moral  orders  find  their  principle  of  unity  in  this  spiri*ual 
principle,  which  in  turn  relates  itself  to  God  by  the  theistic 
postulate. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  MORAL  PROOFS:    PROOF  FROM   THE   FACT   OF 
OBLIGATION  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  THE  GOOD. 

Contents. 

The  Fact  of  Obligfation  defined.— Goes  with  Right  and  Moral 
Law.  —  Relation  of  Rightness  and  Oughtness.  —  Obligation  a  fact  of 
Consciousness.— Socrates,  Butler,  Kant,  Green  and  Sidgwick.— Con- 
science has  Authority  whose  Imperative  is  lifted  up  in  a  Moral  Life.— 
Solution  of  the  Problem.— The  Theistic  Import  of  Obligation.— Ground 
of  Obligation  is  not  found  in  any  one  Power  of  the  Soul.— Nor  in  all 
the  Faculties  combined.— Nor  even  in  the  Moral  Nature  itself.— The 
Ground  transcendent.— The  Theistic  Postulate  gives  it.— The  Ground  is 
in  God.— The  Highest  Good.— The  relation  of  the  Right  to  the  Good.— 
The  Good  defined.— Not  Happiness  merely.— Nor  Knowledge  only.— 
Nor  Righteousness  alone.— The  goal  or  end  towards  which  all  the 
Powers  cooperate  in  seeking  True  Self-realiration.— It  ever  has  a  Moral 
Quality.— Plato  and  Green.— The  Solution  of  the  Problem.— Man  sets 
a  summum  bonum  before  him.— Strives  to  attain  it.— Does  not  rise  from 
any  one  Faculty.— Nor  from  all.— Its  Ground  and  Motive  found  in  God. 

LrrenATUWE. 

For  the  Fact  of  Obligation:  Calderwood's  Hand-book  of  Moral 
Philosophy,  Part  V.,  Chap.  V.-Flinfs  Theism,  Chap.  VII.— Seth's 
Ethical  Principles,  Part  III.,  Chap.  II.— Sidgwick's  Methods  of  Ethics, 
Book  III.,  Chap.  II.— Green's  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III.,  Chap, 
v.— Patton's  Syllabus  of  Theism.— Diman's  The  '.'heistic  Argument, 
Chap.  VIII.— Fraser's  Philosophy  of  Theism,  Vol.  I.,  Chap  I.— Harris' 
Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism.  Chap.  IX.-Lindsay's  Recent  Advances, 
Chap.  IX.— Dabney's  Theology.  Chap.  I.— Hodge's  Systematic  Theology, 
Vol.  I.,  Part  I.,  Chap.  II.— Shedd's  Dogmatic  Theology,  Vol.  I.,  Div. 
III.,  Chap.  III.— Redford's  The  Christian  Plea,  Part  II.,  Chaps.  II., 
III.— Chadhourne's  Natural  Theology,  Chap.  XL— Tulloch's  Theism, 
Sec.  III.,  Chap.  L 

For  the  Idea  of  Good:  Green's  Prolegomena,  Book  III.,  Chap.  I., 
and  Book  IV..  Chap.  IV.— Sidgwick's  Methods  of  Ethics.  Book  III., 
Chap.  XIV.— Seih's  Ethical  Principles,  Part  III.,  Chap.  II.— Kant's 
Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  Book  II.— Flint's  Theism.  Chap.  VIII.— 
Martineau's  A  Study  of  Religion,  Vol.  II.,  Book  II.,  Chap.  II.-Fraser's 
Philosophy  of  Theism.  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  VII.-Harris'  Philosophical  Basis 
of  Theism.  Chap.  XL— Pressrnse's  Origins.  Book  IV.,  Chap.  II.— 
Kaftan's  The  Truth  of  the  Christian  Religion.  Vo\.  11.,  Chaps.  II.-IV.— 
Patton's  Syllabus.— Koyce's  Religious  Aspects  cf  Pkihsapky.Sfih'i 
Ttvo  Lectures  on  Theism.-Hax\ty'»  Evolution  and  Ethics. 


f:.  \l 


I  «: 


396 


APOLOGETICS. 


I.  The  Proof  from  Obligation:  Its  Problem.    §  94. 

i.^T^HE  theistic  significance  of  the  fact  of  obligation 
J.  is  now  to  be  studied.  The  inquiry  thus  entered 
on  is  closely  connected  wi«^h  that  of  the  preceding  chapter, 
and  the  results  of  the  exposition  of  moral  theories  then 
made  are  to  be  still  kept  in  view.  Then  the  nature  of 
conscience  was  explained;  now  its  authority  is  to  be  con- 
sidered. Then  the  notion  of  rightness  was  interpreted; 
now  the  meaning  of  the  fact  of  obligation  is  to  be  sought. 
Then  the  significance  of  moral  law  engaged  attention ;  now 
the  binding  nature  of  that  law  is  to  be  investigated.  Then 
the  contents  of  a  moral  life  were  str  v^eyed ;  now  the  im- 
perative nature  of  that  life  is  to  be  considered.  Then  the 
wide  scope  of  moral  order  was  scanned ;  now  the  sanctions 
involved  in  that  order  are  to  be  understood.  Then  rightness, 
now  otightncss,  is  the  starting-point  of  the  proof.  If  the 
former  might  be  called  the  ortho-theistic  proof,  the  latter 
may  be  termed  the  deonto-theistic. 

2.  The  fact  of  obligation  does  not  need  much  exposition 
after  what  has  already  been  said  about  moral  theory.  It 
is  simply  a  matter  of  consciousness  in  moral  experience. 
It  is  the  invariable  concomitant  of  the  recognition  of  moral 
law,  and  the  perception  of  moral  distinctions.  Moral  obliga- 
tion as  realized  in  consciousness  speaks  with  no  uncertain 
sound.  It  utters  its  voice  not  in  terms  of  a  persuading 
may,  which  wduld  render  obedience  iiuuly  optional;  nor 
does  it  command  us  with  an  arbitrary  must,  which  would 
make  ol^edicnce  mechanical.  It  rather  addresses  us  with 
an  emphatic  ought,  which  renders  obedience  imperative.  It 
is  an  inward,  unavoidable  exhortation  to  duty.  It  implies 
the  urden  of  moral  responsibility.  Hence,  obligation  as 
it  rises  in  consciousness  is  neither  a  sense  of  what  is  optional, 
nor  a  feeling  of  arbitrary  compulsion,  but  the  conviction 
of  a  moral  imperative  in  the  snul,    It  is  a  call  to  duty,  and 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


397 


its  nature  is  such  that  it  may  not  be  disregarded.  Ought- 
ness  is  perhaps  the  best  single,  though  rather  clumsy,  word 
to  denote  the  fact  of  obligation. 

3.  The  relation  of  oughtness  to  Tightness  is  intimate. 
The  notion  of  right,  which  some  prefer  to  call  the  moral 
good,  is  the  foundation  fact.  If  there  be  no  absolute  right 
as  an  ultimate  fact,  there  can  be  no  imperative  obligation 
as  an  authority  from  which  there  is  no  appeal.  An  absolute 
moral  imperative  depends  on  an  ultimate  right.  This  right 
expresses  itself  through  conscience  as  moral  law  in  a  moral 
life  This  law  is  ;  once  the  expression  of  the  right,  and 
the  norm  by  which  i,  e  moral  life  is  to  be  regulated.  This 
moral  law  is  not  a  positive  enactment,  but  a  moral  prin- 
ciple which  pertains  to  the  ultimate  conditions  of  a  moral 
life.  This  law,  thus  viewed,  implies  a  moral  order  of 
which  my  moral  life  forms  a  part ;  and  my  moral  life  is  a 
part  of  this  moral  order  not  by  my  own  choice.  I  have 
not  constituted  this  order,  for  I  find  myself  placed  under 
it  by  the  very  fact  that  I  have  a  moral  nature,  and  am 
capable  of  a  moral  life.  It  is  out  of  these  inherent  con- 
ditions that  the  fact  of  obligation  arises.  I  find  myself  the 
subject  of  a  moral  life,  which  can  only  be  regarded  as  part 
of  a  moral  order  whose  principles  appear  in  that  life  as 
an  imperative.  Hence,  whenever  the  right  is  recognized, 
my  r.tinns  must  be  construed  in  relation  to  the  law  which 
revea;..  the  right,  and  duty  as  obligatory  opens  its  path 
before  me.  Rightness  becomes  oughtness,  law  prescribes 
duty,  morality  announces  obligation,  and  obedience  is  re- 
vealed as  an  in"^erative. 

4.  Obligation,  therefore,  is  a  fixed  fact  in  consciousness. 
Nothing  can  dislodge  the  imperative  of  oughtness  from 
the  consciousness  of  a  moral  life.  It  matters  not  what  view 
we  take  of  the  metaphysics  of  this  moral  life,  the  fact  of 
obligation  remains,  to  some  degree  at  least,  in  force.  If 
we  hold  an  inductive  or  derivative  theory  of  morals,  the 
fact  of  obligation  has  to  be  reckoned  with.     And  such 


398 


APOLOGETICS. 


m 


theories  always  seek  to  show  how  that  which  is  at  first 
merely  optional  is  transmuted  into  the  obligatory  in  a  moral 
life.  Thus  the  authority  of  conscience,  whatever  may  be 
its  origin,  is  recognized.  The  fact  of  the  imperative  in  a 
moral  life,  no  matter  what  the  principles  of  that  life  may 
be,  cannot  be  ignored.  The  regnant  power  of  moral  law, 
as  an  element  of  consciousness,  is  simply  an  undeniable 
fact.  This,  tl-^n,  constitutes  the  problem  of  this  theistic 
proof.  How  are  the  imperative  of  conscience  and  the 
regnant  power  of  moral  law,  as  experienced  in  a  moral 
life,  to  be  rationally  explained? 

The  real  nature  of  this  problem  is  made  very  plain  by 
writers  on  ethics.  Socrates  clearly  announces  it.  Butler 
expresses  it  when  he  says  of  conscience  and  moral  law, 
that  "if  they  had  might  as  they  have  right,  they  would 
rule  the  world."  K.i  .t's  striking  phrase,  "the  categorical 
imperative,"  of  practical  reason,  represents  it  in  a  very 
forcible  way.  Those  who  represent  the  good  as  the  funda- 
mental fact  in  a  moral  life,  whether  this  be  regarded  as 
distinctly  ethical,  as  Green  argfues,  or  as  somewhat  utili- 
tarian, as  Sidgwick  reasons,  all  agree  in  asserting  that  the 
pursuit  of  this  good,  as  the  end  of  human  activity,  is 
imperative.  It  is  not  conditional  and  optional ;  it  is  cate- 
gorical and  imperative.  It  addresses  the  moral  life  in  the 
imperative,  not  in  the  optative  mood.  Thus,  again,  the 
problem  emerges. 

S-  The  fact  that  there  is  a  moral  imperative  in  our  moral 
life,  and  that  conscience  has  unquestioned  authority  therein, 
is  confirmed  by  the  further  consideration  that  when  this 
imperative  is  not  heeded,  it  lifts  up  its  voice,  and  pro- 
nounces us  guilty.  Thus,  it  comes  to  pass  that  when  we 
disobey  moral  law,  as  expressed  through  conscience,  we 
find  that  a  feeling  of  self-condemnation  rises  up  in  the 
moral  life.  This  sense  of  guilt,  this  feeling  of  moral  dis- 
approbation, testifies  to  the  reality  and  authority  of  the 
moral  imperative  which  has  been  ignored  or  transgressed. 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


399 


If  obedience  to  moral  law,  if  the  pursuit  of  the  higher  ends 
rather  than  the  lower  were  merely  optional,  moral  appro- 
bation and  disapprobation  would  rot  so  surely  and  so  keenly 
arise.  The  fact  that  it  does  so  arise  testifies  to  the  reality 
of  the  authority  of  conscience,  and  the  imperative  which 
is  invariably  associated  with  moral  law.  This,  once  more, 
is  the  problem  of  this  theistic  proof.  How  are  we  to  account 
for  the  categorical  imperative  which  lifts  up  its  voice  in 
a  moral  life?  How  is  the  absolutism  of  conscience  to  be 
explained  ?  How  are  we  to  interpret  the  de  jure  authority 
of  moral  law?  How  is  moral  responsibility  to  be  inter- 
preted?   Does  the  problem  justify  the  theistic  inference? 


n.  The  Proof  from  Obligation:  Its  Solution.    §  95. 

I.  The  theistic  import  of  the  authority  of  conscience,  as 
expressed  in  the  fact  of  obligation,  awaits  consideration. 
The  question  now  raised  is  one  of  the  central  aspects  of 
the  moral  argument,  and  at  the  same  time  one  of  its  most 
forceful.  Does  the  fact  of  moral  obligation,  with  its  accom- 
panying sense  of  responsibility,  require  a  ground  which 
lies  outside  of  man's  mora!  nature,  and  beyond  the  experi- 
ences of  his  moral  life?  Can  all  the  elements  of  that  life, 
which  stand  related  to  the  imperative  of  duty  in  the  human 
scul,  be  explained  out  of  the  resources  of  that  life?  Is  the 
authority  of  the  moral  order,  of  which  man  is  a  part, 
immanent  in  that  order,  or  is  it  also  transcendent? 

2.  To  open  up  the  way  for  a  satisfactory  solution  of  this 
problem,  the  relation  of  the  authority  of  conscience  to  the 
activity  of  the  other  faculties  of  man's  nature  must  in  some 
measure  be  understood.  A  little  reflection  shows  that  the 
authority  of  conscience,  and  the  imperative  of  moral  law, 
are  not  derived  from  the  other  faculties  of  the  human  con- 
stitution. The  intellect  cannot  supply  this  authority  and 
imperative,  because  the  intellect  is  not  primarily  moral  at 
all ;  and  then,  90  far  as  its  judgments  enter  the  region  of 


i  , 


T 


^■■■i 


400 


APOLOGETICS. 


^  •, 


a  moral  life,  they  are  determined  by  moral  law.  The  sen- 
sibility cannot  provide  the  requisite  ground,  for  the  reason 
that  the  feelings,  so  far  as  they  have  moral  quality,  are 
conditioned  upon  the  exercise  of  conscience  in  the  moral 
life.  And  the  will  is  not  adequate  to  gfive  the  basis  of  the 
imperative  which  is  involved  in  moral  obligation,  for  the 
reason  that  the  will  is  the  servant  of  conscience,  and  is 
under  orders  from  moral  law.  The  wiH  is  not  the  basis 
of  the  authority  of  conscience,  but  rathe/  the  instrument 
of  its  expression,  and  hence  subservient  to  it. 

It  is  thus  evident  that  conscience,  with  the  moral  law 
which  it  expresses,  is  supreme  over  all  the  other  faculties 
of  man's  nature.  They  all  render  allegiance  to  it,  and 
acknowledge  its  authority.  This  being  the  case,  the 
authority  of  conscience  is  not  derived  from  any  other 
faculty;  nor  can  it  be  said  that  all  the  other  faculties,  in 
their  combined  exercise,  provide  the  basis  of  that  impera- 
tive which  appears  in  a  moral  life. 

3.  The  question  next  arises  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  con- 
science and  moral  law  itself  to  supply  an  adequate  ground 
for  the  fact  of  obligation.  Is  conscience  self-explanatory 
in  the  matter  of  moral  obligation?  Is  a  merely  subjective 
or  immanent  explanation  of  obligation  sufficient?  A  little 
reflection  serves  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  it  can  scarcely 
be  so.  The  spontaneous  conviction  of  the  moral  life  is  in 
the  direction  of  supposing  a  moral  ruler,  whose  will,  as 
expressed  in  moral  law,  is  the  foundation  of  the  obligation 
which  announces  itself  in  that  life.  Responsibility,  in  the 
last  analysis,  relates  itself  to  a  moral  governor,  and  obliga- 
tion under  moral  law  finally  rests  in  a  n..    -.1  lawgiver. 

And  this  is  greatly  confirmed  by  the  very  nature  of  moral 
obligation.  The  moral  imperative  it  announces  is  a  bond 
from  which,  by  our  own  powers,  we  cannot  set  ourselves 
free.  We  find  ourselves  under  the  dominion  of  respon- 
sibility, with  no  door  of  escape  from  its  authority  open. 
Now,  if  we  had  tied  ourselves  up  under  moral  law  by  our 


i. 


THE  MOPaL  proofs.  401 

own  volition,  tnen,  presumauly,  we  could  in  like  manner 
««/».  ourse  ves  whenever  we  chose.     If  we  ourselves  had 

rra    me  7,:r","''^'  '"^^^"  ''''  ^^^^^  o- 
Zs  d     Buf  o  '  """  '°""  ''''''  ''  whenever  we 

liZut-  '^^"^.^'°"«n«s  testifies  that  we  are  unable  to 

recall  th.s  imperative,  or  to  untie  the  bonds  of  obli^tion 
wh.ch  we  find  upon  us.     It  seems  pretty  clear,  theSore 
hat  we  are  consciously  under  an  authority  which  s  ndthe; 
atrd  rr  "- -'^-Posed.    This  i'mplies  ti;^  :^  '^ 
law  and  hfe  does  not  m  itself  contain  the  foundation  of  its 
own  au    onty  as  expressed  in  the  fact  of  obligaS. 
4.  This  leads  to  the  last  step  in  the  inference      The 

which  moral  law  imposes    n  u       If  thl!         'Tu"'^''''' 
lie  beyond  aT  tl  ff    ts     iT  tr^^^^^     """'"'  ''  "^"^^ 

contain  in  itself    h.  T   .      '"  experience,  does  not 

mam  m  itself  the  ground  of  its  absolute  authoritv    if 

of  moral  order,  law  and  life.  "^  ^'P^'" 

The  question  as  to  where  tiiis  ground  lies  ,•«  „. 
answered.    In  previous  theistic  proofs  we  have  T     ^u"" 
a  necessary,  infinite  and  intelligent  be  n^  1  a^I!/"""^  ^'^" 
and  that  this  being  is  the  effident  ca  "se  of  the  ""  = 

"ts  cosmic  origin,  and  the  sufficient  reason    ?""'"'  '•" 
progress,  order  and  design     ThTtLinl      .  •'"''"''^ 

natural  attributes  and  ir^anent  rehtb^  7   ^  '"''""' 
^-  bee^n  already  vindicated,  tnaytw  4"  ^I J—; 


4M 


APOLOGETICS. 


the  adequate  transcendent  ground  of  the  fact  of  obligation, 
and  of  the  imperative  which  it  asserts  in  the  moral  life. 
This  being,  we  have  already  seen,  is  the  ground  of  the  idea 
of  right  and  of  the  fact  of  moral  law.  He  now  appears 
as  the  basis  of  obligation.  If  his  nature  as  moral  is  ex- 
pressed in  moral  law,  then  this  law,  as  expressed  in  a 
moral  life,  provides  the  authority  which  appears  in  that 
life.  The  theistic  postulate  thus  supplies  the  transcendent 
ground  for  the  fact  of  moral  obligation,  and  this  fact,  in 
turn,  requires  this  postulate.  This  is  the  solution  of  the 
problem. 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  inference  does  not  directly 
prove  the  existence  of  God.  The  postulate  of  his  existence 
is  presented  as  the  transcendent  ground  for  the  fact  of 
obligation,  and  as  the  necessary  basis  of  tb-  moral  impera- 
tive announced  in  a  moral  life.  All  of  which,  in  turn,  con- 
firms the  reality  of  the  existence  of  God,  and  the  validity 
of  the  theistic  view  of  the  universe.  This  solves  the 
problem  of  moral  obligation.  I  am  responsible,  not  merely 
to  law,  but  to  a  law-giver.  I  am  under  obligation,  not 
merely  to  conscience,  but  to  the  moral  ruler  whose  authority 
is  expressed  in  conscience.  This  being  is  God,  as  moral 
ruler. 

In  this  way  it  is  made  plain  that  the  necessarily  existent 
being,  who  is  the  first  cause  and  ground  of  the  universe, 
is  also  moral  in  his  nature.  It  also  clearly  appears  that 
moral  attributes,  as  well  as  natural,  pertain  to  him;  and 
that  he  is  the  moral,  as  well  as  the  natural,  ruler  of  the 
universe. 

III.  The  Proof  from  the  Good:  Its  Problem.    §  96. 

I.  This  branch  of  the  theistic  proof  finds  its  point  of 
departure  in  the  idea  of  the  highest  good.  Its  exposition 
raises  the  inquiry  of  the  ages  in  regard  to  the  summum 
bonum  and  its  theistic  import.     If  the  history  of  human 


tmaM 


mmmm 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS.  403 

speculation  means  anything,  it  is  that  men  have  ever  been 
setting  before  them  an  ideal  of  what  is  for  them  their  chief 
good,  and  that  they  have  earnestly  striven  to  attain  it.  No 
matter  how  widely  men  may  have  differed  in  regard  to  the 
precise  nature  of  their  chief  good,  the  fact  remains  that 
they  set  it  up,  and  bend  their  energies  towards  its  realiza- 
tion. This  fact  is  the  starting  point  of  the  proof  now  under 
notice. 

2.  At  the  very  outset  the  relation  of  the  right,  as  already 
expounded,  and  of  the  good,  now  under  consideration, 
emerges.  That  there  is  a  very  intimate  relation  between 
them  is  generally  admitted,  but  there  is  wide  diversity  of 
opinion  as  to  how  that  relation  should  really  be  construed. 
Some  make  the  notion  of  the  right  fundamental,  and  con- 
strue the  good  under  it.  Others  invert  this  order,  and  give 
the  idea  of  the  good  the  ruling  place.  Still  others  are  con- 
tent to  correlate  them,  and  make  no  attempt  to  construe 
the  one  in  terms  of  the  other.  No  complete  discussion  of 
this  problem  is  now  required.  It  will  suffice  to  adjust  the 
problem  in  a  general  way,  and  to  bring  out  clearly  the 
concept  of  the  good. 

The  term  good  is  quite  ambiguous.  Indeed,  there  are  a 
great  many  goods,  some  higher,  others  lower.  A  thing 
may  be  called  good  when  it  serves  its  end.  There  are 
physical,  metaphysical  and  moral  aspects  of  the  good. 
What  is  now  in  view  is  the  highest  good.  This  means  the 
good  which  serves  man's  best  welfare  in  the  long  run  and 
in  the  widest  sense.  It  is  a  good,  also,  to  which  all  other 
forms  of  the  good  must  be  subordinated. 

3.  In  both  ancient  and  modern  times  opinions  have  dif- 
fered widely  in  regard  to  what  really  constitutes  the  highest 
good  for  man.  Some  found  it  on  the  sensibility,  and  make 
it  consist  in  some  form  of  happiness  or  pleasure.  This  is 
represented  by  the  Cyrenaics  and  Epicureans  among  the 
Greeks,  and  by  the  Hedonists  and  Utilitarians  of  our  own 
day.    This  may  be  egoistic  and  individual,  or  altruistic  and 


■  ■ 


Mi 


iMi 


\ 


1 

it 


I' 


404 


APOLOGETICS. 


universal,  but  in  all  its  types  the  good  is  conditioned  upon 
some  modification  of  the  sensibility.  A  second  opinion 
founds  the  summum  bonum  on  the  reason,  and  makes  it 
consist  in  a  form  of  knowledge  or  right  judgment.  The 
Cynics  and  Stoics  of  ancient  times,  and  modern  rationalistic 
ethics,  as  represented  by  Kant,  are  types  of  this  general 
opinion.  Knowledge  or  right  reason  is  the  goal  where 
man's  highest  good  lies,  and  to  live  according  to  the  nature 
of  things  rightly  understood  is  the  summun  bonum  for  man. 
A  third  view  of  the  chief  good  for  man  associates  it  with 
man's  moral  nature,  and  makes  it  a  matter  of  the  con- 
science. This  view  regards  it  as  righteousness  rather  than 
knowledge  or  happiness,  because  it  spiings  from  the  moral 
nature,  rather  than  from  the  intellectual  or  the  sensuous. 
Socrates,  and  Plato  in  a  sense,  and  Aristotle  more  definitely, 
represent  this  opinion  in  the  olden  time,  and  those  intui- 
tional moralists  of  our  own  day,  who  make  conscience  an 
original  power  of  our  nature,  are  its  exponents.  A  fourth 
opinion  deserves  to  be  mentioned,  though  it  in  a  sense 
combines  elements  of  the  other  three.  This  view  discovers 
the  highest  good  in  the  unity  of  the  exercise  of  all  the 
powers  of  man.  ^t  is  founded  on  the  whole  personality 
of  man,  rather  than  on  any  one  element  in  his  nature. 
That  end  which  best  conduces  to  man's  welfare  as  a  whole, 
is  his  highest  good.  Plato's  ideal  theory  on  its  ethical  side, 
and  some  of  the  better  Stoics,  were  almost  on  this  ground, 
among  the  Greeks.  Hegel  and  Green  and  Seth,  though 
they  differ  much  in  the  particulars  of  their  systems,  prac- 
tically agree  in  finding  the  basis  of  the  highest  good  in 
the  unity  of  the  human  personality,  as  it  strives  towards 
self-realization. 

This  fourth  view  has  much  to  commend  it  so  long  as 
the  ethical  element  is  given  its  proper  place  in  the  scheme. 
In  the  long  run  the  right  and  the  good  will  agree  and  be 
found  in  harmony,  for  the  reason  that  they  are  joined  in  a 
still  deeper  unity.    Indeed,  the  good,  the  true,  and  the  right 


liiiaHi 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


405 


find  their  ground  of  unity  and  harmony  in  personality. 
That  which  contributes  to  the  noblest  exercise  of  all  the 
activities  of  man's  personality  is  his  highest  good.  This 
highest  good,  as  the  noblest  end  of  human  activity,  has 
its  pathway  marked  out,  and  its  goal  set  by  the  right,  and 
it  is  only  w  hen  walking  in  that  path,  and  striving  towards 
that  goal,  that  the  harmony  of  all  the  powers  of  man's 
personality  can  be  secured,  that  the  perfection  of  character 
can  be  attained,  and  that  happiness  in  holiness  can  be  expe- 
rienced. The  chief  end  of  man  is  happiness  in  holiness  for 
the  glory  of  God.  Plato's  highest  idea  as  the  good,  and 
Green's  ideal  end  for  human  conduct,  suggest  the  correct 
doctrine  upon  this  point.  The  fact  that  man  finds  such  a 
good,  or  sets  such  an  ideal  before  him,  and  finds  himself 
striving  towards  it,  is  the  core  of  the  problem  now  to  be 
solved.     Has  it  any  theistic  significance? 


IV.  The  Proof  from  the  Good:  Its  Solution.    §  97. 

1.  The  fact  that  men  do  set  before  them  certain  ends 
which  they  deem  desirable  to  be  attained  must  be  conceded. 
These  desirable  ends  constitute  what  men  regard  as  the 
things  that  are  good  for  them.  As  we  have  seen,  men 
differ  widely  as  to  what  the  highest  good  is.  Still,  the  fact 
remains  that  they  set  something  before  them  and  strive  to 
attain  unto  it.  Hence,  men  do  conceive  of  some  good 
which  they  set  before  them  as  desirable,  and  they  instinc- 
tively put  forth  effort  to  come  into  possession  of  it.  And 
this  instinct  is  not  only  an  inherent  tendency  in  human 
nature,  but  it  is  also  the  condition,  when  rightly  directed, 
of  all  true  human  progress.  It  seems  to  rise  out  of  a  sense 
of  defect,  a  feeling  of  imperfection,  or  a  conviction  of 
moral  incompleteness.  In  its  essential  nature,  it  is  a  striv- 
ing for  the  complete,  a  longing  for  the  perfect,  or  a  struggle 
for  moral  excellency. 

2.  This  highest  good  towards  which  men  thus  strive 


1:1 

Mi 


(  '. 


f'' 


ti 


I 


406 


APOLOGETICS. 


has  a  moral  quality  pertaining  to  it.  To  it,  thus  regarded, 
both  the  sensuous  and  the  rational  nature  of  man  must  be 
subordinated.  The  highest  good,  therefore,  is  not  happi- 
ness nor  knowledge,  but  virtue.  This  is  the  moral  ideal 
which  constitutes  the  highest  good  for  man,  and  conditions 
all  other  goods  which  may  make  their  appeal  to  him.  It 
is  the  proper  goal  of  all  human  effort  after  better  things. 
Its  perfection  consists  in  the  harmonious  exercise  of  all 
powers  of  man  directed  towards  some  definite  goal.  It 
thus  appears  that  there  is  erected  or  revealed  in  man's 
personality  an  ideal  good,  which  ever  beckons  him  on  and 
up  towards  its  realization.  The  question  at  once  arises  as 
to  the  philosophy  of  this  fact  in  human  experience.  Is  it 
capable  of  explanation  from  the  resources  of  man's  nature 
alone?  Must  its  final  explanation  lie  beyond  man?  In  a 
word,  has  it  any  theistic  significance? 

3.  That  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  the  highest  good,  and 
of  the  impulse  in  man  to  attain  it,  can  be  explained  from 
man's  various  powers  alone,  is  more  than  doubtful.  It 
cannot  arise  from  the  sensibility  alone,  for  the  sensibility 
in  itself  is  non-moral,  and  its  feelings  are  conditioned  upon, 
rather  than  produce  the  moral  ideal.  It  can  scarcely  be 
the  p.\,duct  of  the  intellect,  for  the  reason  that  the  intellect 
apprehends  rather  than  originates  it.  And  it  can  scarcely 
be  said  that  conscience  ori^,nnates  it,  for  it  seems  that 
conscience  simply  finds  it  as  a  possession  and  prompting 
in  man's  moral  nature.  As  an  ideal  for  man's  highest 
moral  good,  and  as  a  longing  of  the  human  personality  for 
complete  realization,  it  brings  into  play  all  the  powers  of 
man  in  their  highest  harmonious  exercise.  Now,  the  ques- 
tion is,  whether  all  this  requires  an  objective  ground  of 
some  sort.  Can  any  one  of  the  powers,  or  all  of  them 
combined,  provide  an  adequate  ground  for  this  ideal  and 
striving?    To  this  we  return  a  negative  answer. 

4.  It,  therefore,  follows  that  the  only  supposition  which 
fully  meets  the  case  is  the  theistic  postulate.     In  the  fact 


l^ 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


407 


of  the  existence  of  God  already  made  good,  there  is  found 
an  adequate  objective  basis  for  the  good  as  already  set 
forth  in  the  problem  of  this  proof.  God  becomes  the  goal 
of  the  highest  good  for  man,  and  he  is  the  explanation  of 
man's  striving  after  the  highest  good.  It  appears,  in  this 
connection,  that  there  is  profound  insight  in  Plato's  hint 
that  the  highest  reach  of  his  ideal  theory  is  the  idea  of  the 
good,  and  that  this  good  may  be  identified  with  God.  If 
God  be  the  highest  good  for  man,  then  likeness  to  God  in 
moral  excellency  is  the  summum  bonum  for  man,  and  the 
proper  goal  of  all  his  striving.  Thus  the  theistic  postulate 
presents  an  objective  ground  for  the  moral  ideal  which  is 
expressed  in  man's  nature,  and  out  of  the  relation  of  the 
nature  of  man  to  that  ground  springs  the  longing  of  thf* 
human  soul  to  transcend  itself,  and  the  striving  to  attain 
unto  its  ideal. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  other  moral  proofs,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  this  inference  does  not  directly  prove  the 
existence  of  God.  It  simply  takes  the  fact  of  his  existence, 
as  already  vindicated,  for  granted,  and  finds  in  this  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  the  proof  now  under  discussion. 
If  God  be  immanent  in  some  sense  in  man,  and  is  revealing 
himself  in  the  human  personality,  then  man's  response  to 
God  reveals  the  ideal  which  the  moral  good  expresses,  and 
produces  that  irrepressible  striving  towards  that  ideal  which 
man  finds  in  his  experience.  In  this  simple  yet  profound 
way  the  theistic  postulate  solves  the  problem  of  this  proof. 
God  is  the  goal  and  the  ground  of  this  striving  towards 
complete  self-realization  on  the  part  of  man.  In  this  way 
the  reality  of  the  divine  existence  is  confirmed,  and  it  is 
shown  t'lat  God  possesses  moral  attributes.  He  who  is  the 
first  cause  and  abiding  ground  of  the  universe  is  now  seen 
to  be  the  moral  ideal,  as  well  as  the  ground  of  right  and 
the  basis  of  obligation.  The  right,  the  ought  and  the  good 
all  centre  in  him. 

5.  Here,  again,  the  fact  of  moral  ez'il  must  be  taken  into 


lt»    ' 


t        1 


4o8 


APOLOGETICS. 


account.  By  reason  of  this  fact  men  set  before  them  lower 
ends,  and  strive  after  what  is  an  inferior  good.  But,  after 
all  allowance  is  made  for  this  terrible  fact,  the  principle  of 
this  proof  remains  secure  and  its  inference  is  entirely  sout.i. 
Men  do  set  before  them  a  supposed  good  as  a  desira'  <  end, 
and  the  striving  to  attain  it  is  a  fact  in  their  exp  rierce. 
In  addition,  it  must  be  carefully  observed  that  in  ti  ;e  elf- 
realization,  when  all  the  powers  of  man's  nature  are  vi^i'.Ci.s 
harmoniously,  there  is  a  distinct  tendency  to  eliminate 
moral  evil.  This  fact  goes  far  to  confirm  the  validity  of 
this  proof,  since  it  shows  that  the  real  goal  of  true  self- 
realization  is  the  moral  good.  It  at  the  same  time  exhibits 
the  truly  ethical  character  of  the  highest  good,  as  grounded 
in  God.  Hence,  we  conclude  that  the  theistic  postulate  is 
the  valid  solution  for  the  problem  of  this  proof.  Man  is 
so  constituted  that  in  his  moral  exjierience  he  can  set  before 
him  a  moral  goal  in  the  highest  good,  and  tiiat  he  is  con- 
scious of  a  striving  to  attain  it.  This  striving,  when  it 
is  moving  aright,  travels  along  ,'  .  path  of  righteousness, 
and  is  satisfied  only  when  sclf-rcdisation  in  the  ethical  life 
finds  the  character  becoming  more  and  more  like  God. 
These  things  are  not  self-explanatory,  but  constitute  an 
unfailing  witness  to  an  objective  ground  in  God,  who  is 
the  highest  good  for  man,  and  the  goal  of  that  ceaseless 
striving  in  him  which  seeks  ever  to  transcend  its  limitations 
and  reach  complete  self-realization.  Av  d  all  of  this,  in  the 
sphere  of  natural  thcologj-,  lays  the  sure  ground  for  the 
deeper  experiences  of  a  genuine  spiritual  life,  where  the 
goal  and  the  striving  appear  in  another  and  diflferent  form. 
Here,  too,  we  come  within  sigiit  of  the  redemptive  reve- 
lation which  is  the  Iieart  oi  Cliristianity,  and  of  the  spiritual 
dytiaiiic  which  is  resident  in  the  glorious  gospel  of  the 
blessed  God. 


I      i 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  MORAL  PROOFS:    PROOF  FROM  HISTORY. 

Contents. 

Scope  of  this  Proof.— Two  related  Aspects  of  it.— The  Historico- 
religious  and  the  Historico-moral.— The  former.— The  consensus  gen- 
h'lim.- Belief  in  God  Universal  and  Permanent.— The  Evidence  of  this. 
—The  Reality  of  the  Existence  of  God  best  Explanation  of  the  Facts.— 
All  other  Explanations  insufficient.— The  Historico-theistic  Proof.— 
The  Material  Consists  in  Universal  History.- Positivist  Explanations.— 
The  Statistical  Interpretation.— The  T'.ieistic  Explanation  alone  Suffi- 
cient.—A  Rational  End  and  a  Moral  Purpose  in  History.— Its  Statics 
and  Dynamics.— The  Theistic  Hypothesis  fully  Explains  all  the  Facts.— 
Illustrations  at  length  not  given.— Theism,  not  Atheism,  has  the  Key 
of  Human  History.— Higher  Inference  Suggested.— Christ  and  Christi- 
anity Solves  all. 

LlTEHATURE. 

.\ristotle's  Metaphysics.  Book  XI.,  Chap.  VIII.— Cicero's  Laws.  Part 
1.,  Chap.  VIII.— Augustine's  City  of  Cod.— Howe's  Living  Temple, 
Part  I.— Flint's  Theism,  Chap.  VII— Diman's  The  Theistic  Argument, 
Chap.  IX.— Grotius'  The  Christian  Religion,  Part  I..  Chap.  XII.— Red- 
ford's  The  Christian  Plea,  Part  II.,  Chap.  II.,  .1— Brace's  Gesta  Christi. 
— Storrs'  The  Supernatural  Origin  of  Christianity.— Johnston's  Outline 
of  Systematic  Theology,  Part  II.,  Sec.  XL,  Chap.  VI.— Lindsay's  Recent 
Advances,  Chap.  XVI.— Bruce's  The  Providential  Order  of  the  World, 
Chap.  VIII.— Kidd's  Social  Evolution,  Chaps.  IV.-VII.— Mair's  Studies 
in  the  Christian  Evidences,  Chap.  XI.— Uhlhorn's  The  Conflict  of  Chris- 
tianity, Book  II.,  Chap.  I.,  and  Book  III.,  Chaps.  I.,  II.— Luthardt's 
Fundamental  Truths,  Chap.  IX.— Flint's  Antitheistic  Theories,  Chap.  I. 

I.  Preliminary.    §  98. 

l.'T^inS  is  the  concluding  brancli  of  the  moral  proof 
J.  for  the  existence  of  God.  The  theistic  inferences 
based  on  the  notion  of  the  right,  the  fact  of  obligation,  and 
the  idea  of  the  giK>d  have  been  elucidated.  The  inference 
which  history  justifies  remains  for  exposition.  This  opens 
up  a  vast  and  varied  field.  It  leads  to  the  consideration 
of  man,  not  as  an  individual,  nor  merely  as  the  personal 
subject  of  moral  government,  but  as  a  social  and  religious 


It 

i 


1'  f 

4 

f 


if 
I 


4IO 


APOLOGETICS. 


ii 


i| 


organism,  and  as  a  current  of  successive  hiF^oric  activities. 
This  leads  to  a  study  of  the  social  fabric  ii.  its  totality  at 
any  given  time  in  part,  but  mainly  to  a  careful  interpre- 
tation of  its  historic  moral  and  religious  progress.  Hence, 
social  statics  and  dynamics  are  both  involved  in  this  com- 
prehensive proof. 

2.  There  are  two  related  aspects  of  this  proof.  The  one 
consists  in  an  inference  from  the  fact  that  the  belief  in  some 
sort  of  deity  is  practically  universal  among  men.  This,  by 
some,  is  called  the  anthropological  argument,  and  by  others 
it  is  termed  the  religious  proof  for  the  existence  of  God. 
Either  of  these  titles  fairly  well  denotes  this  general  proof. 
In  any  case,  it  may  not  be  improper  to  regard  it  as  a 
certain  phase  of  the  historical  argument,  for  the  reason, 
mainly,  that  history  is  largely  the  source  of  our  informa- 
tion for  the  materials  of  this  inference.  Strictly  speaking, 
it  is  the  historico-religioHS  proof,  and  as  such  it  will  be 
treated  in  this  connection. 

The  other  and  main  branch  of  this  proof  grows  out  of 
the  moral  order  and  purpose  which  are  to  be  observed  in 
the  history  of  the  human  race.  Here  is  a  multitude  of 
facts  which  call  for  an  explanation.  The  mora'  ••lev  and 
movement  exhibited  by  the  progress  of  the  i  "^wed 

as  a  social  organism,  in  its  broad  and  comprei.  out- 

lines, are  to  be  investigated,  in  order  to  discover  whether 
they  justify  the  theistic  inference.  Each  of  these  somewhat 
diverse  branches  of  the  historical  argument  will  be  briefly 
outlined. 


II.  The  Historico-Rcligious  Proof.    §  99. 


ii 


I.  The  problem  now  presented  is  the  widesprs.  and  per- 
manent belief  in  some  form  of  deity  which  the  history  of 
the  human  race  presents.  Connected  with  this  h  ''ef  is  the 
universal  prevalence  of  some  sort  of  religious  ri  .s  among 
men.    This  general  religious  cuUhs  also  forms  part  of  the 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


411 


present  problem.  The  solution  of  this  problem  provides 
what  is  sometimes  called  the  argument  for  the  existence 
of  God  from  the  consensus  gentium.  The  world-wide  and 
age-long  belief  in  deity  thus  argues  his  existence.  A  brief 
exposition  of  it  must  suffice. 

The  universality  of  the  belief  in  some  sort  of  a  god  or 
gods  is  now  seldom  questioned.  The  alleged  tribes  of 
atheists  spoken  of  by  Lubbock  and  others,  turn  out  to  be 
quite  mythical  in  the  light  of  the  mass  of  testimony  which 
is  now  available  from  every  age  and  every  land.  Flint,  in 
his  Antitheistic  Theories,  shows  conclusively  against  Lub- 
bock, Feuerbach,  and  others,  that  there  are  no  tribes  of 
people  on  the  earth  devoid  of  the  belief  in  some  kind  of 
supreme  being  or  supernatural  powers. 

Plato  says  that  the  belief  in  the  gods  is  a  natural  and 
universal  instinct.  Aristotle  bears  similar  testimony  and 
expresses  the  same  opinion.  Calvin  and  Grotius  adduce 
abundant  evidence  to  justify  the  same  conclusion. 

In  our  own  clay  we  have  materials  coming  from  two 
important  sources,  which  do  much  to  establish  the  consensus 
gentium  in  regard  to  belief  in  deity.  First,  we  have  a  vast 
mass  of  facts  gathered  from  many  a  fieltl  by  those  who 
are  seeking  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  religion  according 
to  naturalistic  methods  and  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  natural  evolution.  These  investigators  have  done 
much  to  show  that  religious  belief  and  worship  are  found 
everywhere  among  men.  They  have  searched  far  and  wide 
among  all  races  and  tribes  of  men,  and  have  broug.it  to 
light  much  that  is  of  interest  and  value  for  the  argument 
now  in  hand.  This  material  we  willingly  utilize  in  laying 
the  foundations  of  the  theistic  inference  which  is  now  under 
discussion. 

Secondly,  the  study  of  Comparative  Religion,  by  those 
who  pursue  it  for  legitimate  apologetical  purposes,  renders 
a  similar  service.  The  beliefs  and  practices  of  all  peoples 
in  matters  of  religion,  as  set  forth  in  their  traditions,  in 


liJi 


412 


APOLOGLiTICS. 


their  literatures,  or  in  their  religfious  rituals,  are  carefully 
studied,  and  a  vast  mass  of  materials  is  thereby  placed  at 
our  disposal.  We  gladly  use  all  that  is  suitable  and  ser- 
viceable of  this  material  in  the  present  discussion,  for  it 
is  much  easier  to  make  bricks  when  both  the  clay  and  the 
straw  are  gathered. 

2.  In  seeking  to  discover  the  solution  of  the  problem 
thus  formulated,  we  have  simply  to  inquire  what  inference 
we  can  properly  make  from  the  facts  of  the  universal  and 
permanent  belief  in  deity,  and  from  the  practice  of  various 
religious  rites  and  ceremonies  among  men. 

The  purely  naturalistic  explanations  scarcely  suffice  to 
account  for  the  facts,  for  while  these  explanations  may 
give  a  complete  natural  history  of  the  facts,  they  do  not 
provide  any  complete  philosophy  of  them.  Indeed,  these 
facts  are  not  self-explanatory.  The  fact  of  a  universal 
belief  in  deity  argues  for  the  reality  of  the  object  of  that 
deity  in  some  proper  form.  Even  though  the  idea  of  the 
object  be  sadly  perverted  in  many  cases,  yet  the  fact  of 
the  belief  suggests  the  reality  of  its  object,  unless  this 
universal  instinct  of  the  human  race  be  false  at  its  very 
root.  But  we  must  assume  the  veracity  of  that  religious 
instinct,  and  hence  find  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  uni- 
versal belief  in  deity  in  the  theistic  hypothesis.  Even  if 
we  admit  that  in  many  pagan  systems  there  is  much  of 
superstition,  this  conclusion  is  valid,  for  superstition,  as  a 
counterfeit  of  religion,  is  a  witness  to  the  genuine.  Hence, 
we  find  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  now  in  hand  is 
found  in  the  conclusion  that  God  really  exists.  To  deny 
this  would  be  to  do  injustice  to  the  very  deepest  convictions 
and  the  most  permanent  practices  among  men  everywhere. 


III.  The  Historico-Theistic  Proof.    §  100. 


I.  This  is  the  main  branch  of  the  fourth  line  of  the  moral 
proofs.     We  have  now  to  consider  the  facts  of  history  in 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


413 


their  inner  relations  and  search  for  their  true  philosophy. 
This  is  a  cogent  proof. 

The  material  of  this  proof  is  vast  and  varied.  It  em- 
braces all  the  events  th- 1  have  ti  anspired  in  the  great  drama 
of  man's  historic  activity  in  all  the  ages  of  the  world. 
Many  of  these  events  have  never  been  recorded  on  the 
pages  of  history ;  but  on  the  historic  page  we  find  sufficient 
to  justify  the  inference  of  this  proof.  Everything  that 
relates  to  men  as  individuals,  as  nations,  and  as  a  race  of 
moral  beings,  rises  up  for  review. 

To  sketch  all  the  facts  here  would  be  to  write  a  com- 
prehen?ive  universal  history.  It  would  require  us  to  find 
out  ail  we  could  about  the  men  who  lived  before  the  deluge ; 
it  would  call  for  a  detailed  account  of  all  the  movements 
of  ancient  nations ;  it  would  further  insist  on  a  connected 
account  of  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  nations  of  the  Christian 
era.  It  would  also  ask  that  we  should  ascertain,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  underlying  motives  which  prompted  men  to 
act  their  parts  on  the  stage  of  history;  and  it  would  raise 
the  question  of  the  loral  bearing  of  these  facts  upon  each 
other,  an'\  upon  the  progress  of  the  race  as  a  whole.  But 
for  the  details  of  the  materials  thus  hinted  at  we  must  refer 
the  reader  to  the  best  current  works  on  general  history. 

2.  In  seeking  now  to  solve  this  tremendous  problem,  we 
have  to  ask  the  question,  What  is  the  true  key  to  interpret 
the  manifold  facts  of  the  history  of  the  human  race?  What 
is  the  philosophy  of  human  history?  Can  it  be  explained 
on  merely  natural  social  ground,  or  must  moral  factors  be 
given  a  place? 

Various  principles  of  explanation  have  been  proposed. 
Comte,  and  positivists  generall-  ••eek  to  explain  history  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  naturalistic  evolution. 
All  such  attempts  must  be  coi-'^dered  failures,  inasmuch  as 
they  merely  state  the  problem  by  giving  a  natural  history 
of  the  facts,  but  provide  no  philosophy  of  the  facts,  no 
solution  of  the  problem  presented.     Herder,  Vico,  Buckle, 


414 


APOLOGETICS. 


ir: 


and  others  of  similar  views,  propose  to  explain  history  in 
a  purely  social  and  statistical  way.  All  such  attempts  leave 
largely  out  of  account  the  fact  of  human  freedom,  and  they 
ignore  entirely  the  permanent  moral  factors  in  the  historic 
activity  of  mankind. 

Edwards  and  Bossuet,  and  a  host  of  others  since  their 
day,  give  the  true  theistic  and  religious  explanation  of  the 
facts,  with  the  agency  of  God  and  the  fact  of  redemption 
underlying  them.  This  is  no  doubt  the  correct  principle 
of  interpretation  for  the  phenomena  of  history.  We  ob- 
serve a  moral  purpose  running  all  through  history.  There 
seems  to  be  a  rational  plan  working  out  in  it  all.  Events 
do  not  transpire  on  the  stage  of  history  by  chance  nor  as 
the  result  of  fate.  They  are  marked  by  freedom,  intelli- 
gence and  morality.  Plan,  purpose  and  design  seem  to 
run  all  through  history  as  the  centuries  roll  on,  and  as 
empires  rise  and  fall.  There  seems  to  be  a  moral  teleology 
in  this  age-long  stream  of  historic  events.  As  the  indi- 
vidual is  consciously  under  moral  government,  so  the  race, 
as  a  whole,  as  an  organism,  is  under  the  same  government. 
Hence,  a  moral  purpose  runs  all  through  the  course  of 
history.  This  is  its  moral  teleology.  There  is  also  seen 
to  be  a  power  which  makes  for  righteousness  w^hich  impels 
and  overrules  the  destinies  of  the  race.  This  is  the  moral 
dynamic  of  history. 

Hence,  whether  we  view  the  human  race  in  its  social 
statical  state,  or  in  its  dynamic  historical  movement,  we 
observe  a  moral  order.  As  in  nature  there  is  a  natural 
order  with  natural  law,  so  in  social  statics  we  see  a  moral 
order  with  moral  law.  And  as  we  see  in  the  universe 
cosmic  progress  in  harmony  with  certain  great  cosmic  prin- 
ciples, so  in  the  movements  of  human  history  we  see 
progress  in  accordance  with  recognized  moral  forces.  This, 
then,  is  the  problem  to  be  solved. 

3.  The  solution  of  this  problem,  in  the  light  of  previous 
proofs  for  the  existence  of  God,  is  almost  self-evident.    It 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


415 


consists  in  a  simple  theistic  inference  from  the  facts  of 
human  history  to  be  seen  on  every  hand,  and  running  on 
through  all  the  ages.  That  inference  is  secured  by  an 
application  of  the  theistic  hypothesis  to  the  facts  in  ques- 
tion. No  other  explanation  of  the  facts  is  adequate.  We 
can  give  unity  and  rationality  to  the  facts  of  history  only 
on  the  supposition  that  there  is  an  intelligent,  powerful  and 
moral  ruler  over  men  in  their  moral  relations  and  history. 
The  life  and  activity  of  the  human  race  does  not  consist 
in  a  series  of  detached  and  arbitrary  details,  entirely  devoid 
of  any  moral  quality.  The  sum  total  of  human  history  is 
not  a  vast  mass  of  unrelated  and  unmeaning  facts;  but 
it  is  an  orderly  whole,  which  finds  the  philosophy  of  its 
order  in  the  hypothesis  of  a  power  over  it,  and  working 
through  it,  which  is  intelligent  and  moral. 

To  give  extended  illustrations  of  this  inference  is  en- 
tirely out  of  the  question  here.  We  can  only  give  a  hint 
or  two  in  regard  to  the  key  for  the  interpretation  of  history 
which  the  theistic  hypothesis  supplies.  Many  able  and 
popular  treatises  supply  abundant  illustration  of  the  way 
history  should  be  regarded  in  the  light  of  its  theistic  inter- 
pretation. To  such  treatises,  some  of  which  are  named  at 
the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  we  must  refer  the  reader. 
History,  from  this  view-point,  becomes  a  description  of 
God's  dealings  with  men.  Even  unconsciously  on  their 
part,  it  may  come  to  pass  that  men  and  nations  fulfil  the 
great  ends  of  the  moral  government  of  God.  By  this  means 
the  presence  and  power  of  God  as  moral  n^'er  is  made  mani- 
fest, and  the  fact  of  his  existence  assured. 

It  is  in  this  way,  rather  than  by  detailed  illustration,  that 
we  emphasize  the  conclusion  that  we  find  in  the  theistic 
postulate,  when  applied  to  the  facts  of  the  human  race  and 
its  history,  a  rational  explanation  of  the  history  and  destiny 
of  humanity.  No  other  view  of  history  gives  such  an 
adequate  explanation.  The  theist  alone  holds  in  his  hands 
the  key  of  human  history.     The  atheist  or  agnostic  may 


f 


MUMbl^Mk^ 


1 1 


la  r 


i!'?  J 


416 


APOLOGETICS. 


describe  the  facts  with  the  utmost  care,  but  both  are  alike 
helpless  to  explain  them.  Hence,  both  the  moral  teleology 
of  the  social  fabric  among  men,  and  the  moral  dynamic 
seen  in  the  historic  lovements  of  the  race,  fully  justify 
the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  moral  divine  ruler. 

4.  It  would  be  easy,  and  perfectly  legitimate,  to  rise  a 
step  higher  than  the  philosophical  theism  just  stated,  and 
to  find  in  human  history  the  confi'mation  of  the  reality  and 
divinity  of  Christianity.  It  would  then  appear  that  the 
history  and  destiny  of  the  human  race  can  be  best  under- 
stood in  its  deepest  significance  only  in  the  light  of  Jesus 
Christ  and  the  redeeming  activity  of  God  in  the  world  by 
him.  From  Bethlehem  and  Nazareth,  from  Jerusalem,  Cal- 
vary and  Olivet,  rather  than  from  palaces  and  fortresses 
and  battle-fields,  is  the  true  divine  keynote  of  history  to  be 
heard.  God's  spiritual  kingdom  in  the  world  is  the  scene 
of  his  empire  on  this  earth.  The  laws  of  that  kingdom 
are  moral  and  spiritual,  and  are  for  the  government  of  men. 
Sin  has  come  in  to  mar  the  order  of  that  government  as 
at  first  instituted.  Redemption  comes  in  to  restore  the 
harmony  which  sin  had  broken.  Jesus  Christ  is  the  central 
figure  of  history,  because  he  is  the  head  of  this  spiritual 
kingdom.  By  him,  through  the  Spirit,  the  redeeming 
activity  of  God  is  exercised  among  men  in  the  world.  The 
history  of  the  race  at  large  can  only  be  understood  in  its 
relation  to  Christ  and  his  kingdom.  Indeed,  all  history, 
directly  or  indirectly,  is  but  an  expression  of  the  n\i,  I'ining 
operation  of  God  among  men  according  to  his  purpose.  If 
we  stand  at  Calvary,  and  look  back,  we  see  all  history  con- 
verging to  its  fulness  of  time  in  Jesus  Christ;  and  if  we 
look  back  from  the  same  vantage  ground,  we  see  all  history 
pressing  forward  towards  its  consummation  in  the  culmi- 
nation of  his  spiritual  kingdom. 

This  being  the  case,  the  theistic  inferente  which  the 
facts  of  history  justify  is  of  the  very  highest  order.  By 
means  of  it  we  stand  at  the  threshold  of  Christianity,  ready 


THE  MORAL  PROOFS. 


417 


to  pass  in  by  the  gateway  of  revelation  to  lean  the  secrets 
of  the  spiritual  kingdom  itself.  With  the  hand  upon  the 
lifted  latch,  reason  leaves  us  standing  on  that  threshold. 
Only  when  by  faith  we  enter  in,  do  we  behold  its  beauty 
and  its  glory. 

5.  This  completes  the  outline  of  the  theistic  proofs.  The 
psychical  and  cosmical  have  been  already  summarized.  In 
a  sentence  or  two  the  force  of  the  moral  proof,  in  its  four 
lines,  may  be  gathered  up.  The  ortho-theistic  proof  argued 
from  the  idea  of  moral  right  and  law  to  God  as  its  proper 
ground.  The  deonto-theistic  proof  reasoned  from  the  fact 
of  the  binding  nature  of  moral  obligation  to  the  will  and 
authority  of  God  as  its  basis.  The  agatho-theistic  proof 
found  that  the  striving  of  man  for  his  true  highest  good 
reached  its  proper  goal  in  God.  And  the  historico-theistic 
proof  discovered  in  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  God  as  the 
moral  ruler  of  the  nations  the  true  key  to  interpret  human 
history.  These  four  true  strands,  bound  together,  form 
the  moral  proof  for  the  existence  of  God.  Binding  the 
psychical,  the  cosmical  and  the  moral  proofs  together,  we 
form  the  strong  cable  of  the  theistic  argument. 


^  I 


I 


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mmn 


]:! 


ih 


'!  ill 


ii 


ill 


4k 
11  If 


,  .1 


CHAPTER  XIII. 
THE  KANTIAN  CRITICISM,  AND  A  SUMMARY  OF  THEISM. 

Contents. 

Kant's  Influence  on  Philosophy  and  Theology.— His  Criticism  of  the 
Theistic  Proofs.— Not  so  Destructive  as  at  one  Time  Supposed.— His 
Classiikation  of  the  Proofs.— The  Arguments  in  Order.— Charged  with 
Logical  Contradiction.— The  Ontologicat  Proof  not  Invalid.— Cosmo- 
logical  Proof  Criticised  under  a  False  \iew  of  Causation.— Noumena 
and  Phenomena  too  Widely  Separated.— Teleological  Proof  Commended 
•and  Limited.— Yet  Criticised  as  Defective.— Kant's  Criticism  Reduces 
kll  Proofs  to  the  Principle  of  the  Ontological.— Overlooks  a  posteriori 
Factors.— Stress  laid  on  Moral  Proofs.— Yet  if  Valid,  so  is  the  Theo- 
retic—Summary of  Psychology  and  Ontology  of  Theism.— Conclusions. 
—Man  a  Religious  Being.— Idea  of  God  not  Produced  by  Theistic 
Proofs. —Proofs  not  Strict  Deduction.— Revelation  Needed.— Divine 
Attributes. — Theistic  Cosmology. 

Literature. 

Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  7??(M0«.— Transcendental  Dialectic.  Book  II., 
Chap.  III.— Pfleiderer's  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Vol.  I.,  Chip.  VI.— 
Stirling's  Philosophy  and  Theology,  Chaps.  XV.,  XVI.— Ueberweg's 
History  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  II..  Div.  III.— Shedd's  Dogmatic  Theology, 
Vol.  I.,  Chap.  III.— Fisher's  Grounds  of  Theistic  Belief,  Chap.  II.— Mar- 
tineau's  Studies  in  Religion.  Vol.  I.,  Book  II.,  Chap.  I.— Caird's  Phil- 
osophy of  Religion,  Chap.  V.— Fairbairn's  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of 
Religion,  Chap.  II.— Balfour's  Foundations  of  Belief,  Part  II.,  Chap.  II. 
— Pressense's  Study  of  Origins,  Chap.  III.— Orr's  The  Ritschlian  The- 
ology, Chap.  II.— Fraser's  Philosophy  of  Theism,  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  II.— 
Schurman's  Belief  in  God,  Chaps.  IV..  V.— Cocker's  Christianity  and 
Greek  Philosophy,  Chap.  V.— Tigert's  Theism,  Chap.  III.— Patton's 
Syllabus  on  Theism. 

I.  The  Kantian  Criticism  of  the  Theistic  Proofs.  §  loi. 
1,  npMiE  influence  of  Emmanuel  Kant  on  both  philoso- 
X  phy  and  theology  has  been  very  great.  Even  if 
it  be  not  fully  admitted  that  the  change  he  effected  in 
philosophy  was  quite  as  radical  as  that  brought  about  by 
Copernicus  and  Galileo  in  the  science  of  astronomy,  yet 
the  deep  and  abiding  influence  of  this  great  thinker  on 


111 


■■ 


THE  KANTIAN  CRITICISM. 


419 


subsequent  philosophy  cannot  be  denied.  Perhaps  no  part 
of  Kant's  critical  work  demands  more  careful  attention 
than  his  destructive  criticism  of  the  general  rational  proofs 
for  the  existence  of  God.  So  trenchant  was  that  criticism 
that  many  writers  since  Kant's  day  have  regarded  all 
theistic  inferences  in  the  sphere  of  pure  reason  as  neces- 
sarily inconclusive,  and  have  fallen  back  entirely  upon  the 
moral  argument  as  the  only  ground  upon  which  belief  in 
the  existence  of  God  can  be  vindicated.  Others,  influenced 
equally  by  this  criticism,  have  taken  refuge  either  in  the 
contents  of  divine  revelation  or  in  the  intuition  of  an  infinite 
personal  God  as  the  only  safety  from  atheism  or  agnos- 
ticism. 

It  is,  therefore,  a  very  important  matter  to  ascertain 
how  far  we  should  in  our  day  be  influenced  by  this  bold 
criticism,  and  to  imderstand  what  the  proper  limits  of  the- 
istic proof  really  are.     It  is  mainly  to  this  inquiry  that 
this  chapter  is  devoted.     In  general,  it  may  be  stated  at 
the  outset  that  our  conviction  is  that  many  writers  have 
given  too  much  weight  to  Kant's  criticism,  and  conse- 
quently have  allowed  themselves  to  be  too  easily  driven 
off  the  field  of  rational  theistic  proof.     It  may  be  freely 
conceded  that  Kant  h-s  rendered  good  service  'in  pointing 
out  the  proper  limits  of  the  rational  proofs,  and  that  he 
deserves  all  praise  for  the  forceful  way  in  which  he  has 
presented  the  argument  based  on  the  categorical  imperative 
of  our  moral  nature.    At  the  same  time,  we  should  hesitate 
before  we  admit  that  Kant  has  shown  that  all  the  rational 
proofs  are  fallacious.     Indeed,  one  of  the  wholesome  signs 
m  recent  theistic  speculation  is  the  fact  that  the  rational 
proofs  for  the  divine  existence  are  coming  to  be  regarded 
with  increasing  favor.    The  modes  in  which  they  are  now 
presented  may  be  somewhat  changed,  but  their  rational 
force  IS  at  the  same  time  confidently  admitted.    We  rejoice 
m  this  tendency  of  our  own  time,  and  a  few  remarks  may 
serve  to  show  that  it  is  well-founded. 


it  ^i 


I 


i 


\ 


420 


APOLOGETICS. 


In  the  examination  of  Kant's  criticism  now  to  be  made, 
a  general  knowledge  of  the  Kantian  philosophy  on  the 
part  of  the  reader  must  be  assumed,  for  space  quite  forbids 
even  a  general  sketch  of  it.  The  examination  itself  may 
be  divided  into  two  distinct  branches.  In  the  first  branch, 
inquiry  will  be  made  as  to  whether  Kant's  criticism  justifies 
the  rejection  of  the  ordinary  theistic  proofs.  In  the  second, 
an  attempt  will  be  made  to  discover  whether  Kant  is  con- 
sistent in  relying  on  the  moral  proofs  while  he  rejects  the 

rational. 

2.  Kant  divided  the  ordinary  rational  proofs  current  in 
his  day  into  three  classes.  The  ontological  proof  reasoned 
from  the  idea  of  a  necessary  being;  the  cosmological  argued 
from  the  universe  existing  contingently  to  its  first  cause, 
existing  necessarily;  and  the  teleological  makes  the  theistic 
inference  from  various  marks  of  design  exhibited  by  the 
universe. 

The  imperfection  of  this  classification  might  be  pointed 
out.     At  the  outset,  he  treats  these  arguments  as  if  they 
were  entirely  distinct,  whereas  we  have  already  pointed  out 
the  fact,  in  unfolding  the  causal  proofs,  that  the  cosmo- 
logical   and    teleological    both    rest   on    the    principle   of 
causality.    Then,  in  the  course  of  his  criticism,  he  attempts 
to  reduce  them  all  to  the  terms  of  the  ontological.     This 
does  serious  injustice  to  the  a  posteriori  factors  in  the  cos- 
mological and  teleological  proofs,  and  overlooks  the  fact 
that  all  the  proofs  are  strands  in  a  cable,  not  links  in  a 
chain.     While,  in  a  sense,  the  proofs  are  to  be  logically 
distinguished  from  each  other  for  purposes  of  exposition, 
yet  in  their  argumentative  force  they  are  cumulative  and 
mutually  confirmatory  of  each  other.    It  cannot  be  admitted 
that  the  fundamental  p'-inciple  of  these  three  proofs  is  the 
same,  or  that  they  can  ail  be  reduced  to  any  one  of  them. 
3.  Kant  next  takes  up  the  three  arguments  in  order,  and 
seeks  to  show  that  they  all  lead  to  logical  fallacies  or  land 
in  rational  contradictions.    In  the  discussion  of  the  psychical 


THE  KANTIAN  CRITICISM. 


421 


proofs,  we  have  alluded  to  this  part  of  Kant's  criticism, 
but,  now  additional  details  may  be  given.    Concerning  the 
oniological  proof,  Kant  argues  that  the  judgment  which 
affirms  the  existence  of  a  necessary  being  is  analytical,  not 
synthetical.    To  understand  the  force  of  the  criticism  here 
made,  the  contrast  between  analytic  and  synthetic  judgments 
must  be  perceived.    The  analytic  judgment  merely  unfolds 
the  contents  of  the  propositions  in  the  argument,  and  adds 
nothing  to  their  material.    The  synthetic  enables  us  to  go 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  propositions  in  the  proof,  and  em- 
brace really  new  material  with  which  the  judgment  may 
be  concerned.     Kant  asserts  that  the  judgment  affirming 
the  existence  of  God  as  a  necessary  being  is  simply  an 
analytical  judgment.     Hence,  it  either  assumes  the  exist- 
ence of  God  in  its  statement  or  identifies  the  idea  of  God 
with  the  object  of  that  idea.     In  the   former  case  the 
existence  of  God  must  be  assumed,  not  proved,  otherwise 
it  could  never  be  asserted.     In  the  latter  case,  the  mere 
conception  of  God  is  made  the  same  as  his  existence,  and 
no  proof  of  his  real  existence  can  ever  be  given. 

The  force  of  Kant's  critique  at  this  point  may  be  ad- 
mitted against  those  views  which  regard  the  idea  of  God 
as  merely  a  general  notion,  which  the  mind  itself  forms 
by  generalization,  for  simple  conceivableness  is  no  test  of 
actual  existence.  But  if  the  idea  of  God  be  a  rational 
intuition,  with  a  definite  a  priori  quality  belonging  to  it, 
then  Kant's  criticism  is  not  effective  at  this  point.  It  is 
evident  that  Gaunilo's  "island"  and  Kant's  "dollars"  are 
not  analogous  mental  possessions  with  the  idea  of  God  as 
that  of  a  necessary  being.  This  being  the  case,  their 
criticism  of  the  ontological  proof  here  fails.  Rightly 
understood,  the  type  of  ontological  reasoning  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God  represented  by  Anselm,  and  in  part  by 
Descartes,  holds  good.  It  rests  on  the  fact  that  the  a  priori 
factors  of  the  human  mind  postulate  the  existence  of  their 
objects.    Such  factors  have  objective  validity.    Hence,  the 


j(23 


APOLOGETICS. 


^m 


m 


it  ft 


i:  ■ 


theistic  judgment  is  synthetic  rather  than  analytic,  and 
consequently  connotes  the  actual  existence  of  the  object  to 
which  it  points.  In  addition,  the  position  suggested  by 
Descartes,  that  the  postulate  of  the  divine  existence  is  the 
condition  of  the  reliability  of  human  knowledge,  is  not  in 
any  way  affected  by  the  Kantian  criticism.  This  is  the 
very  stronghold  of  certain  aspects  of  the  ontological  proof, 
and  theism  need  only  surrender  this  ground  when  absolute 
skepticism  ascends  the  throne  of  human  reason. 

4.  In  his  criticism  of  the  cosmological  argument,  Kant 
is  very  severe.  He  condemns  it  as  full  of  logical  fallacies. 
His  attempt  to  resolve  it  into  the  ontological  proof  may 
riow  be  passed  over,  inasmuch  as  we  have  already  shown 
that  that  proof  is  not  destroyed  by  Kant's  criticism.  His 
criticism  of  the  cosmological  argument  turns  mainly  upon 
the  philosophy  of  causation  which  he  holds.  He  rightly 
holds  that  the  argument  in  question  rests  upon  the  principle 
of  causation,  but  his  interpretation  of  that  principle  may 
be  seriously  questioned.  Kant  constantly  asserts  that  the 
law  of  causation  belongs  to  the  realm  of  the  phenomenal, 
and  is  valid  only  within  the  sphere  of  experience.  Hence, 
there  can  be  no  inference  beyond  this  realm  based  on  causa- 
tion, which  is  simply  one  of  the  categories  that  have 
meaning  only  in  relation  to  the  phenomenal.  God,  how- 
ever, is  noumenal,  and  not  an  object  of  experience  in  the 
sphere  of  pure  reason.  Hence,  lie  says  that  when  the 
category  of  causation  is  used  to  prove  the  existence  of  God. 
a  transcendental  use  of  it  is  made,  inasmuch  as  it  is  taken 
from  the  realm  of  phenomena  and  applied  to  God  as  a 
noumenal  object.    This,  Kant  says,  is  illegitimate. 

Concerning  this  criticism  we  make  two  remarks.  In  the 
first  place,  the  absolute  separation  between  phenomena  ami 
noumena  in  the  fact  of  cognition  is  not  justified,  and  it 
has  done  immense  harm  to  the  interests  both  of  philosophy 
and  theology.  It  logically  led  to  subjective  idealism  in 
philosophy,  and  it  has  done  much  to  produce  mysticism  in 


•  i 

■  il 


THE  KANTIAN  CRITICISM.  4a- 

theology.  By  means  of  this  rigid  sq)aration  between  the 
phenomenal  and  the  real,  the  problem  of  the  relativity  of. 
human  knowledge  has  been  burdened  with  unnecessary 
difficulties,  and  the  rational  pathway  to  the  cognition  of 
realities  has  been  beset  with  needless  dangers.  The  result 
is  that  we  are  in  danger  of  falling  into  the  abyss  of  idealism 
so  far  as  the  contents  of  cognition  are  concerned,  or  of 
landing  in  the  gloom  of  agnosticism  so  far  as  the  know- 
ledge of  the  reality  of  either  mind  or  matter  is  concerned. 
Fichte  and  Spencer  are  the  logical  descendants  of  Kant's 
position  in  regard  to  the  distinction  in  question.  In  a  true 
theory  of  knowledge,  the  phenomenal  and  the  noumenal 
elements  must  always  be  taken  into  account.  The  real, 
and  empirical  so  unite  in  true  cognition  that  they  ought 
not  to  be  divorced  in  any  sound  epistemology. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  not  conceded  that  the  law  of 
causation  is  confined  to  phenomenal  sequences  only.    Such 
a  view  leads  to  a  purely  empirical  doctrine  of  causation, 
and  makes  it  nothing  more  than  mere  succession.     If  we 
take  into  account  the  feature  of  efficiency  which  is  an 
essential  factor  in  causation,  we  might  be  nearer  the  truth 
if  we  said  that  it  enables  us  to  transcei  i  the  line  of  mere 
phenomenal   succession.     Or  if   we  confine  causation   to 
empirical  sequences,  we  must  deny  the  factor  of  efficiency 
in  causation.     This  is  to  empty  the  principle  of  causality 
of  one  uf  its  essential  features,  for  we  maintain  that  the 
quality  of  efficiency,  potency  or  agency  is  the  very  essence 
of  causality.    This  element  of  efficiency  is  given  to  experi- 
ence as  a  rational  a  priori  contribution  which  the  mind  itself 
makes  to  the  experience  of  certain  cases  of  sequence.     It 
underlies  the  changes  which  causation  implies,  and  it  abides 
through  every  stage  of  any  phenomenal  scries.     Hence,  it 
does  not  stand  merely  at  the  Iwginning  of  the  scries  as 
the  first  step,  but  it  grounds  every  succeeding  step  as  well. 
Hence,  Kant  can  only  make  good  his  criticism  at  this  point 
by  ignoring  the  fact  of  efficiency,  as  an  essential  factor  in 


1 


11 


till 
I!  t' 


I! 


424 


APOLOGETICS. 


causation.    This  we  cannot  allow  him  to  do,  and  thus  his 
criticism  may  be  met  at  this  point. 

5.  In  criticising  the  teleological  argument,  Kant  treats 
it  with  a  measure  of  respect,  and  admits  that  it  has  some 
right  to  be  held  in  esteem.  He  is  careful  to  confine  it  to 
its  legfitimate  sphere,  and  with  some  things  Kant  here 
says  we  can  cordially  agree.  At  the  outset,  his  criticism 
of  the  desicTi  argument  is  limitative  rather  than  destructive. 
He  shows  that  this  argument  has  often  been  taken  to  prove 
too  much.  He  points  out,  quite  correctly,  that  the  inference 
from  marks  of  design  in  the  universe  only  justifies  the 
conclusion  that  the  universe  has  had  an  intelligent  arranger 
or  framer,  but  not  a  creator  or  originator.  God  can,  at 
best,  be  but  the  architect  of  the  universe,  according  to  this 
argument.  Kant  further  argues  that  the  quality  of  infinity 
is  not  justified  by  this  argument  from  the  marks  of  design 
observed  in  a  finite  universe.  It  may  require  a  very  vast 
intelligence,  but  not  necessarily  one  that  is  infinite,  to 
accoimt  for  the  facts.  Most  careful  writers  on  theism  now 
frankly  admit  the  propriety  of  this  criticism.  The  design 
argument  does  not  of  itself  justify  the  predicate  of  infinity. 
But  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that  the  teleological  argument 
has  no  value.  The  idea  of  a  first  cause  and  creator,  and 
the  attribute  of  infinity  as  pertaining  to  it,  can  be  vindi- 
cated along  other  lines  of  proof.  Then,  we  can  very 
properly  connect  the  intelligence  which  is  necessary  to 
account  for  the  marks  of  design  seen  in  the  universe  with 
this  first  cause,  and  clothe  it  with  the  attribute  of  infinity. 
With  the  limitations  just  noted,  the  teleological  argum^  t 
is  valid  in  its  own  sphere,  and  yields  very  valuable  the!  .c 
results. 

6.  One  of  the  most  important  aspects  of  the  Ka  .lan 
criticism  remains  to  be  considered.  This  relates  to  the 
ingenious  way  in  which  Kant  presents  his  criticism.  He 
seeks  to  reduce  the  cosmologica!  and  teleological  argument? 
to  terms  of  the  ontolugical,  and  then  destroy  them  all  at 


THE  KANTIAN  CRITICISM. 


42s 


one  blow,  by  showing  that  the  ontological  is  invalid.  He 
maintains  that  before  the  theistic  inference  can  be  made, 
the  ontological  realm  must  be  entered.  If  it  cannot  be 
entered  by  the  gateway  of  pure  reason,  rational  proof  is 
not  possible.  This  procedure  is  ingenious,  but  cannot  be 
admitted.  Kant  reduces  the  stronger  proof  to  the  terms 
of  the  weaker,  and  allows  no  theistic  value  to  the  cosmo- 
logical  and  teleological  elements  which  he  strips  from  these 
cogent  proofs.  He  overlooks  entirely  the  cumulative  nature 
of  the  theistic  proofs,  and  that  each  branch  of  the  argument 
must  be  allowed  to  yield  its  own  proper  result.  Kant  really 
makes  an  undue  analysis  of  the  arguments,  instead  of 
giving  a  careful  exposition  of  each,  and  then  making  a 
synthesis  of  the  whole  in  the  completed  theistic  argument. 
Each  line  of  reasoning  should  be  taken  for  what  it  is  worth, 

nd  we  should  not  reject  all  because  any  one  of  the  proofs 
does  not  establish  the  whole  theistic  position. 

It  is  also  to  be  carefully  observed  that  Kant  allows  the 
a  posteriori  to  drop  out  of  sight  as  he  reduces  the  cosmo- 
logical  and  teleological  proofs  to  the  terms  of  the  ontological, 
and  he  entirely  fails  to  give  them  any  proper  logical  import. 
Even  if  we  admit  that  these  two  proofs  do  rest  upon  the 
third,  it  does  not  follow  that  they  have  no  independent 
logical  value.  More  than  this,  it  might  be  shown  that  in 
the  cosmological  and  teleological  proofs  there  is  an  a  priori 
basis  in  the  principle  of  causation,  which  has  also  to  be 
reckoned  with  in  reducing  these  proofs  to  the  third.  The 
proofs  mutually  sustain  each  other,  and  hence  we  conclude 
that  Kant's  criticism  of  the  rational  proofs  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God  is  not  nearly  so  destructive  as  it  is  generally 
supposed  to  be.  We  are  very  far  from  admitting  that  Kant 
has  shown  that  all  argumentation  in  the  sphere  of  pure 
reason  is  contradictory,  r.nd  leads  to  inevitable  logical 
antinomies. 

7.  It  now  remains  to  be  seen  whether  Kant  can  main- 
tain his  logical  consistency  as  he  proceeds  to  establish  the 


111 


426 


APOLOGETICS. 


theistic  position  by  what  is  usually  known  as  the  moral 
argument.  According  to  Kant,  the  idea  of  God  is  merely 
regulative  in  the  domain  of  pure  reason.  It  is  a  rule  which 
guides  our  thinking  in  regard  to  certain  aspects  of  the 
universe,  but  it  affords  no  rational  ground  to  conclude  that 
there  is  any  real  being  corresponding  to  this  regulative 
idea.  In  the  moral  sphere,  however,  Kant  argues,  it  is 
otherwise.  The  categorical  imperative  of  practical  reason 
is  a  witness  within  the  soul,  testifying  directly  to  moral 
law  and  order  without.  This  law  implies  a  la>v-giver,  who 
is  God,  regarded  as  moral  ruler. 

We  cannot  enter  fully  into  the  merits  and  defects  of  the 
Kantian  ethics.  While  Kant  gave  great  prominence  to 
moral  law,  and  the  authority  of  its  categorical  imperative 
in  the  human  soul,  yet  there  is  reason  to  approve  of  the 
opinion  expressed  by  Patton  and  Schurman,  that  Kant 
should  scarcely  be  classed  with  the  intuitionalists  in  morals, 
for  the  reason  that  the  categorical  imperative  is  an  empty 
rule,  void  of  ethical  material,  and  that  it  can  only  have 
that  material  provided  by  entering  the  sphere  of  practical 
conduct.  In  doing  so,  however,  Kant  must  virtually  sur- 
render to  the  utilitarian.  Passing  this  point  with  its  simple 
statement,  we  make  three  critical  remarks. 

In  the  first  place,  Kant  draws  the  line  too  sharply  between 
the  pure  and  practical  reason.  The  intellectual  and  moral 
faculties  of  the  soul  are  different  in  many  of  their  functions, 
yet  such  a  rigid  distinction  between  them  as  Kant  makes 
cannot  be  justified.  The  intellectual  and  moral  faculties 
not  only  toucli  each  other  at  various  points,  but  are  often 
interwoven.  There  is  an  intellectual  factor  in  conscience, 
and  the  intellect  cannot  be  regarded  as  devoid  of  ethical 
capacity.  Tlie  absolute  unity  of  personality  leads  to  this 
conclusion.  Then,  if  truth  be  the  object  of  the  intellect, 
and  right  the  object  of  conscience,  it  assuredly  follows  that 
the  theistic  inference  may  sustain  the  same  relation  to  both. 
If  God,  as  absolute  right,  be  the  postulate  of  conscience, 


ii  J 


THE  KANTIAN  CRITICISM. 


437 


then  God,  as  absolute  truth,  may  be  the  postulate  of  the 
intellect.  To  be  consistent,  Kant  must  allow  more  than  a 
merely  regfulative  value  to  the  idea  of  God  in  pure  reason, 
or  else  he  cannot  justify  his  position  in  regard  to  the  validity 
of  the  argument  from  practical  reason.  He  cannot  barter 
God  away  to  the  skeptic  on  the  ground  of  pure  reason, 
and  expect  to  have  him  restored  on  the  same  terms  in  the 
sphere  of  practical  reason.  If  the  personality  of  man 
cannot  reach  God  by  the  avenue  of  the  intellect,  it  is  not 
Hkely  to  do  so  by  the  pathway  of  conscience.  It  is  surely 
more  reasonable  to  maintain  that  both  the  intellectual  and 
moral  faculties  open  up  logical  highways  for  the  theistic 
inference.  God  is  surely  the  postulate  of  both  intellect  and 
conscience. 

In  the  second  place,  practical  reason,  like  pure  reason, 
must  enter  the  sphere  of  experience  before  it  has  its  pure 
form  filled  with  any  empirical  content.  The  moral  law, 
with  its  categorical  imperative,  is  as  empty  as  the  categories 
are  prior  to  experience.  To  assume  that  the  practical  reason 
enables  us  to  reach  the  noumenal  sphere  more  readily  than 
pure  reason,  is  erroneous.  In  order  to  have  content  in 
cognition,  both  pure  and  practical  reason  must  alike  enter 
the  realm  of  experience,  where,  according  to  Kant  himself, 
all  is  phenomenal.  Such  being  the  case,  conscience,  with 
its  law,  brings  us  no  nearer  G<-)d  than  reason,  with  its 
regulative  idea.  does.  On  Kant's  premises,  neither  gives 
us  more  than  the  phenomenal.  In  one  case  it  relates  to 
knowledge,  in  the  other  to  conduct,  but  in  neither  case  can 
the  noumenal  in  the  form  of  God  ever  be  reached.  But 
if  it  can  be  reached  in  one  case,  it  can  also  be  in  the  other. 
Kant  is  clearly  inconsistent  with  himself  at  this  point.  The 
tnith  is  that  both  forms  of  i)roof,  rightly  understood,  are 
valid,  and  justify  the  thccic  inference. 

In  the  third  place,  the  precise  basis  of  the  moral  proofs 
is  not  clearly  set  forth  by  Kant.  In  criticising  the  cosmo- 
logical  proof,  Kant  confines  the  conception  of  cause  in- 


IL 


f  i 


■  ? 
llij 


428 


APOLOGETICS. 


volved  in  it  to  phenomena,  and  constantly  refuses  it  any 
transcendental  validity.  Nor  does  he  allow  any  proper 
place  in  the  concept  of  causation  for  efficiency  or  sufficient 
reason.  Such  being  the  case,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  Kant 
can  justify  the  inference  of  the  moral  argument,  unless 
he  removes  it  entirely  from  any  relation  to  the  principle 
of  causality.  And  even  if  he  does  this,  the  difficulty  still 
remains  as  to  how,  by  the  moral  pathway,  the  transcendental 
region,  where  God  abides,  is  reached  in  an  ethical  experi- 
ence. Our  conviction  is  that  the  aspect  of  causation,  known 
as  sufficient  reason,  is  involved  in  the  moral  proof;  and 
if  the  law  of  causation  in  the  intellectual  sphere  cannot  be 
legitimately  applied  beyond  experience,  it  is  not  easy  to 
understand  how  it  can  be  applied  beyond  experience  in  the 
moral  sphere.  Kant  must  fall  back  either  on  moral  in- 
tuition or  on  faith;  but  if  he  does  this  he  is  on  precisely 
the  same  ground  as  some  of  those  whose  views  he  so 
severely  criticises.  We  maintain  that  if  moral  intuition 
and  faith  are  valid,  so  also  are  intellectual.  The  t'^eistic 
proofs  do  not  generate  a  knowledge  or  belief  in  a  ^\)d  of 
whom  we  know  nothing,  but  they  rather  serve  to  justify 
to  reason  the  validity  of  the  primitive  intuition,  or  native 
belief,  with  which  the  soul,  both  in  its  intellectual  and  moral 
aspects,  finds  itself  endowed.  The  moral  argument,  there- 
fore, does  not  so  much  prove  the  existence  of  God,  as 
enable  us  to  attach  moral  attributes  to  the  necessarily  exist- 
ing being  who  is  the  uncaused  cause  of  the  universe.  Rather 
than  stake,  as  Kant  does,  the  rational  vindication  of  the 
belief  in  God  upon  the  moral  argfument  alone,  potent  as 
it  is,  we  prefer  to  place  it  beside  the  other  lines  of  proof, 
giving  all  of  them  their  proper  rational  and  logical  value. 
Then,  having  exhibited  and  tested  the  validity  of  each 
strand  of  proof,  we  also  bind  them  together  in  a  strong 
cable,  and  term  it  the  theistic  argument.  To  this  goal  we 
have  now  been  brought. 


SUMMARY  OF  THEISM. 


439 


'  II.  Summary  of  Theism.    §  102. 

I.  Thus  far  the  discussion  of  theism  has  had  three  main 
topics  under  consideration.    These  were  the  nature  of  the 
belief  in  God,  the  origin  of  this  belief,  and  the  proofs  for 
the  existence  of  God.    As  to  the  first  of  these  topics,  it  was 
found  that  in  theistic  belief  there  was  a  cognition  of  deity, 
a  belief  in  the  existence  of  God,  a  sense  of  natural  depend- 
ence on  him,  a  feeling  of  moral  responsibility,  and  an 
instinct  of  worship.     This  being  the  case,  man  is  able  to 
frame  the  theistic  hypothesis  of  the  universe,  to  apply 
theistic  predicates  to  natural  objects,  and  is  capable  of  re- 
ceiving religious  instruction  by  means  of  revelation.    The- 
istic belief,  with  its  idea  of  God,  is  not  innate  in  the  sense 
of  a  fully  matured  notion  of  God.    At  the  same  time,  it 
is  not  the  product  of  education  merely,  although  it  is 
capable  of  being  educated.    It  is  rather  a  native,  connaiural 
and  constitutional  aptitude  which  he  naturally  possesses, 
and  into  the  maturity  of  which  he  grows  as  his  various 
powers  develop. 

2.  The  second  topic,  which  dealt  with  the  genesis  of 
theistic  belief,  was  treated  at  much  greater  length.  Three 
erroneous  and  three  defective  theories  were  considered. 
Fetichism,  henotheism  and  ancestorism,  as  erroneous  the- 
ories, were  set  aside.  The  function  of  revelation,  reasoning 
and  idealistic  evolution,  resi^ectively,  was  unfolded.  The 
true  doctrine  was  explained  with  some  care.  It  discovers  the 
genesis  of  theistic  belief  in  the  human  soul,  and  finds  that 
it  arises  therein  spontaneously  on  the  presentation  of  its 
appropriate  object.  Then  revelation  and  reflection  may 
direct,  purify  and  exalt  this  primitive  spontaneous  belief. 
There  is  thus  an  a  priori  and  an  a  posteriori  factor  in  thf,- 
istic  belief. 

3.    The  third  set  of  topics  was  discussed  at  still  greater 
lenp;th.     This  consisted   in  a  careful  exposition  of  the 


III 


430 


APOLCX5ETICS. 


theistic  argument.  Here  the  correct  logical  attitude  was 
clearly  indicated.  Three  main  lines  of  reasoning  were 
followed  out.  These  were  the  psychical,  the  cosmical,  and 
the  moral.  The  first  found  the  materials  of  inference  in 
the  human  mind  and  its  conditions  of  cognition,  the  second 
rested  on  the  principle  of  causation,  and  the  third  argued 
from  man's  moral  nature  and  experiences.  In  each  case 
the  theistic  inference  was  carefully  vindicated  in  a  variety 
of  important  particulars.  Then  the  whole  was  bound 
together  into  a  strong  cable,  which  may  very  properly  be 
termed  the  theistic  argument,  by  means  of  which  the  belief 
in  the  reality  of  the  existence  of  God  is  clearly  shown  to 
be  rational  and  logical. 


III.  Some  General  Conclusions.    §  103. 

I.  It  has  clearly  appeared  that  man,  by  his  verj'  nature 
and  constitution,  is  a  religious  being.  By  this  it  is  not 
meant  that  man  can,  without  the  aid  of  special  revelation, 
rise  to  a  correct  and  adequate  knowledge  of  God,  and  of 
the  way  of  salvation  from  sin.  It  rather  means  that  man 
is  held  to  be  distinct  from  the  brute  creation,  in  that  he 
has  a  nature  in  which  the  primitive  elements  of  religion 
form  a  constituent  part.  This  implies  that  there  never 
was  a  time  when  the  human  race  was  not  religious  in  some 
sense.  By  reason  of  the  disorder  which  sin  has  introduced, 
the  race  has  lost  the  true  knowledge  of  God,  and  of  the 
way  he  should  be  worshipped  and  served.  But  the  con- 
stitutional religiousness  of  his  nature  remains;  otherwise 
the  gospel  would  have  no  point  of  contact  therein.  Hence, 
revelation  is  needed  to  supply  such  a  knowledge  of  God 
as  may  deliver  man  from  the  hopeless  condition  into  which 
sin  has  brought  him.  All  theistic  discussion  must  recognize 
the  native  religiousness  of  the  nature  of  man,  and  the 
necessity  of  revelation  to  supply  a  true  knowledge  of  God, 
and  of  the  way  of  escape  from  sin.    It  is  a  mistake  to  ignore 


SUMMARY  OF  THEISM.  431 

•these  facts,  as  is  so  often  done  by  those  who  give  purely 
naturahstic  explanations  of  the  origin  and  development  of 
religion. 

2.  It  is  also  evident  that  the  theistic  proofs  do  not  pro- 
dttce  the  idea  of  God  in  the  human  soul,  nor  do  they 
generate  the  religious  consciousness.  The  theistic  capacity 
must  be  presupposed  in  order  to  the  possibility  of  reasoning 
or  reflection  concerning  God.  Even  the  skeptic  has  the 
Idea  of  God  m  his  mind  when  he  is  reasoning  against  the 
reality  of  the  divine  existence,  which  still  further  shows 
that  reasonmg  does  not  produce  the  idea  of  God  in  the 
soul  at  first. 

3-  Nor  do  the  proofs  demonstrate  the  existence  of  God 
m  a  strictly  deductive  way.  The  various  arguments  are 
vindications  of  the  rational  reality  and  objective  validity 
of  primitive,  spontaneous  theistic  belief.  The  method  is 
expository  rather  than  demonstrative,  inductive  rather  than 
deductive.  The  result  is  moral  rather  than  mathematical 
certainty.  The  denial  of  the  theistic  conclusion  is  illogical 
and  irrational. 

4.  At  the  same  time,  the  con-natural  nature  of  theistic 
behef  does  not  render  supernatural  revelation  unnecessary. 
It  IS  again  insisted  that  such  revelation  is  urgently  needed 
to  give  man  important  religious  instruction.  This  position 
IS  firmly  held  against  all  naturalistic  theories  which  insist 
that  the  light  of  reason  and  the  dictates  of  conscience  are 
all  that  men  need  in  order  to  the  exercise  of  true  religion 
However  true  it  may  be  that  reason  and  conscience  would 
have  been  sufficient  had  mar  not  come  under  the  blight  of 
sin.  It  IS  unquestionably  not  true  of  him  when  his  sinful 
state  is  taken  into  account.  The  only  way  to  escape  this 
conclusion  is  to  deny  the  reality  of  sin,  and  to  do  this  is 
to  fly  in  the  face  of  facts. 

5-  It  has.  further,  been  made  plain  that  one  of  the  im- 
portant purposes  served  by  the  theistic  proofs  is  to  enable 
us  to  attach  to  the  necessarily  existent  being  called  God 


432 


APOLOGETICS. 


!! 


I 


various  attributes.  This  is  specially  true  of  the  causal  and 
moral  proofs.  The  attributes  of  intelligence,  power,  wis- 
dom, justice  and  righteousness  are  reached  and  connected 
with  the  necessary  being  who  is  the  uncaused  cause  of  the 
universe. 

6.    In  addition,  the  true  philosophy  of  the  universe  is 
exhibited.    This  philosophy  supplies  a  theistic  cosmology, 
so  that  theism  is  at  once  a  natural  theology  and  a  theistic 
cosmology.    Neither  atheism  nor  materialism,  neither  deism 
nor  pantheism,  can  supply  such  a  philosophy.    Theism  holds 
that  the  universe  exists  contingently,  and  that  God  is  its 
first  cause  and  abiding  ground.    It  also  teaches  that  God 
IS  both  immanent  and  transcendent  in  relation  to  the  uni- 
verse.   The  theistic  philosophy  enables  us  to  say  that  God 
is  both  within  and  without  the  universe,  both  before  and 
beside  the  worlds  he  has  made.    He  originated  the  universe 
and  sustains  it  at  every  moment  of  its  existence.    In  this 
conclusion  we  firmly  rest,  and  are  sure  that  it  affords  an 
adequate  foundation  for  revelation  to  be  made,  and  for 
redemption  to  be  effected.     This  foundation  is  at  once  a 
natural  theology  and  a  theistic  cosmology. 


THE   ONTOLOGY   OF   THEISM. 

THE  SECOND  SECTION. 
THE  ANTITHEISTIC  THEORIES. 

CHAPTER  I 
ATHEISM. 
Contents. 

Practical-CuTed  by  SS^Tef  7'"  i  °'  ^'''''^"»-Two  Types.- 
tempts  to  Reason  out  hs  Se  I^^^eSatf  "'T??" '"'''  Atheism.-At- 
State  of  Miml  and  Heart -P.^^hn/n    f  ^'heism.-An  Unnatural 

Literature. 

rAMriM,  Chap.  I-Rishell's  r/,1  c        I'  ■       "^— P''"' «  Antitheistic 
CAr»*/«an  Doctrine  Chan?   r    it      c.  .  '"t^'unon,  i,nap.  III.— Dale's 

^«..  Chap.  ii%tt^s'i> -i-^i^rcfr^v'  Htr^"  f ^- 

««*.<:  Theology,  Part  I    Chan   IIT    <:..    i     ^'  /^^V— Hodges  S-yj**. 

ii-Miie/s  S.  J- "S.;  ,'c    ;  m°t7?  '^r'T',^!'''- 

7"*«^fe,  Part  I.-Cudworth'.s  Intclleetual  SvUe^  r~  w  '  ^"^"^ 
/-n  ./  Atheism.-WooU.y'.  UnreoTlbfelZZJ^^^^  ^"«^•"- 
^«/.d<j<«.  ^^a,n,<  Atheism.  '"oieness   of  Atheism.-More's 

I.  Preliminary.    §  104. 

WE  now  enter  upon  the  refutation  of  the  antithe- 
istic  theories.     This  may  be  rerardeH  «  Tk 
negative  side  of  the  ontology  of  LL  Tcons  Uut' 
quae  an^^portant  part  of  the  task  of  fundamentaCi; 


f   J; 


434 


APOLOGETICS. 


.VH 


■Ah  J 


getics.  There  are  many  theories  and  schemes  which  claim 
to  surpass  or  supplant  the  theistic  philosophy,  so  that  a 
large  task  now  awaits  us.  But  if  it  can  be  shown  that 
these  various  systems  are  inadequate  or  irrational,  indirect 
proof  in  favor  of  the  jreneral  theistic  doctrine  will  be 
supplied.  As  these  anugonistic  systems  marshal  their 
hosts,  the  advocates  of  the  theistic  philosophy  must  enter 
an  active  campaign  against  them  all,  and  it  must  not  cease 
till  they  all  are  driven  from  the  field. 

2.  It  is  not  easy  to  define  what  an  antitheistic  theory 
really  is.  There  are  so  many  types  and  shades  of  opposition 
to  the  general  theistic  doctrine  that  it  is  not  easy  to  give 
a  definition  which  shall  include  all.  Some  of  these  theories 
relate  to  the  existence  of  God,  others  to  the  nature  of  man, 
and  still  others  to  the  relation  between  God  and  the  uni- 
verse. Some  of  the  antitheistic  systems  are  erroneous, 
some  are  defective,  and  some  are  one-sided.  In  some 
cases  they  are  the  product  .fa  false  philosophy,  and  in 
others  they  are  the  result  of  one-sided  scientific  views. 
Such  being  the  case,  it  is  not  easy  to  define  antitheism. 

An  antitheistic  theory  may  be  described  as  any  theory 
of  God,  of  man,  of  the  universe,  or  of  the  relations  between 
them,  which  is  opposed  to  theism.  This  is  little  more  than 
a  general  description,  but  it  may  suffice  for  the  present 
discussion.  It  embraces  any  doctrine  that  denies  the  exist- 
ence or  the  personality  of  God,  it  includes  any  theory  that 
sets  aside  the  spirituality  or  immortality  of  man,  it  applies 
to  any  scheme  that  asserts  that  the  universe  is  self-con- 
lained,  and  it  also  designates  any  speculations  that  do  not 
Tightly  construe  the  relations  between  God  and  the  universe. 
Under  this  general  description  all  forms  of  antitheistic 
speculation  may  be  embraced. 

3.  It  is  not  easy  to  secure  a  classification  of  the  theories 
that  are  opposed  to  theism,  for  the  simple  reason  that  no 
common  principle  of  division  is  at  hand.  To  arrange  them 
as  philosophical,  scientific,  critical  and  historical  scarcely 


'I    ,  .' 


ATHEISM. 


435 


meets  the  case,  as  several  of  these  theories  partake  of  more 
than  one  of  these  features.  Hence,  we  can  do  little  more 
than  enumerate  these  theories;  and  in  the  order  of  enu- 
meration we  may  begin  with  the  lowest. 

Polytheism  may  be  passed  over  with  a  mere  mention  of 
its  real  nature.  Though  the  fundamental  conception  of 
God  given  by  polytheism  is  essentially  erroneous,  yet  every 
phase  of  polytheism  is  rather  a  testimony  to  the  inherent 
tendency  of  men  to  believe  in  God,  than  an  expression  of 
antitheistic  thought.  The  materials  supplied  by  many  of 
the  polytheistic  systems  will  have  real  apologetic  value 
later  on,  in  the  introductory  section  of  Christian  Apolo- 
getics, under  what  is  now  termed  Comparative  Religion. 

Atheism  in  all  its  forms,  practical  and  theoretical,  stands 
as  the  direct  opposite  of  theism.  Its  great  assertion  is  that 
there  is  no  God.  The  same  conclusion  may  be  reached  by 
other  indirect  paths,  but  atheism  is  the  dir.-:t  denial  of  the 
existence  of  God  in  any  form. 

Materialism  is  also  d -ect  opposition  to  theism,  although 
it  differs  from  atheism  m  directing  its  great  denial  arainst 
the  reality  of  spirit.  Here  semi-materialistic  theories,  pure 
materialism,  and  psychological  materialism,  must  be  care- 
fully considered.  And,  in  addition,  modern  materialistic 
evolution  must  be  critically  examined. 

Positifism  comes  naturally  after  materialism,  for  it  very 
often  rests  '  a  materialistic  loundation.  Both  in  its 
ontolog  an<  psychology  it  has  much  in  common  with 
matena.ism,  una  it  often  grows  out  of  the  soil  of  the 
ph}  :cal  sci -noes. 

Agnosticism  in  our  own  day  is  prevalent  in  certain 
ci-ltured  circles,  and  needs  careful  examination.  It  is 
jmetimes  the  older  skepticism  in  new  forms;  and,  in  our 
own  day,  it  is  often  openly  advocated.  'hat  it  is  first  a 
subtle  theory  of  knowledge,  and  then  an  antitheistic  scheme, 
n^'?=t  be  carefully  observed. 
Pantheism  is  a  decidedly  philosophical  system,  and  V 


.  -'■ 


436 


APOLOGETICS. 


I 


had  a  prominent  place  in  the  history  of  speculation.  In 
several  of  its  great  historic  forms  it  must  engage  earnest 
attention.  The  claims  of  ethical  monism  in  our  own  day 
will  have  to  be  carefully  weighed  in  connection  with  pan- 
theism. 

Deism,  as  a  scheme  which  in  some  respects  approaches 
theism,  must  be  examined.  Here  rationalism,  and  infidelity, 
and  all  naturalistic  schemes,  must  be  explained  and  critically 
considered,  for  we  have  here  a  general  doctrine  of  God's 
relation  to  the  universe. 

Pessimism,  Secularism,  Socialism,  Communism  and  Spir- 
itualism, though  not  very  closely  related,  will  all  be 
considered  under  one  head  and  in  a  single  chapter;  and 
their  general  bearing  upon  the  interests  of  the  Christian 
faith  will  be  investigated.  Then  the  whole  will  be  con- 
cluded with  a  summary  of  Fundamental  Apologetic*. 

II.  Statement  of  Atheistic  Theories.    §  105. 

1.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  atheism  has  always  had  a 
place  in  the  history  of  human  speculation.  It  consists  in 
the  strict  denial  of  the  existence  of  any  sort  of  a  deity.  It 
looks  upon  all  thcistic  belief  as  groundless,  and  upon  all 
religion  as  a  baseless  superstition.  We  find  traces  of 
atheistic  thought  among  the  Greeks,  although  the  trend  of 
the  best  in  Greek  philosophy  vas  against  it.  It  was  some- 
times regarded  with  such  antipathy  as  to  lead  to  tlic 
banishment  of  those  who  professed  it.  In  recent  times  it 
is  often  coupled  with  materialism.  Indeed,  atheism  and 
materialism  are  often  the  same  general  scheme  of  things, 
looked  at  from  different  view  points. 

2.  There  are  really  two  types  of  atheism.  Each  repre- 
sents a  distinct  attitude  and  temper.  The  one  may  be 
called  practical,  the  other  theoretical.  Practical  atheism  is 
largely  a  moral  product.  It  consists  in  living  as  if  there 
were  no  God,  ant         efusing  to  acknowledge  the  claims 


ATHEISM. 


437 


of  religion  upon  the  attention  of  men.     This   form  of 
atheism  does  not  openly  deny  the  existence  of  God,  nor 
does  it  present  any  rational  grounds  for  the  rejection  of 
the  claims  of  religion.     It  contents  itself  with  a  mode  of 
life  which  is  an  open  repudiation  of  the  authority  of  God, 
and  from  which  the  thought  of  G-d  is  virtually  banished. 
It  is  to  be  feared  that  even  in  Christian  lands  there  are 
many  more  practical  than  theoretical  atheists.    The  decent 
man  of  the  world,  the  respectably  indifferent,  seen  in  multi- 
tudes on  every  hand,  and  the  openly  wicked  soul,  are  all 
to  be  set  down  as  belonging  to  this  class.    In  most  cases 
this  form  of  atheism  has  a  moral  root.    Men  are  living  in 
open  rejection  of  a  God  whose  government  is  over  them. 
They  know  that  their  lives  are  out  of  harmony  with  the 
Uvr  of  God,  and  they  naturally  begin  to  wish  that  there 
were  no  God  to  call  them  to  account.    This  wish  becomes 
the  father  of  the  thought,  and  so  the  thought  that  there 
is  no  God  takes  firm  hold  of  their  minds.    At  the  same  time, 
it  may  be  seriously  doubted  whether  there  are  many  really 
sincere  atheists  of  fl.is  class.    There  is  often  a  good  deal 
of  bravado  in  the  profession  of  atheism,  for  when  death 
stares  the  atheist  in  the  face  his  atheism  often  fails  him. 

No  attempt  is  made  to  refute  this  phase  of  atheism.    It 
is  mainly  one  of  the  sad  consequences  of  human  apostacy. 
Atheism  of  this  sort  is  the  legitimate  fr-t  of  sin,  for  on 
account  of  sin  men  seek  to  put  God  out  of  memory.    This 
being  the  case,  the  true  remedy  for  it  is  the  gospel,  and 
the  best  way  to  treat  it  is  to  preach  that  gospel  in  its 
bearing  upon  sin  and  all  its  evil  results.     This  atheistic 
attitude  is  not  the  result  of  any  reasoning  process,  as  a 
rule,  and  hence  it  is  quite  useless  to  try  to  cure  it  by  rea- 
soning against  it.    But  since  it  naturally  grows  out  of  the 
soil  of  the  apostate  heart  that  does  not  wish  to  retain  the 
thought  of  God,  the  divine  remedy  which  the  gospel  pro- 
vides should  at  once  be  brought  to  bear  upon  it. 
3.  On  the  other  hand,  dogmatic  atheism  consists  in  a 


;f' 


438 


APOLOGETICS. 


reasoned  attempt  to  justify  the  assertion  that  there  is  no 
God,  and  to  show  that  man  is  not  in  need  of  any  kind  of 
religion.     Though  the  number  of  dogmatic  atheists  has 
never  been  large,  yet  the  attempt  to  prove  the  negative  of 
theism  has  been  made  in  various  ways.    Among  the  ancient 
Greeks  the  term  atheist  was  applied  to  those  who  denied 
the  reality  of  the  popular  pagan  deities;  and  in  some  cases 
such  atheism  was  punished  by  death  or  banishment.    The 
general  tendency  of  Greek  philosophy  was  against  atheism 
and  towards  theism.     Of  course  Greek  materialism  was 
atheistic,  as  in  modem  times  atheism  is  usually  coupled 
with  materialism.     Some  of  the  French  materialists  went 
•o  far  as  to  say  that  the  existence  of  God  was  impossible. 
And  still  more  recently  in  Germany,  materialism  has  boldly 
announced  its  avowed  atheism.    Feuerbach  distinctly  says 
that  there  is  no  God.    His  words,  in  part,  are,  "There  is 
no  God;  it  is  as  clear  as  the  sun  and  as  evident  as  the  day 
that  there  is  no  God,  and  still  more  that  there  can  be  none." 
And  he  seeks  to  prove  this  remaiicable  statement  as  follows : 
"For  if  there  were  a  God,  then  there  must  be  one;    he 
would  be  necessary.     But,  now,  if  there  is  no  God,  then 
there  can  be  no  God.     Ther^  is  no  God,  because  there 
cannot  be  any."     This  is  a  caricature  of  the  ontological 
proof  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  assumes  the  very  thing 
to  be  proved  as  between  Atheism  and  Theism.     In  Eng- 
land, Bradlaugh  and  his  school  say  that  "there  is  only  one 
existence,  and  that  there  cannot  be  more  than  one."    This 
is  simply  an  indirect  assertion  of  materialism,  or  of  some 
form  of  impersonal  monism. 

Dogmatic  atheism  usually  tries  to  justify  itself  to  reason 
by  seeking  to  show  that  the  problems  of  man  and  the  uni- 
verse can  all  be  solved  without  assuming  the  existence  of 
God.  In  various  ways  the  universe  is  supposed  to  have 
its  explanation  in  itself.  If  that  explanation  is  cast  in 
terms  of  matter  and  mechanics,  then  atheism  and  mate- 
nahsm  are  really  synonymous.    In  such  cases  the  fact  of 


ATHEISM. 


439 


the  existence  of  God  is  said  to  be  entirely  superfluous; 
and  since  it  is  not  rationally  necessary  to  explain  the 
universe  and  man,  the  theistic  postulate  may  be  laid  aside. 
In  addition,  atheism  has  to  give  some  account  of  the  fact 
that  religions  of  various  sorts  have  always  had  a  place  in 
the  activities  of  men.  It  usually  asserts  that  all  these 
forms  of  religion,  the  Christian  among  the  rest,  are  mere 
superstitions.  They  are  delusions  of  the  human  mind,  and 
have  no  ground  in  reality.  In  particular,  the  existence  of 
God  is  a  simple  hallucination,  with  no  basis  in  fact. 


III.  Refutation  of  Atheism.    §  io6. 

In  the  criticism  and  refutation  of  atheism  now  to  be 
made,  attention  must  be  confined  almost  entirely  to  dog- 
matic atheism.  Ai.  -«mination  of  practical  atheism  would 
lead  to  the  consideration  of  man's  perverted  moral  state. 
This  belongs  to  Systematic  Theology  rather  than  to  Apolo- 
getics. It  need  now  only  be  remarked  that  this  perverted 
moral  state,  by  reason  of  sin,  is  the  chief  cause  of  atheism. 
Men  put  away  God,  and  do  not  like  to  retain  him  in  their 
thoughts,  because  of  the  natural  evil  heart  of  unbelief.  They 
love  darkness  rather  than  light,  because  their  deeds  are  evil, 
and  become  atheists  by  a  bad  moral  propensity,  rather 
than  for  pood  rational  reasons.  This  being  understood, 
some  reasons  for  rejecting  dogmatic  atheism  are  now  given. 

I.  First  of  all,  it  indicates  an  unnatural  state  of  mind 
and  heart.  If  the  facts  and  phases  of  religion  among  men 
mean  anything,  they  surely  show  that  men  are  naturally 
inclined  to  believe  in  some  kind  of  deities.  If  they  do  not 
believe  in  one  living  and  true  God,  they  believe  in  some 
sort  of  deity  or  deities.  The  tendency  to  make  positive 
denial  of  every  kind  of  a  divinity  does  not  appear  among 
pagan  peoples.  The  conviction  of  the  reality  of  the  deities 
may  be  vague  and  perverted,  yet  the  negative  attitude  is 
seldom  uken  by  untutored  savages.    Much  that  was  said 


f^\ 


440 


APOLOGETICS. 


in  dealing  with  the  psychology  of  theism  shows  that  men 
are  naturally  disposed  to  entertain  the  belief  in  deity  in 
some  form.  There  are  no  tribes  of  atheists,  as  Flint  and 
others  have  clearly  shown  against  Lubbock,  Tylor,  and 
others.  And  even  if  the  belief  in  divinity  is  often  crude 
and  perverted,  it  does  not  follow  that  men  are  naturally 
atheistic  and  non-religious. 

And,  further,  if  atheism  be  man's  natural  state,  and  if 
it  be  true  that  men  must  be  taught  to  believe  in  God,  it 
would  be  difficult  to  give  good  reasons  for  the  persistence 
of  this  belief  from  generation  to  generation,  for  if  one 
generation  failed  to  teach  it  to  the  next,  the  belief  would 
be  lost.  The  belief  is  one  of  the  most  persistent  in  the 
life  of  mankind,  and  this  indicates  that  it  is  a  well-founded 
belief.  A  false  belief  is  not  likely  to  so  definitely  persist 
from  age  to  age,  else  our  nature  would  be  deceiving  us  at 
its  very  foundation.  The  conclusion  we  reach  from  all  this 
is  that  atheism  is  an  unnatural  temper. 

And   this  conclusion   is  confirmed   by  observing  how 
atheism  seems  to  be  reached  by  its  advocates.    As  a  rule, 
it  is  true  that  men  must  reason  themselves  into  the  atheistic 
frame  of  mind,  and  that  they  often  stifle  the  deepest  aspira- 
tions of  their  souls  in  doing  so.     It  is  a  state  into  which 
men  bring  themselves  by  voluntary  effort.     It  is  the  result 
of  volition,  not  of  spontaneity.    Men  believe  in  some  sort 
of  deity  naturally,  and  they  can  only  rc^ch  the  denial  of 
that  native  belief  by  a  volition  which  usually  springs  from 
the  morally  disordered  nature  engendered  by  reason  of  sin. 
2.  On  purely  psychological  ground,  it  is  not  easy  to  see 
how  men  can  be  consistent  atheists.    Before  a  person  can 
intelligently  deny  the  existence  of  God,  there  must  be  some 
idea  of  deity  in  his  mind.    Even  the  atheist  must  have  the 
idea  of  God  as  a  part  of  his  mental  content  before  he  can 
rationally  argue  against  the  existence  of  such  a  being. 
This  is  surely  an  indisputable  fact.    It  need  not  be  decided 
how  he  obtained  that  idea.    If  it  be  a  spoauneous  mental 


MHBBMi 


ATHEISM. 


441 


product  under  given  circumstances,  the  objection  to  atheism 
is  most  forceful.  But  if  the  atheist  is  merely  taking  the 
idea  of  the  theist,  it  does  not  really  matter.  The  existence 
of  that  idea  there  has  to  be  reckoned  with  and  accounted 
for.  This  fact  gives  the  basis  for  one  of  the  Cartesian 
proofs  for  the  existence  of  God ;  for  the  idea  of  God,  being 
that  of  an  infinite  being,  cannot  be  the  prodw-t  of  the 
human  soul.  In  addition,  if  the  reality  of  the  idea  of  God 
in  the  human  mind  in  its  full  theistic  sense  be  admitted, 
then  again  some  form  of  the  psychical  proof  has  at  least 
its  starting  point  provided.  Hence,  if  the  true  psychological 
nature  of  theistic  belief  be  conceded,  the  atheist  can  scarcely 
hold  his  ground. 

3.  Atheism  really  explains  nothing,  so  that  it  is  valueless 
as  a  solution  of  cosmic  problems.     If  it  could  be  shown 
that  theism  is  not  needed  to  solve  these  problems,  or  that 
atheism  can  give  better  explanations  than  theism,  then  its 
claims  might  be  at  least  plausible.    But,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
atheism,  being  a  purely  negative  scheme,  can  really  explain 
nothing,  and  must  content  itself  by  assuring  us  that  there 
is  really  nothing  much  to  explain.     It  leaves  the  universe, 
so  vast  and  complex,  unexplained  in  regard  to  its  cosmic 
origin,  cosmic  progress,  cosmic  order,  and  cosmic  design. 
And  it  does  injustice  to  some  of  the  deepest  rational  instincts 
of  the  human  soul.    It  must  hold  that  the  universe  in  some 
form  is  eternal,  that  it  is  purely  mechanical  in  its  develop- 
ment, and  that  it  has  before  it  no  definite  goal.    Surely  we 
can  scarcely  be  expecte     to  give  up  theistic  belief,  which 
explains  all  the  proper       )blems  of  man  and  the  universe 
for  a  world- view  that  doe?  not  even  profess  to  give  any 
adequate  solution  of  all  the  pressing  problems  which  the 
cosmos  presents.    This,  indeed,  would  be  a  poor  exchange. 
4-  And,  then,  when  atheism  does  attempt  to  give  explana- 
tions of  the  questions  which  reflection  upon  the  cosmos 
suggests,  it  becomes  irrational  and  illogical.    This  appears 
whenever  it  attempts  to  solve  the  problems  of  the  cosmos. 


442 


APOLOGETICS. 


It  asserts  that  the  universe  is  eternal,  while  reason  demands 
a  first  cause,  which  is  not  also  an  effect,  as  its  logical 
restingrplace,  for  reason  cannot  be  content  with  the  infinite 
regress  of  causes.  Atheism  thus  commits  itself  to  the 
materialistic  dogma  of  the  eternity  of  matter,  which  cannot 
be  proved,  for  if  matter  be  limited  as  to  space,  it  is  likely 
limited  as  to  time  also.  Further,  it  must  at  every  stage 
derive  the  cosmos  at  one  moment  from  its  condition  and 
resources  the  previous  moment.  This  is  pure  materialistic 
evolution,  and  does  injustice  to  the  law  of  causality,  whidi 
requires  that  there  shall  be  as  much  reality  in  the  cause 
as  in  the  effect.  Then,  atheism  is  helpless  to  explain  the 
problems  of  order  and  design,  of  life  and  mind,  of  morality 
and  religion.  These  are  problons  which  demand  some  sort 
of  a  solution.  Atheism  can  give  no  sufficient  reason,  and 
must  be  rejected  as  irrational.  Theism,  on  the  other  hand, 
fully  meets  the  case. 

5.  Logically,  in  order  to  prove  its  position,  atheism  must 
prove  a  negative.  The  burden  of  proof  rests  on  him  who 
makes  a  denial.  Atheism  denies  the  existence  of  God,  and 
on  it  rests  the  burden  of  proof.  This  is  true  in  several 
respects.  Men  generally  believe  in  some  sort  of  deity. 
Atheism  must  make  good  its  case  against  this  fact.  Then, 
since  atheism  asserts  that  there  is  no  God,  it  must  exhaust 
every  possible  sphere  of  evidence.  The  atheist  must  explore 
the  imiverse  far  and  wide,  scan  every  nook  and  comer  of 
it,  before  he  can  justify  his  negation,  for  if  he  does  not 
he  may  overlook  some  of  the  evidence.  But  in  the  case 
of  theism  it  is  different.  He  only  needs  to  pursue  his 
observation  and  reflection  upon  the  universe  but  a  little 
way  before  he  finds  ample  evidence  to  justify  the  conclu- 
sion that  there  must  be  a  God.  For  example,  suppose  a 
man  is  cast  on  a  lonely  island,  and  raises  the  question 
whether  there  are  any  people  on  it  or  not.  In  order  to  be 
•ure  that  there  are  no  people  on  the  island,  he  must  explore 
it  carefully  in  every  part,  while  only  a  brief  survey  along 


ATHEISM. 


443 


the  shore  may  reveal  to  him  abundant  proof  that  there  are 
people  on  the  island.  The  man  who  undertakes  to  prove 
the  negative  in  this  case  must  explore  the  whole  island  to 
establish  his  conclusion.  So  must  the  atheist  explore  the 
whole  universe,  even  to  its  utmost  bounds,  before  he  can 
justify  his  position.  The  eloquent  way  in  which  Chalmers 
and  Foster  have  set  forth  this  point,  even  if  we  make 
some  aUowance  for  the  rhetoric,  has  much  force.  The 
theist  who  undertakes  to  vindicate  the  positive  assertion  that 
there  is  a  God  has  the  logical  advantage. 

6.  Atheism  leaves  no  basis  for  an  authoritative  morality, 
and  it  provides  no  secure  bond  to  hold  society  together. 
If  there  be  no  God,  under  whose  moral  government  man 
is  a  subject,  there  can  be  no  absolute  morality,  nor  any 
authoritative  obligation.    Morality  can  have  no  other  sanc- 
tions than  such  as  are  human.    There  can  be  no  abiding 
distinctions  between  right  and  wrong,  and  obligation  must 
rest  on  considerations  of  self-love  or  utility.    An  atheistic 
state  of  society  is  simply  anarchy.    National  life  is  hope- 
less in  such  a  case.    There  is  no  bond  to  bind  the  social 
fabric  into  an  organic  whole  on  moral  grounds.    National 
ruin  shall  surely  follow  the  prevalence  of  atheism  among 
any  people.    If  God  be  left  out  of  our  national  life,  it  will 
not  be  long  before  every  man's  hand  will  be  against  his 
neighbor's.    There  is  a  warning  here  for  the  great  nations 
of  our  own  day,  for  should  these  nations  forget  God  and 
become  virtually  atheistic,  history  would  but  repeat  itself 
should  the  sceptre  of  empire  pass  from  their  hands  to  others 
more  worthy.     Religion  is  a  national  necessity,  and  the 
belief  in  God  is  a  moral  desideratum  of  the  highest  v  .'ae. 
7.    Atheism  does  not  abound  in  works  of  charity,  .^n.l 
has  never  been  the  true  handmaid  of  literature,  science  ainl 
art.    Since  atheism  claims  to  provide  all  that  is  necessary 
for  the  welfare  of  mankind,  we  may  justly  ask  to  know 
something  of  her  benevolent  deeds.     How  many  hospitals 
and  poorhouses  has  atheism  established?    How  much  has 


>i 


444 


APOLOGETICS. 


the  dogmatic  or  theoretical  atheist  ever  done  to  help  tli2 
needy,  to  comfort  the  sorrowing,  and  to  raise  up  the  fallen? 
When  it  has  done  as  much  as  Christianity,  with  its  belief 
in  one  living  and  true  God,  then  it  may  make  its  claim. 
So  with  literature,  science  and  art.  History  plainly  shows 
that  these  have  flourished  and  reached  their  best  only  under 
the  benign  influences  of  the  Christian  religion.  Atheism 
blights  everything  that  tends  towards  the  elevation  of  the 
race,  and  it  removes  all  those  agencies  that  heal  the  sores 
and  remove  the  ills  of  this  mortal  life.  How  strange  it 
is  that  the  atheist  opposes  and  denies  the  very  things  which 
make  life  comfortable  for  him  and  his.  For  this  blessing 
he  is  indebted  to  the  very  belief  in  God  which  he  earnestly 
repudiates.  Here  in  this  sphere  theism,  as  the  basis  for 
Christianity,  is  entirely  adequate. 

8.  From  the  religious  point  uf  view,  atheism  stands 
utterly  condemned.  That  man  has  in  his  nature  the  senti- 
ment of  religion  and  the  instinct  of  worship,  can  scarcely 
be  denied,  yet  atheism  provides  nothing  to  meet  these  deep 
demands  of  man's  spiritual  nature.  It  has  no  message  for 
the  heart  of  man.  It  gives  no  hint  of  immortality,  and 
it  affords  no  consolation  in  the  days  of  darkness  and  sorrow. 
It  has  no  hand  to  bind  up  the  broken-hearted,  nor  to  wipe 
away  the  tears  of  sorrow.  It  simply  ignores  these  evident 
facts  in  the  experience  of  men,  and  compels  men  to  live 
without  hope,  and  be  little  better  than  the  beasts.  But  the 
belief  in  God  which  Christianity  announces  supplies  every 
need  that  man's  head  or  heart  can  know.  Nay,  more,  the 
atheist  stifles  every  aspiration  of  the  human  heart,  and 
blunts  all  the  tender  instincts  of  the  soul  of  man.  Atheism 
first  puts  to  death  man's  religious  nature,  and  then  proclaims 
that  there  is  no  God,  and  that  man  does  not  need  a  deity. 
Such  !>  system  merits  little  serious  consideration,  and  may 
be  re ,      ?d  at  once. 


I 


HI 


CHAPTER  II. 
SEMI-MATERIALISM. 

Contents. 

Materialism  not  New.-Its  History.-China.-Gre«:e.-Democritus, 

I  '"^r:.  '"™"'*~^'***'  ""^  AristotIe.-Rome.-Lucretius.-Med«. 
vL-  Modern.-  Hobbes.-  France.-  Spencer.-  Germany.-  Reaction. 
-Ihree  Types  of  Materiahsm.-Semi-n.aterialism.-Three  Phases- 
Soul  of  the  World—Formative  Principle— Immanent  Rationality— 
Sem.-mater.al.sm  and  Semi-pantheism-Criticism  of  Semi-materialism. 
-Idea  of  God  Inadequate-All  Types  of  it  are  Monistic-No  Proper 
Place  for  Individual  Personal  Beings.-All  Present  a  Mechanical  Th^ 
cry  of  the  Universe-Freedom  is  Destroyed  Both  as  to  God  and  Man- 
TTie  Teleology  of  the  Un.verse  Unexplained— The  Immanent  Principles 
of  the  Cosmos  Themselves  Need  Explanation. 

LrreRATURB. 
Eiicyclopadia  Articles  on  Materialism.-FishtT'a  Grounds  of  Theistic 
^  C-*"*<w»   Belief.   Chap.   III.-Bruce's   Apologetics.   Chap.    IV- 
Flint  sAnttthetstic  Theories.  Chap.  Il.-Pressense's  A  Study  of  Origins 
Book  II.,  Chap.  I— Lange's  History  of  Materialism.-Gtoxxnd'i  Spen^ 
cer-s  Structural  Principles  Examined.  Part  I..  Chaps.  V.-XV —Harris' 
Phtlosophxcal  Basis  of  Theism.  Chap.  XVII— Rishell's  The  Pounda- 
Uons  of  the  Fatth.  Div.  I..  Sec.  III.,  Chap.  IV.-Lindsay's  Recent  Ad- 
vances Chap.  XVI.-Strong's  Systematic  Theology.  Part  II.,  Chap  III 
Ssec.  II— Hodges  Systematic  Theology.  Part  I.,  Chap.  Ill    Sec   III-!! 
Dabney's  Theology.  Ch^p.  VI-Birks'  Modern  Physical  Fatalism.  Chap 
yilL-Iverachs  Thetsm.  Chaps.  IV,  V— Fraser's  Philosophy  of  Tht. 
um.  Chap.  IV.— Wagner's  Matter  and  Force.-LoUeS  Microsmus. 

I.  Historical.  §  107. 
FTER  atheism,  materialism  naturally  comes  to  be 
considered,  since  they  often  mean  nearly  the  same 
thing  stated  from  different  points  of  view.  The  former 
looks  at  the  problem  of  existence  from  the  view-point  of 
God,  the  latter  regards  it  in  relation  to  the  universe.  Both 
agree  m  asserting  that  there  is  no  spiritual  form  of  exist- 
ence. 

I.  Materialism  in  some  form  h  no  new  thing.    It  is  not 
an  mvention  nor  a  discovery  of  modem  times.    As  a  world- 


A 


I  ii 


^ 


446 


APOLOGETICS. 


I 


i'     i 


view,  or  a  mode  of  thinking  concerning  the  cosmos,  it  is 
as  old  as  philosophy,  and  philosophy  is  as  old  as  reflection 
upon  the  inner  nature  and  cause  of  the  existing  universe 
of  finite  things.    A  type  of  thought,  therefore,  which  is  so 
old,  and  which  has  been  so  persistent,  must  arrest  earnest 
attention  in  theistic  discussions.     While  it  must  be  con- 
ceded that  writers  like  J.   P.  Lange,  in  his  History  of 
Materialism,  give  too  much  prominence  to  the  materialistic 
phase  of  speculation  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  yet  a 
serious  mistake  will  be  made  in  the  interests  alike  of  theism 
and  Christianity  if  the  significance  of  materialism  be  ignored. 
The  apologete  must  give  earnest  and  careful  attention  to  it. 
2.  Some  brief  historical  allusions  will  confirm  this  view. 
In  ancient  times  there  was  a  good  deal  of  speculation  which 
was  dominated  by  materialism.    We  find  distinct,  though 
not  widely  prevalent,  traces  of  it  among  the  Hindoos  and 
Chinese.     The  prevailing  tendency  of  speculation  among 
the  Hindoos  was  undoubtedly  pantheistic.     Occasionally,, 
especially  in  connection  with  certain  types  of  Buddhism,  it 
degenerated  into  a  sort  of  materialistic  belief,  particularly 
so  far  as  man  is  concerned.     But  in  China,  according  to 
Flint,  in  his  Antitheistic  Theories  (pp.  45-47),  more  than 
three  hundred  years  before  the  Christian  era,  the  mate- 
rialistic view  of  man  had  a  strong  advocate  in  Yang  Choo, 
who  ppsitively  denied  the  separate  existence  of  the  human 
soul  and  its  immortality.    According  to  this  writer,  whom 
Flint  quotes  at  some  length,  men  "when  alive  may  be  good 
or  bad,"  but  when  they  are  dead  "they  are  only  so  much 
rotten  bone."    He  says,  further,  that  "while  alive,  therefore, 
let  us  hasten  to  make  the  best  of  life.    When  about  to  die, 
let  us  treat  the  thing  with  indiflference  and  endure  it;  and 
seeking  to  accomplish  our  departure,  so  abandon  ourselves 
to  annihilation."     The  French  materialists  scarcely  went 
further  than  this. 

3.  In  Greek  philosophy  materialistic  ideas  prevailed  from 
the  earliest  times.     More  than  six  centuries  before  Christ 


SEMI-MATERIAUSM. 


447 


they  appeared  in  one  form  among  the  Greek  physicists. 
These  men,  reflecting  upon  the  manifold  forms  of  finite 
things,  sought  some  first  principle,  by  means  of  which  the 
universe  of  concrete  existing  things  might  be  rationally 
explained.    In  many  cases  a  material  principle  was  postu- 
lated;  and  it  was  generally  a  concrete  material  form  of 
existence.    Thales  (B.  C.  636)  posited  water,  Anaximines 
(B.  C.  548)  proposed  air,  while  Empedocles  (B.  C.  444) 
assumed  the  four  elements  of  earth,  air,  fire  and  water. 
Anaximander,  with  his  <mupov  or  indefinite,  and  Pythagoras 
with  the  conception  of  apt»iMi  or  numbers,  in  the  sense  of 
mathematical   relations,  are  not  to  be  classed  with  the 
physicists  proper. 

It  is  quite  evident  that  the  thinking  of  the  Greek  phy- 
sicists is  at  best  quite  crude,  for  the  material  first  principles 
which  they  assume  to  explain  existing  things  are  already 
definite  concrete  forms  of  being,  and  consequently  require 
for  themselves  rational  principles  of  explanation. 

But  in  later  Greek  speculation  the  materialistic  type  of 
thought  became  much  more  mature  and  consistent.    Indeed, 
the  Greek  atomists  presented  materialism  in  such  a  com- 
plete form  that  modern  speculation  has  added  little  that 
is  essentially  new  to  it.     Some  names  here  deserve  to  be 
mentioned.     Leucippus  and  Democritus,  both  of  Abdera, 
who  lived  about  the  same  time  (B.  C.  460-470),  may  be 
named  together,  inasmuch  as  they  set  forth  substantially 
the  same  opinions.      They  are  the  first  thorough-going 
mate.iahsts  in  the  history  of  philosophy.    As  their  opinions 
will  be  fully  explained  in  the  next  chapter,  their  historic 
position  IS  now  merely  signalized.    Epicurus  (B.  C.  340) 
added  some  important  features  in  regard  to  psychology 
and  ethics  to  the  atomic  doctrines  of  Democritus.     With 
Epicurus,  materialism  reached  its  full  maturity  in  ancient 
times.     In  his  hands  it  was  first  a  theory  of  the  whole 
universe  of  existing  things,  and  afterwards  a  theory  of 
knowledge  and  a  doctrine  of  morals. 


: 


!l 


I 


i 


I 


448 


APOLOGETICS. 


4.  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle  were  the  opponents  of 
materialism  in  their  day,  and  they  rendered  noble  service 
in  the  interests  of  a  true  philosophy.  It  is  to  be  observed, 
however,  that  neither  Plato  nor  Arist^.tle  clearly  grasped 
the  non-eternity  of  matter,  and  its  origin  by  divine  creation. 
Matter,  as  well  as  the  deity,  was  eternal,  and  was  by  him 
moulded  into  the  universe,  according  to  the  ideas  of  Plato 
or  the  forms  of  Aristotle.  The  Sophists  often  rested  on 
the  materialistic  basis  of  Democritus  and  Epicurus,  just  as 
in  our  own  day  empiricism  and  utilitarianism  are  often 
allied  with  materialism.  The  physical  opinicms  of  the  Stoics 
often  tend  towards  materialism,  fcr  matter  is  often  regarded 
as  permeated  by  life.  This  is  almost  a  suggestion  of  the 
hylozoism  of  our  own  day,  which  holds  that  matter  is  ever 
active,  and  really  endowed  with  a  form  of  life. 

5.  The  Romans  imported  their  philosophical  opinions 
very  largely  from  the  Greeks,  hence  almost  all  the  Greek 
schools  of  philosophy  had  their  representatives  in  Rome. 
Lucretius,  who  lived  in  the  early  part  of  the  century  before 
Christ,  became  the  leading  exponent  of  Greek  atomic  mate- 
rialism among  the  Romans.  In  his  writings,  which  are 
mainly  poetic  in  their  form,  there  are  certain  modifications 
of  the  views  of  Democritus  and  Epicurus,  yet  there  is 
nothing  radically  new.  In  the  early  centuries  of  the  Chris- 
tian era  these  materialistic  teachings  came  into  contact  with 
the  religion  of  Jesus  Christ,  and  had  not  a  little  to  do  with 
the  production  of  Gnosticism  and  Manichaeism. 

6.  In  mediccval  times  there  was  but  little  materialistic 
speculation.  Various  reasons  have  been  assigned  for  this 
fact.  Some  suggest  that  there  was  little  intellectual  activity 
and  freedom  of  thought ;  others  attribute  it  to  the  fact  that 
philosophy  was  seldom  divorced  from  religion  during  this 
period;  and  still  others  are  inchned  to  believe  that  the 
absence  of  devotion  to  the  cultivation  of  the  physical 
sciences  explains  the  fact  that  there  was  little  materialism 
in  mediaval  days.     Occasionally  the  immortality  of  the 


SEMI-MATERIALISM. 


449 

fsTract.^1"" .'""''''  '"^  ^  thorough-going  materialism 
IS  practical  y  unknown  among  the  scholastics.     With  the 

modes  of  speculation  reappear.  From  this  fact  some  have 
concluded  that  the  study  of  the  physical  sciencerrreallv 
Stflue:"'  'T  ^^^°"  ^'  °^^-  -  con^Snl^ed  t 

ad^ittTdZT^v  xci^^^^^^^^^^^^  ^^-,r^  ^^  --  ^ 

nnf.,,oi      •  exciusue  and  one-sided  study  of  the 

regarded  as  in  some  sense  the  handiwork  of  God    m„rh 
7-    In  ,„Wmi  .,mes  materialism  prevails  quite  widdv 

it  iT  .Tr  """'"  '■"'■'"^'  ">  »"'  'yP«  "f  though' 
I-  n  H,  he  itat  Unge,  in  his  History  of  MaZialism  ives 

^._;or  he  sough,  to  .hoj"'':  ::■*:- ■:;^:f 

mentioned,  for  he  adopted  tl-  '"-.,.•'  f ,,  ^"  *''°^^  J""* 
Jedge  in  its  baldest  form  ari  ;;"'  ''''?''  °^  '"°- 
materialism.  so  far  as 'hTnatu  >  '  '"  '"  '^"  ^'"""^  °^ 

Descartes  did  not  entirl  .  V  '"'"*  "  '''""'■"'^-  =^^^" 
cations  in  re  Jrd  to    , !    ,  "^'""  """"''"'^^''^^  '•"?'*- 

of  the  soul  ^Z  the  LT'''n '  """"  ^"^  ^^^  -*"- 
essentially  sp^^s^lT^'  ,  ,""T'  ^''"°"P^>^  ^^^ 


•-•'•-"'""'"'"•'"• 


t' 


450 


APOLOGETICS. 


<i632-i704),  though  he  was  far  from  being  a  materialist 
liimsel'  yet  in  his  philosophy  he  announced  certain  prin- 
ciples which,  when  developed  in  a  one-sided  way,  led  to 
materialism.  In  France  particularly  this  development  soon 
■vtook  place,  so  that  materialism,  skepticism  and  atheism 
arose  and  soon  bore  terrible  fruit  in  that  fair  land.  Con- 
dillac  and  Helvetius  were  followed  by  D'Holbach  and 
La  Mettrie  to  extreme  materialism,  where  science,  philoso- 
phy and  theology  were  all  alike  wrecked.  About  the  same 
time.  Hartley  and  Priestley,  both  of  whom  did  good  work 
in  the  sciences,  the  former  in  physiology  and  the  latter  in 
chemistry,  promulgated  opinions  which  leaned  towards  a 
modified  materialism. 

9.  During  the  century  just  closed,  materialism  can  boast 
of  many  we''-known  names  in  Britain,  France  and  Ger- 
many. John  Stuart  Mill  and  Charles  Darwin,  in  different 
ways  tended  towards  materialism,  though  not  avowedly. 
Herbert  Spencer  and  Thomas  Huxley,  thoujh  professedly 
agnostics  in  psychology,  are  virtually  materialistic  in  their 
ontology.  And  the  positivists  generally  are,  in  spite  of 
themselves,  bound  to  rest  on  a  materialistic  basis.  In  Ger- 
many, the  reaction  against  idealism  during  the  past  twenty 
or  thirty  years  has  set  in  motion  two  currents,  one  towards 
materialism  and  the  other  towards  a  spiritualistic  philoso- 
phy. Feuerbach,  Hxckel,  Wagner,  Biichner,  Vogt  and 
Moleschott  represent  the  former,  and  Lotze,  with  his  school, 
represent  the  latter,  and  are  very  influential. 

On  the  whole,  the  outlook  in  regard  to  a  sound  philosophy 
in  opposition  to  materialism  is  brighter  than  it  was  half 
a  century  ago.  Crude  materirlism  is  held  now  by  few 
whose  opinions  have  much  weight.  Tl  •  ger  now  lies 
in  that  subtile  tyi)e  of  refined  materialism  which  endows 
matter  with  the  attributes  of  spirit,  wliile  in  certain  quarters 
there  is  a  tendency  to  fall  back  on  agnosticism  in  regard 
to  the  whole  problem  of  the  reality  and  nature  of  matter. 
At  the  same  time,  it  must  not  l)e  forgotten  that  the  intense 


SEMI-MATERIALISM. 


451 
devotion  oi  i  many  keen  minds  to  physical  science  th. 
wonderful  development  of  the  maten^l'^ourrrf'  Z 
^  X  the  mtense  commercialism  of  our  day.  the  tendency 
K  xunous  hvmg.  and  the  decline  of  the  sense  of  GoTIn 
the  mmds  of  so  many,  ar.  in  great  danger  of  produdnVa 

nrH?i  ^^'^  *■■"  ""^"^  'y^''  °f  materialism,  so  that  for 
^rderly  treatment  of  a  vast  field  some  classification  is  neces- 
sary. Three  mam  classes,  not  entirely  distinct  from  each 
other,  may  serve  present  purposes.  First.  scmi-mateHJ^fc 
theories,  where  the  materialistic  principle  is  accola^ed 
w.th  s.,mething  else;    secondly,  pure  materi^Z'^^ 

realt  tnH  T  T  '"'"^"  ""^  '^  ^'^'"'"^^  to  have  any 
m!5'r  »  '  '■^'^'  ^'y'^'^'^Sical  materialism,  where  the 
matenahstic  pnnc.ple  is  applied  only  to  man,  and  the  real  tv 
of  his  spiritual  nature  is  denied.  ^ 

II.  Semi-Materialism:  Statement.    §  ro8. 

Per^istHt'i'nr."'"  ''''''':  °^  *''*=  '^^^  ^*^*^^''^"  «hows  how 
persistent  and  how  var.ed  materialistic  views  have  bee^ 

It  also  suggests  that  one  of  the  daneers  to  whirl, V!^ 

Sh:r^^\r^ '-  ^"  ''^ "-  Andt  d^  ;:; 

ofte     suppTeT  tl       r'""  '  "  "'""'^^  ''-^  -*"-"- 

rositivr::^tris:r;r'^'or:h^r^^^^^ 

"f  materialistic  speculation  mentioned        the  close  of  T 
t>.     Ihe  eternity  of  matter  in  some  form  and  with 


li 


£ 


M 


:  '■■ 


45J  APOLOGETICS. 

certain  endowments  is  assumed,  and  the  existence  of  spirit 
as  distinct  from  matter  is  denied.  The  reality  of  God  is 
denied,  and  all  mental  facts  are  crnstrued  under  the  cate- 
gory of  matter.  But  these  theories  assume  that  along 
with  matter,  and  not  divorced  from  it,  some  other  principle 
must  be  presupposed  in  order  to  explain  the  phenomena  of 
matter.  Whether  these  principles  are  really  material  in 
their  nature  is  not  made  very  clear.  But  all  these  views 
agree  in  regarding  tnatter  as  the  only  real  existence,  and 
at  the  same  time  it  is  supposed  to  possess  certain  qualities 
or  potencies,  which  are  necessary  to  account  for  the  facts 
which  appear  in  the  universe. 

2.  There  are  at  least  three  phases  of  semi-materialism. 
Some  of  these  are  decidedly  materialistic,  while  others  are 
more  pantheistic  in  their  scope.  Indeed,  some  of  them 
might  almost  be  termed  semi-pantheistic.  Still,  as  the 
monistic  basis  in  each  case  is  conceived  under  the  category 
of  matter,  it  seems  better  to  regard  them  as  semi-mate- 
rialistic theories. 

3.  The  first  phase  of  semi-materialism  is  found  in  the 
Stoic  conception  of  the  anima  mundi,  or  soul  of  the  world, 
and  also,  in  nearly  the  same  way,  in  modem  hylozoic 
theories.  According  to  the  Stoics,  matter  is  the  basal  reality 
of  all  things  in  the  universe.  But  matter  is  not  entirely 
alone,  for  it  is  animated,  and  has  a  life  constantly  throbbing 
in  it.  This  life  or  soul  of  the  world  is  sometimes  called 
God,  so  that  God,  in  this  sense,  is  the  immanent  workinji 
power  in  the  universe.  In  a  quite  monistic  way,  God  is 
the  soul  of  the  world,  and  the  world  is  the  Ixnly  of  Goil. 
This  aspect  of  Stoicism,  which  is  by  no  means  promineiil 
in  it,  has  le<l  some  writers  to  regard  it  as  semi-panthcisin. 
The  world  is  a  vast  living  machine,  of  which  the  active 
power  is  God.  That  the  Stoics  had  a  definite  concepti>m 
of  Gcxl  as  numerically  distinct  from  the  universe  seeiis 
scarcely  probable,  an<l  to  term  the  world-sottl  God  is  hardly- 
justified.    Stoicism  in  general  is  more  projwrly  rq)resenteil 


4 


J 


SEMI-MATERIALISM. 


453 

by  modem  hylozoism,  which  holds  that  matter  inherently 
possesses  a  living  principle  of  active  development.    A  pan- 
theistic doctrine  looks  upon  the  universe  as  a  manifestation 
or  modification  in  some  way  of  the  one  primal  independent 
existence.     The  primal  existence  is  always  first,  and  the 
universe  second,  in  pantheism.    This  is  scarcely  the  doctrine 
of  the  Stoics.    They  put  the  universe  as  material  first,  and 
endow  the  universe  with  vital  activity.     It  is  thus  a  vast* 
organ-^m  with  a  soul.     This  phase  of  thought  -•  properly 
represented  by  those  modem  refined  mat    :         .  iheoriM 
which  look  upon  matter  as  endowed  with  "th«  promise  and 
potency    of  all  that  comes  into  existence  in  the  universe 
This  refined  cosmic  materialism  seeks  to  avoid  the  difficul- 
ties  which   beset   cmde   materialism,   by   presenting   this 
hylozoic  view  of  the  cosmos.     It  may  properly  be  called 
semi-materialism. 

4-    The  second  phase  of  semi-materialism  springs  from 
later  stages  in  the  philosophy  of  Plato  and  of  Aristotle 
According  to  boj,  of  these  men.  matter,  in  its  essential 
nature,  is  not  created,  but  etemal.     This  matter  is  formed 
mto  the  concrete  universe  in  accordance  with  the  ideas  of 
Plato  s  system  or  the  forms  of  Aristotle's  philosophy.     In 
both  ths  germs  of  a  semi-materialistic  theory  of  the  uni- 
verse  are  to  be  found.    So  soon  as  the  idea  is  made  inherent 
m  matter,  or  the  form  is  regarded  as  an  endowment  of 
matter,  the  germs  have  developed  into  semi-matorialism. 
This  IS  practically  what  took  place.     As  these  two  great 
systems,  which  have  not  a  little  in  common,  declined  in 
purity,  matter  came  to  be  looked  upon  as  possessing,  in 
^s   inherent   nature,   a   formative  or  moulding  principle. 
The  i.Iea  of  a  world-former  apart  from  the  universe  faded 
away,  and  the  ideal  or  forming  principle  in  matter  was 
all  that  was  necessary  to  produce  the  universe.     The  uni- 
verse then  came  to  be  construed  in  terms  of  matter,  under 
the  operation  of  some  plastic  nature  or  formative  principle 
w'tliin  it.     In  neo-PIatonic  speculations  and  in  mediaeval 


454 


APOLOGETICS. 


H 

r  1 


Aristotelianism  we  have  instances  of  this.  Cudvorth,  the 
English  Platonist,  though  he  repudiates  crude  materialism 
in  the  interests  of  theism,  yet  is  not  free  from  refined  semi- 
materialistic  tendencies.  In  another  way,  the  monadology 
of  Leibnitz  illustrates  this  tendency,  for  the  monads  were 
simply  little  particles  of  matter  with  a  life  or  soul  in  each. 
Certain  forms  of  modem  evolution,  which  would  repudiate 
the  charge  of  crude  materialism,  presuppose  that  in  the 
material  substratum  of  the  universe  there  is  a  principle 
which  is  at  once  dynamical  or  active,  and  teleological  or 
rational,  in  its  nature,  and  which  is  capable  of  accounting 
for  the  universe  in  its  cosmic  history,  and  in  its  present 
organized  condition. 

5.  The  third  phase  of  semi-materialism  is  more  subtile 
than  the  two  just  described.  It  is  associated  with  later 
aspects  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy.  In  these  aspects  of 
absolute  idealism,  the  question  of  the  category  under  which 
the  absolute  idea  or  unconscious  reason  is  to  be  construed, 
was  raised.  Some  construed  it  under  spirit,  and  others 
under  matter.  The  latter  tended  quite  decidedly  towards 
semi-materialism.  The  basal  reality  of  all  things  was 
matter,  and  in  it  there  is  a  principle  of  inner  movement 
which  must  be  mechanical  rather  than  logical.  The  result 
of  the  operation  of  this  principle  is  the  production  of  the 
universe.  Hartmann  and  Schopenhauer,  though  their  point 
of  departure  was  certain  aspects  of  Hegelianism,  yet  they 
have  moved  so  far  away  as  to  be  scarcely  idealists  in  any 
sense.  They  are  really  semi-materialists,  with  a  strong 
flavor  of  pessimism  in  the  latter.  Their  materialism  is  so 
refined  that  it  .  'most  endows  matter  with  life  and  ration- 
ality. In  many  scientific  circles  where  evolution  rules  this 
philosophy  of  the  universe  finds  favor.  The  universe,  at 
its  root,  is  conceived  as  matter,  but  in  it  are  latent  the  germs 
of  life,  and  order,  antl  design,  in  a  word  of  purposive  intel- 
ligence. This  immanent  endowment  is  sufficient  to  explain 
the  universe  without  the  assumption  of  an  extra-mundane 


SEMI-MATERIALISM.  455 

power  and  intelligence.  If  anything  is  to  be  termed  God, 
It  is  this  endowment  in  the  universe.  The  life,  the  order 
or  the  design  of  the  universe  is  the  only  God  there  is. 
But  this  imprisons  God  in  the  universe,  and  really  robs  us 
of  God  as  extra-mundane  altogether.  All  these  refined 
semi-materialistic  schemes  agree  in  assuming  that  matter 
IS  the  basal  reality  of  all  existence,  and  that  this  matter 
contams  certain  inherent  qualUies  other  than  the  mere 
physical  or  mechanical  forces.  It  is  this  endowment  which 
accounts  for  the  order  and  reason  which  we  discover  in 
the  cosmos. 


III.  Semi-Materidism:  Citicism.    §  109. 

The  examination  of  semi-materialism  does  not  now  need 
to  be  made  at  length,  inasmuch  as  the  criticism  of  pure 
materialism  will  cover  many  of  the  points.  The  general 
cnttctsms  here  offered  are  such  as  apply  almost  equally  to 
the  three  types  of  semi-materialism  described  in  the  last 
section. 

I.  The  conception  of  God  which  these  schemes  present 
IS  quite  inadequate.     To  identify  God  with  the  soul  or  life 
of  the  universe,  and  to  confine  him  within  it,  is  to  apply 
the  name  of  God  to  something  which  it  does  not  fit     To 
regard  God  as  merely  the  formative  principle  in  the  cosmos, 
and  deny  to  him  any  extra-mundane  reality,  is  simply  to 
juggle  with  the  name  of  deity.     To  construe  the  natural 
or  moral  order  of  the  universe  to  be  synonymous  with 
God.  and  give  him  no  reality  lieyond  this  order,  is  to  do 
serious  .njiistice  to  the  idea  of  God.    All  that  these  theories 
can  possibly  supply  is  a  material  substratum  for  the  uni- 
verse m  which  merely  cosmic  principles  are  operative     To 
tmpnson  God  in  the  universe,  or  to  reduce  him  to  a  feature 
of  the  cosmos,  is  to  destroy  God  altogether. 

N^Uh'^M!'"''  '?''.  ""^  «emi-materialism  are  really  monisHc. 
Neither  the  soul  of  the  worid.  nor  the  formative  principle 


4 


II 


4S6 


APOLOGETICS. 


of  the  universe,  nor  the  rational  order  of  the  cosmos,  is 
numerically  distinct  from  the  universe  itself.  They  are  all 
alike  immanent  in  nature.,  and  in  no  case  transcendent. 
Neither  do  these  systems  offer  a  rational  dualism.  Both 
matter  and  its  several  endowments  are  supposed  to  be 
eternal ;  and  if  God  be  identified  with  these  immanent  prin- 
ciples, then  both  God  and  matter  are  eternal.  This  presents 
an  eternal  dualism.  Hence,  all  these  types  of  semi-mate- 
rialism present  either  a  hybrid  monism  or  a  hopeless 
dualism.  In  either  case  reason  rebels  against  th>:  conclu- 
sion. 

But  theism  gives  the  consistent  conception  here.  It  meets 
the  demands  of  monism  perfectly  in  its  hypothesis  of  one 
infinite  personal  God,  who  is  eternal,  self-existent  and  inde- 
pendent of  the  universe.  It  satisfies  all  the  conditions  of  a 
legitimate  dualism  in  its  postulate  of  the  real,  though 
dependent,  existence  of  the  universe.  God  is,  hence,  tran- 
scendent in  relation  to  the  universe ;  yet  he  is  also  immanent, 
and  hence  accounts  for  all  the  features  of  order,  life  and 
rationality  which  the  universe  exhibits. 

3.  Semi-materialism  in  every  phase  fails  to  leave  a 
proper  place  for  individual,  personal  human  beings.  The 
soul,  with  its  personality,  cannot  find  a  consistent  place  in 
any  of  the  schemes  now  under  review.  Man,  at  best,  is 
but  a  part  of  the  cosmos,  and  he  can  be  nothing  more. 
The  universe,  according  to  the  first  of  these  schemes,  is  a 
great  living  organism,  and  man  is  but  a  part  of  the  great 
vital  whole.  On  the  ground  of  the  second,  the  formative 
principle  in  the  cosmos  being  at  best  physical,  makes  man 
nothing  more  than  highly  refined  matter,  so  that  he  is  cor- 
poreal, with  no  spiritual  principle  in  him  at  all.  Under 
the  supposition  of  unconscious  rationality  as  the  endow- 
ment of  the  universe,  man  can  only  be  quasi-spiritual  at 
most,  and  never  distinctly  personal.  According  to  any  dug 
of  the  three  suppositions,  the  soul  is  robbed  of  its  persm- 
ality  and  reduced  to  the  category  of  matter.     Such  \x'mg 


idtei 


SEMI-MATERIALISM.  457 

the  case,  they  all  alike  stand  condenmed,  for  they  destroy 
the  possibility  of  religion  by  obliterating  its  subject. 

4.  These  schemes  all  agree  in  presenting  a  purely  me- 
chanical theory  of  the  universe.  Everything  in  the  cosmos 
is  reduced  to  mechanism,  and  free  rationality  is  obliterated. 
The  soul  of  the  world  moves  without  freedom  or  choice, 
the  plastic  principle  operates  blindly  by  chance  or  fate,  and 
unconscious  rationality  lacks  the  conditions  of  free  activity. 
The  whole  conception  of  the  cosmos  in  any  case  is  me- 
chanical. 

Such  being  the  case,  the  universe  is  not  under  the  govern- 
ment of  a  free,  powerful  and  wise  ruler.  If  any  one  of 
these  principles  which  are  supposed  to  be  immanent  in  the 
cosmos  be  regarded  as  God,  then  he  is  bound  by  the  iron 
law  of  necessity,  or  he  is  at  the  mercy  of  blind  chance. 
The  idea  of  the  cosmos  being  under  the  control  of  God 
as  transcendent  and  free,  has  no  place.  A  world-soul  non- 
free,  a  plastic  principle  working  blindly,  or  an  unconscious 
rationality  incapable  of  self-direction,  cannot  supplv  such  a 
world-view  as  theism  presents  and  Christianity  demands. 

In  like  manner,  man  is  robbed  of  freedom  and  reduced 
to  a  mere  machine.  The  world-soul  throbs  in  him,  the 
formative  principle  moulds  him,  and  the  principle  of  ration- 
ality actuates  him;  but  ail  is  purely  mechanical,  and  free 
self-determination,  such  as  morality  and  religion  demand, 
can  obtain  no  foothold  in  any  of  these  schemes.  Hence, 
definite  personality  for  man  has  no  place,  and  freedom, 
with  consequent  responsibility,  is  excluded.  The  effect  of 
this  is  disastrous,  not  only  for  the  individual  man,  but  for 
society.  Any  scheme  which  destroys  the  basis  of  respon- 
sibility signs  the  death-warrant  of  social  and  rational  well- 
being.    This  the.se  schemes  surely  do. 

S-  None  of  these  phases  of  semi-materialism  can  give  a 
sufficient  explanation  of  the  teleology  or  finality  evident  in 
the  cosmos.  That  there  is  law,  order,  sequence  in  the 
universe  must  be  conceded.    That  there  are  marks  of  plan. 


* 


458 


APOLOGETICS. 


purpose  or  design  in  the  cosmos  cannot  be  denied.  At  best, 
inunanent  finality  is  the  only  explanation  of  the  marics  of 
design  which  are  observed  in  the  universe.  The  soul  of 
the  world,  the  formative  principle  and  the  latent  rationality 
are  all  within  the  universe,  and,  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
case,  they  provide  no  ground  for  an  extra-mundane  ex- 
planation of  the  order  and  design  which  the  cosmos  exhibits. 
What  was  said  in  presenting  the  design  argument  for  the 
existence  of  God  fully  justifies  this  conclusion  here,  and  it 
is  not  necessary  to  repeat  what  was  then  said.  A  merely 
hylozoic  view  of  the  universe  cannot  account  for  those 
features  of  it  which  involve  rationality.  Life  and  mind 
are  different  things,  and  the  former  cannot  fully  account 
for  the  latter.  So,  also,  a  formative  principle  working 
spontaneously  within  the  universe,  and  moulding  matter 
mechanically,  cannot  explain  marks  of  intelligence.  Nor 
can  an  unconscious  reason  which  is  supposed  to  permeate 
the  cosmos,  and  is  shut  up  within  it,  account  for  marks 
of  purpose  and  intention  manifest  therein. 

6.  It  may  be  added  that  the  world-soul,  the  plastic  prin- 
ciple, and  the  immanent  rationality  all  need  to  be  explained. 
How  came  the  cosmos  to  be  thus  endowed?  What  is  the 
ground  or  reason  for  each  of  these  principles?  Is  matter 
eternally  permeated  by  them?  If  not,  whence  did  they 
come?  Then,  too,  we  may  ask  which  of  these  three  con- 
ceptions is  really  correct?  These  are  questions  which  may 
be  reasonably  raised,  and  to  which  semi-materialism  gives 
no  proper  answer.  Theism,  with  its  postulate  of  an  infinite 
personal  Ciod,  whose  efficiency  and  rationality  is  sufficient 
to  account  for  all  those  features  of  tlie  cosmos,  is  amply 
adequate.  It  provides  a  ground  for  the  marks  of  design 
in  the  universe  which  is  at  once  immanent  and  transcendent. 
This  being  so,  theism  is  further  confirmed. 


warn 


=J 


i-i 

I   ■ 


CHAPTER  III. 
PURE  MATERIALISM:    STATEMENT. 

Contents. 

Scope  of  the  Exposition —Method  of  Statement.— Historical.— An- 
cient Greek  Materialism.— Democritus  and  Epicurus.- Matter  and  Mat- 
ter only  the  Real  Existence.— Matter  Eternal.— No  Creation.— Matter 
Indestructible.-Atomic-The  Plenum—Atoms  Qualiutiveiy  Alike.— 
QuantiUtively  Different—Extended,  yet  Indivisible.— The  Vacuum.— 
Bounds  Atoms.— Gives  Motion.— Motion  Downward.— Atoms  OverUke 
Each  Other.-  Impact-  Conuct.—  Commotioa-Combination.— Aristo- 
tle 8  Acute  Criticism.-Epicurus'  Reply.-Necessity  the  Law  of  Atomic 
Combinations.-Chance  and  Fate.— Human  Soul  Atomic-Modem  Ad- 
dttions.— These  Slight.-MolecuUr  Conception.— Prominence  Given  to 
Energy.— Conservation,  TransmuUtion  and  Correlation.— Tendency  to 
Endow  Matter  with  the  Getms  of  Life,  Order,  Design  and  Purpose  — 
Its  Verdict  is:  No  Soul;  No  God. 

LiTBRATUtB. 

Encyclopaedia  Articles  on  A/o/mo/wm.— Flint's  Antitktutic  Tkeo^ 
nw.- Unge's  History  of  Ma<mo/i«ff.— Harris'  Philosophical  Basis  of 
Theum.  Chap.  XVII.— Fisher's  Grounds  of  Theistic  Belirf.—Rishtl\'» 
Th*  Foundattons  of  the  Christian  Faith.  Div.  I.,  Sec.  I.,  Chap.  II.— 
Stewart  and  Tait's  Unseen  Universe.— Bnice's  Apologetics.— Spenctr's 
First  PrincipUs—HmckeVi  Natural  History  of  Creation.-HolbicWs 
System  of  Nature.— nachnet's  Matter  and  Force.— hnefi  Contempo- 
rary  Mo/«na/ww.— Strong's  Systematic  Theology,  Part  II.,  Chap.  III., 
Sec.  I.— Hodge's  Systematic  Theology,  Part  I.,  Chap.  Ill  Sec  IV  — 
Dabney's  Theology.  Chap.  VI.— Birk's  Modern  Physical' Fatalism  — 
Eraser's  Philosophy  of  Theism,  Vol.  I..  Chap.  Ill.-VVatson's  Chrisli- 
antty  and  Idealism,  Chap.  VIII.— Christiicb's  Modern  Doubt  and  Chris- 
tian Belief.  Chap.  III..  Sec.  Il.-Strauss'  The  Old  Faith  and  the  New. 

I.  Statement  of  Ancient  Mm  rialism.  §  no. 
I.  'l^HE  discussion  of  semi-materialism  in  the  last  chap- 
J.  ter  prepares  the  way  for  the  exposition  of  pure 
materialism  in  this  and  the  following  chapter.  This  leads 
to  the  careful  consideration  of  scientific  or  thorough-going 
materialism.  There  are  so  many  types  of  pure  materialism. 
that  It  IS  not  easy  to  give  a  statement  which  is  at  once 


iMH 


46o 


APOLOGETICS. 


V 


compact  and  comprehensive.  And  there  are  also  so  many 
aspects  of  criticism  which  open  up  that  its  refutation 
cannot  be  properly  made  in  brief  compass.  This  being  the 
case,  two  chapters  are  to  be  devoted  to  it.  In  one  a  gen- 
eral statement  of  materialism  will  be  made,  and  in  another 
its  criticism  will  be  presented. 

In  making  a  general  statement  of  materialism,  it  may 
be  instructive  to  give  a  careful  sketch  of  Ancient  Greek 
Materialism,  and  then  to  follow  this  by  some  account  of 
the  additions  to  the  general  scheme  which  modem  mate- 
rialism has  made.  To  follow  this  plan  may  have  some 
historical  interest;  and  it  may  be  surprising  to  some  to 
learn  how  mature  ancient  materialism  was.  And  to  dis- 
cover how  little  the  modems  have  added  to  the  ancients 
in  materialistic  speculation  may  keep  the  modems  truly 
humble. 

In  the  historical  sketch  of  ancient  materialism  given  in 
the  ',ist  chapter,  three  names  were  mentioned  as  its  main 
advocate^  Democritus  and  Epicurus  among  the  Greeks, 
atxl  Lucretius  among  the  Romans,  ever  stand  foremost 
among  ancient  materialists.  It  is  their  views,  in  a  general 
way,  which  are  now  presented. 

2.  The  first  question  relates  to  the  nature  of  the  funda- 
mental existence.  Ancient  materialism  answers  that  matter 
is  the  only  real  and  primal  existence.  The  assertion  is  that 
matter,  in  some  of  its  mo<lifications  and  combinations,  is 
the  only  permanent  reality,  and  that  there  is  no  such  a 
thing  as  .spiritual  modes  of  being.  This  matter  is  eternal, 
so  that  there  never  was  a  time  when  in  some  form  it  was 
net.  The  idea  of  the  origin  of  matter  by  creation,  or  in 
any  other  way,  is  rejected.  The  eternity  of  mutter  is  one 
of  the  first  principles  of  ancient,  as  of  modem,  materialism. 
Even  Plato  and  Aristotle  did  not  rise  above  the  conception 
of  the  eternity  of  matter  to  its  absolute  creation. 

Indeed,  creation  ex  nihilo  is  not  deduced  by  reason,  but 
derived  from  Revelation.     It  thus  becomes  a  matter  of 


i-''j 


PURE  MATERIALISM. 


461 


faith,  so  that  both  science  and  philosophy  are  helpless  to 
solve  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  matter. 

3.  The  next  point  to  be  considered  relates  to  the  inner 
constitution  of  matter.    What  is  matter?    Ancient  mate- 
rialism asserts  that  matter,  which  is  held  to  be  eternal  and 
uncreated,  is  also  indestructible  in  its  nature.     It  persists 
the  same  in  quantity  amid  all  the  changes  it  undergoes, 
so  that  no  particle  of  it  can  ever  be  destroyed.     But  the 
main  feature  of  ancient  materialism  is  the  atomic  concep- 
tion of  matter  which  it  announces.     In  its  inner  nature, 
matter  consists  in  little  definite  particles,  known  as  atotns. 
These  make  the  pleroma  or  plenum.    It  is  not  very  easy 
to  get  a  clear  idea  of  what  was  meant  by  these  terms.    As 
far  as  one  can  gather,  the  atoms  are  the  only  real  forms 
of  existence.     They  only  have  true  being,  and  they  are 
the  primal  forms  of  existence.    In  number  they  are  infinite, 
and  in  their  nature  extended,  yet  indivisible.     They  are 
all  qualitatively  alike,  according  to  Democritus  and  Epicu- 
rus,  though   there   is   reason   to   suppose   that   Lucretius 
admitted  some  sort  of  qualitative  differences  among  them. 
This  seems  almost  necessary ;   for  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how 
atoms  that  are  all  of  the  same  essential  nature  could  ever, 
by  merely  combining,  produce  bodies  radically  different. 
But  the  atoms  differ  quantitatively.    Some  are  large,  others 
are  small;    some  are  heavy,  others  are  light;    some  arc 
rough,  others  are  smooth;    some  are  square,  others  are 
round.    It  is  supposed  tliat  the  combinations  of  such  atoms 
produce  the  different  sorts  of  bodies  found  in  the  universe. 
It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  atom  is  not  really  an  existing 
thing;   it  is  rather  a  speculative  conception  of  what  matter 
in  its  nature  is  supposed  to  be.    The  atom  is  never  actually 
observed;  it  is  rather  postulated.    In  addition,  if  the  atoms 
are  by  hypothesis  indivisible,  they  can  scarcely  be  unex- 
tended.    If  they  are  extended,  they  are  conceivably  divisible. 
But  if  they  be  unextended  in  order  to  be  indivisible,  it  is 
hard  to  conceive  how  any  number  of  conceivably  indivisible 


•Moocorr  mxhution  tbt  chart 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


A 


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: 


462 


APOLOGETICS. 


.1 


and  unextended  atoms  could  ever  unite  to  produce  an  ex- 
tended body. 

4.  A  third  important  factor  in  ancient  materialism  is  the 
vacuum  or  kenon.  This  corresponds  partly  to  the  popular 
conception  of  empty  space.  The  vacuum,  just  as  the 
plenum,  space  as  well  as  the  atom,  is  eternal  and  infinite 
in  extent.  It  is  evident  that  the  idea  of  empty  space  is 
involved  in  that  of  the  atom.  If  there  were  no  empty  space, 
matter  would  be  solid,  and  the  atoms  could  not  be  bounded 
off  from  each  other.  In  its  nature,  matter  would  be  an 
absolutely  impenetrable  mass.  And,  further,  if  there  were 
no  vacuum,  the  motion  of  the  atoms  would  not  be  possible. 
Hence,  those  changes  of  place  and  relation,  which  the 
atoms  must  undergo  in  combining  into  bodies,  could  not 
take  place.  Thus,  the  void  as  well  as  the  full,  empty  space 
as  well  as  material  atoms,  must  be  assumed.  This  vacuum 
is  sometimes  called  non-being,  as  the  atom  is  being.  This 
being  and  non-being  enter  into  the  conception  of  ancient 
materialism,  and  both  are  supposed  to  have  objective 
reality. 

5.  A  fourth  feature  of  ancient  materialism  is  the  place 
and  function  given  to  motion  in  it.  The  question  at  once 
arises  as  to  how  the  atoms  which  exist  at  first,  distributed 
throughout  an  infinite  vacuum,  are  ever  going  to  arrive  at 
any  sort  of  concrete  combinations?  The  answer  to  this 
question  is  found  in  the  fact  of  tl.j  atomic  motion.  Accord- 
ing to  Democritus,  the  atoms  are  all  endowed  with  a  down- 
ward motion,  which  is  also  eternal.  Different  atoms  fall 
at  different  rates  in  the  infinite  void.  The  heavy  atoms 
fall  faster  than  the  light.  The  result  is  that  the  heavy 
overtake  the  light,  and  by  impact  upon  them  deflect  them 
out  of  their  courses.  The  result  of  this  is  to  produce  a 
commotion  among  the  atoms,  as  the  impact  of  one  upon 
another  extends  more  ano  more  widely.  This  produces 
that  atomic  state  known  at  "the  fortuitous  concourse  of 
atoms."    In  this  commotion  certain  groups  of  atoms  which 


PURE  MATERIALISM. 


463 


have  some  natural  kinship  for  each  other  draw  together, 
and  by  degrees  material  bodies  are  formed.  Thus,  out  of 
this  whirling  and  dashing  of  the  atoms  in  a  purely  me- 
chanical way,  this  varied,  orderly  and  beautiful  universe 
has  come  into  its  cosmic  existence. 

6.  At  this  stage  emerges  an  exceedingly  acute  piece  of 
metaphysical  criticism.    It  arises  out  of  the  speculations  of 
Democritus,  Aristotle  and  Epicurus.    Democritus  said  that 
some  atoms  fell  faster  than  others  in  the  eternal  and  infinite 
vacuum.    Aristotle,  with  wonderful  insight,  asserted  that 
in  an  absolute  vacuum,  such  as  Democritus  assumed,  all 
atoms  fall  at  the  same  rate.    The  heavy  and  the  light,  the 
rough  and  the  smooth  atoms,  all  move  at  the  same  rate, 
prior  to  the  beginning  of  the  commotion  among  the  atoms. 
If  this  be  so,  then  Aristotle  claimed  that  no  atom  could 
ever  overtake  another,  but  that  all  would  ever  move  on  in 
straight  lines  eternally.     In  this  case,  the  formation  of 
concrete   material   bodies   is   impossible   by   this   process. 
Epicurus  comes  to  the  rescue  of  Democritus  from  the  hands 
of  Aristotle.     He  sought  to  eflFect  this  rescue  by  assuming 
that  some  of  the  atoms  arc  inherently  endoived  with  a 
tendency  to  deflect  from  the  straight  downward  motion. 
By  this  deflection,  in  even  one  atom,  the  impact  necessary 
to  secu''  the  beginning  of  the  concourse  of  the  atoms 
would  be  effected,  and  the  way  was  opened  up  for  the 
mechanical  production  of  material  bodies  or  masses  of 
matter.     This  tendency  was  a  sort  of  spontaneity  with 
which  certain  atoms  are  endowed;    and  this  is  taken  by 
Epicurus  to  be  the  key  to  the  free  agency  exhibited  in  the 
activity  of  man,  who  is  simply  refined  matter. 

It  would  not  be  hard  to  show  that  Epicurus  does  not 
successfully  meet  Aristotle's  criticism,  for  the  reason  that 
tile  question  could  still  be  raised  as  to  the  reason  for  the 
mtive  tendency  of  some  atoms  to  deflect.  On  a  purely 
mechanical  view  of  things,  no  reason  for  this  can  be  given. 
And  Aristotle  could  still  raise  the  deeper  question  of  the 


l-«   J 


464 


APOLOGETICS. 


origfin  of  the  motion  of  the  atoms,  and  ask  whether  a  first 
mover,  who  is  himself  unmoved,  must  not  be  assumed? 

7.  The  fifth  main  feature  of  ancient  materialism  is  that 
the  method  or  law  by  which  the  combinations  of  the  atoms 
take  place  is  that  of  necessity.  Chance  or  fate  rules 
throughout  the  system.  Every  teleological  factor  is  rigidly 
excluded.  There  is  no  design,  no  rationality,  in  all  the 
movements  of  the  atoms.  The  atoms  move  and  combine 
according  to  pure  mechanical  necessity.  There  is  no  plan 
nor  purpose  anywhere  in  the  cosmos.  There  is  no  free 
agency  anywhere.  So  far  as  there  is  any  ground  or  reason 
for  the  atomic  combinations  which  take  place,  it  lies  in  the 
atoms  themselves,  and  is  in  its  nature  mechanical.  This 
is  a  marked  feature  of  all  types  of  ancient  materialism. 

As  the  materialistic  theory  of  the  human  constit'ition  is 
to  be  fully  considered  in  a  subsequent  chapter,  little  need 
now  be  saic  on  this  point  here.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  the 
Greek  materialists  were  inclined  to  regard  the  sotd  of  man 
as  consisting  in  round,  sn  /th,  fiery  atoms,  which  are  scat- 
tered through  the  body,  which  in  turn  is  made  up  of 
coarser  atoms.  The  movements  of  these  atoms  produce 
the  phenomena  of  life  and  thought,  of  emotion  and  volition. 
But  as  to  the  last  there  is  no  real  freedom,  for  the  will, 
too,  is  under  the  law  of  necessity. 


II.  Additions  of  Modern  Materialism.    §111. 

I.  Modern  materialism,  in  its  widest  sense,  professes  to 
be  a  philosophy  of  all  existence  and  to  present  a  reasoned 
theory  of  the  universe.  It  makes  large  claims  as  to  its 
ability  to  explain  all  things  without  the  hypothesis  of  spirit ; 
and  it  boldly  asserts  tliat  it  has  no  need  of  a  God.  It 
alleges  tliat  it  offers  a  purely  unitary  principle  which  is 
perfectly  adequate  to  explain  all  the  phenomena  of  the 
cosmos.  But  when  modern  materialism  in  its  varied  types 
is  carefully  inspected,  it  is  seen  to  be  not  essentially  dif- 


PURE  MATERIALISM. 


465 

ferent  from  ancient  forms  of  it.  The  modifications  are  not 
radical,  and  the  additions  are  not  of  vital  importance  It 
IS  practically  the  same  thing  in  slightly  different  attire. 
The  nebular  hypothesis,  upon  which  some  modem  mate- 
rialists lay  so  much  stress  as  the  solution  of  the  cosmic 
process  whereby  the  universe  was  framed,  is  not  in  principle 
so  very  different  from  the  Epicurean  fortuitous  concourse 
of  atoms,  by  which  the  cosmos  came  to  be  what  it  is.  Some 
of  the  modifications  and  the  additions  made  by  modern 
materialism  are  now  to  be  noted. 

2  First  of  all,  the  purely  atomic  conception  of  matter 
has  been  somewhat  modified  in  recent  times  by  the  molecular 
view  ot  It.  This  introduces  into  the  constitution  of  matter 
the  Ideas  of  motion  and  energy.  It  regards  matter  as 
ceaselessly  active,  and  as  permeated  by  force.  The  atoms 
are  simple  and  are  held  together  in  groups,  called  mole- 
cules, by  chemical  affinity;  and  molecules  are  held  together 
m  mas^s,  called  bodies,  by  cohesion.  This  combines  the 
Ideas  of  matter,  motion  and  energy  in  the  mod.^rn  concep- 
tion of  matter. 

3-  Then,  next,  modern  materialism  gives  great  promi- 
nence to  the  conceptions  of  force  and  energy.    The  ancients 
aid  stress  upon  matter  and  motion,  while  the  moderns  give 
the  accent  to  matter  and  force.    The  views  of  the  former 
were  chiefly  mechanical,  while  those  of  the  latter  are  mainly 
dynamical.     The  one  constructs  .he  universe  with  atoms 
and  motion  by  means  of  mechanics,  the  other  organizes 
the   cosmos    with    molecules    and    energy    by    means    of 
dynamics.    Bot.  agree  in  holding  to  the  eternity  of  matter 
motion  and  force,  but  the  construction  of  these  three  facts' 
as  found  in  the  universe  is  presented  with  varyin-r  accent 
on  each.     Yet.  after  all,  there  is  no  difference  in  principle. 

oushed  r      "''  '"•"''  '"""P''°"  °^  ^""^y.  I.  .ve  simply 
push  d    he  view-pomt  a  step  backwards,  and  have  rai  ed 

^ZT"]      '5f  ^""^""^  °^  ^^"^*  °^  '"'^'-"  -  'he  atoms 
and  molecules.    But  as  to  the  real  inner  relations  between 


m-i 


fi 


it  I      ' 


I: 


^t 


i' 


Ir 


I 


4<56 


APOLOGETIC' 


matter  and  force,  the  modems  are  not  at  all  agreed.  Some 
regard  the  atoms  as  funaamental,  others  place  energy  at 
the  basis  and  g^ve  matter  a  secondary  place. 

4.  Still  further,  modem  materialism  attaches  great  sig- 
nificance to  the  conservation  of  energy  and  to  the  trans- 
mutation and  correlation  of  the  forces  in  the  universe.  In 
some  respects  the  moderns  have  here  made  a  real  gain  over 
the  ancients.  The  latter  generally  conceived  of  force  as 
all  of  one  sort  and  in  a  purely  mechanical  way;  but  the 
former,  owing  largely  to  the  advance  made  in  the  physical 
sciences,  have  been  able  to  take  a  wider  view  of  the  forces 
in  the  cosmos. 

'./  the  term  conservation  is  meant  the  fact  that  the 
quantum  of  energy  in  the  universe,  as  a  whole,  is  ever  the 
same.  It  may  change  its  foi  ti  and  mode  of-  activity,  as 
this  force  or  that,  but  the  amount  of  energy  which  pervades 
the  universe  is  always  the  same.  No  quantity  of  energy 
can  be  originated,  and  none  can  be  destroyed.  It  is  a  fixed 
fact  in  the  cosmos. 

By  the  term  transmutation  is  suggested  the  idea  that  one 
form  of  force  may  be  changed  into  another.  In  physics 
the  forces  involved  in  heat,  light  and  electricity  are  sup- 
posed to  be  interchangeable,  and  may  be  transformed  from 
one  to  the  other.  Within  certain  well-defined  limits  this 
seems  now  to  be  made  out,  and  one  of  the  claims  of  modern 
physics  is  that  all  the  physical  forces  are  presumably  capable 
of  reduction  to  one  simple  basal  force.  This  conception, 
.as  a  very  useful  working  hypothesis,  is  clearly  brought  out 
jn  modern  materialism. 

The  correlation  of  the  forces  implies  that  all  the  forces 
are  inherently  related  to  each  other,  and  are  all  essentially 
the  same  at  root.  With  this  conception  in  the  purely 
physical  sphere,  we  have  no  fault  to  find.  But  modern 
materialism  often  goes  much  further,  and  asserts  that  the 
physical,  the  vital  and  the  mental  forces  are  all  in  principle 
the  same.     It  is  here  that  some  very  subtile  materialistic 


t 


PURE  MATERIALISM.  467 

speculation  has  arisen  in  our  own  day.  According  to  this 
view,  hfe  and  thought  and  voHtion  are  merely  modified 
mechanical  energy  and  chemical  activity.  The  mechanical 
and  chemical  forces  account  for  life,  and  these  three,  in 
turn,  account  for  thought  and  volition;  all  of  which  simply 
means  that  hfe  and  mind  are  construed  in  terms  of  chem- 
istry. Here  the  modems  have  gone  a  good  deal  further 
than  the  ancients,  and  have  introduced  new  factors  into  the 
problem. 

5-  Finally,  modem  materialism,  especially  in  its  refined 
forms,  shows  a  tendency  to  endow  matter  with  certain 
powers  or  potencies  which  are  scarcely  materialistic  in  il.eir 
nature.     The  whole  hylozoic  conception  of  matter  reveals 
a  tendency  to  endow  matter  with  the  quality  of  life  in  some 
sort  of  latent  way.     The  idea  that  matter  has  in  its  very 
nature  as  molecular  the  germinal  principle  of  order,  is  one 
with  which  modem  materialism  has  made  us  familiar.    And 
some  materialists  in  our  own  day  have  such  remarkable 
msight  that  they  can  discover  a  sort  of  teleological  instinct 
m  the  atoms  and  molecules  themselves.    They  predicate  an 
immanent  design,  or  an  unconscious  purpose,  in  matter 
even  ,n  its  atomic  simplicity,  and  in  energy  in  its  purely 
mechanical  forms.    Having  done  this,  it  is  supposed  to  be 
an  easy  task  to  construe  the  cosmos  in  terms  of  materialism, 
iiut  this  looks  as  if  modem  materialism,  under  the  stress 
of  controversial  storm,  has  felt  that  from  the  data  of  matter 
motion  and  energy,  the  universe,  with  life  and  mind,  cannot 
be  rationally  constmed.     Then,  in  order  to  be  able  to  so 
construe  it,  the  policy  is  adopted  of  introducing  into  matter 
the  germs  of  life  and  mind,  and  all  else  that  is  fomd  in 
the  universe.    But  this  is  not  justifiable;  or,  if  allowed  at 
all,  It  certainly  modifies  the  purely  materialistic  foundations 
of  the  theory.     The  whole  scheme  b-  omes  at  least  semi- 
matenalistic.    But  we  are  now  not  cr      ising  modem  mate- 
rialism;   we  are  simply  pointing  ouc  one  of  its  marked 
tendencies  in  its  refined  circles. 


111 


'I 
•  If  1 


ii 


I    f 


if. 

!!: 
i  I'- 
ll' 


468 


APOLOGETICS. 


6.  This  brief  statement  of  pure  materialism  must  suffice. 
It  proposes  to  construe  the  universe  in  terms  of  matter, 
energy  and  motion,  and  to  explain  all  its  phenomena  without 
the  hypothesis  of  spirit.  The  philosophy  of  the  cosmos  is 
lodged  in  atom  and  molecule,  in  energy  and  motion.  The 
only  real  existence  is  matter;  and  the  verdict  of  mate- 
rialism is  no  soul  for  man,  and  no  God  for  the  universe. 
It  is  simply  a  round-about  way  to  atheism,  and  must  be 
carefully  examined. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


PURE  MATERIALISM:   CRITICISM. 

Contents. 

UnSTr  1  "^  r '  °*  M='\"''''«'"-It  does  not  Provide  a  Principle  of 
A^d  Fnr~  T  ^°*"'°t-Matter  is  Muhiple.-Of  Different  Kinds.- 
And  Force  Increases  the  Complexity.-Materialism  is  Unscientific-It 
.s  Dogmatic  Rather  than  Inductive-Explains  the  Higher  from  the 
^r^r^  '"'2^'  xr.°*  Causation.-Materialism  not  More  Svor! 
?r  Ir  r  V  ""  ^n  ^•'"^"'-It^  Epistcmology  is  Unscientific-Par- 
^cular  Cnt>c.sms.-Cannot  Prove  that  Matter  is  Eternal.-Spirit  may  be 
Sice  M^ ""  "°'  ""'rrf'  ^"<^^P^"dent.-If  not  Infinite  aY  to 
m/u!;^  P  ""''  TJ''  ^"'^"""  '''  '°  Time.-It  cannot  Prove  that 
«nr  v'.^  Tvr  '"  ^^™'  °^  Mi"d.-Cannot  Prove  Absolute  Ind" 
struct.b>hty  of  Matter.-Cannot  be  True  to  its  Theory  of  Knowledge.! 

2'd"Mind.  "  °'  ^"""'-N"'  Order  and  Design.-Nor  Life 

Literature. 

rJ^%1°^Z^\^'''i''\T  Ma/^K,;/,m.-Flinfs  Antitheistic  Theories, 
5o?  1  bIwTi  rr  ^{^'•"^"^'^-'-M^rtineau-s  Study  of  Religion. 
ri  TIT  F- 1  '.  ^*''-  ^-P"^"''  PMosophy  of  Theism.  Vol.  I. 
Chap.  ni.-F.sher  s  Grounds  of  Theistic  Belief.  Chap.  III.-Ebrard's 
ApologeUcs  Vol.  II.,  Sec.  IV.,  Chap.  II.-Rishell's  The  FoundaHo^ 
of  he  Christian  Faith  Div.  L,  Sec.  I.,  Chaps.  IV.-V.-Bruce"  C^ 
^./.«  Chap  IV-B.rks'  Modern  Physical  Fatalism.  Chaps.  VI.-X.- 
Chnstliebs  Modern  Doubt  and  Christian  Belief.  Chap.  Ill  Sec  II  — 
Vatsons  Christianity  and  Idealism,  Chap.  Vlll.-Strong's  Syst'ematic 

./o^X  Part      .,  Chap.  II.,  Sec.  I.-Hodge's  Systematic  The^y. 

-  I     Chap.  IIL.  Sec^IV.-Harris-  Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism. 

.  IT    rl         rrf.'r^';^"'/'^  "^  Ma*.rm/«m.-Bowne's  Metaphysics. 
-t  II..  Chaps.  III.-V.-Dabney's  Theology,  Chap.  VI.  ''•*''' 

I.  General  Considerations.  §112. 
N  the  last  chapter  a  statement  of  materialism  as  it 
appears  in  ancient  and  modern  times  was  made.  This 
cliapter  undertakes  to  present  in  outline  some  criticisms  of 
tins  theory  of  existing  things.  At  the  close  of  the  last 
chapter  it  was  pointed  out  that  in  our  own  day  there  is 
a  tendency  to  discard  the  older  and  cruder  forms  of  mate- 
rialism, which   hold  the  atomic  or  corpuscular  view  of 


I 


iri 


f 


470 


APOLOGETICS. 


(i 


t* 


^ 


H 


-1 


:' 


i: 


•natter,  and  to  advocate  a  refined  or  cosmic  materialism, 
which  is  rather  dynamical  and  hylozoic  in  its  estimate  of 
Ihe  materialistic  basis  of  all  things.  This  should  be  kept 
in  mind  in  all  criticism  of  modem  materialism,  as  this  is 
the  type  of  this  antithe-lfitic  speculation  against  which  Chris- 
janity  must  protect  itself.  In  this  chapter  an  attempt  will 
be  made  to  present  as  careful  an  examination  of  materialism 
as  its  limits  will  allow.  Some  general  considerations  will 
first  be  presented,  and  then  several  particular  points  of 
criticism  will  be  outlined. 

I.  Materialism  signally  fails  to  satisfy  the  logical  demand 
of  human  reason  for  a  unitary  principle,  on  the  basis  of 
which  the  universe  may  receive  its  best  philosophical  ex- 
planation. The  philosophical  instinct  of  human  reason 
demands  'inity  in  the  principle  from  which  a  rationale  of 
the  cosmos  is  to  be  given.  Now,  in  spite  of  the  claim  of 
materialism  that  it  does  this  when  it  denies  matter  and 
spirit,  and  asserts  only  matter,  the  charge  can  be  fully 
sustained  that  materialism,  whilst  monistic  in  its  claims, 
does  not  supply  a  definite  principle  which  is  adequate  as  a 
principle  of  philosophical  unity. 

First  of  all,  matter  itself  is  not  unitary,  but  multiple.  In 
general,  as  we  look  upon  the  universe  we  find  matter  ex- 
isting in  every  conceivable  form.  In  the  heavens  above 
there  are  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars  in  almost  endles.^  ul- 
tiplicity.  On  the  earth  about  us,  there  is  immense  variety 
in  the  forms  of  existing  material  things.  To  the  senses, 
in  this  superficial  way,  there  is  boundless  multiplicity, 
instead  of  proper  unity,  in  the  material  universe.  From 
the  view-point  of  philosophy,  the  unity  here  claimed  is 
spurious,  not  legitimate. 

And  if  we  take  a  deeper  and  more  scientific  view  of 
matter,  we  discover  in  the  atomic  or  molecular  conception 
of  its  constitution  still  greater  multiplicity.  The  atoms 
and  molecules  defy  enumeration,  and  thus  the  notion  of 
unity  sinks  almost  out  of  sight.    They  differ  in  size,  weight 


PURE  MATERIALISM.  471 

and  shape.  Some  are  round  and  some  square,  some  rough 
and  some  smooth.  What  kind  of  unity  is  possible  here? 
If  we  .ake  the  atomic  homogeneous  of  Spencer,  or  the  sup- 
posed star-dust  of  the  nebular  hypothesis,  how  can  any  sort 
of  unity  be  connected  with  it?  Reason  asks  for  a  philo- 
sophical principle  (  raHonal  unity,  and  materialism  cnswers 
with  its  fundamental  postjilate  of  atomic  multiplicity. 

But,  further,  matter  is  not  all  of  the  same  sort.    Some 
of  the  Greek  materialists  asserted  that  the  atoms  were  quali- 
tatively, as  well  as  quantitatively,  distinct.     The  atoms 
were  of  different  kinds.     Empedocles  asserted  that  there 
were  four  distinct  elements:    earth,  air,  fire  and  water. 
Anaxagoras  asserted  that  the  elements  of  various  material 
bodies  were  in  primitive  matter,  and  that  these  were  moulded 
mto  shape  and  order  by  intelligence.    In  modem  times  the 
conception  of  matter,  as  consisting  in  different  kinds,  is 
clearly  defined.    The  simple  substances,  according  to  recent 
views  in  physics,  are  over  sixty  in  number,  and  as  chemical 
analysis  is  seeking  to  do  its  work,  the  number  of  simple 
substances  is  increasing.    In  their  very  nature  these  simple 
substances  cannot  be  changed  the  one  into  another,  nor 
can  they  a,l  be  reduced  to  some  single  material  element. 
This  being  the  case,  the  conception  of  unity  really  vanishes. 
It  thus  appears  that,  on  a  purely  materialistic  theory  of 
existing       ngs,  there  is  no  sort  of  absolute  unity.     The 
counte.     ..erence  that  such  unity  can  be  found  only  in  the 
postulate  of  an  infinite  personal  spirit,  such  as  theism  pro- 
poses, where  unity  and  indivisibility  may  both  find  a  rational 
resting-place,  is  confirmed. 

In  addition,  if  the  fact  of  energy,  and  the  various  forms 
of  force  which  appear  in  the  universe  are  taken  into  account, 
the  presence  of  a  unitary  principle  in  a  merely  materialistic 
scheme  is  still  less  likely.  Materialism  of  all  shades,  and 
m  every  age,  )  -s  always  been  perplexed  with  the  concep- 
tion of  the  physical  forces,  and  how  to  construe  them  in 
relation  to  matter.     V  both  are  real   and  eternal,   then 


-■ 


«■ 


;  f 


f! 


i 

■i 
f 

i   1 
P 


473 


APOLOGETICS. 


dualism,  which  excludes  a  unitary  principle,  rules  in  the 
system.  Then  the  aspects  of  energy  known  as  attraction 
and  repulsion,  and  all  the  various  sorts  of  physical  for:es, 
have  to  be  reckoned  with.  Here,  again,  multiplicity  per- 
vades the  whole  cosmos.  Then,  in  addition  to  the  purely 
mechanical  and  chemical  forces,  there  are  the  vital  and 
volitional  agencies  which  appear  in  the  organic  kingdom, 
and  increase  the  notion  of  multiplicity  very  much.  Now, 
unless  all  the  physical  forces  can  be  reduced  to  one  basal 
force,  and  unless  the  physical,  vital  and  mental  forces  in 
the  universe  can  all  be  correlated  and  reduced  to  one  generic 
form  of  force,  the  foundation  for  a  unitary  principle  does 
not  exist  in  pure  materialism,  no  matter  how  refined.  Here, 
again,  the  theistic  postulate  is  adequate;  for  an  infinite 
personal  spirit,  with  volitional  agency  in  its  personality, 
provides  the  basis  for  a  rational  unity,  and  for  the  dynamical 
activity  which  are  latent  in  the  cosmos.  Absolute  unity, 
both  in  its  ontological  and  dynamical  aspects,  is  found  in 
the  cci  :nts  of  theism.  It  cannot  be  discovered,  in  either 
aspect,  m  materialism. 

2.  Materialism  may  be  charged  with  being  unscientific. 
This  charge,  if  it  can  be  made  good,  is  severe  on  mate- 
rialism, because  that  system  generally  claims  to  be  strictly 
scientific  in  its  spirit  and  methods.  And  if  theism  is  justly 
open  to  the  charge  that  it  is  in  some  way  inimical  to  modern 
science  of  a  legitimate  sort,  it  would  seriously  suffer  from 
such  a  charge.  The  charge  which  we  make  against  mate- 
rialism is  that,  in  spite  of  its  claims  to  the  contrary,  it  is 
unscientific.    This  charge  is  now  to  be  made  good. 

First,  materialism  usually  follows  the  dogmatic  instead 
of  the  inductive  method,  and  in  so  far  as  it  does  so  it  is 
out  of  har-  v  with  the  spirit  of  modern  science.  Its 
usual  dogmatic  assertion  is  that  matter  is  the  only  real  form 
of  existence,  and  on  this  basis  its  theory  is  constructed. 
The  true  scientific,  or  inductive,  method  bids  us  investigate 
the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  and  if  it  can  be  shown  that 


PURE  MATERIALISM.  473 

these  can  all  be  rationally  accounted  for  on  the  basis  of  the 
materialistic  theory,  then  this  cc;. elusion  might  stand.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  it  should  turn  out  that  the  facts  cannot 
all  be  explained  in  a  materialistic  way,  then  it  is  clear  that 
materialism  is  inadequate.  In  addition,  if  it  is  found  that 
the  postulate  of  spirit  is  needed,  and  is  sufficient  to  account 
in  a  rational  way  for  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe, 
we  shall  be  justified  in  holding  that  the  theistic  hypothesis 
is  thereby  confirmed.  But  the  point  now  made  against 
materialism  is  that,  in  assuming  its  fundamental  position, 
it  is  unscientific,  inasmuch  as  it  assumes  dog-matically,  prior 
to  investigation,  what  should  have  been  reached  inductively 
as  the  result  of  .1  careful  survey  of  all  the  facts.  To  assert 
dogmatically  tlm^  matter  is  the  only  reality,  exposes  mate- 
rialism to  the  charge  of  unscientific  procedure. 

Secondly,  materialism  is  compelled  to  explain  the  higher 
by  means  of  the  lower,  and  is  unscientific  in  its  attempt  to 
do  so.     Materialism  asserts  that  matter  is  the  primordial 
form  of  existence.     Matter  is  reality  in  its  lowest  terms 
and  in  the  simplest  modes  of  existence.     Out  of  the  re- 
sources of  matter  all  higher  and  more  complex  forms  of 
existing  things  are  to  be  derived  and  their  reality  ex- 
plained.    Ma';ter  is  devoid  of  life  at  first:   b-  .    somehow, 
life  supervenes.    This  is  a  higher  and  more  c    ■  plex  form 
of  existence.    Again,  the  sensitive  aris  s  upon  ...e  basis  of 
the  vital,  and  reveals  still  further  comokxity.    This,  again, 
is  followed  by  the  rational,   w.iere  v-';irely  new  factors^ 
which  greatly  increase  the  -.onnlexity,  c  .-.le'into  view.    To 
crown  all,  the  facts  of  morainy  and  religion  supervene,  and 
here  the  complexity  reaches  its  maximum.     At  every  step 
there  are  factors  in  the  higher  and  subsequent  stage  which 
are  not  in  the  lower  and  prior  stage  of  development  in  the 
universe.     The  question  for  the  materialist  is  .0  account 
for  that  new  factor  by  means  of  the  resources  of  matter 
alone. 

It  may  be  justly  charged  that  all  attempts  to  explain 


474 


APOLOGETICS. 


"1.! 


?».* 


the  higher  and  more  complex  forms  of  existence  from  the 
lower  and  simpler,  in  a  purely  materialistic  way,  are  quite 
unscientific,  inasmuch  as  the  essential  demand  of  the  law 
of  cattsation  must  be  disregarded  at  every  onward  and 
upward  step.  That  law  require  that  there  shall  be  at  least 
as  much  reality  in  the  cause  as  appears  in  the  effect,  and 
that  no  new  factor  shall  be  admitted  into  the  effect  which 
has  not  its  counterpart  in  the  cause.  The  materialist  admits 
no  extra-mundane  causality  to  account  for  that  which  is 
new  in  every  more  complex  stage  of  the  universe.  Hence, 
he  must  explain  the  vital  from  the  non-vital,  the  conscious 
from  the  non-conscious,  the  rational  from  the  non-rational, 
the  moral  from  the  non-moral,  and  the  religious  from  the 
n.  n-religious.  It  is  evident  that  at  every  stage  the  law  of 
causation  is  transgressed,  and  the  whole  procedure  of  the 
materialist  is,  on  this  account,  unscientiHc. 

The  attempt  made  by  some  refined  types  of  materialism 
to  avoid  this  charge,  by  assuming  that  the  germs  of  life, 
and  mind  and  morality,  are  all  latent  in  matter,  is  equally 
unwarranted,  inasmuch  as  this  is  merely  putting  into  matter 
by  hypothesis  something  which  is  not  essentially  material, 
but  which  is  found  to  be  necessary  to  account  for  the  facts 
which  emerge  in  the  universe.  This  is  practically  a  con- 
fession of  failure  on  the  part  of  materialism  to  explain 
what  we  now  see  in  the  universe.  It  is  also  a  suggestion 
that  the  theistic  postulate  is  needed  to  provide  an  adequate 
causality  which  can  account  for  all  the  facts  in  a  thoroughly 
scientific  way. 

Thirdly,  little  weight  need  be  attached  to  the  claim  that 
materialism  holds  a  more  respectful  atfitide  to7  mrds  xcicmc 
than  theism.  It  is  sometimes  alleged  that  theistic  belief 
and  Christian  faith  are  real  obstacles  in  the  pathway  of 
progress  in  scientific  research,  and  the  boast  is  often  openly 
made  that  mntcrialism  has  done  very  much  to  foster  the 
interests  of  science.  In  reply  to  this  it  is  sufficient  to  say 
that  neither  the  nature  of  the  case,  nor  facts  which  lie 


i 


PURE  MATERIALISM.  475 

open  for  observation,  bear  out  this  allegation.    Much  less 
do  they  justify  the  materialist's  boast.    It  cannot  be  shown 
that  there  is  anything  in  the  nature  of  theistic  belief  or 
even  of  Christian  faith  which  limits  the  human  faculties, 
or  hampers  their  exercise  in  any  realm  of  rational  inquiry! 
Nor  do  the  facts  sustain  the  charge  in  question.     In  those 
lands  and  ages  where  the  belief  in  God  is  well  defined  and 
religious  knowledge  widely  diffused,  the  activity  of  the 
human  mind  has  been  most  marked,  and  its  achievements 
in  science  and  invention  been  most  remarkable.     Where 
religious  ignorance  has  prevailed  the  opposite  is  undoubt- 
edly true.    And  if  the  materialist  ventures,  with  a  degree 
of  assurance,  to  give  a  long  list  of  men  who  have  been 
noted  in  scientific  research,  and  who  at  the  same  time  were 
professed  adherents  of  materialism,  we  can  match  such  a 
list  with  one  containing  an  equal  number  of  the  names  of 
men  who  have  done  quite  as  much  for  the  advancement  of 
science,  and  who  were  all  the  while  humble  believers  in 
God  and  the  verities  of  the  Christian  system.     Arguing 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  we  might  go  further,  and 
make  good  the  claim  that  theism  puts  the  human  mind  in 
a  better  condition  and  attitude  than  materialism  can.   to 
study  nature  in  all  her  wide  and  varied  aspects. 

Fourthly,  the  charge  that  materialism  is  unscientific  in 
its  theory  of  knozvlcdge  may  also  be  made  gtiod  against  it. 
That  theory  of  knowledge  must  be  the  empirical  in  its 
cruder  sensational  forms.  The  only  knowledge  we  can  have 
must  come  through  the  avenue  of  the  senses.  That  this 
theory  is  inadequate  has  been  already  shown.  The  criti- 
cism which  goes  to  show  that  the  sensational  epistemology 
IS  unsound  also  goes  to  show  that  it  is  an  unscientific 
psychology.  If  the  human  mind  has  knowledge  or  beliefs 
which  are  not  derived  from  the  senses,  the  materialist  can 
give  no  explanation  of  these  things.  To  assume  the  atti- 
tude of  the  agnostic  towards  these  elements  of  cognition 
and  belief,  as  the  materialist  often  does,  is  equally  unscien- 


li 


V, 


'!' 


i      / 


if 


I 


476 


APOLOGETICS. 


tific.  As  this  point  will  emerge  again  in  another  connection, 
nothing  more  need  now  be  done  than  to  point  out  the 
unscientific  and  incomplete  nature  of  the  materialistic  theory 
of  knowledge. 


II.  Particular  Considerations.    §  113. 

In  the  previous  paragraph  it  was  shown  that  materialism 
was  neither  philosophical  nor  scientific.  It  failed  to  give 
a  unitary  principle  to  explain  all  things  from,  and  it  also 
disregarded  the  method  of  inductive  inquiry  in  various 
ways.    A  few  particular  points  of  criticism  are  now  adduced. 

I.  Materialism  cannot  justify  its  assumption  that  matter 
is  eternal.  It  is  bound  to  do  this  in  order  to  make  good 
its  case,  for  it  is  just  as  easy,  and  perhaps  quite  as  rational, 
to  assume  that  spirit  is  eternal.  That  some  form  of  being 
has  always  existed  must  be  assumed;  and  the  question  in 
debate  between  the  materialist  and  the  theist  is  as  to 
whether  this  eternal  reality  is  matter  or  spirit.  When  the 
materialist  asserts  that  it  is  matter,  he  is  bound,  in  the 
circumstances,  to  give  some  sort  of  rational  justification  of 
his  initial  assumption.  The  attempt  to  prove  the  eternity 
of  matter  must  be  futile,  and  yet  the  demand  of  the  theist 
that  this  be  done  is  legitimate,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that 
in  its  very  nature  matter  has  the  elements  of  independency 
and  permanency.    This  can  scarcely  be  done. 

If  the  materialist  attempts,  in  an  empirical  way,  to  prove 
the  eternity  of  matter,  he  can  make  little  headway.  His 
only  instruments  of  observation  are  his  senses.  These  en- 
able him  to  go  back  only  a  few  short  years.  And  even  the 
observation  of  the  race  as  a  whole  goes  back  only  a  few 
thousand  years  at  most.  And  when  he  goes  beyond  the 
period  covered  by  the  direct  observation  of  the  human  race, 
and  considers  the  strata  of  the  earth  as  revealed  by  geology, 
lie  may  infer  great  antiquity,  but  he  cannot  prove  eternity 
for  atom  or  molecule.     And  should  he  lift  his  eyes  to 


PURE  MATERIALISM.  477 

heaven,  and  with  the  astronomer  study  the  planets  and  the 
stars,  he  cannot  rise  to  the  definite  conclusion  that  the 
material  elements  of  which  they  are  composed  are  eternal. 
Empirically,  therefore,  the  eternity  of  matter  is  an  unproved 
hypothesis. 

Again,  that  which  is  eternal  must  be  independent  in  its 
conditions  of  existence.    If  there  were  a  time  when  it  was 
not,  then  it  must  depend  on  something  else  to  bring  it  into 
existence.     Now,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  matter  is 
absolutely  independent  in  its  essential  nature,  there  may 
have  been  a  time  when  it  was  not.    Hence,  there  may  have 
been  something  upon  which  it  is  dependent,  and  in  relation 
to  which  it  may  have  had  a  beginning.    As  to  the  initial 
assumption  which  must  be  made,  the  theist  has  the  advan- 
tage here.     His  assumption  is  that  there  is  an  eternal 
personal  spirit  called  God.     This  possesses  the  element  of 
mdependency  and  self-sufficiency  much  more  clearly  than 
the  assumption  of  a  multiplicity  of  blind  crass  atoms.    If 
matter  in  any  form  has  in  it  the  features  of  change  and 
decay,  it  is  not  easy  to  maintain  its  independency  and  con- 
sequent eternity. 

In  addition,  it  may  be  argued  that  if  matter  be  not  infinite 
in  relation  to  space  it  may  not  be  so  n  -elation  to  time. 
That  It  IS  infinite  in  relation  to  space  cannot  be  proved; 
and  if  It  could  it  would  be  only  a  quantitative  infinite  that 
would  be  reached.  This  being  the  case,  the  infinitude  of 
matter  in  relation  to  time  cannot  be  reasonably  maintained, 
for  if  matter  be  finite  in  one  respect  it  is  likely  finite  in  all 
respects.  In  any  case  the  burden  of  proof  rests  with  the 
materialist  to  pruve  the  eternity  of  the  material  basis  of  his 
system. 

2.  If  materialism  cannot  justify  its  claim  that  matter  is 
eternal,  it  cannot  make  good  the  contention  that  matter 
precedes  every  form  of  mind.  From  the  very  nature  of 
the  case  it  may  be  that  mind  has  in  it  elements  which  sug- 
gest its  eternity  in  some  form.    If  this  be  the  case,  it  may 


u 


.f 


!   I 


478 


APOLOGETICS. 


be  much  easier  to  explain  matter  from  mind  than  to  derive 
mind  from  matter.  It  must  be  assumed  that  something 
has  always  existed,  which  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  it  is 
eternal.  The  only  question  is  as  to  the  nature  of  that  some- 
thing which  is  eternal.  That  the  form  of  existence  which 
has  always  existed  is  mind  or  spirit  is  an  hypothesis  which 
has  many  things  in  its  support. 

The  assertion  that  historically,  so  far  as  our  earth  is  con- 
cerned, there  seems  to  have  been  a  time  when  there  was 
no  forms  of  spiritual  being  in  it  does  not  go  to  the  root 
of  the  problem,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  spiritual  per- 
sonal beings  like  men  are  derived  from  matter.  But  even 
then  the  question  would  still  arise  as  to  whether  an  infinite 
form  of  spiritual  being  did  not  antedate  and  condition  all 
forms  of  finite  being,  both  material  and  spiritual,  in  the 
universe.  And  it  might  be  argued  that  even  if  the  mate- 
rialistic view  of  the  human  constitution  were  admitted,  the 
question  of  an  infinite  or  divine  mind,  which  implies  a 
spiritual  form  of  being,  would  still  arise.  In  a  word,  even 
if  psychological  materialism  should  be  proved,  ontological 
evolution  would  not  necessarily  follow,  for  there  might  stil! 
be  a  God,  even  though  man  had  no  soul. 

3.  The  materialist  cannot  prove  the  indestructibility  of 
matter,  and  the  absolute  persistence  of  force.  Superficial 
thinking  here  is  apt  to  be  misled  by  the  fact  that,  so  far 
as  scientific  observation  and  experiment  go,  human  agency 
can  neither  originate  nor  destroy  an  atom  of  matter,  nor 
an  element  of  force.  All  that  the  materialist  has  any  riglit 
to  say  is  that,  so  far  as  man  is  concerned,  matter  is  inde- 
structible and  force  persistent.  With  equal  propriety  can 
it  be  said  that  spirit  and  mental  energy  are  persistent  and 
indestructible,  so  far  as  man's  observation  is  concerned.  To 
assume  that  there  is  no  other  agency  than  that  of  man  is 
to  assume  what  is  m  debate.  To  deny  that  there  is  any 
divine  agency  that  may  do  with  matter  and  force  what 
man  cannot  is  to  venture  a  bold  denial.     It  may  be  that 


PURE  MATERIALISM.  479 

the  divine  agency  which  brought  matter  and  force  into 
being  can  cause  them  to  cease  to  be.  The  only  way  to 
avoid  this  conclusion  is  to  make  it  plain  that,  in  its  essential 
nature,  matter  is  inherently  indestructible,  and  it  has  already 
been  shown  that  this  is  highly  improbable.  All  that  can 
be  allowed  in  regard  to  the  atom  is  its  relative  indestructi- 
bility, which  means  that,  so  far  as  human  resources  are 
concerned,  this  seems  to  be  true  of  matter  and  force. 

It  must  also  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  atomic  conception 
of  matter  and  the  dynamic  idea  of  force  are  more  or  less 
^deal  or  a  priori.    Both  are  hypothetic  constructions  of  cer- 
tain sets  of  facts  which  appear  in  nature.    The  atom  does 
not  really  fall  under  the  ken  of  the  senses  directly,  and 
motion  rather  than  force  is  what  the  senses  realize  in  the 
dynamical  realm.    Both  the  atom  and  tiie  forces  are  meta- 
physical principles.    To  assert  the  indestructibility  of  matter 
and  the  persistence  of  force  is  really  to  make  an  assertion 
about  these  principles.    This  is  scarcely  consistent  with  the 
materialistic  theory,  which  usually  denies  the  reality  of 
metaphysical  principles.    Yet  it  would  seem  that  material- 
ism must  assume  the  reality  of  such  principles.     But  theism 
is  under  no  such  difficulty.     By  its  fundamental  postulate 
of  an  infinite  personal  spirit  it  provides  an  absolutely  inde- 
structible foundation  for  all  finite  forms  of  being,  whether 
material  or  spiritual.    This  postulate  also  guarantees  what- 
ever of  permanency  and  persistence  there  may  be  in  these 
finite  aspects  of  l,eing.     If  the  annihilation  of  matter  and 
the  cessation  of  force  be  not  inconceivable,  then  tlie  origin 
of  both,  under  a  theistic  view  of  the  universe,  is  possible 
Here  materialism  lias  special  difficulties.     It  must  hold  to 
the  eternity  of  matter,  for  there  is  no  infinite  personal  spirit 
to  bring  It  into  being.     This  means  that  matter  always 
was  and  always  must  be.     Tliis  is  a  conclusion  whose 
metaphysical  validity  may,  as  we  have  seen,  l)e  seriously 
questioned,   while  its  scientific  correctness   is  more  than 
doubtful.    Theism  consistently  holds  ail  that  science  provei 


ii 

y 


it'i_ 


48o 


APOLOGETICS. 


1l     4': 


in  regard  to  the  relative  indestructibility  of  matter,  and  it 
provides  the  metaphysical  basis  of  an  absolutely  indestructi- 
ble personal  spirit  in  God. 

4.  Materialism  cannot  be  consistent  with  its  own  theory 
of  knowledge.    Flint  and  others  use  this  with  telliiig  effect 
against  materialism.    This  theory  is  the  sensational  or  purely 
empirical.    According  to  this  theory,  the  senses  are  the  only 
avenues  of  knowledge,  and  the  senses  bring  us  into  cog- 
nitive relation  only  with  what  is  concrete  and  palpable. 
Now,  it  has  already  been  seen  that  the  fundamental  con- 
ception of  materialism  is  the  atoms,  and  that  these  atoms 
are  metaphysical  conceptions  which  do  not  come  under  the 
ken  of  the  senses.    Even  in  the  laboratory,  where  the  closest 
inspection  of  various  forms  of  matter  is  made,  the  atoms 
are  never  seen  nor  handled.     Hence,  materialism  can  only 
speak  of  knowing  its  fundamental  conception  by  being  incon- 
sistent with  its  own  epistemology.     In  like  manner,  force 
in  itself  is  not  cognized  by  the  senses.    What  is  observed 
thereby  is  only  the  facts  of  motion,  which  are  the  results 
of  force.    By  the  senses  only  the  fact  of  change  is  observed. 
They  do  not  bring  us  into  cognitive  touch  with  the  force 
which  effects  the  change.    Hence,  materialism  has  no  right 
to  assert  the  reality  of  force ;  and  when  it  does  so  it  must 
be  entirely  inconsistent.     Both  the  atom  and  force  are 
a  priori  conceptions,  which  can  have  value  and  validity  only 
on  the  basis  of  the  rational  theory  of  knowledge  whose 
main  outlines  have  already  been  expounded  in  this  treatise. 
For  materialism  to  assert  the  reality  of  either  is  to  proclaim 
its  own  inconsistency,  or  to  go  ijeyond  the  limits  of  its  own 
principles. 

5.  Materialism  has  great  difficulty  in  giving  a  good  ex- 
planation of  force  or  energy,  and  in  indicating  its  relation 
to  matter.  The  conceptions  of  force  and  matter  are  distinct 
even  in  the  mind  of  the  materialist.  Both  are  abstractions 
or  inferences  from  what  the  senses  observe.  Now,  mate- 
rialism is,  at  best,  vague  in  its  conception  of  force.     And 


;'  ^  i 


TC-giijW'-a-^ 


PURE  MATERIAL     M. 


481 


in  regard  to  the  relations  between  force  ond  matter  the 
opinions  of  materialists  differ  widely.     Soine  regard  force 
as  corporeal,  others  incorporeal;    so-       hold  that  it  may 
subsist  independently  of  matte  r,  others  chat  it  is  to  be  found 
only  in  connection  with  matter.    Some  make  matter  funda- 
mental, conditioning  force;  others  make  force  fundamental, 
conditioning  matter.     According  to  the  former,  the  atom 
IS  the  great  reality,  and  force  is  a  quality  or  invariable 
concomitant  of  the  atom;  according  to  the  latter,  force  is 
the  real  entity,  and  the  atom  is  the  resultant  of  force  in 
some  way.     So  long  as  this  difference  and  confusion  of 
ideas  exists  among  materialists,  we  may  well  hesitate  to 
accept  their  philosophy  of  existence.     Here  the  theist  has 
decided  advantage.    His  conception  of  one  infinite,  personal 
Spmt  IS  definite.     He  is  the  one  eternal  reality,  and  from 
him  both  matter  and  force  can  be  adequately  explained  in 
such  a  way  as  to  render  it  unnecessary  to  deduce  the  one 
from  the  other  as  materialism  must.    Theism  has  the  merit 
of  clear  thinking  on  this  point. 

6.  What  is  perhaps  a  still  more  serious  objection  to  the 
materialistic  construction  of  things  lies  in  its  inadequacy  to 
explain  the  order  and  design  seen  in  the  cosmos.    That  the 
universe  exhibits  order  and  harmony,  and  has  marks  of 
adaptation  and  design,  must  be  admitted  even  by  material- 
ism.    Of  these  ^  cts  some  explanation  is  needed      H(   > 
materialism  is  practically  helpless.     All  that  was  adduced 
m  a  positive  way  in  the  exposition  of  the  eutaxio-  and  teleo- 
theistic  proofs  for  the  reality  of  the  existence  of  God   tells 
negatively  against  materialism.     Materialism  must  explain 
order  without  intelligence,  and  design  without  purpose     It 
must  account  for  harmony  and  adaptation  in  the  cosmos 
only  by  chance  or  fate.     Such  explanations  are  scarcely 

alT  sunnl"'  "    '.""'  '°""  "^"^''"^  "^^  ^ead  atoms 
cannot  supply  an  adequate  explanation  of  the  undoubted 

fact    of  order  and  design.     Neither  the  eutaxiologv  nor 

the  teleologj-  of  the  cosmos  has  any  rationale  on  the' basis 

0* 


p  ip 


i 


482 


APOLOGETICS. 


of  materialism.  Neither  the  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms 
in  ,  .ncient  materialism,  nor  the  reaction  of  the  atomic  homo- 
.^eneous  of  modem  materialistic  theory  provides  what  the 
iacts  need  for  rational  explanation.  Every  phase  of  pure 
materialism  which  begins  with  crass  material  atoms  and 
blind  mechanical  force  is  open  to  this  fatal  criticism. 

In  addition,  it  may  be  further  said  that,  to  sustain  the 
laws  of  nature  which  appear  to  express  the  order  in  the 
cosmos,  something  else  than  the  order  itself,  and  something 
other  than  atom  and  force,  is  necessary.  To  say  that  matter 
was  originally  endowed  with  the  potcr  y  of  order,  and  a 
tendency  towards  design,  is  to  lodge  in  matter  qualities 
which  are  not  necessarily  materialistic  and  d}mamical.  This 
supposition  is  really  a  confession  that  pure  materialism 
cannot  account  for  order  and  adaptation,  law  and  purpose, 
in  the  cosmos.  Theism,  on  the  other  hand,  has  no  such 
difficulty  with  these  y^-  oblems.  In  its  postulate  of  an  •.ifinite 
personal  Spirit,  wi*'  intelligence  and  volitional  agency, 
theism  provides  the  key  to  solve  all  these  problems  in  the 
cosmos.  All  in  this  sphere  that  goes  to  support  theism 
refutes  materialism. 

7.  Finally,  materialism  finds  its  fatal  test  in  its  attempt 
to  explain  life  and  mind.  The  origin  of  life,  and  the  devel- 
opment of  living  things,  are  inexplicable  on  the  basis  of 
materialism.  Even  chemistry  cannot  account  for  life,  for 
living  things  can  use  the  resources  of  chemical  activity. 
Yet  materialism  is  bound  to  bridge  the  breach  between  the 
'vital  and  non-vital  forms  of  being,  or  it  must  reduce  the 
former  to  terms  of  the  latter.  Materialism  has  never  yet 
shown  how  atom  became  cell,  or  how  physical  energy  be- 
came vital  force.  All  the  force  of  the  modern  doctrine 
of  biogenesis,  which  teaches  that  life  always  comes  from 
preexistent  life,  tells  against  materialism  at  this  point.  To 
speak  of  the  physical  basis  of  life  as  bioplasm  or  protoplasm 
is  not  to  explain  life  itself  in  terms  of  matter,  for  protoplasm 
is  never  vit;;l,  save  in  connectiun  with  an  organism  already 


PURE  MATERIALISM.  483 

vital.    Can  materialism  explain  this  vitality?    Even  if  we 
admitted  that  mere  mechanical  agency  could  account  for 
the  order  in  the  cosmos,  or  explain  the  definite  forms  of 
the  crystal,  can  this  agency  account  for  the  life  in  a  bee, 
a  bird,  or  a  bea-^t?     Even  if  we  conceded  that  the  me- 
chanical forces  could  produce  the  complex  lenses  in  the  eye 
of  a  beetle,  this  would  not  explain  the  function  of  vision 
which  this  wonderful  eye  performs.     In  like  manner,  if 
mechanism  can  explain  the  organic  structure  of  an  animal, 
yet  the  fact  of  sensation  must  be  accounted  for,  and  mate- 
rialism has  never  succeeded  in  doing  so;    and  the  vital 
processes  of  nutrition,  growth  and  reproduction,  instead  of 
arising  out  of  the  chemical  action  involved  in  them   are 
rather  produced  by  some  agency  which  is  capable  of  using 
this  chemical  action.     Such  considerations  as  these  show 
how  futile  is  the  materialistic  account  of  the  facts  of  organic 
life.  ° 

The  phenomena  of  mind  or  thought  aflford  the  materialist 
still  greater  difficulty.     As  many  things  which  bear  upon 
this  point,  so  far  as  man  is  concerned,  are  to  be  discussed 
in  the  next  chapter,  what  is  now  to  be  said  will  be  of  a 
general  nature.    The  main  point  now  to  be  discussed  is  not 
whether  man  can  be  accounted  for  without  assuming  that 
there  is  a  spiritual  factor  in  his  constitution,  but  rather 
whether  the  whole  frame  of  the  ccsmos  can  be  accounted 
for  without  mind.     The  former  belongs  to  the  sphere  of 
psychological  materialism,  the  latter  to  pure  or  ontological 
materialism.     Man  may  have  no  soul,  yet  there  may  be  a 
Ood.    There  are  knowing  forms  of  being  in  the  universe. 
Can  these  be  explained  by  materialism?    There  are  moral 
forms  of  being  in  the  world.    Can  the  materialist  account 
tor  these?    There  are  volitional  forms  of  existence     What 
can  materialism  do  with  free  responsible  agents?    Mind 
morahty  and  freedom  are  rocks  upon  which  pure  material- 
ism  goes  to  pieces. 


i 

1  '  k 

1  -i 

'    r' 

i 


CHAPTER  V. 

PSYCHOLOGICAI,  MATERIALISM. 

Contents. 

A  Particular  Aspect  of  Materialism. — Its  Import. — The  Materialistic 
Theory  of  Man. — No  Spiritual  Principle  in  Man. — All  Mental  Facts 
Explained  from  the  Basis  of  the  Physical  Organism. — No  Personal 
Immortality  for  Man. — Criticism. — Common  Traditions  against  the 
Theory. — Many  Things  not  Observed  by  the  Senses  have  Reality. — The 
Brain  as  an  Organic  Structure  not  the  Seat  of  Consciousness. — Self- 
Consciousness  Demands  a  Unitary  Basis. — This  Found  only  in  a  Spirit- 
ual Principle. — The  Facts  of  Memory  and  Personal  Identity  Tell  against 
the  Theory. — Matter,  as  Atomic,  as  much  an  Hypothesis  as  Soul. — 
Perhaps  Soul  near  the  Seat  of  Knowledge. — Consciousness  of  Freedom 
the  Fatal  Rock. — The  Immortality  of  the  Soul. — Its  Simplicity  and 
Immateriality  Suggest  it. — Man's  Instinctive  Desire  Argues  in  Favor 
of  it. — General  Belief  Implies  it. — The  Demand  for  a  Moral  Equality 
Requires  it. 

LiTEKATURE. 

Encyclopxdia  Articles  on  Materialism-  and  Immortality. — Flint's 
Antitheistic  Theories,  Chap.  IV. — Martineau's  Study  of  Religion,  Vol. 
II.,  Book  IV.,  Chaps.  I.-III.— Bruce's  Apologetics,  Chap.  IV.— Farrar's 
History  of  Free  Thought,  Chap.  V. — Adeney's  Evolution  and  Immor- 
tality, Chap.  VI. — Draper's  ConHict  Between  Religion  and  Science, 
Chap.  V. — Van  Dyke's  Theism  and  Evolution,  Chap.  XIX. — Lange's 
History  of  Materialism. — Bowne's  Metaphysics,  Part  III.,  Chap.  I.— 
Tait's  Mind  and  Matter,  Part  III.— Harris'  Philosophical  Basis  of  The- 
ism, Chap.  XVII. — Rishell's  The  Grounds  of  the  Christian  Faith,  Div. 
I.,  Sec.  I.,  Chaps.  II.-IV.,  and  Div.  VI.,  Sees.  I.,  II. — Lindsay's  Recent 
Advances,  Chap.  XII. — Bowne's  Studies  in  Theism,  Chap.  X. — Dabney's 
Sensualistic  Philosophy,  Chaps.  VII.,  VIIT. — Dabney's  Theology,  Chap. 
VII. — Girardeau's  Discussions,  Chap.  XIII. — Vogt's  Lectures  on  Man. — 
Lotze's  Microcosmus. — Ulrici's  God  and  Man. — Salmond's  Christian 
Doctrine  of  Immortality,  Book  I. 


I.  Stathnent  of  Psychological  Materialism.    %  114. 

i.^TT^WO  chapters  have  been  devoted  to  the  statement 
X  and  criticism  of  the  materialistic  theory  of  the 
universe.  It  was  shown  that  this  theory  was  open  to  some 
general  criticisms,  and  that  it  was  marked  by  various  par- 
ticular defects.    At  the  same  time,  care  was  taken  to  indicate 


PSYCI  OLOGICAL  MATERIALISM.         485 

at  every  turn  that  theism  met  the  demands  of  the  facts 
where  materialism  failed  to  do  so. 

A   particular  aspect   of   materialism   remains   for   this 
chapter.     It  may  be  termed  psychological  or  anthropo- 
logical materialism,  and  it  consists  in  an  application  of  the 
the  principles  of  the  materialistic  theory  to  the  nature  and 
constitution  of  man.    In  the  interests  of  religion,  it  is  very 
necessary  for  Apologetics  to  discuss  this  aspect  of  material- 
ism with  some  care,  for  it  is  at  this  point  that  the  assault 
IS  made  upon  the  very  foundations  of  Christianity.     An 
opponent  of  Christianity  may  not  hold  the  materialistic 
theory  of  the  universe  as  a  whole,  yet  maintain  the  mate- 
nahstic  view  as  to  the  nature  of  man.     And  even  if  we 
establish  the  divine  existence  as  against  pure  materialism, 
proof  may  still  be  demanded  for  the  reality  of  the  spiritual 
nature  of  man.    We  must  vindicate  the  reality  of  the  human 
soul,  as  well  as  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  God,  for  the 
Christian  religion  not  only  requires  God  as  its  object,  but 
also  the  human  spirit  as  its  subject.    This  being  the  case 
the  apologete  must  establish  the  reality  of  the  human  soul 
and  Its  immortality,  just  as  carefully  as  he  does  the  exist- 
ence '  f  God.     This  is  the  attitude  of  the  Bible  towards 
these  two  problems.    The  reality  of  both  is  simply  assumed 
as  the  basis  of  religion  which  pertains  to  the  relations  be- 
tween them.     Hence,  psychological  as  well  as  ontological 
materialism  must  receive  serious  attention.    And  hot  only 
is  this  important  in  the  interests  of  religion  in  general,  but 
also  of  theism  in  particular.     We  have  already  seen  that 
several  of  the  arguments  for  the  divine  existence  are  based 
on  the  reality  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man.     The  psy- 
chology of  theism  is  the  starting  point  for  the  ontology  of 
theism.    Hence,  in  the  interests  alike  of  the  theistic  philoso- 
phy and  the  Christian  religion,  psychological  materialism 
has  vital  importance. 

2.  A  few  paragraphs  will  suffice  to  state  the  aspect  of 
materialism  now  under  discussion.    In  general,  it  consists 


4  j  h    i1 


486 


APOLOGETICS. 


'•( 


in  an  interpretation  of  the  facts  of  man's  constitution  in 
terms  of  materialism.  Of  course,  there  are  various  ways 
in  which  this  interpretation  is  made,  from  crude  Epicu- 
reanism to  refined  modem  theories.  As  they  all  agree  in 
their  fundamental  tenets,  it  is  not  necessary  to  expound 
them  in  detail.  Three  main  particulars  will  give  an  outline 
of  the  way  in  which  psycholog-'^al  materialism  regards  man. 

First,  man  has  no  soul  or  spiritual  principle,  distinct  from 
his  body,  in  his  make-up.  There  is  only  one  essence  in  the 
being  of  man,  and  that  belongs  to  the  category  of  matter. 
Psychological  materialism  asserts  that  what  is  called  mind, 
soul  or  spirit  in  man  is  not  a  distinct  entity  from  his  body. 
The  only  reality  in  man  is  his  bodily  organism,  with  its 
material  organic  structure  and  complex  functions.  Man's 
personality  does  not  include  the  two  natures,  one  material 
and  the  other  spiritual.  Any  personality  possessed  by  man 
is  such  individuality  as  is  competent  to  highly  refined  matter. 
In  some  types  of  the  materialistic  theory  of  man,  an  attempt 
is  made  to  give  a  place  to  the  evident  duality  in  man's  nature 
and  experience,  by  assuming  that  both  body  ana  soul  must 
be  construed  in  terms  of  matter,  bt-  hat  the  soul  is  a  much 
finer  sort  of  matter  than  the  body.  I'his  view  appeared  in 
ancient  Greek  materialism,  and  it  has  emerged  in  various 
quarters  in  later  times.  This,  however,  affords  no  relief. 
It  confesses  some  sort  of  dualism  in  man's  constitution,  yet 
offers,  as  the  key  for  its  interpretation,  nothing  but  a  dual 
materialistic  principle. 

Secondly,  all  mental  facts  are  explained  in  some  way  as 
the  product  of  the  physical  organism  of  man.  All  so- 
called  psychical  phenomena  are  construed  in  terms  of  their 
physical  foundation.  Hence,  psychological  materialism  un- 
dertakes to  explain  all  forms  of  mental  activity  on  the  basis 
of  the  brain  and  the  nervous  system.  In  this  way  thought, 
memory  and  imagination  are  to  be  accounted  for,  and  the 
moral  sentiments  and  the  religious  instincts  are  all  to  be 
explained  in  liie  same  way.     As  each  physical  organ  has 


'  i 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  MATERIALISM.         487 

its  special  function,  so  the  particular  function  of  the  brain 
is  to  produce  all  phases  of  thinking.    Intellect,  sensibility 
and  will,  in  all  their  varied  forms  of  activity,  are  all  ex- 
plained in  this  way.     Even  consciousness  itself,  as  the 
invariable  concomitant  of  all  psychical  facts,  must  be  con- 
strued on  a  materialistic  basis.     In  explaining  all  these 
facts,  modem  psychical  materialism  makes  much  of  phy- 
siological psychology,  and  thinks  it  discovers  the  secret  of 
consciousness  amid  the  mysteries  of  the  nervous  system. 
Sensation,  perception,  memory,  feeling,  reasoning,  volition 
and  morality  are  all  explained  as  products  of  brain  and 
nerve.    They  do  not  need  a  spiritual  entity  to  account  for 
them  at  all,  for  they  can  all  be  explained  without  it.    We 
have  no  fault  to  find  with  physiology  in  relation  to  psy- 
chology; but  we  are  careful  ever  to  keep  in  mind  that  an 
affection  of  nerve  or  brain  is  one  thing,  and  consists  in 
motion,  while  an  affection  of  the  mind  is  another,  and  con- 
sists m  some  form  of  consciousnes ,.    The  problem  arises 
as  to  how  physical  motion  becomes  psychical  conscious- 
ness. 

Thirdly,  psychological  materialism  admits  no  personal 
tmmortality  for  man.     This  necessarily  follows  from  the 
two  positions  already  stated.     If,  in  the  present  life  and 
experience  of  man,  there  is  in  his  nature  r-  spiritual  entity 
numerically  distinct  from  the  body,  thei    when  the  body 
suffers  death  and  falls  into  its  original  elements,  that  is  the 
end  of  the  individual  man.     There  cannot  be  any  immor- 
tality tor  him,   since  death  ends  all  that  made  up  the 
individual  man.    If  all  forms  of  nsychical  activity  are  inhe- 
rently dependent  on   tne  physiology  of  nerve  and  brain, 
when  nerve  and  brain  cease  their  physical  activity,  psychical 
activity  also  ceases;  though,  of  course,  this  theory  of  man 
has  no  good  reason  to  speak  of  physical  and  psychical 
activities  on  the  part  of  man.    If  there  be  no  brain  there 
can  be  no  thought;   then  when  the  brain  ceases  to  do  its 
work,  thought  is  suspended.     But  if  thinking  implies  a 


I  » 


488 


APOLOGETICS. 


thinker,  and  if  that  thinker  is  other  than  matter,  it  is  evident 
that  a  correct  view  of  thinking  makes  it  difficult  to  hold 
the  materialistic  view  of  the  ending  of  man,  and  the  denial 
of  immortality.  Turn  the  matter  as  we  may,  psychological 
materialism  has  no  place  for  personal  immortality.  Most 
of  its  advocates  plainly  teach  this,  while  others  are  ready 
to  explain  immortality  as  the  permanency  of  our  influence, 
as  we  live  in  the  lives  of  those  whom  we  have  touched,  and 
who  survive  us.  In  a  few  cases,  as,  for  example,  the  French 
atheists  and  materialists,  the  materialistic  view  of  man  was 
stated  in  a  crude  and  vulgar  form,  but  we  have  no  space 
to  enter  into  particulars  on  this  point. 

Hence,  the  materialistic  construction  of  man's  niture 
teaches  that  there  is  no  spiritual  entity  in  it;  that  all  its 
activities  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  matter,  and  that  there 
is  no  personal  immortality  for  man.  The  rest  of  the  chapter 
proceeds  to  careful  criticism  of  this  doctrine. 

II.  Criticism  of  Psychological  Materialism.    §115. 

As  careful  an  examination  of  the  materialistic  view  of 
man's  nature  as  the  limits  of  this  chapter  permit  is  now 
to  be  made.  If  man's  nature  be  merely  highly  organized 
matter,  and  if  immortality  be  but  a  dream,  then  religion  is 
superstition,  and  our  hope  for  the  future  is  a  mere  delusion. 
But  let  us  see. 

I.  Certain  common  beliefs  and  traditions  among  men  sug- 
gest that  in  man  there  is  something  more  than  his  bodily 
organism.  These  beliefs  and  traditions  are  found  in  ancient 
and  modern  times,  and  among  savage  and  semi-civilized 
peoples.  Some  general  suggestions  that  man  has  a  soul, 
and  some  faint  gleams  of  its  immortality,  are  found  widely 
diffused  among  pagan  races  generally.  .\n  those  facts 
which  form  the  basis  for  animism  and  spiritism,  as  theories 
for  the  beginnings  of  religion,  arise  here.  These  involve 
tl  e  native  tendency  in  mankind  to  believe  that  man  has  a 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  MATERIALISM.         489 

double,  or  second  self,  and  that  the  man  in  some  form  con- 
tinues to  be  after  death.  This  traditional  belief  in  man's 
spiritual  nature  runs  side  by  side  with  his  belief  in  deity 
in  some  form. 

It  is  vain  to  recite  the  manifold  forms  in  which  this  belief 
appears.    The  general  belief  in  ghosts,  or  the  disembodied 
spirits  of  men  who  once  lived,  illustrates  one  general  set 
of  these  facts.    The  varied  and  widely  prevalent  belief  in 
transmigration  of  souls,  or  metamorphosis  of  individuals 
of  the  human  race,  presupposes  belief  in  the  reality  of  a 
spiritual  and  enduring  principle  in  man.     Transmigration 
does  not  relate  to  the  body,  but  to  the  soul,  so  that  wherever 
It  appears  it  presupposes  a  well-defined  belief  in  the  spiritual 
element  in  the  human  constitution.    Egypt,  India  and  China 
give  abundant  evidence  of  this  belief.     In  like  manner, 
ancestonsm,  wherever  it  appears,  implies  a  belief  in  spirit, 
as  an  essential  element  in  man's  nature.     This  belief   so 
widely  prevalent  in  Asia,  rests  upon  the  fact  that  man  is 
supposed  to  possess  a  spiritual  factor  in  his  constitution 
which  survives  the  article  of  death,  and  comes  to  be  re- 
garded with  reverence.     This  is  the  essence  of  ancestor 
worship  in  all  its  forms.     All  these  primitive  beliefs  and 
traditions  suggest  the  reality  of  the  human  soul,  and  tell 
against  psychological  materialism. 

2.  Crude  forms  of  the  materialistic  theory  of  man  argue 
m  a  very  loose  way  when  they  assert  that  since  the  soul  is 
not  perceived  by  the  senses,  therefore  it  does  not  exist. 
Those  who  thus  argue  are  out  and  out  sensationalists  in 
their  theory  of  knowledge.  They  allege  that  what  does 
not  come  under  the  observation  of  the  senses  does  not  exist. 
The  soul  IS  not  seen,  nor  felt,  nor  tasted,  nor  heard,  hence 
Jt  does  not  exist.  Others,  who  profess  to  be  a  little  more 
scientific,  assert  that  the  anatomy  of  the  human  organism 
never  reveals  the  presence  of  the  soul,  nor  does  the  micro- 
Kope  reveal  any  sign  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man. 
Scientific  research,  it  is  said,  reveals  only  matter  in  more 


V 


'i: 


I 


490 


APOLOGETICS. 


It 


or  less  highly  organized  forms,  and  to  assert  the  existence 
of  anything  else  is  to  go  quite  beyond  the  facts. 

All  this  reasoning  is  entirely  superficial.  It  assumes  that 
only  what  comes  under  the  ken  of  the  senses,  or  can  be 
made  the  subject  of  physical  experiment,  has  reality.  Not 
only  is  the  sensational  theory  of  knowledge,  upon  which 
this  reasoning  is  based,  false,  but  the  very  materialists  who 
use  it  are  often  quite  inconsistent  with  it.  They  often  talk 
about  things  which  are  entirely  supersensible,  as  if  they 
knew  ever  so  much  about  them.  Thus  they  discourse  about 
atoms  and  the  ether,  neither  of  which  the  senses  ever  cog- 
nize, and  yet  refuse  to  admit  the  reality  of  the  soul,  which 
is  no  more  supersensible  than  is  atom  or  ether.  All  we 
claim  heie  is  consistency  at  the  hands  of  materialism. 

But  the  fact  that  anatomy  does  not  reveal  any  signs  of 
the  soul  in  man  proves  nothing,  for  it  is  entirely  beside 
the  point  at  issue.  The  anatomist  deals  only  with  a  dead 
body,  from  which  the  spiritual  principle,  by  the  very  fact 
of  death,  has  departed.  Anatomy,  to  make  good  its  claim, 
must  make  and  complete  its  observation  in  a  living  human 
organism.  Those  who  hold  that  there  is  a  spiritual  prin- 
ciple in  man  maintain  that  the  union  subsists  during  life 
between  the  soul  and  body.  At  death  that  principle  departs, 
and  it  is  vain  to  search  for  it  in  the  dead  body.  The  ab- 
surdity of  this  procedure  is  evident.  It  is  as  if  I  should 
seek  for  a  friend,  who  had  gone  to  Europe,  in  his  house 
in  America,  and  then  declare  that  because  I  found  that 
house  empty  my  friend  was  dead. 

3.  The  fact  that  the  brain,  as  an  organic  structure,  is  not 
conscious,  nor  itself  the  scat  of  consciousness,  is  a  serious 
objection  to  the  materialistic  doctrine  of  man.  Recent 
physiological  researclies  in  regard  to  the  function  of  the 
brain  in  relation  to  thought  have  1  .actically  established  the 
position  that  the  brain,  as  a  complex  material  organism,  is 
not,  and  cannot  be,  the  sphere  of  conscious  experiences. 
Experiments  in  vivisection  in  various  animals  show  that 


11^  •i^ 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  MATERIALISM.         491 

large  areas  of  the  brain  are  not  involved  in  sensation. 
Then,  if  a  section  of  the  brain  be  separated  from  the  living 
organism,  that  section  has  no  sensation  whatever.     Theo- 
retically, large  sections  of  the  brain  might  be  removed,  and 
yet  the  seat  of  sensation  might  remain  unimpaired.     And 
even  if  the  removal  of  brain  matter  were  continued  till 
death  ensued,  it  would  not  prove  that  the  seat  of  conscious- 
ness were  in  the  brain,  but  simply  that  the  bond  between 
the  brain  and  the  real  seat  of  consciousness  was  broken. 
In  a  word,  the  real  sphere  in  which  consciousness  arises 
always  eludes  the  search  of  the  physiologist.     A     that 
physiology  discovers  is  motion,  or  change  in  the  white  and 
grey  matter  of  the  brain,  but  such  motion  is  not  itself  sensa- 
tion,  but  must  be  transferred  to  the  psychical  sphere  before 
consciousness  arises.    The  materialist  here  must  either  show 
that  consciousness  arise    out  of  brain,  or  that  brain  move- 
ment and  psychical  consciousness  are  identical. 

If  the  materialist  says  to  us  that  it  is  very  difficult  to 
locate  the  soul  anywhere  in  the  body,  we  may  replv  that 
he  finds  it  equally  difficult  to  locate  consciousness  anywhere 
in  the  brain.    At  best,  the  brain  may,  on  the  purely  physical 
side,  be  the  organ  of  the  soul  and  of  certain  of  its  experi- 
ences, yet  that  organ  needs  the  player,  which  is  the  spiritual 
principle  in  man,  to  bring  forth  the  harmonious  activities 
which  arise  in  consciousness.     If.  a^     jme  say,  the  soul 
needs  the  brain  in  order  to  its  activities  as  revealed  in  con- 
sciousness, it  can  be  replied  that  the  brain  needs  the  soul 
in  order  to  the  possibility  of  consciousness  in  any  form 
But  we  might  go  further,  and  say  that  a  brain  from  which 
the  soul  had  departed  is  so  much  dead  matter,  doomed  to 
decay,  while  the  soul,  set  free  by  death  from  its  union  with 
the  body,  may  continue,  in  a  freer  form,  its  spiritual  being 
and  activity.     In  support  of  this  hypothesis,  it  may  be 
pointed  out  that  certain  forms  of  consciousness  are  scarcely 
dependent  on  the  body  organisms  at  all  for  their  exercise 
■inc  lofuer  emotions  and  abstract  reasoning  are  cases  in 


rJi;  i 


ii.  ' 


i;  '^1 


11 


492 


APOLOGETICS. 


point.  Hence,  the  brain  is  not  necessarily  the  seat  of  con- 
sciousness in  all  its  forms,  and  this  shows  another  serious 
defect  in  psychological  materialism. 

4.  Against  the  materialistic  view  of  man  is  may  be  further 
argued  that  consciousness  demands  a  unitary  basis,  and  that 
this  cannot  be  supplied  by  psychological  materialism.  Con- 
sciousness is  here  taken,  in  its  strict  sense,  to  denote  a 
certain  psychical  condition,  which  is  an  invariable  con- 
comitant or  condition  of  all  mental  and  moral  experiences. 
It  is  not  so  much  a  single  faculty  as  the  common  basis 
of  the  activity  of  them  all.  As  such  it  involves  unity  of 
the  highest  and  most  definite  kind.  It  is  the  unity  of 
apperception  or  self-consciousness,  and  consists  in  that 
spontaneous  power  in  the  human  personality  by  which  it 
unifies  all  its  experiences,  and  says  that  they  belong  to  that 
personality.  This  is  the  ego,  and  its  absolutely  ■;  ii visible 
essence.  All  sound  psychology  now  holds,  in  substance,  to 
this  view.  It  teaches  that  the  ego,  as  the  seat  of  self-con- 
sciousness, must  be  unitary  in  its  nature. 

We  charge  that  psychological  materialism  in  every  form 
fails  to  provide  such  a  unitary  basis.  Matter,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  is  multiple,  not  unitary,  in  its  fundamental 
conception.  The  unity  of  self-consciousness  cannot  be  found 
amid  the  physical  multiplicity  of  the  atomic  or  cellular  con- 
ception of  matter,  inorganic  or  organic.  The  materialist 
cannot  locate  consciousness  in  that  which  is  material,  nor 
can  he  attach  self-consciousness  to  that  which  has  atomic 
or  cellular  multiplicity.  In  which  of  the  atoms  or  cells  is 
the  throne  of  the  ego,  and  the  seat  of  self -consciousness  tu 
be  found?  To  this  question  psychlogical  materialism  has 
no  answer  whatever. 

5.  The  facts  of  memory  and  personal  identity  form  an- 
other serious  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  materialistic  theory 
of  man.  Memory  is  a  fact  in  man's  experience,  and  per- 
sonal identity  is  implied  in  his  intellectual  and  moral  life. 
It  is  not  necessary,  therefore,  to  discuss  the  psycholog)-  of 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  MATERIALISM.         493 

memory,  or  the  metaphysics  of  personal  identity,  in  order 
to  see  the  force  of  this  argument  against  the  materialistic 
view  of  man's  constitution.    Taking  the  two  facts  together, 
we  recollect  that  we  were  the  subjects  of  certain  experi- 
ences in  the  past,  and  we  are  sure  that  we  are  now  the 
same  persons  that  we  were  then.     If  this  be  the  ca,?e,  it  is 
not  easy  to  see  how  the  materialistic  construction  of  the 
facts  of  man's  mental  and  moral  experience  is  sufficient. 
Physiologists  tell  us  that  our  bodies,  mcluding,  of  course, 
tht  brain  cells  and  fibres,  are  all  changed  by  the  vital  pro- 
cesses which  take  place  in  the  organism  every  seven    ten 
or  twelve  years.     If  this  be  the  case,  it  is  net  easy  to  see 
how  memory,  if  its  basis  be  purely  material,  can  survive 
and  persist  throughout  these  changes.     And  if  personal 
identity  must  have  the  same  organic  basis,  without  refer- 
ence to  any  spiritual  principle,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  it 
can  be  preserved.     If  personal  identity  must  have  a  purely 
org-anic,  as  distin<Tuished  from  a  psychical,  basis,  as  psycho- 
logical materialism  contends,  it  is  perfectlv  clear  that  the 
conception  of  that  identity,  together  with  the  responsibility 
which  It  implies,  must  be  greatly  modi.ied.     In  a  wor^. 
psychological  materialism  does  not  so  much  explain,  as 
explain  away,  the  facts  of  memory  and  personal  identity 
It  may  he  very  safely  said  that  the  hypothesis  of  a  unitary 
spiritual  principle,  such  as  the  idea  of  the  human  soul 
implies,  supplies  a  much  m..re  adequate  basis  for  the  facts 
of  memory  and  personal  identity.     This  supplies  an  indi- 
visible and  permanent  factor  amid  all  organic  or  physical 
changes  in  the  body. 

6.  Another  consideration  has  some  weight  in  this  con- 
nection. It  is  charged  against  those  who  hold  the  reality 
of  the  soul  in  man  that  this  is  a  mere  h^Mhesis,  which 
can  never  be  proved.  The  idea  of  the  human  soul,  we  are 
told,  IS  a  mere  abstraction,  and  cannot  be  shown  to  have 
reality.  I„  reply  to  this,  ard  in  refutation  of  tlie  theory 
01  man  now  un.Ier  review,  it  may  be  said  that  the  material- 


!  : 


n 


J' 


fl     J 


m 


494 


APOLOGETICS. 


istic  conception  is  as  really  an  hypothesis  as  the  idea  of  the 
human  soul.  The  atom,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  an 
abstraction  which  never  comes  under  actual  observation. 
If  it  be  said  that  the  atom  is  a  necessary  supposition  to 
account  for  certain  things  which  are  observed  in  the  physical 
realm,  we  can  again  retort  by  asserting  that  the  sotd  is  also 
a  necessary  hypothesis  to  account  for  certain  facts  which 
arise  in  the  psychical  realm.  The  one  hypothesis  is  cer- 
tainly as  well  grounded  as  the  other,  because  just  as  much 
needed  to  explain  the  facts.  It  might  be  possible  to  go 
further,  and  say  that  we  have  a  more  immediate  knowledge 
in  self-consciousness  of  spirit  than  we  ever  can  have  of 
matter,  and  that  the  proof  of  the  reality  of  the  soul  is 
stronger  than  for  the  reality  of  the  atom. 

7.  But  the  crowning  refutation  of  psychological  material- 
ism is  found  in  the  consciousness  of  self-determination 
which  a  man  has.    That  man  has  free  agency,  and  is  him- 
self the  cause  of  his  volitions,  is  an  indubitable  fact.    Con- 
sciousness so  testifies  without  doubt.     This  fact  is  utterly 
at  variance  with  the  materialistic  view  of  man.     If  all 
psychical  activity  be  the  product  of  matter,  then  the  law  of 
necessity,  which  pertains  to  the  physical,  must  rule  in  man. 
Volition  must  also  come  under  the  same  law,  and  there 
can  be  no  freedom  in  his  activities.     The  consciousness  of 
freedom  is  a  delusion,  and  the  reality  of  volition  is  a  sham. 
And  if  such  be  the  case,  all  moral  responsibility  is  at  an 
end,  and  man  is  but  a  piece  of  mechanism  and  a  creature 
of  circumstances.     But  this  cannot  for  a  moment  be  con- 
ceded, and  on  the  rock  of  man's  undoubted  psychical  and 
moral  freedom  the  materialistic  theory  of  his  nature  is 
wrecked.    Freedom  cannot  be  an  attribute  of  matter,  either 
in  the  universe  as  a  whole  or  in  man  in  particular.     It 
belongs  only  to  some  form  of  spiritual  being,  to  God  in 
the  highest  sense,  and  to  man  as  made  in  his  image  and 
possessed  of  a  spiritual  nature.    Hence  the  fact  of  freedom 
excludes  the  materialistic  view  of  man. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  MATERIALISM. 


'T- 


IS 


III.  The  Immortality  of  the  Soul.    §  1 16. 

From  the  reasonings  of  the  last  section  it  was  made  clear 
that  man's  constitution  was  dual,  having  a  bodily  organism 
and  a  spiritual  principle  in  union.    The  two  together  com- 
plete man's  personality.    It  is  also  evident  that  during  this 
life  the  two  are  in  most  intimate  union,  and  that  they 
interact  on  each  other.    But  the  human  personality  suffers 
death,  and  the  question  at  once  arises  as  to  the  continued 
existence  of  the  soul  or  spiritual  principle  of  man  after 
death.    This  is  the  question  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
with  which,  again,  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  as  a  doc- 
trine of  Christian  revelation,  is  connected.     In  addition  to 
what  IS  implied  in  the  reasonings  for  the  reality  of  the 
spiritual  principle  in  man,  in  favor  of  the  immortality  of 
the  human  soul,  a  few  headings  of  direct  proof  of  that 
doctrine  are  now  added. 

I.  From  the  simple  and  immaterial  nature  of  the  soul  its 
immortality  may  be  argued.  The  verv  idea  of  the  soul,  is 
that  It  is  a  simple,  indivisible  monad,  incapable  of  being 
reduced  to  anything  else,  or  anything  lower.  In  that  fact 
there  IS  a  suggestion  of  perdurability,  if  not  of  immortality; 
and  the  fact  that  the  soul  is  not  material,  removes  it  from 
the  conditions  of  decay  which  pertain  to  material  forms  of 
existence;  and  when  we  see  the  mental  powers  of  a  man 
clear  and  strong,  while  the  body  is  very  feeble,  we  have 
a  strong  hint  that  the  spiritual  principle  is  not  liable  to 
decadence  as  the  body  is  subject  to  decay. 

2.  The  fact  that  there  is  in  most  men  an  instinctive  desire 
for  continued  existence  is  of  some  force  also.  Men  shrink 
from  the  idea  of  cessation  of  being,  and  cling  very  firmly 
to  the  existence  they  desire.  This  may  have  little  logical 
value,  yet  it  cannot  surely  be  that  the  Creator  implanted 
this  instinct  to  deceive  or  disappoint  us  with  a  delusive  hope 
3-  The  almost  universal  belief  in  immortality,  or  con- 


f 


V 

h 


4^ 


APOLOGETICS. 


tinued  existence  in  some  form  beyond  this  life,  has  much 
•weight.  This  belief  is  widespread  and  persistent.  It 
emerges  in  some  form  in  almost  every  phase  of  religion 
among  men.  The  Bible  takes  it  for  granted,  as  it  does 
the  existence  of  God,  without  giving  formal  proof  of  the 
fact.  This  general  and  persistent  belief  must  surely  have 
a  basis  in  reality;  and  if  this  be  so,  there  is  a  suggestion 
of  a  continuance  of  personal  existence  beyond  this  present 
mortal  life. 

4.  The  proof  for  natural  immortality  which  has  perhaps 
most  cogency  is  that  which  Butler  in  his  Analogy  so  ably 
presents.  It  may  be  termed  the  moral  argument  based  on 
God's  providential  government.  There  are  in  this  life 
many  facts  which  show  that  God  has  established  a  moral 
government  over  men  which  is,  on  the  whole,  just  and 
beneficent.  Still,  it  equally  appears  that  the  justice  and 
beneficence  of  this  government  is  not  absolutely  balanced  to 
what  is  just  and  good.  There  are  moral  inequalities  which 
are,  at  best,  anomalies.  In  order  to  rectify  these,  and 
balance  the  accounts  perfectly,  there  must  be  for  men  an- 
other state  of  existence,  where  the  inequalities  of  this  life 
are  equalized.  If  Lazarus  has  his  evil  things  in  this  life 
and  Dives  his  good,  there  must  be  a  future  state,  where 
the  tables  are  turned,  and  Dives  has  his  evil  things  and 
Lazarus  his  good.  Hence,  the  spirituality  and  immortality 
of  man  is  securely  fi.xed  on  rational  grounds. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
MATERIALISTIC  EVOLUTION. 

Contents. 

M.^nJ'"olZn^TT  ,E-'"'-n-Evolutio„  Ambiguous-Literal 
SojTf  Cosi^'i?  Evolufon  -Biological  Evolution.-General  D- 
-Ataml  M  »  xf  """'f  "'"-^'"*''  ^'"'  Matter.  Fort:e  and  Motion 
Matter  rJi^  Unstable-Dissipation  of  Motion-Integration  5 
J^stmem  r'p  °"'  D'fferentiation.-Co6rdination  of  Facfors-A^ 
Tern  K  Envronment-Retum  to  Homogeneous-Criticism.- 
IZtoWoTTr'T''"  ^^^""'P'-ns -Needs  Extra-cosmL  Prin- 
ciples to  Work  the  scheme— Cannot  Account  for  the  Genesis  of  th^ 

SrtioT'^     '""l"-;^'""   "^"   '°'  «^   Continuation  in  any  Givt 
Direction— Cosmic  Evolution  Reduces  Vital  Facts  to  the  CatLr!  !S 

ReTecS'rT  f  r  ""''"'  ^""^  ^^^'"^  ^°  ^^""^  0?  Atom  and  S.f 
Rejecting  Teleology,  ,t  yet  Must  Use  its  Terms.  ">ergy. 

Literature. 
«.M7prn    ChaS"l  ?f,,^-'"«'--Spencer's    SyntHetic   Pkil- 
II  and  Vm     Fi5*^r    ^~^iy.~^'°''"'  '^'""^'"  Theology,  Chaps. 
Vn-JS;;;?     r'  ^"f.'^'^  P'"'osophy,  Vol.  I.,  Part  II..  Chap,.  I.^ 

Part   m     Chin    rf '?.    "    '"    ''^   ''•'''"''"'    '"    ^-'■>'°«      7-^*' 
m     Pr  ^'   "-Chapman's   Pre-organic  Evolution,   Chaps    II 

Ill-Pressense's  A  Study  of  Origins,  Book  II.,  Chap    IV-Ri!hJl': 

Jurtis^T    !•""  "f  i'^^"''"'  Div.   II..   Sec.   II..   Chapl"  IV     V- 
Curtis    Creation   or  Evolution    Chan«    tv-tv     n  J      .     i,    ' 

Chap^  III-Dabney's  W.«:;,v?iily,  S^^^^^^ 

^-  ^o»^e  General  Explanations.    §1x7. 
n^HE  formal  discussion  of  materialism,  in  its  three  main 
X      aspects,  has  been  completed.    As  a  theory  concern- 
ing God.  man  and  the  universe,  the  glaring  defects  of 
matenalism  have  been  made  evident.     It  the  sam    t  me 
^e^rattonal  sufficiency  of  theism  has  been  more  ful^  vTn-' 

I.   There  remains  an  important  question  which  modern 
evoluUonJ..s  started  in  connection  with  the  materialSj 


*■•  ':    -J    b  i 


i^W''  h 


•498 


APOLOGETICS. 


Ilicory  of  the  universe.  This  question  relates  to  the  way 
in  which  the  universe,  construed  in  terms  of  materialism, 
came  to  be  what  it  now  is.  This  raises  the  problem  of 
materialistic  evolution.  It  might  almost  be  called  onto- 
logical  evolution.  It  has  come  into  view  already  at  several 
stages  of  the  discussion  of  materialism.  Among  the  an- 
cients, the  method  by  which  the  fortuitous  concourse  of 
atoms  produced  an  orderly  cosmos  is  a  crude  form  of  this 
type  of  evolution.  In  a  more  metaphysical  form  it  appears 
in  Greek  pantheism,  where  the  many  were  manifestations 
of  the  one. 

The  universe  shows  progress  from  the  simple  to  the  com- 
plex all  along  its  history.  There  has  been  development  in 
its  entire  cosmical  career.  The  question  at  once  arises  as 
to  the  mode  and  agency  of  this  development.  Materialism 
gives  its  answer  in  terms  of  cosmic  evolution.  It  is  by 
this  principle  that  the  progress  of  the  universe  from  its 
primitive  simple  condition  has  come  to  be  what  we  now 
find  it.  Some  are  content  to  speak  of  evolution  as  the 
method  by  which  the  agency  operative  in  the  cosmos  works ; 
others,  thinking  less  carefully,  associate  the  idea  of  agency 
with  the  fact  of  evolution.  According  to  the  latter,  evolu- 
tion becomes  an  agent,  with  power  and  rationality  capable 
of  producing  the  cosmos  at  any  stage.  This  puts  evolution 
in  the  place  of  God,  and  is  atheistic.  The  former  regards 
evolution  as  merely  the  mode  of  the  operation  of  the  causal 
-agency  operative  in  the  universe.  If  that  agency  be  re- 
igarded  as  merely  mechanical  in  its  nature,  then  we  have 
•a  purely  materialistic  type  of  evolution ;  but  if  that  agency, 
be  the  operation  directly  or  indirectly  jf  one  infinite  per- 
sonal God,  then  we  have  what  may  be  termed  theistic 
evolution.  It  is  with  materialistic  evolution,  strictly  speak- 
ing, that  the  present  discussion  is  concerned.  Of  this 
Herbert  S'  -ncer  may  be  taken  as  the  best  modern  repre- 
sentative -cording  to  Spencer,  evolution  represents  tlie 
method  according  to  which  the  infinite  and   inscrutable 


MATERIALISTIC  EVOLUTION.  499 

energy  that  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  universe  operates  in 
the  production  of  the  cosmos.  John  Fiske,  in  his  Cosmic 
Fhxlosophy.  is  the  best  American  expositor  of  this  general 
evolutionary  scheme. 

2.  The  term  evolution  needs  careful  t.tplanation,  for  it 
;s  used  m  different  senses,  and  is  often  quite  ambiguous. 
The  word  itself  means  to  unroll,  but  it  is  used  in  many 

Z^fc?  Tl\^'"'"^  'P^'"^'"^'  ''  ^™P^y  d^"°tes  the 
process  by  which  the  simple  becomes  the  complex.  It  marks 
the  progress  of  organization  in  the  cosmos  as  a  whole  or 
in  any  section  of  it.  Strictly  speaking,  neither  causality 
nor  rationality  pertains  to  it.  thus  understood.     If  there 

t^  "^^^^  "  f '°"?^  '"''^"^  •"  *^^  P^*^^^^^'  ^'^•^  belongs 
to  something  else,  and  is  merely  exhibited  in  the  process 

evolution  has  its  important  place. 

First,  there  is  its  application  to  the  entire  cosmos.  In 
this  sense  ,ts  sphere  is  ail  existing  things.  It  professes  to 
give  a  philosophy  of  the  entire  univefse,  which  tt: 

more  han  its  natural  history,  from  beginning  to  end     The 
law  of  continuity  rules,  and  the  procL  of  ^evolution  pre 
vails  everywhere.    It  is  cosmic  transformism.  and  it  is  fi  It 
a  scientific  hypothesis^which  is  next  made  a'philoso  hy  o 
the  entire  universe.    Comte  represents  this  on  the  basis  of 
positivism.  Spencer  exhibits  it  in  terms  of  materialism  and 

piThlT'  s"o'  ""''^  '""'r- '  ^" ''' '--  ^^^ 

ZsZZ      r"'  ''f'^'P^  ''''  ^''  representative  of 
his  type  o   evolution,  which  may  be  termed  cosmic  or  onto- 
logical  evolution  on  grounds  of  materialism 

tern^T?;-  '^''^  ''  ^  """"'^  "^'"^°^^'-  application  of  the 

Ze    M     "'  T*"'"^  *°  "'^•^'^  '^  '^  ^-fined  to  the 

Solj         '  y^'-    ''  ''  '"  *^'^  ^P'^-^  that  modem 
bmlogical  science  has  made  so  very  much  of  it.    This  may 

be  caned  organic  evolution.    Its  problem  relates  to  th    way 

m  wh,ch  one  species  or  grade  of  living  things  has  b^n 

produced  m  relation  to  other  species  in'the  vjetab L  ^d 


i: 


li'l 


i 

■'4 


iVhi 


thi'  l> 


500 


APOLOGETICS. 


animal  kingdoms.  The  origin  of  new  species  by  means  of 
genetic  descent,  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  organic 
evolution,  is  the  single  question  here  considered.  Lamarck, 
Darwin,  Haeckel,  Wallace  and  Huxley  are  well-known  rep- 
resentatives of  this  type  of  evolution.  It  is  not  with  this 
that  we  have  now  to  do.  Later  on  in  our  discussions  it 
will  be  carefully  reviewed.  We  have  now  to  do  with 
cosmic  evolution  as  represented  by  Herbert  Spencer  on  a 
materialistic  basis. 

II.  General  Description  of  the  Theory.    §  118. 

The  particular  problem  which  now  arises  is  the  mode  or 
method  according  to  which  the  universe  from  its  simple, 
primitive,  materialistic  condition  comes  to  exist  in  its 
various  stages  of  ever-increasing  complexity.  Several  par- 
ticulars will  exhibit  the  comprehensive  scheme  of  cosmic 
evolution  of  which  Spencer  is  the  great  modem  exponent. 

1.  The  starting-point  of  this  scheme  is  that  of  pure 
modem  materialism.  According  to  this  view,  matter  is 
etemal,  and  it  exists  in  its  early  stages  in  the  form  of 
atomic  homogeneity.  From  this  primitive,  atomic,  homo- 
geneous matter  everything  is  derived.  Along  with  this 
primordial  matter,  an  eternal  and  inscrutable  energy  i-,  also 
assumed.  This  is  the  agency  which,  as  the  ground  of 
change  in  the  homogeneous,  effects  the  movements  which 
constantly  take  place  in  the  universe.  Then  the  fact  of 
motion  has  a  definite  place  at  the  initiation  of  the  whole 
process  of  the  cosmic  evolution  now  under  notice.  Matter 
eternal,  force  persistent,  and  motion  continuous,  constitute 
the  fundamental  facts  of  Spencer's  system.  This  is  the 
trinity  of  cosmic  evolution.  That  evolution  expresses  the 
mode  in  which  that  force  works  in  producing  motion  in 
the  atomic  material  homogeneity. 

2.  The  process  of  cosmic  evolution  is  relatively  simple. 
The  problem  is,  How  does  the  primitive  incoherent  homo- 


'^-^'Hi 


MATERIALISTIC  EVOLUTION.  501 

geneous  become  the  subsequent  coherent  heterogeneous? 
How  do  the  ntoms.  as  they  are  all  mixed  together  in  an 
mdistmgu.shaLle  mass,  by  degrees  come  to  take  definite 
form  m  this  or  that  particular  concrete  object?  How  does 
the  atomic  homogeneous,  under  the  operation  of  inscrutable  " 
energy,  acting  according  to  the  law  of  cosmic  evolution 
produce  gold  and  silver,  hydrogen  and  oxygen,  and  all 
other  inorganic  concrete  objects?  The  scheme  of  cosmic 
evolution  indicates  three  stages  in  the  process. 

First,  the  atomic  homogeneous  is  supposed  to  be  in  an 
unstable  condition.    In  its  primitive  state  matter  is  not  in 
a  rigid  or  immobile  condition.     It  is  the  seat  of  energy 
and  this  energy,  constantly  active,  produces  a  ceaseless 
tendency  m  the  homogeneous  to  change  its  state  or  mode 
of  existence.     This  energy,  either  as  an  attribute  of  the 
atoms  o~  as  acting  on  them,  gives  rise  to  that  condition  of 
atomic  or  molecular  activity  which  physicists  tell  us  marks 
all  materia   forms  of  existence.    The  atomic  homogeneous, 
consequently,   is  in  a  condition  of  unstable  equUibrium 
whereby  It  IS  ready  at  any  time  to  enter  into  new  combina- 
tions, and  become  more  complex  in  its  nature 

Secondly,  this  instability  is  accompanied  with  a  reaction 
m  the  atomic  homogeneous.  As  the  inscrutable  energy 
acts  on  the  atoms  and  molecules,  they  in  turn  react  against 
that  energy.  The  result  of  this  is  that  some  degree  of  the 
motion  which  this  energy  has  produced  seems  to  be  dissi- 
pated. This  simply  means  that  some  of  the  motion  which 
was  manifested  in  the  atomic  homogeneous  is  transferred 
from  a  kmetic  to  a  potential  form  in  the  atoms.  The  motion 
which  was  previously  exhibited  seems  to  be  lost,  and  this 
>s  what  IS  meant  by  the  reaction  of  the  atomic  homo- 
geneous. 

Thirdb^,  the  integration  or  segregation  of  matter  natu- 
rally follows.  As  the  energy  acting  on,  or  among,  the 
a  cms  IS  resisted  or  reacted  on  by  the  atoms,  and  the  form 
of  the  energy  so  modified  as  to  cause  the  losing  of  some 


i 


* 


rti 


■■\ 


■  i 


5<a 


APOLOGETICS. 


degree  of  atomic  motion,  the  result  is  that  the  atoms  come 
to  rest  to  some  extent,  and  hence  they  tend  to  cHng  together 
in  little  groups  or  masses.  This  is  the  integration  of  matter, 
by  means  of  which  aggregates  of  atoms,  having  certain 
inherent  affinities  for  each  other,  come  together.  By  this 
means  the  atomic  homogeneous  begins  to  pass  to  the  com- 
plex heterogeneous,  and  the  foundations  of  a  material 
universe  of  diverse  inorganic  things  are  thereby  laid.  The 
instability  of  the  homogeneous  opens  the  way  for  the  dis- 
sipation of  motion,  and  this  results  in  the  integration  of 
matter  in  concrete  forms. 

3.  By  means  of  the  further  differentiation  of  the  less 
complex  heterogeneous  all  the  more  complex  forms  of 
heterogeneity  are  brought  about.  After  the  first  stages  of 
heterogeneity  have  arisen  the  differentiation  of  the^.e  origi- 
nal segregations  must  be  continued  in  order  to  account  for 
the  most  complex  forms  of  existing  things  in  the  cosmos 
as  we  now  see  it.  Some  further  explanation  is,  therefore, 
needed  of  the  way  one  grade  of  existing  things,  with  higher 
organization  and  increased  complexity,  are  to  be  accounted 
for.  Here  Cf>smic  evolution  announces  two  further  prin- 
ciples to  explain  increasing  heterogeneity. 

First,  coordination,  which  secures  increasing  and  con- 
tinuous integregation,  appears.  According  to  the  law  of 
coordination,  things  which  have  become  so  far  differen- 
tiated are  so  coordinated  that  tiie  differentiation  continues. 
This  simply  means  that  things  are  s<i  fitted  or  a(ljuste<i  to 
cacii  otlier  under  the  oversight  of  cosmic  evolution  that  the 
differentiation  goes  steadily  on  through  successive  stages 
until  concrete  material  objects  reach  their  completeness. 

Secondly,  the  influence  of  environment  is  another  inipiT- 
tant  law  which  conies  into  play  i  this  process  of  evolutinn 
through  successive  differentiations.  Adaptation  to  environ- 
ment has  much  to  do  with  the  nature  and  direction  of  the 
evolution.  It  also  has  much  to  do  in  lifting  the  process 
from  one  sphere  or  grade  to  another,  and  in  effecting,  by 


MATERIALISTIC  EVOLUTION.  503 

successive  differentiations,  the  passage  from  the  non-vital 
to  the  vital,  from  the  vital  to  the  sensitive,  from  the  sensi- 
tive to  the  rational,  from  the  rational  to  the  moral,  and 
froTTT    .),.  rpnral  to  the  religious.    Continuity  rules  through- 
c  u  the  proce.^ :.    -^here  are  no  breaks,  hence  creation  is  not 
n  Kle.j.    The  la.-  of  this  con^mMtV3f  is  evolution  of  a  cosmic 
sc  -  ilirou,Tl!out      Adaptation  to  environment,  along  with 
coorduiaticui  of  the  factors  in  the  process,  serve  to  account 
for  all  that  the  cosmos  now  exhibits,  in  all  the  complex 
and  heterogeneous  forms  of  existence  therein  observable. 
In  this  way  cosmic  evolution  on  a  materialistic  basis  pro- 
fesses to  explain  the  universe  and  all  it  contains. 

4.  It  is  proper  to  add  that  in  Spencer's  hands  this  theory 
also  provides  for  the  return  of  the  heterogeneous  to  the 
primitive  homogeneous  again.    This  is  sometimes  overlooked 
m  this  scheme.  Not  only  is  there  the  passage  from  the  atomic 
homogeneous  through  successive  differentiations  to  the  com- 
plex heterogeneous,  but  me  cycle  of  evolution  provides  for 
the  return  of  the  heterogeneous  to  the  homogeneous,  whence 
;t  came.     This  is  the  whole  cycle  of  the  cosmic  history. 
That  history  is  the  story  of  the  rhvthmic  movement  of  the 
simple  homogeneous  to  the  complex  heterogeneous,  and  of 
the  return  of  the  heterogeneous  to  the  homogeneous,  through 
long  cycles  of  cosmic  time.    Matter  is  eternal,  force  is  per- 
sistent, and  motion  is  cflnthwous.  through  it  all.    Nothing 
really  new  ever  comes  into  existence,  and  nothing  is  ever 
lost      There  may  be  an  endless  variety  of  combinations, 
but  the  fundamental  factors  are  always  the  same.    All  these 
Changes  and  combinations  take  place  according  to  cosmic 
evolution,  which  is  defined  to  be  "the  process  of  change 
from  the  incoherent  homogeneity  to  the  coherent  hetero- 
geneity through  successive  differentiations,  accompanied  by 
the  dissipation  of  motion,  the  integration  of  matter    the 
coordination  of  factors  and  adaptation  to  environment." 
ev^li  '  ^'""'■'  '^"  '""^''■"  "P"'*'^  "^  materialistic 


I  It 


i  , 


}    : 


iJ  n 


l  I- 


504  APOLOGETICS. 


III.  This  Theory  Examined.    §  1 19. 

This  general  scheme  is  open  to  many  of  the  criticisms 
already  made  of  pure  materialism.  But  it  i^  also  exposed 
to  other  additional  objections,  which  can  only  now  be  briefly 
outlined.  From  the  standpoint  of  pure  physics,  it  might  be 
criticised  with  fatal  effect,  by  showing  that  it  is  a  purely 
speculative  scheme,  rather  than  a  strictly  scientific  inter- 
pretation of  physical  facts.  The  following  points  are  noted 
in  order : 

1.  The  usage  of  the  term  evolution  is  ambiguous  and 
often  misleading  in  this  scheme.  Strictly  speaking,  evolu- 
tion is  an  unfolding  of  one  thing  out  of  another,  by  means 
of  some  principle  of  development  within  that  thing.  In  the 
hands  of  Spencer,  cosmic  evolution  is  rather  the  method 
of  aggregating  or  combining  atoms  which  already  have  a 
real  existence  assumed.  It  may  be  truly  charged  against 
this  form  of  evolution  that  it  does  not  present  the  true  idea 
of  evolution  at  all.  The  instability  of  the  homogeneous, 
the  re  ction  it  exhibits,  the  dissipation  of  motion  and  the 
integration  of  matter,  is  not  really  evolution.  Combination, 
aggregation,  differentiation  and  dissolution  are  all  that 
takes  place  in  this  cosmic  process.  To  call  these  factors 
in  the  process  evolution,  is  certainly  to  use  the  term  in  a 
very  loose  way.  There  is  a  process,  and  there  is  progress, 
but  tlie  relations  of  the  factors  in  that  process  are  external, 
not  internal  as  evolution  implies. 

2.  The  notions  of  the  eternity  of  matter,  the  persistence 
of  force,  and  the  continuity  of  motion,  have  no  proper 
place  in  a  scheme  like  Spencer's,  yet  he  makes  them  tlie 
very  foundation  of  his  cosmic  evolution.  These  notions 
are  purely  abstract  or  a  priori  ideas,  and  they  have  no  place 
in  a  philosophy  like  that  of  Spencer's,  which  denies  the 
reality  of  the  a  priori  altogether.  Even  by  the  help  of 
habit  and  heredity,  Spencer  can  never  successfully  connect 


MATERIALISTIC  EVOLUTION.  505 

the  qualities  of  necessity  and  universality  with  any  factors 
of  human  knowledge.  Yet,  at  the  threshold  of  his  cosmic 
evolutionary  philosophy,  he  does  this  very  thing.  He 
cannot  justify  his  underlying  notions  of  indestructible 
matter,  persistent  force  and  continuous  motion. 

3-    To  render  cosmic  evolution  workable,  certain  facts 
quite  inconsistent  with  it  must  be  introduced.    In  the  purely 
physical  realm,  certain  afUnities  among  the  atoms  must  be 
presupposed,  so  that  gold  and  silver  may  be  respectively 
produced  afterwards.    This  is  inconsistent  with  the  idea  of 
an  absolute  homogeneous  where  things  in  their  rudiments 
are  all  alike.     In  the  organic  sphere,  generation  and  birth 
are  means  whereby  individuals  in  any  given  species  are 
produced  and  the  species  perpetuated.     This  can  scarcely 
be  harmonized  with  cosmic  evolution  as  a  series  of  succes- 
sive differentiations  of  a  somewhat  external  nature.    How 
came  all  the  organs  involved  in  nutrition  and  assimilation 
to  be  originated  by  cosmic  evolution?     Then,  when  the 
highest  forms  of  the  heterogeneous  are  considered,   the 
difficulty  of  explaining  the  facts  by  any  cosmic  process  is 
still  greater.    The  dissipation  of  motion  and  the  integration 
matter  are  purely  mechanical  processes,  inherently  in- 
)le  of  producing  certain  forms  of  existence  to  which 
•  -j.e  than  the  mechanical  pertains. 

4.  Spencer's  cosmic  scheme  affords  no  proper  explanation 
for  the  bcg„miug  of  the  evolutionary  process.     It  assumes 
the  instability  of  the  homogeneous,  but  in  this  there  is  no 
rationale  of  the  origin  of  the  process  of  evolution.     There 
being  at  first  really  no  environment  to  anything,  its  influ- 
ence cannot  l)e  called  in  to  originate  the  cosmic  process, 
mess   some   extra-cosmic   principle   be   introduced,    this 
v:osmic  scheme  can  never  sh..w  how  the  evolution  makes  a 
start.      Why   should    ^he   unstable    homogeneous   at   any 
-  ven   time,   and  at   some  particular  point,   break  away 
^rom  Its  incoherent  homogeneity  and  become  a  coherent 
heterogeneity?    The  homogeneous  must  remain  in  unstable 


{ 


ii 


So6 


APOLOGETICS. 


11 


equilibrium  continuously.  If  any  change  takes  place,  the 
ground  and  reason  for  this  must  reside  in  the  atomic 
homogeneous,  or  in  the  energy  with  which  it  is  endowed. 
Spencer's  system  has  no  such  ground,  for  it  does  not  give 
any  place  to  an  extra-cosmic  reason  or  agency  to  originate 
the  process  of  evolution.  Movement  requires  a  first  mover, 
and  this  cosmic  evolution  excludes. 

5.  Still  less  can  cosmic  evolution  give  a  satisfactory 
reason  why  the  process  should  move  in  one  direction  rather 
than  in  another.  If  the  homogeneous  be  absolutely  un- 
stable, it  is  as  ready  to  move  out  in  one  direction  as  in 
another.  If  the  evolution  be  equally  likely  to  move  in  one 
line  as  in  another,  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that  it  will 
keep  on  continuously  in  ly  given  direction.  There  is 
nothing  to  prevent  the  m^.ement  going  hither  and  thither, 
without  ever  reaching  any  definite  goal.  This  scheme  is 
really  no  better  than  that  of  the  fortuitous  concourse  of 
atoms  of  ancient  materialism.  Chance  rules,  yet  chance 
can  effect  nothing,  for  it  is  neither  rational  nor  dynamic. 
Cosmic  evolution  is  bound  to  give  some  good  reason,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  why  the  evolutionary  process  keeps 
steadily  on  to  an  appointed  result.  It  has  not  yet  done  so, 
and  hence  fails  as  a  theory. 

6.  Another  serious  difficulty  of  cosmic  evolution  is  that 
it  reduces  all  vital  facts  to  the  category  of  the  mechanical. 
It  must  either  do  this  or  assume  tliat  there  is  no  generic 
difference  between  the  vital  and  the  mechanical.  If  the 
theory  begins  with  atomic  matter  and  purely  physical  en- 
ergy, it  must  show  how  the  passage  can  be  made  by  repeated 
differentiations  to  the  category  of  organic  cells  and  vital 
energy.  Such  a  passage  has  not  yet  been  pointed  out  by 
cosmic  evolution,  and  organic  life  can  consist  in  naught 
else  than  the  play  of  the  purely  physical  forces.  Cosmic 
evoluti'-n  must  show  that  there  is  a  purely  natural  path 
from  the  non-vital  to  the  vital.  This  means  that  it  is  face 
to  face  with  the  modern  scientific  conclusion  that  the  living 


MATERIALISTIC  EVOLUTION.  507 

always  comes  from  the  living,  and  not  from  the  non-living. 
This  blocks  the  path  of  this  theory. 

7-  A  still  more  fatal  objection  to  cosmic  evolution  lies  in 
the  fact  that  it  can  give  no  rational  account  of  the  phe- 
nomena oimind  and  morals,  of  society  and  religion.  It 
makes  a  labored  attempt  to  do  so  bu.  with  no  real  success. 
It  IS  always  compelled  to  construe  all  the  facts  in  the  last 
analysis  m  terms  of  atoms  and  energy,  and  this  is  itself 
a  confession  of  the  failure  of  the  whole  scheme.     To  ex- 

rsol^^'"'"'!  '?'.'"  '"  ^'''"  '"  psychology  and  ethics, 
m  sociology  and  religion,  i.  not  no:,  possible.  But  if  such 
an  examination  were  made,  the  force  of  this  general  criti- 
asm  would  be  plainly  evident.  To  rob  the  facts  of  some 
of  their  distinctive  marks,  in  order  to  render  them  capable 
of  explana  ion  by  a  preconceived  theory,  is  not  scientific. 

8.  Finally,  the  very  terms  in  which  the  theory  of  cosmic 
evolution  IS  expressed  are  often  quite  inconsistent  with  the 
^pe  of  the  theory  itself.  We  find  adjustment,  coordination 
and  adaptation,  terms  frequently  used,  and  these  terms 
surely  imply  purpose  and  design.     By  a  subt  •>  turn,  the 

which  IS  really  the  r^^oduct  of  what  these  terms  denote,  i 
the  cause  of  these  very  things.    But  the  question  naturally 
arises  as  to  what  skillful  hand  effects  the  adjustments  and 

b  nation  imply.  ,f  not  a  wisdom  and  power  to  effect  what 
h.se  terms  e.xpress?  Surely  there  are  here  marks  of 
teleology.  If  tl,e  adaptations  and  adjustments  involved  in 
cosmic  evolution  are  of  chance,  how  do  they  come  to  be 
^constant  and  regtilar?  Why  do  they  produce  results 
which  look  so  much  like  the  efTectr,  of  intelligence?  Deny- 
mg  teleology,  cosmic  evolution  really  implies  it,  and  in  its 
working  cannot  get  on  without  it. 

an^  h'  ?  ''■"  "'"••'^  P'-°f°""d  question  may  also  be  asked, 
and  that  is,  How  does  intelligence  itself  arise?  Even  if 
we  were  to  hold  that  this  intelligence  is  intra-mundane,  the 


li 


5o8 


APOLOGETICS. 


question  of  its  genesis  would  sorely  press  cosmic  evolution. 
Spencer  has  no  reply  to  such  a  query  as  this  that  meets 
the  rational  demands  of  the  case. 

To  take  the  conception  of  evolution  presented  by  Le  Conte 
in  his  Evolution  and  Religious  Thought  affords  little  relief 
to  Spencer's  perplexity.  Le  Conte  defines  evolution  as 
"continuous  progressive  change  according  to  certain  laws 
and  by  means  of  resident  forces."  Only  the  first  of  the 
statements  in  this  definition  relates  to  what  is  now  taken 
to  be  evolution  in  the  strict  sense  as  a  method  of  cosmic 
progress,  and  not  the  cause  of  it.  Both  of  the  other  state- 
ments in  this  definition  lead  to  implications  which  transcend 
the  cosmos  wherein  the  progress  lies.  The  question  may 
at  once  be  asked  as  to  how  the  laws  were  planted  in  the 
cosmos,  or  whether  they  are  inherent  in  it.  Still  more  per- 
tinent r  the  question  as  to  the  nature,  origin  and  ground 
of  the  resident  forces  of  which  this  definition  makes  so  much. 
They  certainly  imply  an  extra-cosmic  ground,  for  otherwise 
they  are  entirely  hypothetical. 

Hence,  our  conclusion  is  that  cosmic  evolution  which  ex- 
cludes God,  and  construes  all  the  facts  in  the  cosmos  in 
terms  of  matter,  force  and  motion,  is  not  competent  to  meet 
the  demands  of  the  case. 


'f    i 


CHAPTER  VII. 

positivism. 

Contents. 

SyS^Z"^J^'TK  Statement-Term  Vague.-Relation  to  Other 
iTr^  uT'"''  ,^«=«"««-Deni«  Metaphysics.-Denies  the  rI' 
tonal  Psychology._No  Immutable  Principles  of  Truth  and  Duty.-I?, 

or^TThrT^r^'^r'u  *'*  **»*-^-t-  Evolution.-Thtliw 
Of  the  Three  Stages  of  Human  Progress.-The  Theological -The 
Ph.losoph.cal.-The  Scientific-Its  Empirical  Psycholog^!:^  Ou£e 
of  Rel,g,on.-Exam.nation  of  Positivism.-Denial  Tt  MetaphysSs 
Fut.le.-Causes  must  be  Sought.-Its  Psychology  Defective -Ito  Ma! 

St-Vhe  wl^'rp"^'^  ^T  ^"-""''-T^«  Three  Stages  D  - 
fect.ve.-The  Idea  of  Progress  Inverted—The  Three  Stages  Coexist - 

for  r  StLl  M^'r^  '"  ?T"  P^°«^«— Positivism  Gives  no  Sound 
iTav  t  ^.°"^''y-^''  R'^'iK-ous  System  a  Confession  of  Failure - 
It  Asks  Questions  which  Philosophy  and  Theology  alone  Answer 

Literature. 

Encyclopaed^  Article  on  P..,V.V^.,„._Flinfs  AntitheUHc  Theories. 

p/v      yi"       wn.    '   C-Am<,a«,/y   and   Posilivism.-Comte's   Positive 

Plulosophy-MAl's  Comte  and  Po«/.W5m.-Lewes'  Hislorv  of  pZt 

woMy.-Huxley's     The    Scientific    Aspects    of    Posit^Tm     FisW ' 

Thought,  Chap.  Vll.-Pressense's  A  Study  of  Origins   Book  I    Thll 
I-Bowne's  Metaphysics.  Part  III..  Chap.  IV-Sv's \t^L;:v.  ta*^' 

?r'  ''r.''  s"^"-  "^•'  '^'=-  "^-Harris- pSc,.Sr;ii*:; 

i-/..«m,  Chap.  y.-Rishell-s  The  Foundations  of  the  Faith    dTv 
Sec^  I..  Chaps.  I.-IIL-Dabney's  Sensualistic  Philosophy    ChT'v- 
Modern  Skepticism,  Chap.  III.-Matheson's  The  GosZl' .,a  Ir  I 
S^stitutes.  Chap.  VI.-Bowne's  Studies  ilMcLS^    "-wt^t: 


I. 


I.  GrM^ro/  Description  and  Statement.  §  120. 
pOSITIVISM,  which  is  to  be  the  subject  of  this 
J.  chapter,  is  a  somewhat  vague  and  indefinite  scheme 
It  often  stands  on  the  ground  of  materialism  and  speaks  in 
the  accents  of  agnosticism.  Some  of  those  who  hold  the 
cosmic  evolution  discussed  in  the  last  chapter  might  be 
termed  positivists,  while  the  distinction  between  the  agnostic 


,^/* 


Sio 


APOLOGETICS. 


Ilf  M 


and  the  positivist  is  often  quite  obscure.  Spencer,  the  pro- 
fessed agnostic,  is  sometimes  described  as  the  English 
exponent  of  Comte,  but  this  description  he  persistently 
repudiates.  Writers  like  Lewes  and  Harrisoi  ,  Congreve 
and  Morley,  are  avowed  positivists,  while  the  teachings  of 
J.  S.  Mill  are  in  many  respects  like  those  of  positivism. 
Some  deists,  too,  who  deny  the  supernatural  and  exalt  the 
natural  and  the  sensible,  are  practically  on  the  ground  of 
the  positivist.  And  in  our  own  day,  some  who  are  devoted 
to  scientific  research,  rather  than  to  metaphysical  study, 
exhibit  the  temper  of  positivism,  and  insist  that  human 
investigation  is  to  be  concerned  only  with  observed  facts 
as  they  coexist  or  succeed  each  other.  It  is  evident,  there- 
fore, that  positivism  is  a  general  temper  or  type  of  thought, 
rather  than  a  connected  scheme  of  things.  This  being  the 
case,  it  can  scarcely  be  called  a  philosophy  of  all  existence. 
It  is  rather  a  method  of  scientific  investigation,  with  no 
general  agreement  among  its  adherents.  This  makes  it 
difficult  to  give  a  connected  description  of  the  general 
scheme  which  it  denotes.  Comte,  of  course,  is  usually  taken 
to  be  the  great  modern  exponent  of  positivism,  yet  many 
who  profess  to  be  positivists  do  not  agree  with  Comte  in 
many  particulars.  Among  the  Greeks,  especially  with  the 
Sophists,  and  the  adherents  of  later  decadent  nescience,  the 
temper  of  positivism  is  found.  But  we  have  now  to  do 
with  modern  po  tivism,  and,  in  a  g:eneral  way,  the  exposi- 
tion will  follow  Comte. 

2.  The  relation  of  positivism  to  other  systems  may  be  a 
little  more  fully  elucidated.  In  relation  to  atheism,  posi- 
tivism is  in  Comte's  hands  practical  atheism.  By  this  is 
not  meant  that  all  positivists  are  atheists,  but  that  the 
principles  of  positivism  are  entirely  destructive  of  theism. 
When  positivism  confines  our  attention  exclusively  to  sen- 
sible phenomena,  and  forbids  any  inquiry  after  causes  and 
grounds,  it  blocks  the  way  for  any  theistic  theory  of  the 
universe,  and  renders  religion  virtually  impossible.    In  rela- 


POSITIVISM.  511 

tion  to  materialism,  it  may  be  said  that  in  almost  every 
case  positivism  builds  on  a  materialistic  basis.    Materialism 
indeed,  is  the  soil  in  which  both  positivism  and  agnosticism' 
usually  grow.    Comte  and  Spencer,  in  their  ontology,  have 
a  great  deal  of  materialistic  resemblance,  yet  one  is  a 
positivist  and  the  other  an  agnostic.    This  gives  the  mate- 
rialistic scheme  of  things  greater  importance.     In  relation 
to  agnosticism,  it  may  be  remarked  that  it  and  positivism 
are  twin  brothers.    In  their  psychology  they  agree  in  both 
holding  the  empirical  theory  of  knowledge,  but  they  differ 
in  their  application  of  that  theory.     The  agnostic  asserts 
that  there  may  be  an  absolute  or  supersensible  reality,  but 
says  that  we  cannot  know  anything  of  its  real  nature.    The 
positivist,  on  the  other  hand,  refuses  to  make  any  assertion 
whatever  in  regard  to  the  absolute  or  real  which  is  supposed 
to  he  behind  the  relative  and  phenomenal.    In  the  sphere 
of  religion,  of  course,  there  are  other  differences  between 
the  two  systems. 

3-   In  describing  positivism,  its  negative  features  first 
arrest  attention.    These  are  simple  denials. 

First    in  regard  to  metaphysics,  as  the  science  of  first 
principles  or  necessary  truths,  both  mental  and  moral,  posi- 
tivists,  with  great  unanimity,  deny  the  validity  of  any  such 
science.     They  do  not  admit  the  reality  of  the  a  priori 
conditions  of  human  thought  which  render  experience  pos- 
sible.    Hence,  all  metaphysical  inquiry  is  futile,  and  can 
ever  lead  to  any  reliable  results.     Comte  distinctly  takes 
his  negative  position,  and  Lewes  has  written  an  elaborate 
History  of  philosophy  to  discredit  metaphysics  in  the  inter- 
ests of  positivism.     Positive  science  is  exalted  as  the  only 
reliable  organ  of  truth,  while  metaphysics  moves  in  the 
region  of  mere  speculation,  and  never  reaches  certainty 

Secondly,  ,n  reference  to  psychology,  as  the  science  of 
the  human  soul  and  its  conditions  of  cognition,  positivism 
holds  a  negative  position  also.  By  not  a  few  the  mate- 
rialistic view  ot  man's  nature  is  taken,  and  by  such  adherents 


i 


m 


512 


APOLOGETICS. 


I 


of  the  system  the  reahty  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man 
is  denied.  By  others,  who  do  not  hold  the  materialistic 
theory  of  man,  the  sensational  theory  of  knowledge  is  held, 
and  the  validity  of  the  rational  theory  is  frankly  denied. 
All  the  objects  of  human  knowledge  are  found  in  the  circle 
of  phenomena,  and  the  cognition  of  noumena  is  denied. 
All  inquiry  into  grounds,  causes  or  essences  is  excluded, 
and  the  activity  of  the  human  mind  is  to  be  confined  strictly 
to  the  sphere  of  the  sensible.  Its  epistemology  is  em- 
pirical. 

Thirdly,  in  the  realm  of  morality  and  religion,  similar 
denials  are  made.  Positivism  denies  the  reality  of  any 
eternal  and  immutable  principles  of  morality.  Man  be- 
comes, as  with  the  old  Sophists,  the  measure  of  all  things. 
There  are  no  abiding  rules  of  duty,  but  the  path  of  duty 
is  to  be  marked  out  by  experience  and  expediency.  There 
can  be  no  metaphysics  of  ethics,  since  there  are  no  neces- 
sarj  moral  truths;  and  so  far  as  the  knowledge  of  God 
is  concerned,  the  negative  position  in  some  form  is  taken. 
At  best,  this  knowledge  can  only  be  relative,  for  we  cannot 
know  God  as  he  really  is,  but  only  as  he  is  related  to  us. 
This  virtually  cuts  up  by  the  root  any  rational  theism,  and 
heads  us  towards  agnosticism. 

4.  The  positive  features  of  this  system  can  be  briefly 
stated.  These  are  associated  with  its  peculiar  theory  of 
the  progress  of  human  civilization. 

First,  positivism  is  usually  associated  with  some  form  of 
naturalistic  rc)olution.  It  can  scarcely  be  said  that  any  very 
thorough  exposition  of  the  evolutionary  philosophy  is  given 
oy  leading  positivists,  yet  they  generally  assume  its  sound- 
ness, and  construe  the  facts  of  human  society  according 
to  the  teachings  of  this  philosophy.  The  idea  of  progress 
prevails  in  the  positivist  scheme,  and  this  progress  is  a  sort 
of  natural  development.  Human  society  and  institutions 
have  developed  through  the  centuries  by  slow  degrees  from 
the  simple  to  the  complex. 


POSITIVISM.  5,3 

It  is  in  this  connection  that  the  law  of  the  three  stages 
of  human  progress  comes  into  view  as  one  of  the  marked 
features  of  leading  types  of  positivism.  Comte  gave  much 
prommence  to  these  stages  in  his  scheme,  but  other  posi- 
tmsts  are  content  to  interpret  the  progress  of  human 
civilization  in  terms  of  the  evolutionary  philosophy  in  a 
rather  vag^e  and  comprehensive  way.  A  very  brief  outline 
of  these  three  successive  stages  will  indicate  the  general 
drift  of  the  scheme. 

The  first  is  called  the  theological  or  religious   stage, 
which  IS  associated  with  primitive  man  in  his  earliest  con- 
dition of  culture.     In  this  stage,  as  men  began  to  inquire 
concerning  the  world  about  them  and  the  events  which 
happened,  they  sought  to  explain  the  things  that  happened 
by  referring  them  to  certain  supernatural  powers  or  agents. 
These  agents  were  personified,  and  then  regarded  as  deities. 
In  this  stage  men  were  theologians,  and  gave  the  religious 
explanation  of  the  universe.     Under  the  influence  of  this 
motive,  the  first  stage  of  human  culture  was  experienced. 
I'ositivists  give  elaborate  descriptions  of  the  way  in  which 
men  m  this  stage  of  their  culture  sought  to  explain  the 
various  phenomena  of  nature.     These  events,  sometimes, 
sub  mie  and  terrible,  sometimes  gentle  and  beneficent  were 
explained  by  means  of  some  real  divine  agency  which  was 
he  cause  of  them  all.    In  this  way  positivism  accounts  for 
the  ongin  of  religion  in  fetichism,  and  thus  interprets  the 
first  temporary  stage  of  the  civilization   of  the   human 

The  second  stage  was  the  philosophical  or  metaphysical 
1  his  is  an  advance  on  the  previous  stage.  With  the  events 
of  nature  still  before  them,  men  in  this  stage  have  made 
such  progress  that  they  begin  to  discard  the  theological 
explanation  of  these  events,  and  proceed  to  give  a  meta- 
physical instead.  In  the  place  of  personal  ddties.  occult 
causes  or  s.^i^ersensible  essences  are  assumed  to  stipplv  a 
rational  explanation.     Impersonal  essences  take  the  place 


su 


APOLOGETICS. 


of  personal  agents,  and  abstract  causes  are  substituted  for 
concrete  beings.  Men  thus  became  philosophers  in  the 
.second  stage  of  their  progressive  civilization. 

But  the  third  stage  follows,  and  constitutes  the  crown 
of  it  all.  This  is  the  scientific  or  positive  stage.  In  this 
stage  the  supposition  of  causes  and  essences  is  discarded, 
and  all  search  after  them  is  declared  to  be  futile.  Hence, 
both  theology  and  philosophy  are  rejected,  and  science  is 
given  the  field.  Phenomena  in  their  coexistences  and 
sequences  are  all  that  men  have  anything  to  do  with  in 
this  stage.  This  is  the  very  highest  stage  of  intellectual 
development  in  the  human  race,  and  to  its  lofty  and  serene 
elevation  only  a  few,  who  call  themselves  positivists,  have 
yet  attained.  When  all  shall  have  reached  this  elevation, 
then  the  race  will  have  attained  its  goal  and  perfection. 

5.  Positivism  presents,  as  has  been  hinted,  a  psychology 
of  its  own.    On  this  a  word  or  two  only  is  now  necessary. 
Its  psychology  is  sensational ;  its  epistemology  is  empirical. 
The  0  priori  factor  is  entirely  excluded,  and  all  knowledge 
is  gained  by  sensible  experience,  and  all  the  contents  of 
the  various  sciences  that  have  any  reality  depend  entirely 
on  observation.    The  results  of  this  observation  in  various 
■spheres  of  human  knowledge,   and  the  outcome  of  the 
-classification  of  these  results,  constitute  the  aim  and  end 
of  science.     The  whole  of  human  knowledge  is  embraced 
in  the  circle  of  the  sciences  thus  understood,  and  Comte 
proposed  an  elaborate  classification  of  the  sciences  on  this 
'.basis.    Indeed,  the  classification  of  the  sciences  is  the  only 
philosophy  there  is.    How  positivism  can  make  any  rational 
classification  of  the  sciences,  or  suggest  any  kind  of  philoso- 
phy of  them,  is  a  real  difficulty  of  the  scheme,  when  it 
denies  the  reality  of  such  first  principles,  as  seem  necessary 
to  effect  a  true  classification. 

6.  Finally,  positivism  outlines  a  religion  and  proposes  a 
cultus.  This  may  seem  a  strange  statement  after  what  has 
been  said  in  regard  to  the  repudiation  of  the  religious  view 


POSITIVISM. 


SIS 


of  things  made  by  positivism  in  its  exposition  of  the  law 
of  the  three  stages  of  human  progress.     Yet.  in  spite  of 
this,  Comte  undertakes  to  give  an  entirely  new  religious 
system.    This  system  is  entirely  empirical,  and  has  no  place 
m  It  for  a  supersensible  deity     The  deity  erected  is  man 
himself.    Humanity  is  made  divinity,  and  hence  this  system 
»s  sometimes  called  the  religion  of  humanity.     Positivists 
are  usually  content  with  the  abstract  conception  of  idealized 
humanity.     Whatever  this  phrase  may  mean  is  the  deity 
of  the  system,  and  man  is  bidden  worship  himself.    Comte 
was  much  more  concrete  in  his  views,  but  they  were  so 
absurd  as  to  be  scarcely  worthy  of  mention  in  this  con- 
nection. 

A  cultus.  or  ritual  of  worship,  was  drawn  up  by  Comte 
though  more  sober  adherents  of  positivism  repudiate  the 
prophet  of  the  scheme  at  this  point.  Paris  was  to  be  the 
holy  city,  and  a  temple  was  to  be  built  there.  Other  temples 
were  to  be  built  all  over  France,  facing  Paris.  Priests 
were  to  be  appointed  and  paid  by  the  State.  Prayers  were 
to  be  offered  and  sacraments  were  to  be  observed  The 
whole  scheme  at  this  point  is  puerile,  and  has  been  well 
termed,    Romanism  minus  Christianity." 

The  State  was  to  control  everything,  and  the  priests  of 
this   system    were   to   have   charge   of  education.      Both 
religion  and   education  were  to  be  paid   for  out  of  the 
public  treasury    The  principles  of  positive  science  were  to 
form  the  basis  of  all  education,  and  for  a  time  an  attempt 
was  made  in  France  to  put  this  scheme  into  practical  effect 
As  might  be  expected,  the  attempt  was  an  utter  failure 
m  all  of  this  there  is  a  concession  to  the  native  religious 
mst.nct  of  men,   which  is  entirely  inconsistent  with  the 
principles  of  positivism.     It  is  only  fair  to  add  that  few 
It  any,  of  the  positivists  of  to-day  embrace  these  vagaries 
ot  Lomte.    They  content  themselves  with  fine  phrases  con- 
cernmg  the  religion  of  humanity,  and  with  hard  words  about 
metaphysics  and  theology. 


it      i 

-lit  s  li 


mii 


516  APOLOGETICS. 


II.  The  Examination  of  Positivism.    §  121. 

This  examination  can  only  be  made  in  general  outline, 
although  there  are  several  points  which  merit  careful  con- 
sideration. 

1.  The  denial  of  metaphysics  which  positivism  makes  is 
futile.  Every  line  of  investigation,  sooner  or  later,  leads 
to  first  principles,  and  demands  a  philosophy.  To  deny  the 
a  priori  is  to  repudiate  the  fundamental  conditions  of  the 
possibility  of  rational  cognition.  In  practical  experience  it 
is  impossible  to  hold  to  the  denial  of  the  search  after  causes. 
The  inquiring  little  child  insists  on  asking  questions  about 
causes,  that  upset  all  the  arbitrary  denials  of  the  right  of 
the  human  mind  to  make  this  interrogation ;  and,  in  addi- 
tion, it  can  be  charged  against  positivism  that  it  greatly 
limits  the  scope  of  scientific  inquiry,  and  in  some  respects 
renders  it  practically  helpless.  Much  of  the  inspiration  of 
modem  science  arises  directly  from  the  impulse  of  the 
human  mind  *o  seek  for  causes,  and  to  silence  this  quest 
is  to  deprive  science  of  its  romantic  interest,  and  to  make 
it  prosaic  in  the  extreme.  In  a  word,  all  true  science  frames 
the  materials  of  a  metaphysic,  and  any  scheme  which  puts 
up  an  impassable  barrier  between  these  two  realms  is  arbi- 
trary and  irrational. 

2.  In  like  manner,  its  empirical  psychology  is  radically 
defective.  After  what  has  been  said  in  the  Introduction 
to  this  treatise,  but  little  need  now  lie  added  in  criticism 
of  the  empirical  epistemology.  Positivism  is  open  to  all 
the  objections  which  lie  against  the  empirical  psycholofjy, 
and  it  entirely  fails  tc.  meet  the  conditions  of  a  rational 
epistemology.  In  addition  to  ail  that  was  there  adduccil, 
it  need  now  only  be  pointed  out  that  the  ability  to  frame 
scientific  hypotheses  transcends  a  purely  sensational  theory 
of  knowledge.  Take  the  law  of  gravitation  to  illustrate. 
The  senses  never  perceived  this  great  law.     When  first 


POSITIVISM.  517 

proposed,  it  was  a  purely  supersensible  or  rational  product 
The  process  of  its  mathematical  confirmation  was  rational 
also,  as  It  was  worked  out  by  Newton.    Hence,  the  power 
to  make  and  to  prove  any  scientific  hypothesis  lies  in  a 
region  of  mental  activity  which  transcends  the  senses.    The 
senses  simply  observe  the  facts,  which  must  ever  remain 
smgle  and  unrelated  if  the  human  mind  has  no  supersen- 
sible or  rational  power,  such  as  is  involved  in  making  a 
scientific  hypothesis.    Hence,  the  positivist  theory  of  know- 
ledge is  either  erroneous,  or,  if  true,  it  destroys  the  possi- 
bihty  of  science  itself,  which  relates  facts  to  each  other 
according  to  some  general  law  or  principle. 

3-  So,  also,  it  need  only  be  pointed  out  that,  since  posi- 
tivism builds  on  the  basis  of  materialistic  evolution   it  is 
open  to  all  the  criticisms  of  that  scheme.     We  have  seen 
already  how  defective  that  scheme  is  as  a  complete  philoso- 
phy of  all  existence.     In  its  attempt  to  provide  such  a 
philosophy,  it  must  bid  farewell  to  logic  and  reason.    Just 
so  far,  therefore,  as  positivism  rests  on  a  materialistic  basis, 
It  is  a  house  built  on  a  foundation  of  sand,  and  cannot 
stand  strict  rational  tests;    and  in  the  application  of  the 
philosophy  of  evolution  to  the  progress  of  civilization  in 
general,  poc.tivism  is  open  to  the  objection  that  it  intro- 
duces something  new  into  each  successive  stage  of  the 
development  of  humanity.    This  new  factor  pertains  to  a 
stage  of  the  progress  which  is  an  .(Tect  of  the  preceding 
stage  as  its  cause.     This  construction  of  the   facts  of 
progress   with   increasing  complexity,   constantly   contra- 
venes the  law  of  causation,  which  refuses  to  allow  anything 
in  the  effect  which  has  not  its  adequate  ground  in  the  cause. 
i  he  higher  cannot  be  explained  from  the  lower  alone,  and 
an  infinite  regress,  such  as  is  involved  in  the  positivist 
philosophy,  in  this  view-point,  is  irrational. 

4.  Serious  objection  may  be  made  to  the  law  of  the  thret 
stages  in  human  progress,  as  outlined  in  positivism.  It  is 
largely  a  speculative  view  of  the  way  in  which  the  human 


i 


•■i 


H 


I! 


5x8 


APOLOGETICS. 


race  has  advanced  in  civilization.  The  evident  absurdity 
of  the  manner  in  which  Comte  has  presented  the  theo- 
logical, philosophical  and  scientific  stages  of  progressive 
human  culture,  has  so  impressed  many  more  recent  advo- 
cates of  positivism  that  they  reject  it  in  its  Comtean  form, 
and  are  content  with  a  purely  empirical  construction  of  the 
facts  of  the  culture  of  the  race,  in  accordance  with  pro- 
gressive evolution.  A  few  separate  points  may  now  be 
noted. 

First,  the  very  idea  of  progress  is  wrong.  Comte  regards 
.  it  as  an  advance  to  go  from  the  theological  to  the  meta- 
physical, and  from  the  metaphysical  to  the  scientific.  It 
may  be  more  correct  to  say  that  the  progress  lies  in  the 
opposite  direction.  The  lowest  activity  of  the  human  mind 
may  be  to  observe  phenomena  and  their  order.  To  give  a 
true  philosophy  of  these  phenomena,  by  referring  them  to 
their  causes,  is  surely  a  higher  form  of  rational  activity; 
and  to  construe  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  in  relation 
to  the  agency  and  purpose  of  deity,  is  certainly  a  still  higher 
form  of  human  activity  This  we  take  to  be  the  true  order, 
and  this  order  is  simply  inverted  by  positivism. 

Secondly,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  these  supposed  stages  are 
not  really  successive',  but  contemporaneous.  History  does 
not  bear  out  Comte's  exposition  at  all.  In  every  age  these 
three  stages  have  existed  side  by  side  and  been  influential. 
Any  age  may  be  observing  facts,  seeking  their  philosophy, 
and  searching  for  their  religious  significance.  Even  a  single 
individual,  like  Newton,  for  example,  may  exhibit  all  these 
stages  in  himself.  The  positivist  must  show  how  the  one 
stage  leads  on  to  the  next,  and  at  the  same  time  make  it 
plain  that  that  stage  is  left  entirely  behind;  and,  in  the 
same  connection,  it  is  proper  to  remark  that  the  view  of 
evolution  which  positivism  exhibits  leaves  no  place  for 
degeneration,  while  the  facts  of  the  civilization  of  the 
race  frequently  show  that  there  has  been  decline  as  well  as 
advance.    Recent  advocates  of  the  evolutionary  philosophy 


POSITIVISM.  519 

admit  this,  and  are  more  ready  to  do  justice  to  the  facts 
than  positivism  is. 

Thirdly,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  science,  philosophy  and 
theology  must  always  go  together.    In  the  activity  of  the 
human  race,  they  cannot  be  divorced  from  each  other. 
There  are  facts  which  pertain  to  each  of  these  spheres,  and 
of  these  facts  in  general  the  scientific,  the  philosophical, 
and  the  religious  view  may  be  taken.    In  this  connection 
positivism  does  injustice,  not  only  to  history,  but  to  the 
very  nature  of  the  case.    These  three  departments  of  human 
inquiry  inherently  subsist  side  by  side  in  all  true  rational 
investigation.     We  first  explore  the  facts,  and  see  what 
they  are.    We  next  search  for  their  causes  or  reasons,  and 
discover  how  they  are.     Then  we  finally  raise  the  query 
concerning  their  purpose  or  end,  and  ascertain  why  they 
are  as  they  are.    At  this  point  positivism  is  painfully  one- 
sided and  defective. 

5.  Positivism  leaves  no  ground  for  stable  morality  or 
for  national  security.  It  rejects  any  fixed  and  immutable 
morality,  and  leaves  no  ground  for  the  obligatory  character 
of  moral  duties.  This  being  the  case,  the  very  foundations 
of  individual,  domestic,  social  and  national  well-being  are 
destroyed.  It  provides  only  an  empirical  type  of  ethics, 
and  such  a  type  must  ever  be  intensely  egoistic,  clearly  indi- 
vidualistic, and  essentially  utilitarian. 

6.  The  attempts  which  certain  types  of  positivism  make 
to  construct  a  religious  system  are  not  only  in  themselves 
absurd,  but  constitute  a  reluctant  confession  that  man  is, 
after  all,  a  religious  being,  and  must  have  some  sort  of 
reli!  on.  After  denying  that  men  need  religion  when  they 
re?  .  the  positivist  stage,  it  seems  very  strange  to  find  a 
r"'  iion,  with  its  deity  and  its  cultus,  proposed  by  posi- 
ti  iSm.  Then,  to  find  more  moderate  positivists  speaking, 
as  they  do,  of  the  religion  of  humanity,  with  some  vague 
Idealization  of  the  race  as  its  deity,  is  scarcely  less  absurd, 
and  is  equally  a  cgnfession  of  the  insufficiency  of  positivism. 


SM 


APOLOGETICS. 


and  a  testimony  to  the  native  religiousness  of  the  human 
race.    In  this  respect  positivism  is  self-condemned. 

7.  To  conclude,  it  may  be  added  that  positivism  really 
asks  questions  which  it  cannot  answer,  and,  like  the  dog 
in  the  manger,  forbids  either  philosophy  or  theology  to 
give  the  answer.  Questions  concerning  the  origin  of  the 
imiverse,  of  its  inner  grounds  and  meaning,  are  left  without 
any  answer.  Problems  concerning  the  human  mind  and 
the  profoimd  principles  of  human  knowledge  are  not  solved ; 
and  inquiries  in  regard  to  the  moral  sentiments  and  re- 
ligious instincts  of  the  spirit  of  man  are  left  untouched. 
Now,  these  are  questions  and  problems  and  inquiries  which 
will  not  down  at  the  bidding  of  positivism.  On  this  account 
we  must  pronounce  this  scheme  superficial,  incomplete,  and 
arbitrary  in  its  nature. 

Though  Comtean  positivism  may  have  had  its  day,  and 
be  now  no  longer  a  potent  power,  yet  the  general  temper 
which  it  has  begotten  abides  as  a  baneful  heritage  in  wide 
and  influential  scientific  circles.  This  temper,  we  are  sure, 
is  not  only  most  inimical  to  Christian  faith,  but  hurtful  to 
the  best  interests  of  science  itself.  The  Christian  philoso- 
phy, which  is  a  sound  theism,  is  needed  to  give  the  true 
explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  alike  in  their 
cosmic  origin,  cosmic  progress,  cosmic  order,  and  cosmic 
design.  At  every  one  of  these  test  places  the  positivist 
philosophy  fails.    It  is,  therefore,  to  be  at  once  rejected. 


■-i 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
AGNOSTICISM:   STATEMENT. 

Contents. 

Agnosticism  a  Type  of  Thought.-It  is  Ancient  and  Persistent- 
Greek.-  Sadducees.-  Modem—  Hume.-  Kant-  Hamilton.-  MiU.- 
Spencer.-Four  Types.-  Psychological.-Ontological.-Logical.-Reli- 
Trir  ?"i^  "^"""'^  °^  Knowledge—Faculties  of  Cognition  Some- 
what  Unreliable.-Always  Empiricism.-The  Laws  of  Thoufrt  Denied. 
-Rea  ity  not  Subject  of  Cognition— Uses  the  Relativity  of  Human 
Know  edge-Various  Aspects  of  Relativity.-The  Agnostic  Theory  of 
Know  edge  Leads  to  Antitheistic  Results.-The  Empirical  Theory  of 
Knowledge  Rules  Out  a  Knowledge  of  the  Supersensible.-The  Agnostic 
Use  of  the  Doctrine  of  Relativity  does  the  Same— Agnosticism  does  not 
Deny  God—Asserts  that  He  is  not  Cognizable— The  Human  Power. 
Inadequate.-God  Absolutely  Insc.  utable.-Arguments  Balanced-Rela- 
ttvjty  Excludes  God. 

Literature. 
Encyclopedia  Articles  on  Agnosticum  and  Skepticism.— Sptncer't 
Synthcuc  Philosophy,  Part  L.  Chaps.  I.-V.-Fiske's  Cosmic  Philosophy. 
vol   I.,  Fart  I..  Chap.  I— Hamilton's  Metaphysics.  Chaps,  on  The  Un- 
condit.oned.-Miirs  ExaminaHon  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy.  Vol.  I 
^i""   VI..   VII.-Mansel's  Limits  of  Religious   Thought.— Boyme't 
Studies  tn  Theism.  Chaps.  II.,  III.-Bruce's  Apologetics.  Chap.  VII- 
Physicus    Candid  Examination  of  Theism,  Chaps.   V..   VI— Fisher*! 
Cr«,««</,  0/  rAm/ir  Belief.  Chap.  Ill.-Pressense's  A  Study  of  Origins. 
Chaps.  II.-IV.-Watson's  Kant  and  His  English  Critics,  Chap.  XI.- 
Kaftans   The   Truth  of  the  Christian  Religion.  Vol.  II.,   Chap.  I  — 
Knights  Aspects  of  Theism,  Chaps.   IX.,  X.-Harris'  Philosophical 
Bas,s  of  Theism.  Chaps.  II.,  III-Ri,he!l's   The  Foundations  of  the 
Paul,  D,v.  I    Sec.  II.,  Chaps.  I.-VII.,  and  Div.  II.,  Sec.  I..  Chaps.  I., 
U.-Cunis    Creation   or  Evolution,   Chap.   VII— Hodge's   Systematic 
Theology,  Part  I.,  C^ap.  III.,  Sec.  V.,  and  Chap.  IV.,  Sees.  I.,  II.-Dab- 
ney  s  Theology,  Chaps.  VIII.,  IX— Matheson's  The  Gospel  and  Modern 
Substuutes.  Chap.   II.-Birk's  Modern  Physical  Fatalism,  Chap.   I— 
Watson  s  Christianity  and  Idealism.  Chap.  VII.-Flint's  Agnosticism. 

I.  Some  General  Explanations.    §  122. 
I.    \  GNOSTICISM  is  a  general  tyf>e  of  thought,   ather 
,   -^^    than  a  definite  system  of  things.    The  term  itself 
«s  quite  modem,  but  what  it  denotes  is  really  of  ancient 
Jate.    In  general,  it  relates  to  the  cognitive  capacity  of  the 


h 


$22 


APOLOGETICS. 


human  mind,  and  it  expresses  a  sort  of  universal  skepti- 
cism in  regard  to  the  power  of  the  mind  of  man  to  know 
reality.  It  consequently  raises  in  a  very  direct  way  the 
question  of  the  capacity  of  the  human  mind  to  know  God, 
and  the  supersensible  verities  of  the  Christian  religion. 

In  one  form  or  another,  it  has  had  a  place  in  the  specu- 
lations of  almost  every  age.    Two  centuries  before  Christ, 
in  the  decadent  era  of  Greek  philosophy,  it  appeared  as  a 
kind  of  universal  skepticism  or  avowed  nescience.     The 
Sadducees  of  our  Lord's  day,  among  the  Jews,  represent, 
in  the  sphere  of  religion,  many  traits  of  agnosticism.    They 
were,  at  least,  skeptics  in  regard  to  the  reality  of  the 
spiritual   and  tmseen  world.     In  modem  times,   Hume, 
though  usually  regarded  as  a  universal  skeptic,  is  really  a 
typical  agnostic,  alike  in  the  field  of  philosophy  and  in  the 
sphere  of  religion.    This  accounts  for  the  revival  of  interest 
in  the  philosophy  of  Hume  in  our  own  day-    Even  in  the 
philosophy  of  Kant,  and  of  Hamilton,  too,  there  are  features 
which  open  the  way  for  a  form  of  agnosticism.    When  the 
former  held  that  we  have  no  cognition  of  noumena,  and 
that  the  categories  of  the  understanding  and  ideas  of  reason 
are  regulative  only  of  phenomena,  and  have  no  cogfnitive 
validity  in  relation  to  things  in  themselves,  or  notmiena, 
then  idealism  was  the  result  on  the  side  of  psychology,  and 
agnosticism  or  skepticism  was  the  consequence  in  the  sphere 
of  ontology;   and  when  the  latter  asserted  that  the  uncon- 
ditioned, in  both  its  infinite  and  absolute  aspects,  was  both 
inconceivable  and  incognizable  by  the  human  understanding, 
he  set  the  door  open  for  the  agnostic  to  come  in  as  an 
unwelcome  guest.     Herbert  Spencer  has  not  been  slow  in 
turning   thes^    aspects   of   the   philosophy   of   Kant   and 
of  Hamilton  to  account  in  the  interests  of  agnosticism. 
Spencer  may  have  pushed  his  inferences  too  far,  yet  it  must 
be  confessed  that  these  eminent  thinkers  left  at  least  a  loop- 
hole for  Spencer.    J.  S.  Mill,  and  those  who  hold  similar 
aensatir     .  theories  of  cognition,  and  give  prominence  to 


I-:  ii 


AGNOSTICISM.  5,3 

the  relativity  of  human  knowledge,  bring  tribute  to  the  feet 
of  agnosticism. 

Spencer,  of  course,  is  the  great  modern  exponent  of 
scientific  agnosticism,  or  of  universal  skepticism  touching 
realities.  Fiske,  Huxley  and  Clifford  are  also  familiar 
names  in  the  same  connection.  This  brief  sketch  will  serve 
to  show  how  extensive  this  antitheistic  type  of  thought 
really  is.  It  also  makes  it  evident  that  agnosticism  is 
merely  a  somewhat  modest  term  to  denote  what  is  usually 
known  m  the  history  of  human  thought  as  philosophical 
skepticism,  more  or  less  complete.  Agnosticism,  skepticism 
and  nescience  mean  neariy  the  same. 

In  the  discussion  of  agnosticism,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind 
hat  It  IS  first  a  theory  of  knowledge,  and  then  an  anti- 
thetstc  theory.  Antitheistic  implications  are  necessarily 
involved  in  its  epistemology.  This  being  the  case,  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  discuss  agnosticism  as  a  theory  of 
knowledge,  and  as  a  system  opposed  to  theism.  But  before 
entering  upon  this  twofold  discussion,  some  explanation  of 
^.e  various  types  of  agnosticism  may  be  of  advantage 

2.  There  are  at  least  four  distinct  types  of  agnosticism, 
fhese  are  determined  according  to  the  different  methods 
by  which  the  agnostic  conclusion  is  reached. 

First,  there  is  what  may  be  called  psychological  agnos- 
ticism According  to  this  type  of  the  theory,  it  is  argued 
that  the  capacities  of  the  human  mind  are  not  competent 
to  come  into  cognitive  relation  with  the  supersensible 
objects  of  religion.  God  and  the  verities  of  the  unseen 
world  are  beyond  the  grasp  of  the  mental  powers  of  man. 
He  has  no  faculty  by  which  God  can  be  known.  By  reason 
of  this  mental  incompetency  agnosticism  is  the  only  con- 
clusion in  which  the  mind  of  man  can  rest. 

Secondly,  ;  nother  type  may  be  termed  ontological  agnos- 
ticism. According  to  this  phase  of  the  system,  the  objects 
of  religious  knowledge,  in  their  own  nature,  are  inscrutable. 
They  necessarily  are  such  that  they  are  not  capable  of  be- 


524 


APOLOGETICS. 


I  » 


\m 


coming  objects  of  human  cognition.  God  and  supersensible 
realities  are  absolute  entities  that  entirely  elude  the  mental 
grasp  of  the  finite  mind  of  man.  They  are  inscrutable  and 
unknowable  in  their  inherent  nature;  hence,  the  agnostic 
position  in  regard  to  them  is  the  only  tenable  one. 

Thirdly,  there  is  another  type  of  agnosticism,  which  may 
be  denoted  the  logical.  According  to  this  type  of  the 
theory,  it  is  maintained  that  the  arguments  for  and  against 
the  reality  of  God,  and  the  things  of  the  spiritual  world, 
are  so  nearly  balanced  that  no  conclusion  can  be  confidently 
rested  in.  There  are  reasons  in  favor  of  believing  in  their 
reality,  and  there  are  reasons  which  look  in  the  other 
direction,  so  that  the  judicial  mind,  carefully  weighing 
these  reasons,  must  at  least  suspend  judgment,  and  hold  ihe 
agnostic  attitude  towards  the  whole  matter. 

Fourthly,  there  remains  the  relativist  phase  of  agnos- 
ticism. This  is  founded  on  an  extreme  application  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  human  knowledge  to  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  religion.  This  doctrine,  in  general,  holds 
that  we  do  not  know  things  as  they  really  are,  but  only 
as  they  are  related  to  us.  This  is  a  sort  of  phenomenalism. 
Things  are  not  really  known  as  they  are,  but  only  as  they 
appear  to  us.  Hence,  in  the  case  of  God,  he  is  not  known 
as  he  really  is,  but  only  as  he  appears  to  us  to  be;  and 
there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  our  knowledge  of  him  is 
adequate.  In  this  way,  again,  the  agfnostic  goal  is  reached. 
The  eternal  verities  of  religion  are  only  relatively  known, 
and  we  can  never  be  sure  that  our  knowledge  is  adequate. 

These  four  types  of  agnosticism  are  often  found  subsist- 
ing side  by  side,  but  taken  together,  they  quite  cover  the 
field  of  modern  agnosticism.  The  conditions  of  the  first 
are  found  in  Kant,  the  germs  of  the  second  lie  in  Hamilton, 
the  third  is  announced  by  Huxley,  who  claims  the  honor 
of  inventing  the  term,  and  the  elements  of  the  fourth  are 
involved  in  Mill.  But  they  all  agree  in  representing  the 
type  of  thought  now  under  consideration. 


AGNOSTICISM. 


525 


II.  The  Agnostic  Theory  of  Knowledge.    §  123. 

The  statement  of  this  theory  can  be  made  in  compara- 
tively brief  compass,  after  what  has  been  said  in  the 
Introduction  on  the  theory  of  knowledge.  The  several 
points  involved  in  the  agnostic  theory  of  knowledge  need 
only  be  stated  without  any  expanded  exposition.  The  main 
gist  of  the  matter  is  involved  in  what  the  term  empiricism 
denotes.  With  this  the  readers  of  this  treatise  are  already 
famihar.  The  real  point  in  debate  is  as  to  whether  the 
human  mind  possesses  the  capacity  to  transcend  the  senses, 
and  come  into  real  cognitive  relations  with  what  is  super- 
sensible. Hence,  agnosticism  raises  a  debate  which  goes  to 
the  very  root  of  the  doctrine  of  cognition. 

I.  First  of  all,  agnosticism  shows  a  tendency  to  attach 
a  degree  of  unreliabUity  to  the  operation  of  the  powers  and 
faculties  of  the  human  mind.    The  hint  is  thrown  out  that 
these  powers  can  never  lead  to  certainty  in  any  sphere, 
much  less  in  regard  to  things  supersensible.    By  those  who 
hold  with  the  Pyrrhonists,  certainty  can  never  be  reached 
m  any  sphere,  and  the  only  attitude  of  the  human  mind 
is  that  of  absolute  skepticism.     It  is  said  that  the  first 
impressions  of  the  senses  may  not  be  correct,  for  they  have 
to  be  corrected  by  the  subsequent  exercise  of  the  under- 
standing.    This  appears  in  the  experience  of  the  child  as 
It  acquires  by  degrees  the  conception  of  relative  distance, 
from  the  first  impressions  made  on  the  senses  by  objects. 
This,  it  is  claimed,  suggests  that  the  senses  are  not  accurate 
in  their  apprehension  of  realities. 

2.  The  agnostic  theory  of  knowledge  is  always  more  or 
less  emfnrtcal  in  its  nature.  The  empirical  theory  limits 
human  knowledge  to  the  resources  of  the  senses.  So  far 
as  the  various  senses  extend  their  scope,  so  far  we  may 
have  knowledge;  but  we  cannot  go  beyond.  Sensation  is 
the  source  of  all  the  materials  of  cognition,  and  the  higher 


I 


'  -I 


llta 


-^-^ 


5a6 


APOLOGETICS. 


ri  I 


ii  i 


forms  of  knowledge,  which  we  regard  as  rational  in  their 
nature,  are  nothing  more  than  transformed  sensations. 
Habit,  ;-30ciation  and  heredity  account  for  the  whole 
fabric  of  human  knowledge,  no  matter  how  abstract  it  may 
appear  to  be.  Everything  grows  out  of  experience,  and 
those  elements  of  cognition  which  are  not  directly  sensa- 
tional are  only  idealized  experience.  Just  as  Greek  nescience 
and  Hume's  skepticism  were  associated  with  sensationalism, 
so  modem  agnosticism  is  connected  with  thorough-going 
empiricism. 

3.  The  agnostic  epistemology  generally  denies  the  a  priori 
factor  in  human  cognition.  It  steadily  refuses  to  admit  the 
real  objective  relation  of  the  cognitive  activity  of  the  mind 
to  the  reality  of  the  objects  of  cognition.  The  reality  of  the 
categories  of  the  human  understanding  is  not  admitted  by 
agnosticism.  It  does  not  concede  that  the  spontaneity  of 
the  spiritual  principle  in  man  is  determined  by  any  rules 
inherent  in  its  very  nature.  The  laws  of  thought  are  not 
fundamental,  and  hence  they  are  not  necessary  to  condition 
the  possibility  of  experience.  Even  these  uniformities  of 
cognition,  like  the  causal  relation,  are  the  product  of  repe- 
tition and  association,  of  habit  and  heredity.  Modem 
agnosticism  has  no  sympathy  with  any  type  of  rational 
psychology.    It  repudiatet^  the  a  priori. 

4.  Agnosticism,  consec  itly,  asserts  that  the  faculties  of 
the  human  mind  are  it.  equate  to  cognize  the  reality  of 
things  at  all.  Human  .  jowledge  pertains  to  the  sphere  of 
the  phenomenal ;  and  man  has  no  cognitive  powers  by  the 
exercise  of  which  he  comes  into  rational  relation  with  the 
non-phenomenal.  Since  man  acquires  all  his  knowledge,  in 
the  first  instance,  from  the  senses,  he  is  severed,  so  far  as 
cognition  is  concerned,  from  the  supersensible  or  hyper- 
empirical.  He  knows  appearances  only,  not  realities,  or 
things  in  themselves.  The  agnostic  sometimes  admits  that 
there  is  or  may  be  a  supersensible  world,  but  he  uniformly 
insists  that  we  cannot  know  aught  about  it.     This  is  to 


AGNOSTICISM. 


527 


sever  the  whole  rational  activity  of  man  from  the  realm  of 
reality,  and  to  commit  him  to  the  ever-changing  region  of 
appearances.  This  is  what  modem  agnosticism  uniformly 
does.    It  IS  a  scheme  of  phenomenalism. 

5-  Modem  agnosticism  is  usually  coupled  with  the  doc- 
trine of  the  relativity  of  human  knowledge.  In  many  cases 
agnostics  push  this  doctrine  to  an  extreme  in  the  interests 
of  their  views  of  cognition.  It  is  not  here  asserted  that 
there  IS  not  something  tme  in  the  relativity  of  human 
Imowledge,  much  less  is  it  implied  in  what  is  now  said  that 
all  who  hold  in  any  way  this  doctrine  are  agnostics.  It  is 
simply  stated  that  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  human 
knowledge  is  unduly  pressed  into  service  by  modem  agnos- 
ticism. *     - 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  at  this  point  to  enter  upon  a 
careful  dtscussion  of  the  relativity  of  human  knowledge 
The  doctrine  is  held  in  different  forms.    In  some  cases  it 
is  substantially  correct,  but  in  others  it  is  held  in  at  least 
a  one-sided  way.     By  some  this  doctrine  merely  denotes 
that  we  know  only  those  things,  and  that  we  know  them 
only  m  the  manner,  and  to  the  extent,  which  our  faculties 
enable  us  to  cognize  them.    When  used  in  this  way,  it  is 
ittle  more  than  a  truism,  for  it  leaves  entirely  unsolved 
the  problem  of  the  extent  of  human  knowledge,  and  of 
the  nature  of  the  objects  actually  known.     Others,  by  the 
relativity  of  knowledge,  mean  that  we  do  not  know  things 
as  they  really  are,  but  only  as  they  appear  to  be  to  us.    The 
human  mind  is  directly  related  only  to  the  appearances  of 
things,  and  we  ran  have  no  guarantee  that  things  them- 
selves are  wh^.  chey  appear  to  be.    Still  others  lay  stress 
upon  the  view  that  all  the  contents  of  cognition  must  pass 
through  the  forms  of  the  senses  and  understanding  before 
they  actually  become  matters  of  knowledge.     This  being 
the  case,  it  is  impossible  to  tell  what  changes  these  mate- 
rials may  have  undergone  in  the  process,  so  that  wc  can 
have  no  guarantee  that  there  is  any  real  and  accurate  know- 


528 


APOLOGETICS. 


ledge  of  things  acquired.  All  is  merely  relative,  and  nothing 
assured.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  agnostic,  pushing  this 
doctrine  to  an  extreme,  uses  it  in  favor  of  this  theory. 

III.  Agnosticism  as  Antitheistic.    §  124. 

1.  The  agnostic  theory  of  knowledge  has  been  explained; 
its  antitheistic  bearings  are  now  to  be  indicated,  for  agnos- 
ticism is  first  a  theory  of  knowledge,  and  then  an  antitheistic 
^nhrrr-.^,.  Taking  the  contents  of  the  preceding  section,  we 
n^  '  p  :^eed  to  show  how  the  agnostic  theory  of  knowledge 
!  .:essarily  leads  to  entirely  antitheistic  results.  As  this  is 
.  .ne  of  the  cultured  aspects  of  philosophical  unbelief  in  our 
o',vn  day,  it  is  of  the  utmost  moment  to  have  it  clearly  before 
us  in  this  discussion.  It  prevails  in  many  quarters  in  both 
Europe  and  America  in  our  own  time,  and  there  are  traces 
of  it  in  much  of  the  popular  literature  of  our  own  day.  It 
seeks  to  destroy  the  foundations  of  theistic  belief  b)  pro- 
pounding a  theory  of  knowledge  which  renders  that  belief 
impossible.  It  assumes  the  garb  of  humility  and  an  air  of 
modesty  in  regard  to  the  capacities  of  finite  human  under- 
standing, and  confesses,  most  willingly,  that  there  is  mucli 
that  is  mysterious  in  the  universe.  It  is  not  so  irreverent 
as  atheism,  nor  so  consistent  as  materialism;  but  it  bows 
before  the  mystery  which  lies  at  the  heart  of  all  existence, 
and  in  regard  to  God,  pleads  the  agnostic  attitude. 

2.  Agnosticism  essentially  consists  in  an  application  of 
the  theory  of  knoidedgc  it  holds  to  the  subject-matter  of 
religion.  It  argues  that  since  that  subject-matter,  broadly 
viewed,  belongs  to  the  realm  of  the  supersensible  or  nou- 
menal,  it  lies  beyoi.d  the  scope  of  human  knowledge.  It 
cannot  be  known.  Hence,  it  follows  that  God,  who  is 
confessedly  supersensible,  cannot  be  cognized.  The  whole 
round  of  spiritual  facts  which  pertain  to  religion  transcends 
the  senses,  and  so  they  cannot  be  known.  The  most  that 
can  be  said,  is  that  God  may  be  existent;   but  as  to  what 


i 


AGNOSTICISM.  j^p 

he  is  in  any  cognitive  way,  agnosticism  takes  an  entirely 
negative  view.  Even  if  there  be  a  God.  we  could  never 
know  enough  of  h.m,  and  of  our  relations  to  him.  to  justify 
us  m  actmg  upon  this  supposed  knowledge.  That  God  is. 
may  be  conceded  by  agnosticism;  but  as  to  what  he  is 
and  A.«;  we  are  related  to  him.  we  have  no  real  knowledge.' 
This  ,s  the  core  of  modem  agnosticism.  This  geneS 
position  may  be  elucidated  in  a  few  particulars 

3.  The  sensational  theory  of  knowledge  held  by  agnos- 
ticism  renders  the  knowledge  of  God  as  the  objefT  of 
religion  impossible.  Pure  empiricism,  with  its  deiial  o 
the  a  pnon  iactor  in  the  activity  of  the  spiritual  principle 
m  nun,  makes  it  unreasonable  to  expect  a  knowfedge  of 
the  spinttal  to  be  attained  by  mankind.     If  there  L  no 

m    u-  .'"r  *'°"^'^^'  ''^'^ "« -  p-^p"- 

thJr  Z  "V''  '"•"^  ^"  ^PP'-^hend  reality.  If 
there  be  nothing  real  and  permanent  in  the  whole  realm  of 
existence,  then  the  knowledge  of  God  as  such  a  being  ha 
no  valid  grounds.  Hence,  empiricism,  which  is  the  key  note 
of  agnosticism,  confines  cognition  to  the  sensible  and  phe- 
AnTsfnce'?  /  "  °"'  ''^  supersensible  and  noumenal. 
tnln  "^  '"  *''  supersensible,  he  cannot  be 

regard  to  human  knowledge  leads  straight  on  to  the  Ll 
of  agnosfcsm.     If  we  know  rhings,  not  r     thev  really  are 
or  as  they  are  apprehended  hy  the  .ubli.       n  oWhe   en"  ' 
hen  we  cannot  know  God  real) v.  ;  ut  on,"  as  he  is  reS 
to  ,  mr  powers  of  cotrn  ton  .P«f     .,,  „ 

b^heve    In    this  app,.ara,.-«  ,s  at  all  cong„„us  with  the 
reai.ty.     It  may  merel:-    >e      :  idealized  and  anthromornhic 

We  are  n^;"'  ^"  ""  "^"  ^""'^  ^"'  ''  ^'''  ^  -other's, 
we  are  not  anxi,,n<;  to  '!»"-  'hat  tu^r    •  , 

of  tnifh  ;„  *u-      I      '       ^^^'^  '■  "^^  ^"  *;lement 

taith^in  this  doctrine      Ti.ere  is  a  sense  in  which  we 


■^   .31 

J  H! 


mi 


n  ' 


'}\ 


.1  : 


l'.i 


!  r 


I, 

i 


53° 


APOLOGETICS. 


know  things  as  they  appear  unto  us,  though  it  does  not 
follow  that  we  do  not  know  them  truly  and  as  they  really 
are.  So  there  is  a  sense  m  which  we  know  God  only  as 
he  relates  himself  to  us  in  his  works  about  us,  in  our 
mental  and  moral  constitution,  in  the  revelation  of  the  Holy 
Scriptures,  and  in  the  experience  of  the  Christian  life.  But 
from  this  it  does  not  follow  that  we  are  bound  to  take  the 
gnostic  conclusion,  for  our  knowledge  of  God  as  a  fact, 
no  matter  how  it  has  been  acquired,  is  correct  and  valid 
as  far  as  it  goes. 

5.  A  few  brief  statements  may  make  the  antitheistic 
aspects  of  agnosticism  perfectly  evident.  First  of  all,  agnos- 
ticism does  not  deny  the  existence  of  God.  It  differs  from 
atheism  in  saying  that  there  may  be  a  God,  but  that  there 
are  no  faculties  in  man's  constitution  to  cognize  God.  Its 
real  ground  is  that  of  skepticism.  If  there  be  a  God,  he 
must  to  us  ever  be  an  unknown  being,  not  cognitively 
related  to  us. 

If  man  has  no  faculty,  "not  even  the  rudiment  of  a 
faculty,"  by  which  God  and  religious  realities  can  be  cog- 
nized; if,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  the  object  of 
religion,  which  is  God,  and  the  contents  of  religion,  which 
are  spiritual  truths,  are  inscrutable;  if  the  arguments  for 
and  against  belief  in  God  are  almost  evenly  balanced,  so 
that  judgment  must  be  suspended ;  and  if  we  know  things, 
especially  the  things  of  religi'  n,  only  as  they  are  related 
to  us,  then  in  each  case  the  agnostic  wsition  is  the  only 
one  to  hold.  Hence,  confessed  ignorance,  inherent  defect, 
or  simple  indifference,  are  the  marks  of  agnosticism  in  our 
own  day.  Usually  the  strict  agnostic  rests  in  sus(>cnsion 
of  judgment,  or  rational  indifference  in  regard  to  the  reality 
of  the  existence  of  Gou.  He  argues  that  there  is  no  good 
ground  for  bringing  the  thought  of  God  into  human  life 
in  any  such  way  as  may  affect  the  conduct  of  that  life. 


i-'\ 


CHAPTER  IX. 

AGNOSTICISM:   CRITICISM. 

Contents. 

«,H  T^n, .  »  Rdated—Agnosticsm  as  Antitheistic.-Admit  Mystery 
and  Limitation—Agnostic  Conception  of  God  at  Fault  rL  u  . 
Merely  the  Absolute.-Or  Unconditioned- "fves  no  p;;;*^^^^^^ 
Faith  or  Beliel-Kinship  of  Na'.re  Between  God  andTan  i^in.^ 
Agnostic.sn,.-a„not  Explain  Religious  Sentiments -Nor  R^Sou, 
R.te,.-Nor  Contents  of  the  Bible-Bad  Effects  of  Atheism 

LiTERATURI. 

Encyclop«di.  Article  on  //^«o./,Vwm.-Bowne's  The  Philosophy  of 
SI  /Jfr'';-^*r'"""'''  ^  SMy  of  Religion,  Vol  I..  B^k  l' 
Chaps.  l.-IV.-Bowne'g  Studu-t  in  Theism.  Chaos    II     III     n^.J. 

«^:'Xa'p  x%L"h-'?r ''*  ^--^'^^o^scii";^: 

In'.  Ti  X  ^r^"rP'"'  '  ^t"'«"<"«  o-d  Christianity,  Chap.  X.-Kaf- 
^^»  The  Truth  of  the  Christian  Religion.  Vol.  II.,  Chap. T-^wVe'. 
Meta,hys*cs  Part  III..  Chap.  II.-Miley's  SysteJt^Theoiogv^U 
IV.-Knighfs  Aspects  of  Theism.  Chap.  XIV.-GrouncI'sTt««^J 
Structural  Principles.  Part  II..  Chaps.  I.-V.-Smith's  f".VA  Hlpti 
osophy  Chap.  VIIL-Rishell's  The  FoundatioTof  he  Faith  Diyf 
Sec.  II..  Chaps.  I.-VIII..  and  Div.  II.,  Sec.  I.,  Chap,  I  II  H '11' 
Systematic  Theology.  Part  I..  Chap.  IV..  Sec.  T.  H.-MaheTo":  n 

?2r  chal  ri/"'/'''"''".^'  ^!;"'-  "-^'^''•»  ^^oderPh'yL^i 

/•a/a/wm  Chaps.  I.-IV.-Iverach's  TheUm,  Chap.  IX.-Maitland's  r*, 
«m  or  ^,„.,rtaj.^.Gir.rde.u-s  Discussions.  Lp.  XIL-S L?;." 

I.  The  Theory  of  Knotvledge:  Criticism.    §  125. 

SINCE  agnosticism  is,  first  of  all,  a  theory  of  knowledge 
that  theory  must  ht  carefully  examined.    It  were  folly 
to  allow  a  doctri.ie  of  cognition  to  hold  its  place,  if  the 


532 


APOLOGETICS. 


logical  result  of  that  doctrine  were  universal  skepticism. 
Such  a  doctrine  would  make  shipwreck  of  philosophy, 
morals  and  religion,  for  its  logic  would  surely  be  nescience, 
nihilism  and  atheism.  Hence,  the  epistemology  of  agnos- 
ticism challenges  careful  criticism. 

I.  The  charge  made  by  agnosticism,  that  our  faculties  of 
knowledge  are  more  or  less  unreliable,  cannot  be  admitted. 
We  maintain  that  the  powers  of  cognition  with  which  the 
human  soul  is  endowed,  when  taken  together  in  their 
normal  and  healthy  action,  are  trustv.'orthy.  If  the  senses 
have  to  be  corrected  in  experience  by  the  rational  judg- 
ment, the  result  is  that  the  combined  action  leads  to 
certainty,  not  uncertainty.  The  view  that  our  faculties  are 
constituted  to  be  true  and  trustworthy  is  firmly  held  against 
agnosticism.  To  hold  that  these  faculties  are  inherently 
constructed  to  deceive  and  perplex  is  absurd. 

It  is  not  necessary,  in  maintaining  the  inherent  reliability 
of  our  faculties,  to  hold  that  these  powers  are  competent 
to  embrace  the  whole  field  of  possible  knowledge,  or  that 
they  are  capable  of  fathoming  its  depths.     Faculties  of 
cognition  may  be  reliable  in  certain  spheres  without  being 
infallible  in  every  realm,  and  knowledge  may  be  quite 
trustworthy  within  its  proper  limits,  and  yet  not  be  om- 
niscient.    The  agnostic  seems  to  demand  infallibility  and 
omniscience   in   order   to   reliability   and   trustworthiness. 
This  we  do  not  admit,  but  protest  against  it  with  great 
earnestness.    We  argue  that  our  powers  were  made  to  be 
reliable,  and  their  results  trustworthy,  according  to  their 
finite  constitution;    and  if  one  set  of  faculties  willingly 
receives  correction  from  another  in  actual  experience,  this 
plainly  goes  to  show  that  when  the  complete  cognitive 
results  are  reached,  certitude  has  been  attainwl.    This  posi- 
tion is  earnestly  held  in  the  interests  of  science,  philosophy 
and  religion.     Unreliable  faculties  of  observation  would 
destroy  science,  uncertain  pnwff*  nf  reflection  would  obht- 
erate  philosophy,  and  defective  faculties  to  cognize  deity 


AGNOSTICISM. 


533 


The  agnostic  commits  treason 


would  annihilate  religion. 
against  all  three. 

2.    But  agnosticism  in  this  connection  commits  logical 
sutade.    If  the  faculties  of  the  human  mind  are  unreliable 
one  may  very  properly  ask  the  agnostic  how  he,  in  the  use 
of  these  same  faculties,  ever  reaches  so  surely  his  agnostic 
conclusions?    If  he  had  faculties  of  a  diflferent  sort  from 
those  possessed  by  the  theist,  he  might  make  good  his  con- 
tention;   but  he  must  rely  on  precisely  the  same  sort  of 
faculties  of  observation  and  powers  of  reflection  as  the 
theist.    If,  therefore,  these  faculties  and  powers  are  unre- 
liable and  untrustworthy  in  the  hands  of  the  theist.  they 
must  also  be  m  the  hands  of  the  agnostic.    Thus,  we  may 
turn  the  tables  on  the  agnostic  in  the  realm  of  his  psy- 
chology.    This  contention   may   be  pushed   against   the 
agnostic  with  fatal  effect.     If  the  human  pr    -rs  of  cog- 
nition  are  inherently  unreliable,  not  only  is  the  ..  ,ist  frus- 
trated in  his  views,  but  the  agnostic  is  blocked  in  the 
intentions  he  makes.    Nay,  more,  the  possibility  of  certain 
knowledge  in  any  sphere,  and  in  regard  to  any  matter,  is 
destroyed.    We  cannot  be  sure  that  we  do  not  know,  nor 
can  we  be  sure  that  we  are  not  sure  that  we  do  not  know. 
This  IS  the  absolute  skepticism  of  decadent  Greek  philosophy, 
and  It  IS  the  logic  of  modern  agnosticism  at  this  point.    In 
both  cases  it  is  absolute  nescience,  which,  having  destroyed 
theism,  commits  logical  suicide. 

3.  But  we,  further,  contend  against  agnosticism  that  the 
human  mind  does  come  into  cognitive  relation  with  reality 
as  well  as  with  appearances.  The  theory  of  knowledge 
steadily  maintained  in  this  treatise  justifies  this  statement. 
That  theory  is  the  rational,  as  distinguished  from  the 
empirical.  According  to  that  theory,  the  human  mind 
IK«sesses  rational  rules,  according  to  which  its  cognitive 
activities  come  into  exercise.  In  cognition,  the  mind  of 
man  comes  into  rational  relation  with  the  law«  of  thing* 
which  constitiite  their  real  being.    Hence,  while  the  senses 


I    ,/' 


534  APOLOGETICS. 

bring  the  human  mind  into  relation  with  the  appearances 
of  things,  the  rational  rules  of  the  spiritual  principle  in 
man  bring  the  mind  at  the  same  time  into  rational  relation 
■with  the  realities  of  things.  Only  thus  can  the  many  and 
varied  units  of  sense  perception  be  unified  into  a  whole  of 
rational  cognition.  According  to  this  epistemology,  the 
spiritual  principle  in  man  has  rational  relation  to  the  realities 
of  things.  Hence,  reality  is  not  entirely  beyond  the  grasp 
of  human  knowledge. 

If  this  doctrine  of  human  cognition  be  carefully  held,  the 
agnostic  theory  of  the  incognoscibility  of   reality  is  no 
longer  tenable.    If  human  knowledge  can  in  any  measure 
penetrate  the  supersensible  realm,  the  agnostic  position  is 
no  longer  defensible.    It  is  not  necessary  to  be  able  to  per- 
ceive m  an  omniscient  way  all  the  inner  secrets  of  real  being 
in  order  to  maintain  the  ground  against  agnosticism.     It 
is  enough  if  the  human  mind  is  able  to  look  through  the 
veil  between  the  sensible  and  supersensible,  and  come  into 
cognitive  relations  with  the  reality  that  is  involved  in  phe- 
nomenal appearances.    If  the  laws  of  thought  and  the  laws 
of  things  are  correlated  in  cognition,  empiricism,  on  which 
agnosticism  usually  rests,  is  destroyed.     The  foundation 
being  destroyed,  agnosticism  itself  falls  into  ruins.     Such 
being  the  case,  the  door  is  at  least  open  for  the  human 
mind  to  come  into  real  rational  relation  with  God,  even 
ihough  he  pertains  to  the  supersensible  realm.    Unless  the 
agnostic  can  show  that  God,  as  supreme  personal  reason,  is 
superrational,  he  fails  to  establish  his  position  in  the  sphere 
of  religion. 

4.  Against  agnosticism  the  ground  may  be  safely  taken 
that  a  knowledge  of  phenomena  is  possible  only  on  the 
supposition  of  the  reality  of  noumena,  and  that  in  the  fact 
of  the  knowledge  of  appearances,  the  knowledge  of  realities 
is  necessarily  implied.  We  may  not  know  both  by  the 
same  sources  of  cognition,  but  each  may  be  known  by  its 
own  appropriate  powers  of   rational  apprehension.     An 


AGNOSTICISM.  ^^ 

appearance  suggests  a  reality,  for  there  must  be  something 
to  appear.    A  phenomenon  witnesses  to  a  noumenon.    The 
separation    between   the   appearance   and    "the   thing   in 
Itself,    which  Kant  made  so  rigid  in  his  critical  idealism, 
a^d  which  Spencer  laid  hold  of  in  the  interests  of  agnos- 
ticism,  IS  artificial,  and  has  done  much  harm  both  to 
philosophy  and  theology.     The  idealism  of  Fichte  and  the 
nescience  of  Harrison  are  the  logical  results  of  this  unreal 
divorce  between  phenomena  and  noumena.    A  true  doctrine 
of  cognition  gives  a  place  to  both,  and  binds  them  together 
in  the  activity  of  true  knowledge.    By  the  senses  the  mind 
apprehends  the  appearances  of  things,  and  by  the  rules  of 
he  rational  spontaneity  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man. 
the  mind  apprehends  the  laws  of  the  reality  of  things.    The 
complete  act  of  cognition  involves  both.     By  this  means 
agan,  it  appears  that  the  door  is  open  for  the  cognition 
of  the  supersensible  involved  in  the  sensible,  and  the  agnostic 
has  no  rational  right  to  close  this  door. 

5-  A  right  understanding  of  the  doctrine  of  relaHvity  in 
relation  to  human  knowledge  does  not  favor  the  agnostic 
contention.  This  doctrine  has  puzzled  philosophers  in  all 
ages.  It  has  been  both  understated  and  overstated.  From 
the  days  of  the  Greek  sophists  and  skeptics,  down  to  the 
positivists  and  agnostics  of  our  own  time,  this  doctrine 
has  been  pushed  to  an  extreme  in  one  direction,  while  by 
Idealists  and  certain  intuitionalists  it  has  been  given  undue 
stress  in  another.  In  both  cases  harm  has  been  done  to 
philosophy  and  theism.  To  secure  a  well-balance'  position 
m  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  relativity  is  very  portant. 
Three  simple  remarks  may  be  helpful  to  this  end. 

First,  we  may  know  a  thing  truly  without  knowing  it 
tttlly.  We  may  know  very  much  about  any  object  of 
knowledge,  and  yet  be  far  from  knowing  all  about  it. 
Perhaps  perfect  knowledge  of  anything  is  possible  only  to 
omniscience.  Since  we  are  finite,  absolute  knowledge  of 
anything  may  be  impossible  to  us.    But  this  does  not  justify 


ij«:  'v 


It 


53* 


APOLOGETICS. 


the  agnostic's  position ;  or,  if  it  does,  then  the  only  deliver- 
ance from  agnosticism  is  omniscience.  The  old  distinction 
between  apprehending  a  thing,  and  comprehending  it,  is 
of  value  here.  The  fact  of  space  or  extension  may  illus- 
trate this  distinction.  We  apprehend  limited  portions  of 
s  >ace  as  extension ;  yet  we  do  not,  perhaps  cannot,  com- 
prehend space  in  its  infinite  aspects.  It  does  not  follow, 
however,  that  because  we  do  not  fully  comprehend  infinite 
space,  therefore  we  do  not  apprehend,  in  a  real  way,  what 
extension  is  as  a  fact. 

Secondly,  true  knowledge  does  not  require  identity  of 
nature  between  the  subject  and  object  in  cognition.  This 
error  dates  back  to  Descartes,  who  suggfested  that  essential 
distinction  between  mind  and  matter,  which  introduced  a 
rigid  dualism  into  philosophy.  It  also  led  to  the  one-sided 
solutions  of  it  presented  by  idealism,  pantheism  and  mate- 
rialism, respectively.  This  same  error  is  the  underlying 
assumption  in  many  phases  of  the  doctrine  of  relativity.  It 
is  assumed  that  before  we  can  have  a  knowledge  of  any 
object,  either  the  mind  must  be  reduced  to  the  terms  of  that 
object,  or  the  object  must  be  reduced  to  terms  of  the 
knowing  mind.  This  means  idealism  or  materialism.  It  is 
maintained  by  the  relativists  that  the  only  way  is  to  hold 
that  we  know  things  only  as  they  are  related  to  us  through 
our  powers  of  cognition.  But  this  does  not  justify  the 
conclusion  that  we  do  not  truly  know  things  as  they  really 
are.  The  sound  theory  of  knowledge  already  established 
enables  us  to  hold  that  true  cognition  does  not  require  abso- 
lute identity  between  subject  and  object  therein.  In  such 
cognition  there  is  a  synthesis  of  the  two  factors,  so  that 
both  appearance  and  reality,  both  the  sensuous  and  the 
rational,  are  bound  together  in  cognition. 

Thirdly,  a  knowledge  of  relations  implies  some  know- 
ledge of  the  things  related.  This  bears  very  directly  on 
the  question  nf  the  relativity  of  nur  knowledge.  Relations 
apart  from  things  related  are  nothing.     They  are  pure 


'■ 


AGNOSTICISM.  53^ 

abstractions,  and  have  no  rational  value.  To  say  that  we 
taow  thuigs  only  as  they  are  related  to  us  is  to  imply  some 
knowledge  of  the  things  related.  Then,  if  we  hold  the 
!!!;T  *^,^''*'"8:^'«h«d  from  the  empirical  psychology,  a 

iSint  ?f  ''  t'  °'^'"=*'  ''  "*="  -  the  subject  is 
attamed.     Thus,  a  knowledge  of  things  is  involved  in  a 

knowledge  of  the,  r  relations.  A  doctrine  of  pure  relativity 
..consequently  quite  untenable.  A  doctrine  of  modified 
relativity  enables  us  to  hold  that  while  we  know  things 
only  as  they  are  related  to  us  by  our  powers  of  knowing 
yet  we  know  thmgs  truly  in  this  way 

The  conclusion  is  reached  that  the  agnostic  theory  of 
taow ledge  breaks  down  at  various  points.  The  door  of 
taowledge  stands  open  towards  the  supersensible,  and  hence 
God  IS  not  necessarily  beyond  the  rational  grasp  of  the 
human  mind.  s     h  "»  me 

II.  Agnosticism  as  Antitheistic:  CriHcism.    §  126. 

I.    In  dealing  critically  with  the  antitheistic  aspects  of 
agnosticism,  an  important  admission  is  cheerfully  made 
The  spint  of  humility  in  regard  to  the  very  limited  scope 
of  human  knowledge,  so  far  as  it  is  just  and  sincere,  is 
worthy  of  praise  in  agnosticism.    It  is  also  conceded  that 
there  IS  much  of  mystery  in  the  things  we  know  in  part, 
and  that  in  the  case  of  the  knowledge  of  God  this  is  also 
the  case.    We  cannot  find  out  the  Almighty  unto  perfection, 
and  we  can  know  only  a  little  of  his  ways.     Clouds  and 
darkness  are  round  about  him.    There  is,  therefore,  a  valid 
and  a  necessary  agnosticism  in  our  religious  knowledge, 
which  IS  the  source  of  certain  aspects  of  true  reverence  and 
deep  devotion.    But  while  all  this  is  admitted  as  the  neces- 
^O'  results  of  the  relation  of  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  it  is 
still  maintained  that  we  do  know  God.    The  spiritual  prin- 
ciple m  man  comes  into  spiritual  relations  with  God  as  the 
•upreme  spirit,  and  hence  in  religion  there  is  an  element 


'538 


APOLOGETICS. 


JiS 


of  cognition.  So  far  as  the  knowledge  of  God  is  concerned, 
both  agnosticism  and  gnosticism  have  their  place.  There 
is  mystery  and  knowledge,  there  is  the  known  and  the 
unknown,  and  the  problem  for  the  philosophy  of  religion 
is  to  define  the  limits  of  each,  and  to  adjust  their  relations. 

2.  The  agnostic  conception  of  God  is  at  fault.  Passing 
by  the  point  that  one  wonders  how  the  agfnostic  has  any 
idea  of  God  at  all,  we  raise  serious  objection  to  the  way 
in  which  the  agnostic  arrives  at  the  incognoscibility  of  God. 
He  first  of  all  identifies  God  with  the  absolute.  God  is  the 
absolute  form  of  being,  and  is  consequently  out  of  relation 
with  all  other  forms  of  being.  This  being  the  case,  God 
is  out  of  all  cognitive  relation  with  the  human  faculties, 
and  hence  he  is  inscrutable  or  unknowable.  God  is  the 
absolute,  the  absolute  is  unknowable,  therefore  God  is  un- 
knowable.   This  is  agnostic  log^c. 

But  this  logical  procedure  is  illegitimate.  It  takes  the 
very  point  in  debate  for  granted.  The  question  relates  to 
the  knowableness  of  God.  To  say  that  the  absolute  is 
imknowable,  and  that  God  is  the  absolute,  is  an  evident 
begging  of  the  question.  But,  further,  the  agnostic  idea 
of  the  absolute  is  at  fault.  It  makes  it  an  entity,  whereas 
it  is  simply  a  quality  of  some  form  of  being.  God  may  be 
the  absolute  being,  but  it  is  not  true  that  the  absolute  itself 
is  a  form  of  being.  To  speak  of  the  absolute  as  inscrutable, 
therefore,  is  quite  absurd.  Then,  the  quality  of  absolute- 
ness, as  it  pertains  to  God,  does  not  place  him  out  of  relation 
with  all  other  forms  of  being.  It  rather  denotes  that  he  is 
not  dependent  on  any  other  being  for  his  origin  and  con- 
tinued existence.  It  means  that  he  is  self-existent  and 
indeperjent. 

But  the  agnostic  idea  of  God  is  mainly  defective  because 
it  makes  him  a  kind  of  abstraction  when  it  describes  him 
as  the  absolute.  God  is  nc  n  abstraction,  but  a  real 
spiritual  personal  being.  Agi.  icism  is  at  fault,  because 
it  always  obscures  this  fact.    God  is  the  infinite  personal 


,  i 


AGNOSTICISM.  53^ 

spirit  who  sustains  definite  relations  to  the  universe,  both 
as  to  Its  ongm  and  continued  existence.  But  he  himself  is 
ot  none  and  dependent  on  none. 

Not  unlike  this  agnostic  reasoning  is  that  which,  foUow- 
mg  Hamilton  asserts  that  God  is  the  unconditioned  form 
of  bemg  and  that  to  think  is  to  condition  the  object  thought, 
so  that  God  cannot  become  an  object  of  thought.  To  think 
of  God  IS  to  condition  God;  but  God  is  the  unconditioned, 

fel.  p  ?""°'  ^.  *'''"^^*'  °'"  *^°'"*=  ^"  object  of  know: 
ledge.  Reflection  for  a  moment  will  clearly  show  that  to 
come  mto  cognitive  or  thought  relations  with  any  object 
does  not  m  any  way  affect  the  conditions  of  the  being  of 
hat  object,  unless  we  be  idealists,  and  hold  that  the  cog- 
mtive  act  of  the  mind  creates  the  object.  Hence,  when 
the  human  mmd  comes  into  cognitive  relations  with  "God 
as  the  unconditioned  form  of  being,  the  ontological  con- 
ditions of  his  being  are  in  no  way  affected  by  the 
psychological  activity  of  the  human  mind.  Here  agnosti- 
cism greatly  blunders. 

3-  Agnosticism  gives  no  proper  place  to  faith  in  the 
sphere  of  theistic  and  religious  truth,  and  it  overlooks  the 
fact  that  between  faith  or  belief,  and  cognition  or  know- 
ledge, there  are  intimate  relations.  This  has  been  pointed 
out  in  the  Introduction  of  this  treatise.  Both  have  rational 
value  and  lead  to  certitude.  In  popular  usage  we  some- 
times say  that  we  know  when  we  believe,  and  believe  when 
we  know.  We  almost  as  readily  say  that  we  know  that 
there  is  a  God  as  that  we  believe  in  God.  This  shows  how 
close  y  belief  and  knowledge  are  bound  together,  and  that 
t)ehef  or  faith  is  one  avenue  to  truth  and  certainty. 

The  agnostic  ignores  this  fact,  and  argues  that  because 
Ood  IS  not,  as  he  thinks,  an  object  of  knowledge,  he  lies 
beyond  rational  apprehension  altogether.  But  this  does  not 
lollow.  Even  if  we  concede  to  the  agnostic  that  the  door 
of  cognition  is  closed  in  regard  to  God,  it  may  still  be  true 
that  the  avenue  of  belief  is  wide  open  to  reach  truth  and 


i 


S40 


APOLOGETICS. 


certainty  concerning  God.  At  this  point,  it  is  evident  that 
Spencer  does  but  scanty  justice  to  Kant  and  Hamilton,  in 
the  use  he  makes  of  them  in  favor  of  agnosticism;  for 
while  Kant  and  Hamilton  denied  that  the  understanding 
related  us  cognitively  to  God,  they  both  strongly  held  that 
by  faith,  and  on  moral  grounds,  the  human  mind  reaches 
undoubted  certainty  regarding  God.  This  fact  modern 
agnosticism  quite  disregards.  It  may  be  added  that  this 
faith  factor  may  be  the  fundamental  fact  m  our  rational 
apprehension  of  God,  so  that  the  agnostic,  by  ignoring  this 
factor,  does  serious  injustice  to  the  aptitude  of  the  human 
mind  for  God. 

4.  If  there  be  any  kinship  in  nature  between  God  and 
man,  then  agnosticism  may  be  untenable.  God,  according 
to  the  theistic  conception  of  him,  is  the  infinite  personal 
spirit;  and  man,  on  theistic  and  religious  grounds,  is  in 
his  inner  being  spiritual.  This  being  the  case,  there  may 
be  established  a  real  rational  relation  between  God  as  a 
spiritual  being  and  the  spiritual  principle  in  man.  If  this 
be  the  case,  the  door  is  open  for  man  to  come  into  real 
cognitive  relations  with  God.  The  agnostic,  unless  he  be 
a  materialist  also  in  regard  to  man's  constitution,  cannot 
ward  off  the  force  of  this  fact.  Of  course,  if  he  be  a 
materialist,  debate  with  him  ends;  but,  if  materialism  be 
refuted,  his  foundation  is  destroyed.  The  reality  of  God 
having  been  established  as  an  infinite  spiritual  and  personal 
being,  and  the  reality  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man  having 
been  made  good,  the  agnostic  contention  for  the  incognos- 
cibility  of  God  is  fully  met. 

And  with  this  the  Scriptures  agree  when  they  teach  that 
man  was  made  in  the  image  of  God,  and  that  there  are 
the  conditions  of  rational  and  moral  relations  between  God 
and  man  that  do  not  exist  in  regard  to  the  relations  between 
God  and  the  brutes.  If  man  be  the  crown  and  glory  of 
God's  creative  activity,  and  if  he  be  made  in  the  image 
and  likeness  of  God,  then  it  is  reasonable  to  conclude  that 


AGNOSTICISM.  54, 

tnan  (an  have  a  knowledge  of  God.  Of  this  high  preroga- 
tive the  agnostic  robs  man,  and  sends  him  on  his  dark 
pathway  of  ignorance  to  his  unknown  destiny.  It  blot- 
out  the  sun  from  his  heavens,  and  hides  from  man's  ej-e 
the  pole-star  which  guides  him  safely  on.  No  such  gloomy 
doctnne  meets  the  needs  of  a  being  made  in  the  image  of 
God,  and  made  for  God. 

S;    Agnosticism  is  greatly  perplexed  with  the  religious 
fwhngs  or  sentiments.    It  is  bound  to  admit  the  existence 
of  these  sentiments  in  the  human  breast.    The  experience 
of  men  everywhere  testifies  to  the  reality  of  these  senti- 
ments.    There  is  a  consciousness  of  the  divine  in  some 
form  m  the  human  race.    There  is  a  feeling  of  dependence, 
and  a  sense  of  responsibility,  in  the  heart  of  men  generally 
The  agnostic  is  bound  to  construe  these  facts  in  some  way. 
He  must  explain  them  in  harmony  with  his  denial  of  any 
cognition  of  God  on  the  part  of  man.    How  he  can  account 
for  a  feeling  of  dependence  on,  and  a  sense  of  accounta- 
bility to,  a  being  who  lies  beyond  his  cognitive  apprehension 
IS  almost  absurd.    The  agnostic  must  admit  this  religious 
feeling  and  sentiment,  and  deny  that  it  stands  related  in 
any  rational  way  with  the  being  of  God.    Religion  can  only 
be  a  purely  subjective  sentiment.    It  is  really  superstition, 
with  no  basis  in  objective  reality.     To  this  absurdity  the 
agnostic  is  shut  up. 

But,  further,  the  feelings,  psychologically  considered,  are 
associated  with  some  form  of  knowledge.  In  psychological 
analysis  we  have  first  the  cognitive  powers  of  sense  per- 
ception, understanding  and  reason,  and  then  we  have  the 
sensibility  or  feeling  capacities  of  the  human  soul,  followed 
by  the  will.  Now,  the  sensibility  is  always  related  to  cog- 
nition. If  there  be  no  content  of  cognition,  there  can  be 
no  aflFection  of  the  sensibility.  This  is  true  alike  in  the 
intellectual,  the  moral  and  the  religious  spheres.  The 
nature  of  the  cognition  will  determine  the  character  of  the 
feeling.     This  being  the  case,  agnosticism  is  convicted  of 


» 


f 


PiM^"^ 


m^'-H 


54a 


APOLOGETICS. 


ff 


'I 

I 


a  false  psychology  in  seeking  to  explain  religious  feelingfs 
or  sentiments,  without  reference  to  the  knowledge  of  God 
which  these  feelings  imply. 

6.  Agnosticism  has  no  proper  explanation  to  give  of  the 
universal  prevalence  of  religious  rites  and  practices  among 
men.  Agnosticism  is  bound  to  admit  that  men  in  all  ages 
and  conditions  have  exhibited  some  form  of  external  re- 
ligious activity.  There  is  a  belief  in  some  form  of  deity, 
and  religious  rites  connected  with  the  worship  instituted. 
This  belief  and  these  rites,  so  universal  among  men,  con- 
stitute a  real  problem  for  the  agnostic.  They  are  an 
outward  expression  of  the  feelings  and  sentiments  described 
in  the  preceding  section,  and  the  agnostic  is  bound  to  con- 
strue these  universal  fr.cts  in  harmony  with  his  ultimate 
position  in  regard  to  the  knowledge  of  Gud.  Here  the 
agnostic  usually  goes  far  a-field  to  account  for  the  fact.  He 
sometimes  lays  stress  on  the  mythical  instinct  in  the  race, 
forgetful  that  even  this  instinct  itself  is  a  problem  for  him. 
He  dwells  on  the  effect  of  fetichism  in  producing  religious 
belief  and  rites,  overlooking  the  fact  that  fetichism  has  to 
be  accounted  for.  He  makes  much  of  ancestorism,  .n  other 
cases,  and  derives  religion  from  respect  paid  to  departed 
ancestors,  apparently  insensible  of  the  fact  that  even  ancestor 
worship  involves  religion.  All  such  attempts  to  solve  the 
problem  of  the  universal  prevalence  of  religious  opinions, 
rites  and  practices  are  futile.  The  agnostic  has  no  explana- 
tion of  them  to  give.  When  he  says  that  God,  the  object 
of  religion,  is  quite  beyond  the  knowledge  of  man,  the 
subject  of  religion,  he  simply  leaves  universal  religious 
belief  and  practice  hanging  in  mid-air,  without  any  rational 
support.  Theism  fully  meets  this  problem.  It  holds  that 
man  comes  into  rational  relation  with  God;  and  that,  by 
reason  of  sin,  there  has  been  decline  in  the  knowledge  and 
service  of  the  true  God.  Hence,  all  forms  of  pagan  religion 
can  be  explained. 

7.  The  contents  of  the  Bible  greatly  perplex  the  agnostic 


AGNOSTICISM.  543 

Taking  the  Bible  simply  as  a  collection  of  remarkable 
religious  literature,  there  are  many  things  which  the  ag- 
nosfc  ,s  helpless  to  explain.  Here  we  have  a  great  many 
mtelhgent  and  devoutly  religious  men  and  women  whose 
experience  IS  exhibited  in  the  Bible.    They  had  clear  ideas 

t°L^  H  J^7  ^f  ""'^  '"™  '^^'  '^^  l'"**  God,  and 
that  God  had  spoken  to  them.    The  sense  of  God  in  the 

Old  Testament  is  very  vivid,  and  in  the  New  the  knowledge 
of  God  stands  cut  as  clear  as  noonday.  The  prophets  and 
apostles  were  mere  certain  of  nothing  than  that  there  was 
an  infinite  personal  God,  and  that  they  had,  by  some  means 
or  other,  a  knowledge  of  him. 

Now  if  agnosticism  be  true,  how  is  all  this  possible?  Or 
if  this  knowtedge  was  gained  by  men  of  the  biblical  era. 
how  IS  ajrnost,cism  tena.lc'  The  agnostic  seems  to  feel 
the  force  at  t  ms,  an.l  usually  has  but  little  to  say  concern- 
ing  the  comeut.  .  f  Scripture.  In  this  he  reveals  prudence. 
If  he  does  expose  the  defects  of  his  theory.  Yet  we  feel 
justified  in  calling  en  the  agnostic  to  account  for  the  gnos- 
ticism  of  the  Bible.  ^ 

In  addition,  the  agnostic  must,  further,  explain  the  un- 
doubted fact  that  men  may  be  taught  clearer  ideas  of  G-i 
by  the  contents  of  the  Bible.     This  we  see  in  th^  .-   ,.^ 
children,  and  is  evident  in  the  results  of  preachme      v >' - 
especially  does  it  appear  in  heathen  lands,  wheiv  •.■.».  .^  /. 
of  God  prevail.     These  heathen,  by  the  contents  "  ^  v^e 
Bible,  come  to  have  their  ideas  of  God  elevated  and  n  :  ■  eu 
Hovv  this  IS  possible  on  agnostic  ground  is  not  easily  mHer- 
stood      And.  above  all.  that  saving  knowledge  of  God 
which  sinful  men  come  to  have  by  the  preaching  of  the 
gospel,  and  through  faith  in  Christ,  stands  as  an  insuperable 
barrier  in  the  pathway  of  agnosticism.    The  fact  of  Jesus 
thnst  and  his  knowledge  of  God.  has  also  to  be  accounted 
or^    If  he  were  but  a  man.  how  had  he  this  knowledge? 
If  he  were  more  than  a  man.  God  was  revealed  in  him  in 
a  way  capable  of  apprehension  by  men;  and  all  the  experi. 


m 


■I  s 


rl 


U 
■I 


rz 


544 


APOLOGETICS. 


cnces  of  the  Chriswan  life  have  to  be  taken  into  account 
knd  explained  by  agnosticism.  This  cannot  be  done,  so 
agnosticism  is  rejected.  Theii.n  meets  all  the  conditions 
here.  It  provides  a  basis  for  the  knowledge  of  God,  it 
opens  the  v;ay  for  the  message  of  the  Scriptures,  and  it 
gives  all  the  conditions  for  a  true  religious  experience  in 
all  respects.  Hence,  eternal  life,  which  consists  in  knowing 
the  one  Vrm  God  and  Jesus  Christ,  whom  he  hath  sent,  is 
the  very  heart  of  true  religion. 

8.  To  conclude,  agnosticism,  if  made  universally  opera- 
tive among  men,  would  have  all  the  evU  moral  effects  of 
atheism  and  materialism-  Even  if  there  be  a  God,  if  I 
cannot  know  him,  this  is  practically  the  same  to  me  as  if 
there  were  no  God.  The  unknown  God  will  not  long  hold 
authority  over  the  human  heart  and  life.  If  reduced  to 
practice,  it  would  be  as  dangerous  anu  harmful  as  atheism, 
and  more  subtile,  for  it  wears  a  mask.  Agnosticism  seems 
very  humble  and  modest,  yet  its  influence  is  bound  to  be 
baneful.  Let  agnosticism  rule  the  thought  and  life  of  any 
people,  and  its  fruit  would  be  exceedingly  bad.  This  danger 
may  threaten  even  now.  Let  a  well-grounded  theistic 
philosophy  be  held,  let  a  firm  faith  in  the  Word  of  God 
be  m!siintained,  and  let  a  pure  gospel  be  faithfully  preached, 
and  all  will  be  well. 


•:  H 


DEISM  ANL      ATIONALISM. 
_.  .        _  Contents. 

In  ^Z±^X\!:'TrTZTr  ?  ^'-"'>'--I"  Greccc- 

alism.-Rationali,r-I„  J,  ™1S      '""^t"^^^ 

ence  of  God.-God   One    plr       f    T     °^   Deism.-Holds    Exist- 

Denie,  God's  I^r„a„e„Rera„°T   r',/""^'"*'"'-^'^'  Creator.- 

-No  Supcrnatur^vl^f-ro  ^V^tIc'^^^p7^°  "^T'o"'  '^'^ 
tion—Exaraination—GeneraJ   n„,  n  .   ?!     «     Prayer.-No  Redemp. 

c«lty.-How  has  God's  Relation  cl       ZT^J  "^°-^"  '"«'»'  Diffi- 
-Deism  Uy.  too  Much  8.^.  *^''^?f«-'''?-S«'f-nainte„ance  Difficult. 

Scope  of  Freedom—No  Place  for  Tr^^Ti       ^'^Pf'^"'*'  -impairs  the 

Literature. 

Ch-p.  VII,  Harris'  Co,,  Cr.^ZJu^JlrAUr^  i%"'  ^^tT' 
-lllmgworth'.  Difine  ImmaHencc.  Chan,  m  rv  «  '  ^'"P-  ^^^- 
«'/!«,  Book  I.,  aap  V-Far^nr.  w  ,  ;.■■  ^^— ^ruce's  Apola. 
-Stearns'  P,„,„,  C^A^s  Ch  7^x1  /'^  'V' 

of  Chrutuinily,  Ch^p   V  ~  ITrCosh-!  ri    n^"'"'' *  ^'"*''<"^'-hM  Ideas 
-Fisher's  D^u^Zs   cZ^^niluth^^^^^^  ^"'P-  "• 

C*m,i„,  /.„,,,,  Div.  I.    S«.  IV    Clfa;   ^^  The  foundations  of  tke 

ne^.  Chap.  Vin.-P.aser's  P;»S;^ 'i, '^.-^rv:,. ^^^ 
I.  Some  Preliminary  Explanations.    §  127. 
EISM.  like  materialism,  is  a  definite  scheme  and 
It  ha,  h.  rr^  ?'''"'  ^^"^'"•^'"  «•  ^"  antitheisticT;eory 

cry    :  -^  '?^!  '^'T,'"  """'^^"'''^•^^'  •^'-"••^"•<'"  '•"  aS 
«^verj  age.     The  problem  it  ra uses  does  not  relif  f     *u 


1. 


D 


-r-!^---e--!-=ad[ 


546 


APOLOGETICS. 


^eism  and  theism  substantially  agree,  but  in  regard  to  the 
latter  they  differ  at  vital  points. 

The  old  Greeks  frequently  raised  the  question  of  the  rela- 
tion of  the  gods  to  the  universe,  and  they  often  debated 
the  extent  of  their  control  over  the  affairs  of  men.    Anaxa- 
goras,  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle  incline  to  a  definite 
theistic  doctrine,  while  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans  in  different 
ways  represent  the  dcistic  type  of  speculation.    According 
to  the  latter,  the  gods  may  have  played  an  active  part  in 
first  framing  and  arran;^ng  the  universe,  but  they  after- 
wards withdrew  from  its  oversight,  and  do  not  now  exercise 
any  control  over  it.    The  affairs  of  men  and  the  concerns 
of  the  entire  universe  are  in  the  lap  of  chance  or  the  grasp 
of  fate.    This  was  ancient  deism.    It  represented  the  gods 
as  now  inactive,  and  the  universe  as  running  itself.     In 
England  and  France,  in  the  eighteenth  century,  there  was 
a  remarkable  development  of  this  type  of  thought.     In 
England  the  chief  exponents  of  deism  in  that  century  were 
Herbert,   Hobbes,   Bloj  ist,  Toland,   Shaftesbury,   Collins, 
Woolston,  Tindal,   Morgan,  Chubb,   Bolingbroke,   Hume 
and  Gibbon.    In  France  and  Germany,  men  like  Rousseau 
and  Voltaire,  who  did  not  go  to  such  extremes  of  atheism 
and  materialism  as  did  Le  Mettrie  and  D'Holbach,  are  the 
representatives  of  deistic  views.    In  our  own  day  there  is 
a  tendency  towards  a  deistic  view  of  the  universe  in  certain 
scientific  circles.     By  these  circles  the  laws  of  nature  are 
made  very  prominent,  and  the  universe  under  their  control 
is  almost  self-regulative,  so  that  the  agency  of  God  is  at 
least  kept  in  the  background,  if  not  excluded  entirely.    This 
tendency  threatens  to  dethrone  God  altogether,  and  leave 
the  universe  to  its  own  resources.     If  God  does  appear 
upon  the  scene  at  all.  it  is  only  in  some  occasional,  miracu- 
lous way.    In  the  interests  alike  of  science,  philosophy  and 
theology,  it  is  cheering  to  know  that  a  sounder  theistic 
doctrine  is  taking  hold  of  other  influential  scientific  circles 
in  our  own  day. 


DEISM  AND  RATIONALISM.  54;; 

n^rw'^V'Zi^'^  *"  "^"^'''^  discussions,  and  meaning 
deum   from  the  Utm.  has  the  same  meaning  as  theism 
whjch  comes  from  the  Greek.     But  in  discusfion,  onTi 
^t^sophy  of  religion  they  are  used  in  widely  different 
senses.    Theism  .s  the  doctrine  of  one  personal  God.  who 
sus tarns  abidmg  relations  with  the  universe.    Dei«n  is  the 
doctnne  of  one  personal  God.  who  does  not  now  sustain 
such  relations  w.th  the  works  of  his  hands.    The  former 
asserts  providential  control.  t..c  latter  denies  it.    The  term 
naturalism  ,s  often  used  in  this  connection.     This  te^ 
denotes  the  view  that  everything  that  transpires  in  the  uni- 
verse  is  happening  in  a  perfectly  natural  way  under  the 
laws  of  nature  pertaining  to  the  universe.     Natural  law 
and  order  account  for  everything,  and  there  is  nothing 
supernatural  m  nature  cr  in  religion. 

The  term  rationalism  is  one  very  frequently  used  in  the 
deistic  controversy.     This  term  indicates  the  place  given 
to  the  reason  and  conscience  of  man  in  matters  of  religion 
and  It  expresses  the  high  functions  they  discharge  for  man' 

LnT"*.  ;  ^.'''°"'  T'*  ""^  P'""^*''^'-  ''  the  sufficient 
Z^T  ^  u  ^^°"  ^°''  '"*"•  N°  supernatural  aid  is 
needed,  and  hence  special  revelation  is  quite  superfluous. 
The  light  of  nature,  which  is  the  light  in  man's  intellectual 
and  moral  constitution,  is  all  the  tutor  he  needs  for  his 
guidance  in  religion.  There  is  no  need  of  the  Bible  as  a 
sp«nal  revelation  from  God.  for  the  inner  light  of  reason 
and  ojnscience  which  God  has  kindled  m  the  human  «>ul 
IS  sufficient. 

Another  term  is  infidelity.  This  is  often  used  in  a  wide 
sense  to  denote  religious  unbelief  in  general,  but  it  should 
always  be  used  in  its  proper  definite  signification.  The 
term  infidel  first  came  into  common  use  in  the  days  of  the 
Crusades,  when  the  Turks  or  Saracens  were  called  infidels. 
lh.s  meant  that  they  did  not  believe  in  the  Bible,  nor  in 
jesus  Lhrist,  nor  in  the  supernatural  realities  of  the  Chris- 


il-l 


548 


APOLOGETICS. 


tian  system.  Hence,  in  the  strict  sense,  an  infidel  is  one 
who  does  not  believe  in  the  supernatural  factors  in  Chris- 
tianity. He  thus  corresponds  to  the  deist,  and  infidelity  is 
really  the  same  as  rationalism.  It  is  this  definite  scheme, 
of  which  these  terms  denote  different  aspects,  that  is  now 
under  notice. 


II.  Statement  of  the  Deistic  Position.    §  128. 

Deism  asserts  certain  things,  and  denies  certain  other 
things,  in  regard  to  the  main  topics  of  the  theistic  contro- 
versy.   These  are  now  to  be  set  forth  in  order. 

1.  Deism  asserts  the  reality  of  the  existence  of  God.  In 
this  it  differs  with  atheism  and  materialism,  and  agrees 
with  theism.  The  spirituality  and  personality  of  God  is 
held  fast,  and  his  separate  existence  from  the  universe  is 
asserted.  He  is  also  set  forth  as  the  creator  and  framer 
of  the  universe.  He  at  first  brought  it  into  being,  and 
endowed  it  with  all  its  powers  and  potencies.  He  also 
established  the  laws  or  fixed  order  of  its  activity,  so  that 
it  works  out  its  destiny  apart  from  his  hand.  The  fact  of 
the  existence,  independence  and  wise  creative  power  of  God 
is  strongly  asserted  by  deism. 

2.  In  regard  to  the  nature  of  God.  deism  further  holds 
that  he  is  one,  personal  and  intelligent.  The  monotheistic 
conception  of  God  is  clearly  grasped,  and  the  personality 
of  the  creator  of  the  universe  is  distinctly  asserted.  The 
moral  attributes  of  God  are  also  given  a  place  by  the  better 
types  of  deism,  and  in  some  cases  the  outlines  of  a  moral 
government  are  announced.  But  in  such  cases  the  relation 
of  God  to  the  imiverse  is  extra-mundai .J  and  mechanical. 
God  is  external  to  the  universe,  in  such  a  way  that  he  dncs 
not  exercise  any  direct  control  over  its  destiny.  God  is 
as  an  intelligent  watchmaker  who  has  made  a  watch,  and 
having  endowed  it  with  the  capacity  of  running  so  as  to 
keep  time,  he  leaves  it  to  run  itself. 


DEISM  AND  RATIONALISM.  549 

3.  In  the  sphere  of  religion,  deism  asserts  that  natural 
reason  and  conscience  are  amply  sufficient.    The  conclusions 
of  sound  rational  judgment,  and  the  dictates  of  conscience, 
are  adequate  to  guide  men  in  all  the  paths  of  duty  pleasing 
to  God     This  IS  that  aspect  of  deism  which  is  known  as 
rationalism,  and  it  denotes  the  fact  that  man  needs  no  other 
mstruction  in  order  to  know  the  will  of  God  than  what 
reason  and  conscience  teach.     This  is  the  light  of  nature, 
which  shines  in  the  human  soul,  and  is  enough  to  guide 
men  m  the  right  path,  and  home  to  God  at  last.     Special 
revelation  is  not  necessary,  and  the  Scriptures  do  not  so 
much  contain  such  a  revelation  as  set  forth  moral  and 
religious  teaching  which  confirms  the  light  of  nature  in 
the  soul.     Revealed  religion,  as  it  is  called,  grounded  in 
Scripture,  does  not  so  much  give  new  and  needed  truth 
as  confirm  what  reason  has  already  propounded  for  human 
conduct. 

4-  Deism  denies  the  constant  prot'idence  of  God  over  all 
his  creatures.     If  there  be  providence  at  all,  it  is  of  the 
most  general  nature,  and  consists  in  nothing  more  than 
simply  holding  the  universe  in  being.     A  special  provi- 
dence,  with   its  constant,   intelligent  and  tender  care,   is 
always  denied  by  deists.    It  is  sometimes  argued  by  deism 
that  the  doctrine  of  theism,  which  holds  that  God  has  a 
direct  and  constant  oversight  of  all  his  works,  implies  an 
mi],erfect  condition  of  the  universe,  and  is  not  entirely 
honoring  to  God.     If  God  has  made  the  universe  complete 
at  first.  It  does  not  need  his  sleepless  vigil  over  it  all  along 
Its  history.     The  universe  moves  on  according  to  definite 
hxed  laws  which  God  has  im,H.se.l  upon  it,  and  any  inter- 
ference with  the  o,H;ration  of  these  laws  is  unnecessary,  if 
not  impossible.     Great  stress  is  laid  upon  the  uniformity 
"f  nature,  and  the  rigid  character  of  her  laws.    Some  even 
go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  author  of  these  laws  is  not 
able  to  interfere  and  modify  their  operation.     Hence,  there 
can  be  no  sijecial  providence  in  the  universe. 


i», 


S50 


APOLOGETICS. 


5.  In  particular,  deism  denies  the  supernatural  aspects  of 
the  activity  of  God  in  relation  to  his  creatures.    Since  God 
is  extra-mundane  and  transcendent  merely,  he  cannot  in 
any  way  introduce  his  activity  into  the  cosmos  or  into  the 
sphere  of  humanity.    All  that  happens  is  purely  natural; 
nothing  whatever  is  supernatural.    This  is  true  in  nature 
and  in  the  realm  of  human  history,  and  especially  in  the 
matter  of  religion.    There  is  no  such  event  as  the  miracle, 
since  there  can  be  no  interruption  of  the  laws  of  nature. 
Touching  the  miracle,  deism  sometimes  contends  that  when 
our  knowledge  of  nature  is  complete,  the  unusual  nature 
of  the  miracle  will  disappear,  and  all  will  be  seen  to  be 
natural.     So  there  can  be  no  such  a  thing  as  answer  to 
prayer,  if  that  answer  implies  any  change  in  the  supposed 
order  of  nature  or  of  human  history.    All  that  prayer  can 
possibly  do  is  to  bring  our  hearts  into  willing  submission 
to  the  order  of  things  as  they  were  fixed  under  the  hand 
of  God.    Above  all,  deism  steadfastly  refuses  to  admit  the 
reality  of  any  kind  of  supernatural  revelations  from  God, 
such  as  are  recorded  in  the  Scriptures.    The  reality  of  those 
special  messages  from  God  which  men  in  Old  and  New 
Testament  times  claimed  to  have  received,  is  not  admitted. 
It  matters  not  how  strong,  reliable  and  abundant  the  evi- 
dence of  such  revelation  may  be,  it  is  not  competent  to 
justify  belief  in  its  reality,  for  God  is  not  now  in  such 
relations  with  his  creatures  as  to  make  this  possible;  and 
so  far  as  the  experience  of  anything  supernatural  in  per- 
sonal religious  life  is  concerned,  the  same  general  denial 
is  also  made.     Religion  is  all  natural,  and  it  is  morality 
rather  than  piety.     It  consists  in  living  according  to  the 
light  of  nature  shining  in  the  soul;   not  according  to  the 
light  of  external  revelation  shinine  into  the  soul.     The 
facts  of  theology  are  all  construed  as  natural  theology,  and 
the  facts  of  the  inner  life  are  all  interpreted  as  natural 
religion. 

Such,  in  broad  outline,  is  deism.     It  makes  God  tran- 


DEISM  AND  RATIONALISM.  551 

scendent  merely,  and  denies  all  aspects  of  his  supernatural 
oversight  and  activity  in  relation  to  his  works. 

III.  An  Examination  of  Deism.    %  129. 

The  examination  of  deism  now  to  be  made  can  only  be 
in  general  terms.    Detailed  criticism  of  individual  opinions 
m  regard  to  the  deistical  mode  of  construing  the  relations 
subsistmg  between  God  and  the  universe  cannot  be  now 
undertaken.    In  a  thorough  review  of  deism  in  all  its  bear- 
mgs,  It  would  be  necessary  to  make  an  estimate  of  divergent 
opinions,  from  the  one  extreme  of  a  bald  deism,  which 
does  little  more  than  recognize  the  one  infinite  being  as  the 
first  cause  and  ground  of  the  universe,  to  the  other  extreme 
of  that  elevated  deism,  which  is  really  advocated  by  some 
who  hold  the  Christian  name.     But  for  present  purposes 
It  IS  not  necessary  to  enter  upon  this  large  task,  for  all 
critical  ends  may  be  well  served  if  the  central  position  of 
deism  be  clearly  seized  and  carefully  examined.    That  cen- 
tral  position   lies  in   the  question   as   to   whether   God's 
relation  to  the  universe  is  merely  transcendent,  or  not  also 
immanent;  and  whether  God's  action  upon  the  universe  is 
merely  external  and  mechanical,  or  not  also  internal  and 
organic.    All  variant  aspects  of  deism  involve  this  question, 
and  here  lies  the  heart  of  its  debate  with  theism.     From 
this   central   position   all   controversy  about   general   and 
special   providence,   about   the  natural   and   supernatural, 
about  miracle  and  revelation,  and  about  Christ  and  redemp- 
tion, takes  its  rise:    and  at  this  point  theism  enters  into 
controversy  with  deism.    The  debate,  then,  is  as  to  whether 
the  deistical  interpretation  of  the  relations  of  God  and  the 
universe  is  correct,  and  affords  the  sound  philosophical 
basis   for   the   Christian   system   as   found   in   the   Scrio- 
tures.  *^ 

I.  The  deistical  view  has  an  initial  dimcultv.    The  deist 
admits  that  God,  as  the  creator,  organizer  and  endower  of 


:J 


i 


rli  > 


:| 


552 


APOLOGETICS. 


the  universe,  must  have  been  at  first  in  very  close  relations 
with  the  work  of  his  hands.  His  skill  planned  it,  his 
wisdom  arranged  it,  and  his  creative  power  brought  it  into 
existence.  As  it  came  at  first  from  his  hand,  he  must  have 
sustained  intimate  operative  relations  with  the  universe. 
This  arises  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case.  But  the 
deist  then  goes  on  to  argue  that  God  is  now  removed  from 
operative  relations  with  the  universe  which  he  originated. 
If  he  does  come  into  such  relations,  it  is  only  occasionally 
from  without,  and  in  an  extraordinary  way.  God's  normal 
relation  to  the  order  of  nature  and  the  process  of  human 
history  is  not  to  guide  and  order  all  things  therein,  but 
rather  to  watch  the  order  and  the  process,  and  to  be  pre- 
pared to  interfere  at  critical  junctures  when  disaster  seems 
to  threaten. 

Now,  the  deist  may  very  properly  be  asked  to  show  how 
this  change  of  relation  to  the  universe  on  the  part  of  God 
has  taken  place.  He  may  be  fairly  asked  to  show  why  it 
is  that  God  is  now  extra-mundane,  though  he  at  first  was 
in  close  touch  with  the  cosmos  of  nature  and  the  order  of 
history.  Or  we  may  ask  the  deist  to  make  it  plain  how  it 
comes  to  pass  that,  if  God  has  now  no  providential  hand 
upon  the  universe,  he  ever  had  a  creative  hand  upon  it.  The 
unchangeableness  and  omnipotence  of  God,  rightly  under- 
stood, fully  justifies  these  inquiries  of  the  deist;  and  they 
go  far  to  suggest  that  the  relations  of  God  to  his  works 
are  always  practically  the  same.  Then,  if  God,  as  sound 
theism  teaches,  be  the  abiding  jjround  and  reason  for  the 
continuance  of  the  universe  from  moment  to  moment,  as 
well  as  its  creator  and  first  cause,  his  fundamental  relation 
to  his  works  must  remain  the  same  from  moment  to  mo- 
ment; and,  in  addition,  if  there  be  good  reason  to  believe 
that  God's  creative  activity  was  neither  completed  nor 
exhausted  when  the  universe  Iwgan  to  be,  but  that  later  on, 
from  age  to  age,  new  forms  of  being  were  brought  into 
existence  by  creative  power,  then  the  deist  is  bound  to  show 


DEISM  AND  RATIONALISM.  553 

when  and  how  Gods  initial  organic  relation  to  the  universe 
was  changed  into  the  mechanical,  and  how  it  came  to  pass 
that  the  divine  immanence  was  withdrawn. 

2.  The  deist  has  also  to  face  the  fact  that  the  self-main- 
tenance of  finite  forms  of  being;  is  scarcely  more  rational 
than  self-origination.    The  deist  admits  that  the  universe 
did  not  create  itself  at  first.     The  self-production  of  any- 
thmg  IS  unthinkable,  and  the  self-existence  of  any  finite 
form  of  being  is  scarcely  conceivable.    Theism  asserts  that 
there  is  only  one  seif-e.xistent  being,  and  that  is  God.    The 
materialist  is  somewhat  consistent  in  holding  that  the  uni- 
verse maintains  itself  now,  because  he  teaches  that  matter 
is  eternal,  that  is,  that  it  is  infinite  as  to  time.     But  when 
the  deist  asserts  that  the  universe  is  finite,  and  no*  self- 
produced,  but  created  by  God,  he  is  bound  to  show  that 
the  self-mamtenance  and  self -regulation  of  the  natural  and 
moral  universe  is  a  rational  belief.    This  he  finds  a  difficult 
task. 

The  fact  that  not  a  few  philosophers  and  theologians 
have  proposed  continuous  creation  at  the  hand  of  God,  as 
the  best  explanation  of  the  continued  existence  and  provi- 
dential care  of  the  universe,  indicates  how  hard  it  is  to 
regard  as  reasonable  any  kind  of  self-maintenance  of  a 
universe  that  had  a  beginning  in  time  and  is  finite  in  its 
nature.  The  deist  must  show,  from  the  order  of  nature 
and  the  course  of  human  history,  that  this  order  and  course 
are  self-sufticient.  self-regulating  and  self-maintained.  The 
assertion  of  the  deistical  doctrine  requires  this,  and  we  are 
convinced  of  its  error  at  this  point. 

3-  From  this  it  follows  that  deism  lays  too  heavy  a  burden 
on  natural  lazv.  It  maintains  that  God.  having  framed  the 
universe,  and  having  endowed  it  with  certain  potencies, 
has  placed  it  under  certain  definite  laws,  and  has  commis- 
sioned these  laws  to  conduct  nature  and  human  affairs  to 
their  appointed  destiny.  There  is  no  doubt  much  that  is 
true  in  what  deism  has  to  say  alwut  the  uniformity  of 


■  { 


i^^f  (I 


iM^, 


554 


APOLOGETICS. 


nature,  and  the  fixity  of  natural  law,  still  when  the  whole 
burden  of  regulating  the  natural  and  moral  order  of  the 
universe  is  laid  upon  these  laws,  the  load  may  be  more 
than  they  can  bear.  In  addition,  deism  is  in  danger  of 
giving  a  wrong  construction  of  the  nature  and  function  of 
natural  law  in  the  uniformity  of  nature.  These  laws, 
whether  in  the  order  of  nature  or  in  the  course  of  human 
affairs,  have  in  themselves  no  rational  or  executive  power 
at  all.  They  are  neither  physical  causes,  nor  rational  agents, 
nor  mora^  ulers.  They  are  merely  the  expressions  of  the 
uniform  mode  in  which  these  causes,  agents  or  rulers  exer- 
cise their  i>ower  or  authority.  In  relation  to  God,  they 
simply  express,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  his  wisdom, 
his  power,  and  his  moral  authority.  Apart  from  divine 
agency,  these  laws  would  be  empty  abstractions,  if  not 
nonentities.  If  this  be  the  case,  it  seems  impossiMe  to 
separate  the  agency  from  the  lav,  or  to  transfer  the  agency 
to  the  law  as  deism  does.  The  deist  goes  to  the  opposite 
error  of  the  pantheist  at  this  point. 

4.  The  deist  often  lays  t.  o  much  stress  on  the  distinction 
between  the  physical  and  the  nio^al.  He  does  this  when 
he  suggests  that,  while  God  may  have  now  no  control  over 
physical  events  in  the  order  of  nature,  he  may  yet  exercise 
authority  over  events  in  the  realm  of  human  affairs.  Indeed, 
one  of  the  strong  contentions  of  certain  types  of  deism  is 
that  God  holds  men  under  mora!  responsibility,  that  con- 
science is  the  voice  of  God  in  the  human  soul,  and  that 
if  its  voice  is  faithfully  heeded,  the  life  will  be  pleasing  to 
God,  and  reach  its  happy  goal  in  the  end.  We  have  no 
dispute  with  the  teaching  of  this  type  of  deism  upon  God's 
relation  to  the  moral  order  of  which  man  forms  a  part. 
But  we  contend  that  the  moral  and  physical  are  so  inti- 
mately related  that  it  is  impossible  to  admit  moral  govern- 
ment and  consistently  deny  physical  control.  If  God 
governs  in  the  one  sphere,  he  also  rules  in  the  other.  This 
is  plainly  evident  in  the  case  of  man.     He  has  a  physical 


DEISM  AND  RATIONALISM. 


555 


organism,  which  relates  him  in  various  ways  to  the  order 
of  nature,  and  he  has  a  moral  constitution,  by  which  he 
becomes  a  part  of  the  moral  order.    If  he  is  'inder  God  in 
the  one  sphere,  he  must  also  be  in  the  other.     To  teach 
otherwise  is  absurd.    The  only  consistent  deistical  doctrine 
IS  that  God  has  no  oversight  in  either  sphere,  and  that  as 
nature  is  self-contained  under  natural  law,  so  human  affairs 
are  self-contained  under  moral  law;    but  in  neither  case 
has  God  any  interest  in  what  takes  place.    This  would  be 
consistent;  but  the  price  of  the  consistency  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  moral  government.    There  is  no  alternative.    The 
physical  and  moral  are  so  bound  up  together  that  the  same 
philosophy  of  both  must  be  given.    The  choice  is  between 
the  baldest  deism,  which  makes  God  a  perpetual  absentee 
from  the  universe,  and  a  consistent  theism,  which  regards 
him  as  an  abiding  resident  in  it,  and  as  ruling  over  all 
forms  of  being  embraced  in  it,  ever  in  harmony  with  the 
nature  of  each  of  these  orders  of  being. 

5.  Deism  makes  it  difficult  to  hold  a  sound  doctrine  of 
human  freedom.    Man  becomes  a  part  of  that  universe  from 
which  God  is  usually  absent.    In  that  universe  mechanism 
generally  prevails.    All  events  are  under  the  reign  of  law, 
and  there  is  small  place  for  man's  moral  agency.     Even 
if  we  hold  that  the  creator  has  endowed  man  with  inherent 
freedom,  yet  man  is  placed  by  the  deist  in  a  universe  where 
mechanism  prevails,  and  not  in  a  universe  where  all  events 
are  to  be  traced,  in  the  last  analysis,  to  the  free  activity 
of  God,  the  author  of  all.    Under  these  circumstances  man's 
autonomy  must  be  seriously  impaired.     He  is  placed  in  a 
universe  where  rigid  law  rules;  and  his  own  nature  is  also 
under  a  moral  law  which  is  imposed  upon  him.    This  cannot 
but  hamper  his  freedom.     Thus  it  also  appears  that  the 
best  and  widest  field  for  human  freedom  is  found  where 
a  free,  rational,  holy  God  exercises  control  in  the  spheres 
of  both  natural  and  moral  government.    This  is  what  theism 
provides. 


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APOLOGETICS. 


6.  Deism  leaves  no  proper  scope  for  the  exercise  of  the 
divine  love,  pity  and  compassion  towards  men.    God  >s  far 
removed  from  the  universe,  and  does  not  concern  himself 
with  the  affairs  of  men.    He  is  too  far  away  to  touch  us 
with  his  tender  compassion,  and  we  are  too  distant  from 
him  for  the  eye  of  his  pity  to  see  us.    There  is  no  bridge 
by  which  our  burdened  souls  may  go  to  him,  and  no  channel 
down  which  his  consolations  may  flow  to  us.     His  hand 
is  too  far  removed  tc  wipe  away  the  tears  of  sorrow,  or 
to  bind  up  broken-hearted  grief.     He  cannot  be  t  present 
help  in  time  of  trouble,  nor  a  deliverer  in  seasons  of  dis- 
tress.   Deism  presents  a  God  cold  and  distant;  too  cold  to 
love  and  too  distant  to  help  his  creatures.    This  condemns 
it  on  emotional  grounds.  t  n  a 

7  Deism  is  open  to  this  practical  objection,  that  if  Uod 
is  not  concerned  in  us,  why  should  we  concern  ourselves 
with  him?  If  God  does  not  care  for  his  creatures  by  his 
providence,  why  ought  his  creatures  trouble  themselves  with 
obedience  to  him?  If  there  be  no  other  moral  government 
than  that  which  the  law  of  my  moral  being  expresses  to 
me,  why  should  I  be  troubled  about  obeying  God,  or  be 
concerned  about  any  rewards  and  punishments  at  his  hand? 
Deism  cuts  the  sinews  of  a  moral  life,  and  removes  one  of 
its  strong  sanctions. 

8.    In  conclusion,  deism  leaves  no  place  for  the  super- 
natural facts  and  experiences  of  a  Christian  life.    The  Bible 
as  a  supernatural  revelation,  Jesus  Christ  as  the  Son  of 
God  and  divine  Saviour  of  men,  the  atonement  as  a  real 
sacrifice  for  our  sins,  regeneration  as  the  work  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  our  souls,  the  contents  of  a  truly  religious  life, 
prayer  as  a  really  efficacious  exercise,  the  resurrection  of 
the  body  and  the  life  everlasting,  have  no  real  place  on 
the  basis  of  the  deistical  philosophy.    This  is  its  final  and 
fatal  defect;  and,  being  marked  by  this  defect,  it  can  give 
no  adequate  interpretation  of  the  facts  of  the  history  of 
the  Christian  religion.     In  this  history  we  have  a  great 


t  5 


DEISM  AND  RATIONALISM. 


557 


mass  of  facts  pertaining  to  the  affairs  of  men,  which  cannot 
be  construed  on  the  foundation  of  the  deistic  philosophy. 
Theism  has  no  difficulty  with  these  facts.  God  is  the  postu- 
late cf  the  moral  order,  as  well  as  of  the  natural  order. 
But  deism,  when  weighed  in  the  balances,  is  found  wanting. 
It  may  be  well  to  add  that  the  Apologetics  of  a  century 
ago  proceeded  largely  upon  the  basis  of  a  modified  deism. 
The  result  was  that  the  distinctive  supernatural  features  of 
Christianity  were  regarded  in  a  somewhat  external  and 
mechanical  way.  With  the  advent  of  a  richer  theistic 
philosophy  of  the  relation  of  God  to  the  universe,  a  more 
vital  Apologetic  has  come  into  existence.  Even  Butler  did 
not  entirely  free  himself  from  certain  features  of  deism. 


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CHAPTER  XI. 
PANTHEISM:   STATEMENT. 

Contents. 

Pantheism,  Deism  and  Theism  in  Contrast— Pantheism  Subtile  and 
Persistent.— Its  History.— India.— Greece.— Mediaeval  Times.— Modern 
Days.— Spinoza.— Hegel.  —  General  Description.  —  Three  Principles.— 
One  Essence.— Finite  Things  Derived.— Principle  of  Derivation  in  the 
One  Essence.— Personality  of  the  Monistic  Essence  Denied.— The  Re- 
ality and  Creation  of  Finite  Things  Denied.— Four  Historic  Types  of 
Pantheism.- Hindoo,  with  Brahm  and  Emanation.— Greek,  with  Pure 
Being  and  Manifestotion.— Spinozistic,  with  Substance  and  Modification. 
—Hegelian,  with  Absolute  Reason  and  Idealistic  Evolution.  Summary 
of  the  Statement  of  Pantheism. 

LlTERATURB. 

Encyclopedia  Articles  on  Pantheism  and  Afonwm.— Pinnock'i  5^»- 
wojo.— Saisset's  Modern  Pantheism.— Caird' a  Spinota—Jandt'z  History 
of  Pantheism.— h\Mt'i  Pantheism  and  Christianity.— Plamtret'a  His- 
tory of  PanfAmm.- Martineau's  Study  of  Religion.  Book  III.,  Chaps. 
I.,  II.— Bruce's  Apologetics,  Cha,  III.— Flint's  Antitheistic  Theories, 
Chap.  IX.— Caird's  Fundamental  iu.«  of  Christianity,  Ch  ps.  III.,  IV. 
— Oarke's  Outline  of  Christian  Theology,  Part  I.,  Chap.  III.— Royce's 
The  World  and  the  Individual,  Chap.  IX.— Ebrard's  Apologetics,  Vol. 
II.,  Sec.  v..  Chaps.  I.,  II.— Miley's  Systematic  Theology,  Vol.  I.,  Chap. 
HI.,  Sec.  II.— Rishell's  The  Foundations,  Div.  I.,  Sec.  III.,  Chaps.  I.- 
IX.— Strong's  SystemaHc  Theology,  Part  II.,  Chap.  III.,  Sec.  HI.— 
Modern  Skepticism,  Chap.  II.— Bowne's  Studies  in  Theism.  Chap.  HI.— 
Eraser's  Philosophy  of  Theism.  Vol.  I.,  Chaps.  V.,  VI.— Christlieb's 
Modem  Doubt  and  Christian  Belief.  Chap.  HI.,  Sec.  III. 

I.  Preliminary  and  Historical.  §  130. 
i."WT|TE  have  now  to  consider  pantheism.  This  great 
VV  type  of  semi-reUgious  philosophy  has  ^'ways  had 
a  large  place  in  speculative  thought.  It  has  been  alike  per- 
sistent and  widespread  in  both  ancient  and  modern  times. 
It  seems  to  have  a  certain  attractiveness  to  many  minds 
that  delight  to  meditate  on  high  themes.  As  a  type  o£ 
thinking  upon  these  themes,  it  is  subtile  and  potent.  In 
some  cases  Christian  thinkers  of  speculative  instincts  have 


PANTHEISM. 


559 


shown   pantheistic   tendencies.     The  Christian  apologete 
must,  therefore,  inspect  pantheism  with  some  care. 

The  purer  and  nobler  aspects  of  pantheism  have  certain 
points  of  affinity  with  theism.  Like  theism,  it  lays  stress 
upon  the  fundamental  unity  of  the  absolute  ground  of  all 
existence;  but  it  differs  with  theism  as  to  the  precise  nature 
of  that  ground.  Lit- 3  theism,  pantheism  maintains  the 
immanent  relation  of  what  it  calls  God  to  the  finite  uni- 
verse; but  it  is  not  in  agreement  with  theism  in  regard  to 
the  real  transcendence  of  God  in  relation  to  the  cosmos. 
In  certain  respects,  pantheism  stands  at  the  opposite  pole 
of  thought  from  deism.  Deism  insists  on  the  positive 
transcendence  of  God,  and  almost  ignores  his  immanence, 
while  pantheism  always  emphasizes  the  divine  immanence 
at  the  expense  of  his  transcendence.  But  theism  asserts 
both  the  transcendence  and  immanence  of  God  in  reference 
to  his  relations  with  the  universe  of  finite  things,  and  it 
seeks  to  construe  both  facts  in  a  well-balanced  way,  and 
thereby  to  provide  an  adequate  philosophical  basis  for  the 
Christian  system.  Pantheism,  however,  lays  insistent  stress 
on  t!ie  essential  and  generic  unity  of  all  existence,  and  it 
refuses  to  admit  that  the  finite  cosmos  and  its  infinite  ground 
are  to  be  numerically  distinguished  from  each  other.  This 
means  that  God  and  the  universe  are  in  some  way  to  be 
identified.  God  is  eith  -  hidden  in  the  universe,  or  ths 
universe  is  lost  in  God. 

2.  The  history  of  pantheism  is  an  interesting  and  instruc- 
tive chapter  in  the  trend  of  human  thought.  The  Hindoo 
theosophy  involved  in  both  Brahmanism  and  Buddhism  is 
perhaps  the  oldest  type  of  pantheistic  speculation.  In  Greek 
philosophy  it  appears  in  several  forms.  Anaximander,  with 
his  mtttpov  as  the  source  of  all  things,  came  near  to  the 
notion  of  pantheistic  unity.  The  Heraclitics,  in  quite  an- 
other way,  with  their  conception  of  all  finite  tbings  ever 
becoming  in  ceaseless  flow,  sought  for  a  monistic  principle 
of  existing  things.    Some  of  the  Stoics,  in  their  conception 


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APOLOGETICS. 


of  the  cosmos  as  a  vast  vital  entity,  were  nearly  on  the 
same  ground.  In  later  Platonir  speculations,  especially  in 
the  Alexandrian  school  of  Proclus  and  Plotinus,  very  dis- 
tinct pantheistic  tendencies  emerge.  But  the  Eleatics,  like 
Xenophones,  Zeno  and  Parmenides,  are  the  urqualified 
pantheists  of  Greek  philosophy.  In  their  conception  of  the 
one,  or  the  all,  or  pure  being,  they  assert  the  unity  and 
reality  of  one  unchanging  essence,  and  at  the  same  time 
they  deny  anything  but  a  phenomenal  reality  to  the  many 
in  finite  forms  of  existence.  This  is  pure  monism  in  ancient 
times.  In  Gnosticism  there  are  also  distinct  traces  of  pan- 
theistic influences. 

In  medicpi'd  times  there  was  little  pantheistic  philoso- 
phizing, save  as  the  neo-Platonic  philosophy  affected  the 
thinking  of  certain  scholastics.  In  the  controversies  between 
the  scholastics  who  were  Aristotelian  in  their  philosophy, 
and  those  who  were  Platonic,  the  latter  always  inclined  to 
what  may  be  called  idealistic  pantheism.  These  scholastics, 
moreover,  represent  some  of  the  very  best  aspects  of 
mediaeval  speculation. 

In  modern  days  pantheism  has  widely  prevailed.  Bruno 
and  Boehme,  in  Italy  and  Germany,  respectively,  in  a 
vague  way,  were  its  modem  precursors.  But  it  was  the 
philosophy  of  Descartes  that  se*-  the  problem  which  modem 
pantheism  in  Spinoza's  hands  sought  to  solve.  Descartes 
asserted  an  inherent  dualism  between  mind  and  matter, 
between  spiritual  and  material  forms  of  existence.  To 
resolve  this  dualism,  and  to  mediate  between  mind  and 
matter,  the  occasionalism  of  Gueliux,  the  preestablished 
harmony  of  Leibnitz,  and  the  vision  of  ali  things  in  God 
of  Malebranche,  were  proposed.  But  it  was  the  Jew, 
Spinoza,  who  resolved  this  dualism  by  asserting  the  sole 
reality  of  a  unitary  substance,  which  underlay  both  mind 
and  matter,  and  of  which  both  spiritual  and  ma.erial  forms 
of  being  were  merely  modes.  There  is  only  one  essential 
reality    which,  as  eternal,  self-existent  substance,  has  for 


PAxNTHEISM. 


561 


us  two  attributes,  thought  and  extension,  under  which 
attributes  all  modes  of  spiritual  and  material  existence  in 
the  finite  universe  may  be  construed.  This  is  typical  modern 
pantheism,  and  it  has  had  many  adherents. 

In  more  recent  times,  in  that  type  of  modem  idealistic 
philosophy  which  sprang  from  Kant,  and  which,  through 
Fichte  and  Schelling.  culminated  in  Hegel,  we  have  the 
latest  type  of  pantiieism.     By  Hegel,  the  monistic  ground 
of  all  existence  in  the  finite  universe  is  unconscious  reason 
or   impersonal   tiiought  or  absolute   idea.     This   reason, 
thought,  idea,  or  ego,  takes  the  place  of  Spinoza's  sub^ 
stance;  and  while,  perhaps,  it  is  not  so  clearly  defined  as 
was  Spinoza's  monistic  principle,  it  was  perhaps  a  more 
fruitful  conception.     All  finite  things  in  the  universe  are 
construed  m  relation  to  absolute  reason,  and,  by  a  logical 
process,  are  deduced  from  it.    This  may  be  called  idealistic 
pantheism,  and  by  its  denial  of  personality  to  its  monistic 
principle,  is  radically  opposed  to  theism.    In  our  own  day, 
those  who  are  in  sympathy  with  this  doctrine  are  anxious 
to  attach  moral  attributes  to  absolute  reason,  or  uncon- 
scious thought,  and  in  this  way  to  provide  a  philosophical 
basis  for  the  moral  world  and  a  valid  ground  for  the  ethical 
life  of  moral  beings,     In  this  way  that  aspect  of  idealistic 
pantheism  which  is  called  ethical  monism  has  arisen  in  our 
own  day.    The  aim  of  this  efifort  is  laudable;   but  so  long 
as  personality  is  denied  to  the  absolute  and  self-existent 
ground  of  finite  things,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  that 
ground  can  proi)erIy  possess  moral  attributes,  or  establish 
and  conduct  a  moral  government  over  any  forms  of  being. 
This  very  meagre  historical  sketch  will  suffice  to  show  that 
pantheism  has  had  a  long  history,  and  that  it  can  claim  the 
prestige  of  many  noble  names. 

II.  General  Description  of  Pantheism     §  131. 
While  pantheism  has  as.sumed  many  v     ant  historical 
and  speculative  forms,  yet  its  essential  principles  are  capable 


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ii: 

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562 


\POLOGETICS. 


of  comparatively  easy  exposition.  This  section,  m  a  brief 
•way,  undertakes  to  give  that  exposition,  in  the  hope  that 
a  simple  analysis  of  generic  pantheism  will  suffice  in  its 
discussion  as  an  antitheistic  theory. 

I.    Pantheism  of  all  types  always  asserts  that  there  is 
only  one  real  and  abiding  existence  in  the  realm  of  bemg. 
There  is  only  one  absolute  and  self-existent  essence,  only 
one  fundamental  and  eternal  substance,  only  one  real  and 
unchanging  being.     No  matter  under  what  category  this 
essence,  substance  or  being  is  construed,  it  is  always  unitary. 
It  is  infinite,  eternal,  self-existent  and  absolute,  yet  essen- 
tially and  inherently  one.    This  monistic  basis  has  in  it  all 
the  resources  that  are  necessary  to  explain  the  finite  and 
changing  universe;  but  amid  all  these  changes,  the  ground 
of  all  change  is  unchanging,  and  suffers  no  decay  in  its 
real  being.    It  is  often  called  God,  but  this  adorable  name 
is  not  applicable  to  this  one  essence  in  any  proper  theistic 
sense,  for  the  reason,  mainly,  that  personality,  and  all  it 
involves,  are  denied  to  this  essence.     But  pantheism  is 
always  monism,  impersonal  monism,  and  wherever  we  have 
this  conception  of  absolute  reality  we  have  pantheism. 

2    Pantheism  of  all  shades  always  construes  finite  thmgs 
in  relation  to  this  one  abiding  essence.    The  precise  mode 
of  that  construing  may  vary,  but  the  fact  is  held  fast  by 
all  pantheists.    Finite  things,  which  are  many  and  changmg. 
have  no  real  abiding  being  in  themselves.    The  many  have 
no  reality,  the  one  only  has  real  being.     Finite  things 
are  derived  in  some  natural  and  necessary  way  from  the 
infinite  monistic  ground  of  all  being.     Any  reality  which 
these  finite  things  has  is  temporary  and  derivative,  not 
permanent  and  inherent.    Views  differ  widely  among  pan- 
theists as  to  the  precise  mode  whereby  finite  things  are 
de'ived  from  the  monistic  source  of  all  being,  but  all  are 
agreed  that  in  some  necessary  way  this  derivation  takes 
place.    It  is  never  creation,  for  no  new  essence  or  substance 
is  brought  into  existence  by  this  process  of  derivation. 


'  'I  r 


PANTHEISM. 


563 


These  finite  things  are  always  phenomenal,  and  ever  chang- 
ing. The  only  temporary  reality  they  possess  comes  from 
the  reality  derived  from  the  one  only  real  essence.  They 
are  a  stream  ever  flowing  on,  a  fire  ever  blazing  up,  a 
panorama  ever  passing  by,  a  procession  ever  moving  on. 
They  have  no  abiding  reality;  they  are  derived  in  some 
inherent  way  from  the  monistic  ground  of  all  real  being; 
and  they  are  always  to  be  construed  in  relation  to  that 
ground.  The  unreal  and  derivative  nature  of  all  finite  things 
in  the  universe  is  common  to  all  aspects  of  pantheism. 

3.  The  principle  of  the  derivation  of  finite  things  from 
their  infinite  monistic  ground  is  always  within  that  ground. 
That  monistic  ground  is  self-contained,  and  has  in  it  the 
resources  of  all  finite  forms  of  being.    By  some  immanent 
process,  finite  things  arise  out  of  the  secrets  of  the  one  and 
only  real  essence.     This  process  cannot  be  called  creation, 
and  hence  its  ground  need  not  be  called  a  creator.     This 
monistic  ground,  either  from  its  own  inherent  nature  or 
because  of  the  conditions  of  its  existence,  is  so  constituted 
as  to  express  or  exhibit  itself  in  forms  of  space  and  time, 
of  motion  and  thought,  of  order  and  end.    This  expression 
or  exhibition  constitutes  the  universe  as  it  is  from  moment 
to  moment.    There  is  no  extra-mundane  agent,  nor  a  neces- 
sarily definite  intelligence,  involved  in  the  process  in  ques- 
^'on,  for  out  of  the  native  immanent  resources  of  primal 
c  ig  all  things  finite  come.     If  this  inner  principle  of 
^rivation  be  called  God,  he  is  confined  within  the  universe, 
.  lies  back  of  it,  without  ever  transcending  it  in  any  respect. 
The  universe  and  God,  so  far  as  real  essence,  at  l'»ast,  is 
concerned,  are  to  be  regarded  as  numerically  identical.    The 
universe  is  not  created  by  God.    The  universe,  at  best,  can 
only  be  the  existence  form  of  God  at  any  given  time. 
The  impersonal  ground  of  all  existence  expresses  itself  in 
the  finite  universe,  and  the  reason,  cause  and  end  of  that 
expression  are  to  be  discovered  in  that  ground.    The  prin- 
ciple of  the  derivation  of  the  universe  is  intra,  not  extra- 


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564 


APOLOGETICS. 


I 


nundane,  and  the  limits  of  the  cosmos  indicate  the  bounds 
of  the  activity  of  the  absolute  ground  of  all  existence. 

These  three  principles  mark  all  kinds  of  pantheism.    Pan- 
tlieism  is  monism.    Pantheism  derives  finite  things  by  some 
ratural  process  from  its  monistic  ground.     The  pnnctple 
■A  the  process  of  derivation  lies  within  that  ground.    Inci- 
dentally, it  may  be  added  that  all  forms  of  pantheism  deny 
the  personality  of  its  monistic  principle,  refuse  to  admit 
that  finite  things  have  any  save  a  phenomenal  reality,  and 
leave  no  place  for  a  proper  doctrine  of  free  and  intelligent 
creation.     God  and  the  cosmos  are  in  some  way  to  be 
regarded  as  identical.    It  may  almost  be  said  that  the  uni- 
verse produces  itself,  and  this  is  about  the  same  as  to  say 
that  God  reproduces  himself  in  the  universe.    Wherever  we 
find  a  system  of  thought  which  involves  these  main  posi- 
tions, we  are  in  touch  with  some  one  or  other  of  the  many 
types  of  pantheism. 

III.  Four  Historic  Types  of  Panthism.    §  132- 

In  the  further  exposition  of  pantheism,  it  may  best  serve 
our  purpose  to  give  a  brief  description  of  some  of  its  great 
historic  forms.  There  are  at  least  four  of  these  which 
arrest  attention  and  invite  inspection.  A  brief  sketcn  of 
each  of  them  will  supply  concrete  illustration  of  the  -''dactic 
statement  made  in  the  preceding  section,  and  may,  pt. -aps, 
serve  to  make  our  general  view  of  pantheism  more  definite 

and  clear.  ,    •  ..u» 

I  Chronologically,  the  Oriental  type  of  pantheism  is  the 
most  ancient.  It  appears  in  its  most  definite  forr^  among 
the  Hindoos  in  India,  though  there  are  hints  of  it  m  Persia, 
Egypt  and  China.  It  took  its  rise  somewhere  between  1500 
B  C  and  600  B.  C,  and  it  supplies  the  philosophical  basis 
of  Brahmanism,  and,  to  some  extent,  of  Buddhism  also. 
This  type  of  philosophy  has  colored  the  whole  life  of  many 
millions  of  the  human  race. 


1; 


'ii  „. 


PANTHEISM. 


S6S 


The  primal  essence,  the  one  only  reality,  is  thought  of 
as  a  sort  of  spiritual  entity.  It  is  called  Brahm,  or  primal 
essenoe,  and  it  constitutes  the  basis  of  the  Hindoo  theosophy. 
It  is  usually  conceived  of  under  the  category  of  spirit  rather 
than  matter,  hence  Hindoo  philosophy  has  affinity  with 
idealism  rather  than  materialism.  This  Brahm  is,  however, 
impersonal  and  un.onscious,  yet  it  is  the  source  of  all  finite 
thmgs.  These  finite  things  have  reality  only  as  they  par- 
take in  the  essence  of  Brahm.  This  vague,  shadowy,  half 
spiritual,  yet  impersonal,  conception  of  real  being,  is  re- 
garded as  deity,  and  as  the  fountain  of  all  finite  being. 

The  mode  by  which  finite  thirgs  are  derived  from  the 
resources  of  Brahm  is  cmamtion.    Finite  things,  including 
the  members  of  the  human  race,  are  eons  which  spring  from 
Brahm  by  a  process  whose  principle  is  inherent  in  Brahm. 
This  process  may  be  called  emanation,  although  it  is  not 
quite  the  same  as  the  emanation  of  the  neo-Platonism  which 
appears  in  Gnosticism.     By  this  rather  vague  and  specula- 
tu-e  process  finite  tilings  of  all  sorts  and  grades  rise  into 
phenomenal  being;    and.  after  they  have  served  their  day 
and  generation,  they  fall  back  again  into  the  bosom  of 
Brahm,  and  their  temporary  existence  thereby  comes  to  an 
end.     In  an  ever-recurring  process  this  goes  on  through 
the  ages. 

2.  Th-  Greek  pantheism  is  also  of  high  antiquity  and 
well  d'  .in  its  form.  It  appears  in  the  Eieatic  philoso- 
phy, about  400  B.  C.,  and  it  was  potent  in  the  speculation 
of  that  period,  and  long  afterwards. 

The  fundamental  essence  which  alone  has  reality  is  pure 
being.  This  is  conceived  of  in  different  ways.  It  i:  some- 
times called  the  one,  as  against  the  manifold  of  finite  exist- 
ence, and  again  it  is  called  the  all,  as  embracing  the  total 
reality  in  all  finite  things.  This,  in  any  case,  is  taken  to 
be  the  sole,  unchanging  and  underived  existence.  In  it, 
as  one,  all  rea'  >eing  abides.  It  alone  is  unchanging,  and 
is  pure  noumenal  being.     In  it  lies  the  secret,  and  is  found 


<     : 


:•  .  < 


% 
■■    I  : 


I' 


%\ 


m 


ill 


t  " 


/§ 


566 


APOLOGETICS. 


■■  i: 

!   i   .: 


S)  Hi 


the  source,  of  the  many  as  they  appear  in  various  passing 
forms  of  existence. 

As  to  the  principle  and  process  by  which  finite  things 
are  derived  from  the  one,  the  Eleatics  were  never  clear,  and 
their  statements  upon  this  point  are  not  very  consistent. 
Some  went  as  far  as  to  deny  that  finite  things  had  any 
reality  at  all,  but  this  was  against  both  sense  and  reason. 
Others  were  content  to  give  finite  things  a  sort  of  unreal, 
phenomenal  existence,  and  to  rest  in  a  quite  empirical  inter- 
pretation of  their  relation  to  the  one,  as  the  unity  of  real 
being     About  all  that  can  be  said  concerning  the  relation 
between  finite  things  and  real  being  is  that  in  them  real 
being  is  manifested.    Manifestation,  then,  is  the  term  we 
may  take  to  denote  the  relation  between  the  one  and  the 
many,  between  the  noumenal  and  the  phenomenal. 

r  Spinoza,  about  1600  A.  D.,  represents  modern  con- 
sistent pantheism.  It  is  stated  by  him  in  a  wonderfu % 
clear  and  logical  way,  so  that  there  is  not  mucn  difficulty 
in  under?     iding  his  scheme. 

The  fundamental  and  only  real  essence  is  substance.   This 
substance  is  one,  real,  infinite,  eternal  and  self-existent.    It 
is  in  itself  neither  spiritual  nor  material,  though  it  becomes 
the  source  of  both  kinds  of  finite  existence.     By  Spinoza, 
and  those  who  think  with  him,  this  substance  is  always 
identified  with  God,  and  the  one  basal  reality  and  ground 
of  all  existence  may  be  described  equally  well  by  one  of 
these  terms  as  by  the  other.     Not  only  is  this  substance 
infinite  in  its  extent  and  resources,  but  it  also  possesses  an 
infinite  number  of  attributes.    But  for  us,  and  our  appre- 
hension, there  are  only  two  attributes.    These  are  extension 
for  material  thin-s  and  thought  for  spiritual  tnings.    Each 
material  obje-       x  mode  of  substance  exhibited  under  the 
attribute  of  extension,  while  each  spiritual  entity  is  a  mode 
of  this  same  substance  under  the  attribute  of  thought 
Hence,  a  tree  is  infinite  substance  expressed  as  a  mode 
of  the  attribute  of  extension;   while  a  human  soul  is  the 


^i 


♦ 


PANTHEISM. 


567 


same  substance  expressed  as  a  mode  of  its  attribute  of 
thought. 

The  principle  which  marks  the  process  of  the  derivation 
of  finite  things  from  their  basal  reality  is  here  more  clearly 
defined.  It  may  be  termed  modification.  According  to 
this  conception,  finite  things  are  modes  of  infinite  substance, 
determined  according  to  one  or  other  of  these  two  attributes 
of  extension  and  thought.  Substance  is  capable  of  many 
modifications  under  these  two  attributes,  and  in  this  way 
the  multiplicity  of  finite  things  is  explained.  This  substance 
is  always  impersonal,  and  this  affords  real  difficulty  to  an 
otherwise  attractive  scheme.  How  any  modification  of  an 
impersonal  entity  could  ever  produce  a  personal  form  of 
finite  being  is  hard  *o  conceive!  The  process,  it  must  be 
added,  by  which  il;.s  activity  of  modification  takes  place 
is  never  free  and  distinctly  rational.  It  is  always  necessary, 
and  mechanical  in  its  nature.  By  such  a  process,  however, 
the  whole  cosmos  of  finite  things,  in  its  origin,  progress 
and  end,  is  derived  from  the  one  all  in  all. 

4.  The  Hegelian  type  is  the  most  recent  phase  of  pan- 
theism. It  seeks  to  avoid  some  of  the  rocks  on  which 
Spinoza's  system  suffers  shipwreck,  and  in  doing  so  comes 
into  some  affinity  with  neo-Platonism  and  Hindoo  theoso- 
phy.  Hegel's  syi tern  may  be  well  cal'ed  idt^^iistic  p  ' he'  ?m, 
and  in  its  better  aspects  it  has  some  good  features,  ^  icially 
as  against  materialism. 

The  primal  essence,  according  to  Hegel  '"s  pure  thought, 
absolute  reason  or  unconscious  rnirit.  Th'  Ij.isal  reality  is 
construed  under  the  conception  .f  pirit  ratiir  •  than  matter, 
of  the  idea  rather  than  the  atom.  This  pure  thought  is 
sometimes  called  pure  being,  and  at  first  it  is  also  regarded 
as  impersonal.  In  this  absolute  unconscious  reason  there 
IS  a  principle,  or  inner  logical  movement,  which  is  its  main 
feature.  This  process  is  a  thought  or  rational,  not  pnysical 
or  mechanical,  process.  In  this  process  the  secret  of  finite 
things  is  to  be  found. 


I 


1^ 


'     i 

I     i 


n 


ii 


I 


1568 


APOLOGETICS. 


The  process  of  the  derivation  of  finite  things  from  their 
original  source  has  been  practically  suggested.    The  phrase, 
idealistic  evolution,  may  express  it.     This  process  is  not 
material  or  dynamical;  it  is  rather  logical  and  rational  m 
its  nature.    There  is  a  spiritual  principle  in  all  finite  things, 
whether  we  call  them  spiritual  or  n.aterial,  or  whether  they 
be  found  in  nature  or  in  human  spirit.    In  that  fact  resides 
the  unity  of  all  things.     The  rational  which  comes  into 
■finite  things,  and  constitutes  their  passing  reality,  flows 
by  a  logical  process  which  is  a  thought  activity,  and  which 
may  be  termed  idealistic  evolution.     This  process,  as  ex- 
pressed by  Hegel,  is  quite  complex,  and  in  some  respects 
it  seems  superficial.     By  means  of  it  all  finite  things  are 
construed  in  relation  to  absolute  unconscious  reason,  which 
is  the  source  of  them  all. 

These  are  the  great  historic  types  of  pantheism.  They 
are  all  monistic,  presenting  a  unitary  principle  as  the  primal 
essence  of  all  things.  It  may  be  Brahm,  pure  being,  infinite 
substance,  or  unconscious  reason,  but  it  is  always  unitary; 
and  finite  things  are  always  derived  from  the  unitary  basis 
by  means  of  a  principle  resident  in  that  basis,  and  they 
have  naught  save  a  phenomenal  and  temporary  reality. 
Whether  it  be  emanation,  manifestation,  modification  or 
evolution,  it  matters  not.  The  principle  and  the  process 
are  in.  and  from,  the  basal  reality;  and  are  in  no  sense 
outside  of  it,  so  that  finite  things  thereby  produced  cannot 
be  thought  of  as  numerically  distinct  from  the  fountain 
whence  they  flow,  and  into  which  they  return  when  their 
finite  career  ends.  We  may  now  be  prepared  for  some 
criticism  of  this  great  antitheistic  scheme  in  the  next  chapter. 


I  k' 


<  \ 


m. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


PANTHEISM:    CRITICISM. 
Contents. 

Criticism  Necessary,  for  Pantheism  Subtile  and  Attractive.— Defec- 
tive on  Philosophical  Grounds.— Its  Advocates  Differ  Widely.— No 
Absolutely  Unitary  Basis.— Does  not  Explain  Finite  Things— Facts  of 
Life  and  Consciousness  Unaccounted  for.— Personality  Denied.— Defec- 
tive on  Moral  Grounds.— No  Basis  for  a  Moral  Order.— Obliterates 
Moral  Distinctions.— Robs  God  of  Intelligent  Freedom.— Denies  Free- 
dom and  Responsibility  in  Man.— Has  all  the  Evil  Results  of  Atheistn 
in  Practice.— Defective  on  Religious  Grounds.— Destroys  Religion  as 
Well  as  Morality.— Idea  of  God  Inadequate.— Relation  Between  God 
and  Man  Excludes  Religion.— Gives  no  Basis  for  the  Facts  of  Objective 
Revelation.— Nor  Proper  Place  for  the  Subjective  Facts  of  Religious 
Experience.— But  Theism  Adequate  at  all  These  Points. 

LtTEHATURE. 

Encyclopedia  Articles  on  Pantheism  and  A/oiiwrn.- Caird's  Spinosa. 
— Saisset's  Modern  PoM//ifw»i— Flint's  Antithcistic  TItforics.  Chap.  X, 
— Bruce's  Apologetics.  Chap.  Ill  — Caird's  Fundamental  Ideas,  Chaps. 
VI.,  VII.— Hunt's  Pantheism.— lAWvyi^  Systematic  Theology,  Vol.  I., 
Chap.  III.,  Sec.  II.— Rishell's  Foundations  of  the  Faith.  Div.  I..  Sec. 
III..  Chaps.  I.-IX..  and  Div.  IV.,  Sec.  I..  Chap.  III.— Strong's  Syste- 
matic Theology,  Part  II.,  Chap.  III..  Sec.  HI.— Hodge's  Systematic 
Theology,  Vol.  I.,  Part  I.,  Chap.  III..  Sec.  W— Modern  Skepticism. 
Chap.  II.— Bowne's  Studies  in  Theism.  Chap.  VII.— Eraser's  Philosophy 
of  Theism,  Vol.  I..  Chaps.  \'..  VI.— Girardeau's  Discussions,  Chap. 
VIII.— Christlieb's  Modern  fhmht  and  Christian  Helief.  Chap.  III..  Sec 
III.— Cudworth's  Intellectual  System  of  the  tMitrrii.— Fairbairn's 
Philosophy  of  the  Christian  Religion.  Chap.  I. 

THIS  chapter  undertakes  to  criticise  pantheism  in  the 
interests  of  theism.  Tliat  which  is  good  in  it,  such 
as  the  emphasis  which  it  puts  upon  the  immanence  of  God 
in  his  works,  may  be  freely  conceded.  But  its  fatal  defects, 
as  a  philosophy  of  the  relation  of  God  to  the  universe,  and 
of  the  nature  of  God  as  well,  must  be  plainly  indicated. 
The  popular  idea  of  pantheism,  as  that  system  which  regards 
God  as  merely  the  sum  total  of  concrete  existing  thing?. 


"a  h 


h 


'  H 


S70 


APOLOGETICS. 


must  be  set  aside  as  a  defective  conception  of  this  great 
system.  Pantheism  is  a  much  more  profound  theory  of 
existing  things  than  this  popular  idea  suggests.  That  it 
is  in  itself  a  subtile  system  is  undoubted,  and  that  it  is 
attractive  to  a  certain  type  of  minds  is  evident.  Especially 
in  its  attractive  modem  dress  of  ethical  monism  is  it 
inimical  to  a  sound  theism  which  gives  a  rational  basis  for 
Christianity.  Due  care  in  its  criticism  is,  therefore,  neces- 
sary.   This  critical  survey  is  made  under  three  heads. 


.  f 


I.  Criticism  on  Philosophical  Grounds.    §  133. 

I.  Some  weight  is  to  be  attached  to  the  fact  that  the 
adherents  of  the  pantheistic  view  of  existing  things  are  not 
in  agreement  in  regard  to  the  main  elements  of  their  system. 
This,  of  course,  in  itself,  is  not  a  refutation  of  pantheism, 
yet  it  is  a  consideration  which  exhorts  us  not  to  accept  it 
hastily.  Especially  will  it  have  weight  if  it  can  be  shown 
that  theism  is  a  more  definitely  conceived  system,  and  if 
it  appears  that  its  advocates  are  in  g^reater  agreement  with 
each  other.    This,  we  believe,  can  be  done. 

That  pantheists  are  at  variance  with  each  other  at  many 
points  is  evident  from  the  statement  of  the  system  made 
in  the  last  chapter.  It  was  incidentally  brought  out  in  that 
chapter  that  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  one  primal 
essence,  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  finite  things,  and  their 
relation  to  that  monistic  essence,  and  especially  in  regard 
to  the  way  in  which  the  fleeting  things  that  make  up  the 
finite  universe  are  derived  from  their  monistic  and  imper- 
sonal source,  there  is  not  a  little  diversity  of  view  among 
pantheists.  Is  Brahm,  or  pure  being,  or  infinite  substance, 
or  unconscious  reason,  the  unitary  basis  of  all  things? 
Then,  is  emanation  or  manifestation,  modification  or  evolu- 
tion, the  mode  by  which  finite  things  are  derived  from  their 
infinite  source?  Have  concrete  finite  things  any  actual 
reality,  or  are  they  entirely  unreal,  and  the  whole  universe 


iMiBi 


PANTHEISM. 


S7i 


merely  a  passing  show?    Is  the  Hindoo,  or  Parmenides,  or 
Spinoza,  or  Hegel  right  ? 

Other  deeper  differences  exist  among  pantheists.  Some 
hold  that  the  primal  monistic  essence  has  the  attributes  of 
both  mind  and  matter,  others  that  it  has  the  attributes  of 
matter  only,  and  still  others  the  attributes  of  mind  alone. 
These  differences  are  radical,  and  lead  to  entirely  different 
constructions  of  the  general  scheme  of  things.  Then,  in 
regard  to  the  place  of  personality  in  the  system,  in  regard 
to  the  operation  of  secondary  causes,  and  in  regard  to  the 
relation  of  morality  to  the  monistic  essence,  pantheists  differ 
widely.  So  we  see  much  diversity  of  opinion  among  them. 
On  the  other  hand,  tlieists  are  in  closer  agreement.  They 
practically  agree  in  holding  that  God,  as  infinite,  spiritual 
and  personal,  is  the  primal  reality;  that  the  universe  of 
finite  things  has  a  dependent,  but  genuine,  reality,  due  to 
the  causal  creative  agency  of  God;  and  that  God  is  both 
immanent  and  transcendent  in  his  relation  to,  and  opera- 
tions in,  the  universe.  Such  being  the  case,  theism  has 
the  rational  advantage  over  pantheism. 

2.  It  may  be  charged  that  pantlieism  does  not  provide 
an  absolutely  unitary  principle  to  account  for  the  system 
of  existing  things.  That  it  does  provide  such  a  principle 
is  its  high  claim,  and  as  against  materialism  t'  ^s  claim  has 
some  weight.  Bit  it  is  very  evident  that  in  its  explana- 
tion of  finite  things  it  requires  two  principles.  It  has  its 
primal  essence,  and  its  principle  for  the  derivation  of  finite 
things  from  that  essence.  Without  this  principle  the 
essence  would  be  absolutely  impassive  and  immobile,  and 
hence  incapihle  of  bringing  the  universe  into  temporal 
being.  If  ii  be  assumed  that  the  principle  is  not  eternal, 
as  the  primal  essence  is,  tiien  the  question  as  to  the  source 
of  the  principle  of  derivation,  and  the  beginning  of  its 
activity,  at  once  arises.  To  this  question  pantheism  can 
give  no  good  answer.  Its  advocates  cither  ignore  the 
question,  or  give  the  principle  of  derivation,  whether  it  be 


I! 


1% 


11 


1 


572 


APOLOGETICS. 


emanation,  or  manifestation,  or  modification,  or  evolution, 
a  reality  coeval  with  the  primal  essence.  This  necessarily 
lands  in  a  rational  dualism.  In  addition,  if  the  primal 
essence  be  eternal,  and  if  the  principle  for  the  derivation 
of  finite  things  be  coeval  in  its  activity  with  that  essence, 
then  the  finite  universe,  which  is  the  result  of  the  acti.ity 
of  that  principle,  is  also  eternal.  This  gives  three  eternal 
forms  of  being,  and  shows  how  far  from  providing  a  uni- 
tary basis  pantheism  is.  To  make  it  workable,  it  must 
become  dualism ;  and  when  it  does  work,  it  becomes  a  sort 
of  tritheism,  which  is,  however,  devoid  of  personality. 

Theism  has  the  advantage  at  this  point.  In  its  funda- 
mental postulate  of  an  infinite  personal  Spirit,  possessing 
creative  power  in  his  very  nature,  theism  provides  in  God 
an  absolutely  unitary  principle  to  account  for  all  existence; 
in  its  conception  of  creative  power  freely  exercised,  it  pro- 
pounds the  philosophy  of  finite  things  in  their  origin,  reality 
and  end;  and  in  its  doctrine  of  immanence  it  announces 
the  gfr-ji;nd  and  explanation  of  the  universe  at  every  stage 
of  it. 

3.  The  explanation  of  finite  things  which  pantheism  sup- 
plies is  defective.  How  are  these  things  to  be  concei\ed? 
Are  they  in  any  proper  sense  real?  If  real,  is  their  essence 
different  from  that  of  the  primal  essence?  If  different, 
what  is  it,  and  how  does  it  become  different?  If  the  same, 
does  the  primal  essence  suffer  any  temporary  loss  of  reality 
by  the  rise  of  finite  things  into  existence?  Further,  if  the 
primal  essence  is  at  first  absolutely  undifferentiated,  and 
if  finite  things  are  derived  from  that  essence  in  some  natural 
way,  how  comes  it  to  pass  that  finite  things  seem  to  be  so 
greatly  differentiated  as  they  are  in  the  various  grades  of 
these  things?  How  does  the  distinction  between  the  inor- 
ganic and  organic,  between  the  vegetable  and  the  animal, 
between  the  sensitive  and  the  rational,  and  between  the 
rational  and  the  moral,  arise?  At  every  turn  pantheism 
cither  does  injustice  to  the  facts  in  finite  things,  or  fail-s 


PANTHEISM. 


573 


to  provide  a  rational  explanation  of  them.  In  addition, 
pantheism  fails  to  give  any  reasonable  account  of  the  relation 
of  finite  things  in  the  universe  to  each  other.  How  are 
the  different  grades  of  finite  things  to  be  regarded  in  their 
relations?  How  do  social  and  moral  relations  among  cer- 
tam  forms  of  finite  being  arise?  In  a  word,  pantheism 
provides  no  rational  basis  for  either  a  natural  or  moral 
order  and  rule  among  finite  things. 

4.    Pantheism  cannot  account  for  the  facts  of  life  and 
consciousness,  and  these  facts  themselves  tell  against  it 
As  LO  the  reality  of  these  facts,  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
Ever,  pantheists  cannot  deny  them.    First  of  all,  the  ques- 
tion arises  as  to  how  vital  and  conscious  forms  of  being 
first  began  to  be.     The  primal  essence  of  pantheism  is 
always   held   to    be   at   first   non-vital    and   unconscious. 
Whether  it  be  taken  to  be  Brahm,  or  pure  being,  or  infinite 
substance,  or  absolute  reason,  this  is  true.     There  was  a 
time  when,  in  the  whole  realm  of  being,  there  was  not  a 
smgle  vital  or  conscious  form  in  it.    Creation  in  the  proper 
sense  being  denied,  no  radically  new  forms  of  beings  can 
arise.    The  gern.s  of  such  forms  of  being  must  have  been 
latent  in  the  primal  essence.     Pantheists  hesitate  to  say 
this  plainly.    And  yet  we  are  asked  to  believe  that,  in  some 
mysterious  way,  a  non-vital  and  non-conscious  essence  gave 
rise,  out  of  its  own  resources,  to  certain  forms  of  being 
that  are  vital  and  conscious.     This  means  that  the  non- 
vital  produced  the  vital,  and  that  the  unconscious  produced 
the  conscious.     Such  a  supposition  does  utter  injustice  to 
the  law  of  causation,  and  professes  to  derive  the  higher 
from    the    lower    without    any    adequate   cause    for   that 
derivation.     Modern  science  fully  confirms  this  criticiim 
of  pantheism  by  its  doctrine  of  biogenesis,  and  no  school 
of  psychology,  even  the  very  latest  physiological  psychology, 
has  been  able  to  deduce  the  conscious  from  tlie  unconscious. 
Life  and  consciousness  can  have  only  a  phenomenal  exist- 
ence, .ind  their  reality  is  entirely  obscured  by  pantheism. 


Ill 

1 


HMMMk 


574 


APOLOGETICS. 


This  is  a  fatal  criticism  of  all  types  of  pantheism,  for  even 
the  Hegelian  refuses  to  admit  that  absolute  reason  is  at  first 
living  and  conscious. 

Theism  again  meets  the  conditions  here.  In  its  postulate 
of  an  infinite  God,  it  provides  a  living,  active,  conscif  is 
being,  with  power  at  least  to  create  forms  of  beine  having 
the  same  attributes  as  himself.  He,  being  the  highest  form 
of  being  conceivable,  provides  a  causal  ground  to  originate 
and  endow  all  lower  forms  of  being  with  the  qualities  they 
possess.  Hence,  theism  can  account  for  the  facts  of  life 
and  consciousness. 

5.  The  denial  of  personality  to  the  primal  essence  is  a 
fatal  defect  of  pantheism.  This  denial  blocks  its  way  in 
seeking  to  give  a  rational  explanation  of  finite  personal 
forms  of  being.  That  there  are  such  forms  of  being  is 
certain.  Here  we  have  the  question  of  the  personality  of 
the  primal  essence,  and  the  problem  of  a  multitude  of  finite 
personal  beings  to  deal  with.  As  to  the  denial  of  the  per- 
sonality of  the  primal  essence,  it  might  be  sufficient  to  say 
that  this  is  a  mere  hypothesis,  without  anything  to  support 
it.  But  it  can  be  added  that  the  evidences  of  free,  intelli- 
gent activity  on  the  part  of  the  primal  essence  imply  that 
it  possesses  self-consciousness  and  self-direction,  which  are 
the  essential  elements  of  personality.  Moreover,  without 
the  conception  of  personality,  which  pertains  only  to  spir- 
itual forms  of  being,  it  is  impossible  to  secure  an  absolutely 
unitary  principle,  in  relation  to  which  all  forms  of  finite 
being  may  be  rationally  construed.  The  denial  of  person- 
ality to  the  primal  essence  whicl  pantheism  makes,  robs 
us  o  srch  a  unitary  principle  as  theism  provides ;  and  for 
the  rise  of  self-consciousness  and  the  genesis  of  personal 
forms  of  finite  being,  pantheism  gives  no  philosophy.  This 
is  one  of  the  most  glaring  defects  of  pantheism,  and  yet 
it  is  one  to  which  its  adherents  hold  with  great  tenacity. 

Theism  well  meets  the  case  here.     In  its  postulate  of 
God,  it  attaches  self -consciousness  and  self-direction  to  the 


PANTHEISM. 


575 


basis  of  all  being,  and  grounds  its  princip  of  absolute 
unity  in  the  personality  of  God.  This  enables  it  to  give  a 
good  account  of  all  forms  of  finite  dependent  p»;rsonality, 
and  to  meet  all  the  conditions  of  a  soun<  aeory.  On 
philosophical  grounds,  pantheism  fails  us. 

II.  Criticism  on  Moral  Grounds.    §  134. 

If  pantheism  is  defective  in  its  philosophy,  it  is  still  more 
so  when  tested  in  the  moral  realm.  It  does  scant  justice 
to  moral  facts,  and  explains  the  terms  which  express  moral 
order  by  really  explaining  them  away.  A  few  points  are 
noted. 

I.  Pantheism  provides  no  adequate  basis  for  a  moral 
order  and  government.     Such  order  and  government  pre- 
suppose moral  attributes  in  the  ground  of  the  order  and 
m  the  nature  of  the  moral  governor.     But  the  conception 
which  pantheism  gives  of  the  primal  essence  of  all  things 
IS  entirely  devoid  of  moral  attributes.    Brahm,  pure  being, 
substance  and  unconscious  reason,  are  all  non-moral  con- 
ceptions.    Not  one  of  them  possesses  such  definite  moral 
attnbutes  as  to  lay  the  basis  for  a  moral  order  and  govern- 
ment among  finite  forms  of  being;   and  being  non-moral, 
this  monistic  essence  can  never  constitute  any  finite  forms 
of  being  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  them  fit  subjects  of  a 
moral  order.    All  of  l...s  is  evidently  felt  by  those  in  our 
own  time  who  are  in  sympathy  with  pantheism,  and  yet 
feel  the  need  of  attaching  moral  attributes  to  the  primal 
essence,  in  what  they  call  ethical  monism.     This  is  a  con- 
fession of  need,  rather  than  a  solution  of  the  problem.    It 
really  seems  impossible  to  provide  a  ground  for  a  moral 
order,  unless  the  primal  essence  and  ground  of  all  things 
is  moral.     The  postulate  of  theism  is  ample  to  provide 
this. 

2.  A  still  more  serious  objection  to  pantheism  is  that  it 
really  obliterates  moral  distinctions,  and  leaves  no  proper 


576 


APOLOGETICS. 


difference  between  good  and  evil,  right  and  wrong,  holiness 
and  sin.     This  appears  in  various  respects.     Everything 
that  happens  in  the  universe  is  the  outcome  of  the  activity 
of  the  primal  essence,  and  its  principle  of  activity,  which 
is  called  God,  and  his  mode  of  operation.    All  that  comes 
into  existence  must  be  only  either  good  or  bad,  for  it  is 
all  the  same  in  its  essential  nature.     Then,  all  that  these 
things  do  is  really  the  activity  of  God;   and  if  he  is  per- 
fectly holy,  then  these  things  must  be  like  him.     Among 
men,  all  that  they  do  is  in  harmony  with  God,  and  it  is 
not  possible  for  them  to  be  otherwise  than  as  God  is.    They 
are  from  him  as  to  their  nature,  and  the  activity  of  that 
nature  can  never  be  really  moral.     To  identify  God  and 
the  universe  as  pantheism  does,  is  to  break  down  all  moral 
distinctions,  and  to  obliterate  the  radical  diflference  which 
every  moral  consciousness  experiences  between  right  and 
wrong.    There  are  no  second  causes  under  the  pantheistic 
scheme.    All  that  transpiris    -  due  to  God's  causal  agency. 
What  a  man  does  is  an  activity  of  God  in  and  by  that  man. 
If  he  gives  a  cup  of  cold  water  to  the  thirsty,  or  if  he 
loves  his  neighbor,  it  is  God's  deed;  and  if  he  grinds  the 
face  of  the  poor,  or  if  he  kills  his  fellow,  it  is  God's  doing 
also.    All  the  ingenuity  of  ethical  monism  fails  to  scale  this 

difficulty. 

3.  Pantheism  robs  God  of  freedom  with  the  intelligent 
self-direction  that  freedom  implies.  The  fundamental  pos- 
tulate of  pantheism  always  denies  the  quality  of  freedom 
to  the  primal  essence  of  all  things,  and  it  also  refuses  to 
attach  that  quality,  even  to  the  principle  of  the  derivation 
of  finite  things  from  the  primal  essence.  This  being  the 
case,  all  the  activities  of  this  essence  under  this  principle 
are  necessitarian,  and  virtually  mechanical  in  their  nature. 
God  is  not  able  to  set  an  end  before  him  as  the  goal  of  the 
universe,  he  has  no  power  to  bring  intelligence  and  wisdom 
to  bear  upon  the  development  of  the  cosmos,  and  he  is 
incapable  of  the  exercise  of  free  determination  in  regard 


PA.  THEISM. 


177, 


to  what  course  the  history  of  the  universe  shall  take. 
Necessity  of  the  sternest  sort  holds  him  in  its  grasp,  and 
mechanism,  in  the  strictest  sense,  marks  out  his  course  for 
him.  This  is  sheer,  blank,  blind  fatalism,  under  which 
morality  never  can  come  into  being. 

4.  Nor  is  there  any  freed-^m  in  the  creature.    No  member 
of  the  angelic  host,  nor  any  child  of  Adam's  race,  had,  or 
ever  can,  possess  freedom,  which  is  the  crowning  glory  of 
personality.    Man  is  bound  in  the  iron  chains  of  necessity, 
and  his  supposed  sense  of  freedom  is  a  delusion  into  which 
he  has  fallen.     His  feeling  of  responsibility,  which  pre- 
supposes freedom,  is  entirely  unreal.     What  he  is,  is  as 
he  must  be;   what  he  does,  cannot  be  otherwise.    He  has 
no  power  of  rational  choice,  or  of  freedom  in  action.    He 
lives  in  a  region  of  shadows,  where  twilight  makes  all 
sense  of  freedom  unreal,  and  raises  before  him  a  mirage 
of  responsibility  which  has  no  real  existence  at  all.     Pan- 
theism robs  man  of  freedom,  and  binds  him  to  the  chariot 
wheels  of  a  stern  necessity,  which  is  driven  by  a  blind 
charioteer  down  the  steeps  of  fatalism. 

5-  It  may  be  added  that  pantheism,  though  more  respect- 
able than  atheism,  has  in  its  train  all  the  bad  moral  results 
of  atheism.     An  impersonal  God  is  really  no  God     Pure 
necessity,  carried  into  the  sphere  of  morals,  binds  men 
helpless  under  mechanical  law;    but  it,  at  the  same  time, 
gives  them  license  to  live  as  they  list,  and  co.nmit  all  sorts 
of  excess.     Pantheism  gives  no  ground  for  moral  order 
and  hence  fosters  moral  disorder.     Pantheism,   denying 
freedom  alike  to  God  and  man,  takes  away  responsibility, 
and  sets  every  man  with  his  hand  against  his  neighbor     It 
would,  if  reduced  to  practical  eflfect,  abolish  the  home, 
destroy  stable  government,  and  speedily  obliterate  modem 
civilization. 

At  every  one  of  these  points  theism  suAccs.    It  gives  a 
good  basis  for  moral  order  and  government;  it  announces 
in  no  uncertain  tones,  the  eternal  distinction  between  good 


«  I 

'If 


578 


APOLOGETICS. 


and  evil,  right  and  wrong;  it  asserts  that  God  has  absolute 
freedom,  and  that  man  has  dependent  freedom  from  God's 
hand;  and  it  has  noble  fruitage  among  men  as  the  adequate 
basis  for  Christianity. 

III.  Criticism  on  Religious  Grounds.    §  135. 

It  is  on  the  ground  of  religion  that  pantheism  reveals  its 
greatest  weakness.  We  now  make  this  its  final  test.  Any 
scheme  of  existing  things  that  fails  here  is  radically  de- 
fective.   Only  a  few  points  are  needed  to  make  plam  this 

defect. 

1  If  pantheism  lays  no  foundation  for  morality,  it  pro- 
vides no  basis  for  religion.  This  is  a  general  statement, 
yet  it  is  profoundly  true.  Morality  and  religion,  though 
not  identical,  are  yet  closely  related.  Morality  is  not  the 
whole  of  religion,  yet  if  man  is  not  in  moral  relations  with 
God,  religion,  on  its  ethical  side,  could  never  have  risen. 
Now,  pantheism,  by  destroying  the  basis  of  moral  order, 
has  left  religion  without  a  foundation. 

2  The  idea  of  God  which  pantheism  announces  is  en- 
tirely defective.    It  makes  God  simply  the  primal  essence 
of  finite  things,  and  then  denies  its  personality.     It  asks 
us   to    love,    worship    and   obey   an    abstract    impersonal 
essence.     It  speaks  of  Brahm,  pure  being,  substance  and 
absolute  reason,  and  then  calls  these  God.     This  becomes 
little  better  than  philosophical  idolatry.     It  is  a  pure  per- 
version of  the  sacred  name  to  use  it  as  pantheism  does. 
Then,  since  all  finite  things,  myself  included,  are  aspects 
or  modifications  of  God.  I  should  worship  nature  and  even 
myself,  and  still  be  guilty  of  no  perversion  of  the  senti- 
ment of  worship.    To  ask  me  to  worship  the  impersonal 
ground  of  all  finite  being,  is  to  ask  what  is  absurd.     To 
use  such  an  idea  of  God  as  this,  is  to  address  man  m  terms 
of  atheism,  or  to  set  his  face  towards  polytheism,  in  the 
form  of  nature  worship,  or  hero  worship. 


PANTHEISM. 


579 


3.  Tlie  relation  between  God  and  man  which  pantheism 
expresses  renders  religion  impossible.    For  religion  implies 
an  object  which  is  called  God,  and  a  subject,  which  may 
be  man  or  angel.     Now,  to  render  religion  possible,  both 
Its  subject  and  object  must  have  real  existence,  and  be 
capable  of  numerical  distinction  from  each  other.     If  God 
be  an  abstract,  impersonal  essence,  he  cannot  be  the  object 
which  religion  requires,  and  if  man  be  but  a  modification 
of  infinite  substance,  or,  at  best,  a  moment  in  the  logical 
evolution  of  absolute  reason,  religion  will  be  evaporated. 
If  religion  be  a  mode  of  knowing,  believing,  feeling  and 
acting  on  behalf  of  its  subject,  in  relation  to  its  object, 
then  pantheism  fails  to  provide  the  essential  conditions  of 
religion.     No  absolutely  monistic  system,  no  scheme  of 
abstract  identity,  can  suffice  for  the  basis  of  religion. 

4-  So  far  as  Christianity  is  concerned,  pantheism  does 
not  provide  any  proper  basis  for  its  objective  facts.  These 
facts,  as  they  are  peculiar  to  Christianity,  consist  specially 
m  the  contents  of  supernatural  revelation.  Now,  pantheism 
gives  no  place  for  such  objective  facts,  nor  can  anything 
be  supernatural  at  all.  Everythmg  is  natural  or  super- 
natural, according  as  the  terms  are  used.  There  can  be 
no  special  revelation,  no  miracle,  no  providence  and  no 
prayer.  As  there  is  no  objective  fact  of  sin,  so  there  is 
no  incarnation,  and  no  redemption  by  means  of  God  mani- 
fest in  the  flesh.  As  God  is  hemmed  in  in  his  activity  by 
the  limits  of  the  universe,  he  can  act  in  no  transcendent 
redemptive  way  in  relation  to  that  universe.  Hence,  pan- 
theism destroys  every  distinctive  feature  of  Christianity. 

5.  Then,  finally,  pantheism  provides  no  place  for  the 
subjective  aspects  of  Christianity  in  religious  experience. 
As  man  is  but  a  mode  or  moment  in  the  being  of  God, 
there  can  be  in  man  no  definite  personal  religious  experience.' 
In  particular,  the  supernatural  experiences  wrought  by  the 
Spirit  of  God,  in  regenerating  and  sanctifying  the  heart  of 
man,  and  bringing  him  into  a  genuine  Christian  experience. 


f 


i; 


i      f 


i         "' 


! 


if 


1  - 1 


S8o 


APOLOGETICS. 


have  no  rational  place  on  the  pantheistic  scheme  of  things. 
Any  attempt  to  construe  the  facts  of  such  an  experience 
as  described  in  the  Scriptures,  or  as  realized  in  religious 
consciousness,  must  utterly  fail.  The  fellowship  of  that 
experience  must  be  between  two  persons.  The  conununi- 
cation  and  reception  of  truth,  the  exercise  of  repentance 
and  faith,  and  emotions  of  joy  and  love,  require  what  pan- 
theism does  not  provide. 

But  theism  is  adequate  as  the  religious  basis  of  Chris- 
tianity. It  binds  morality  and  religion  together  in  their 
proper  relations,  it  provides  an  adequate  conception  of  a 
personal  God,  it  construes  the  relations  between  the  object 
and  subject  of  religion  in  a  correct  way,  it  provides  a  secure 
basis  for  the  objective  facts  of  a  redemptive  revelation, 
which  is  supernatural  in  its  nature,  and  does  ample  justice 
to  the  conditions  of  religion  on  its  subjective  or  experi- 
mental side. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


PESSIMISM:    THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL. 

Contents. 

tivism.-i>ocialism.-Government  Owne.ship  of  Property -Commtm. 
Anci^i^rn't-  ''  ^'^  P«P'-P-imisn^.-StateS  [n  G«"rT: 
nauer  ?id  Hartmann.-Existence  Evil.-Life  not  Worth  Living -Criti- 
c.sm.-.xaggerated.-One-sided.-Overlooks  Facts.-fhe  Proble^  o 
tZ7  A  'I  ^°°'  °^  Pessimism.-Dualism  Defective.-The  Real  Prob- 
lem  for  Apologefcs-Physical  Evil.-Metaphysical  Evil.-RIoral  EvU 

ReXn„'si"„?tr"'^  ^^-"  °^  ^'"  ^-'--^-  s°'-'-„i 

Literature. 

Sf  u-  ^•TV"-C'*i'-d''  ^''^•'''  /'A.Vo.oMj'  <.»rf  Religion  ofcJmU- 
atkes  TAe  Tna/  of  Theones.-Kidd's  Social  Evolution.  Chap  VIII- 
!smil  TT^'-'Vl^r''  ^•"'""■■--Sch.penhaueVs  S;  >?iw 
Sro/lSrT"?  ^""'"/'^  "^  ""^  C/««««<,«,._Augusti„e's  r*. 
^"y  of  God.-Fhnt's  AnMheiitic  Theories.  Chaps.  VI.-VIII -Fair- 
ba.rns  The  PhUosophy  of  the  Christian  Religion.  Caps  I  IV- 
Martmeaus  ^  Study  of  Religion.  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  III.-Ebrard'  "^*ofo- 

Tru     r   ^-'/T  ^'  ^"""^  '••  S-^-^-  "-Rishdl's  TA.  Foundafonsof 
the  Chrxstxan  Fatth,  Div.  V.,  Sec.  I.,  Chaps.  III..  IV.-Lindsay"     fJnt 
Advances.  Chap.  XVI.-Matheson's  Th!  Gospel  and  Modern  slZu 
tutes.  Chap.  VIL-Fraser's  Philosophy  of  TheL.  Vol.  I..  Chap  VH - 
Calvms  /«,*,/«/«,  Book  II.-Bruce's  Moral  Order.  Chaps   ^llXlk 
XI.-Pfl«derer's  Philosophy  of  Religion.  Vol.  IV.,  Sec.  IL,  Chap.  IV 

I.  Some  Hybrid  Theories.  §  i  j6. 
T>  EFORE  discussing,  with  some  care,  pessimism  and  the 
M^  probiem  of  evil,  certain  schemes  which  in  practical 
effect  are  usually  more  or  less  antitheistic  in  their  bearin? 
may  be  merely  noted.  These  schemes  are  not  so  much 
separate  or  independent  theories,  as  inferences  from,  and 
applications  ol,  some  of  the  antitheistic  systems  already 


i 


I 


m 


I  ii 


S82 


APOLOGETICS. 


1'   " 


expounded  and  criticised.  It  is  proper  to  remark  that  some 
of  these  schemes  are  advocated  in  our  own  day  by  men 
who  are  not  professedly  antitheistic.  In  some  cases  they 
even  claim  to  be  Christian.  They  are  all  practical  schemes 
or  methods  of  a  social  and  economic  nature,  which  propose 
to  deal  with  human  society  and  property  rights  in  certain 
ways.  This  being  the  case,  the  most  of  them  will  come 
up  naturally  for  consideration  in  the  third  division  of  this 
treatise.  Some  of  these  proposals  may  be  merely  mentioned 
here,  as  they  are  in  all  probability  entirely  sporadic  aber- 
rations of  a  few  erratic  minds,  and  will  soon  pass  away. 
How  far  these  aberrations  are  to  be  viewed  in  relation  to 
the  problem  of  evil  and  Satanic  agency,  is  a  question  of 
considerable  importance. 

1.  Spiritualism,  in  its  popular  sense,  is  a  perverted  or 
exaggerated  belief  in  the  reality  and  activity  of  disembodied 
human  spirits;  and  it  has  reference  especially  to  the  mode 
and  extent  of  the  communication  of  such  spirits  with  those 
who  are  still  in  this  earthly  life.  This  communication  is 
supposed  to  take  place  by  means  of  those  who  possess  cer- 
tain peculiar  powers,  and  are  called  mediums,  and  it  is 
claimed  \o  be  effected  by  methods  which  quite  transcend 
the  natural  conditions  of  our  present  earthly  state. 

This  whole  scheme,  and  all  the  seances  connected  with 
it,  may  he  taken  as  an  indirect  imtncss  to  the  reality  of  the 
spirit  world,  and  a  testimony  to  the  fact  of  man's  immor- 
tality. It  is  marked  by  all  sorts  of  extravagances,  well 
fitte  '  to  impress  those  who  are  in  a  morbid  mental  state ; 
and  sometimes  it  has  been  convicted  of  cunning  imposture, 
which  could  delude  only  those  who  are  willing  to  lie  de- 
ceived. Many  are  inclined  to  think  that  this  whole  system 
of  delusion  or  deception  is  to  be  associated  with  the  problem 
of  evil,  and  tliat  it  is  the  perversion  of  a  legitimate  belief 
in  the  reality  of  the  world  of  spirits. 

2.  Mormonism  is  another  remarkable  excrescence  in  mod- 
ern thought  and  life.    It  claims,  in  a  very  irralioiiai  way, 


PESSIMISM. 


583 


to  be  the  true  religion;  but  it  is  a  self-evident  travesty  of 
all  that  ,s  worthy  the  name  of  religion,  alike  in  belief  and 
practice.  It  is  a  crude  mixture  of  pagan  and  Christian 
elements,  with  a  great  deal  that  is  sensual  and  materialistic 

*r  11! '*•  .      "^^  ^"  ^"^""P*  ^0  masquerade  in  the  garb 
of  Christianity  in  order  to  delude  the  ignorant  and  the 
unwary;    and,  in  doing  so,  it  is  often  brazen,  and  some- 
times blasphemous.     It  is  an  eye-sore  upon  the  fair  face 
of  this  country,  and  a  serious  menace  to  our  civilization 
and  social  well  being.     It  demands  the  serious  attention 
of  our  legislators,  and  it  is  a  providential  exhortation  to 
the  Christian  churches  to  evangelise  all  our  borders  as 
speedily  as  possible.     Rational  refutation,  national  legisla- 
Hon,  may  be  useful  against  this  great  evil;    but  the  best 
weapon  against  it  is  the  gospel,  carried  to  every  nook  and 
comer  of  our  broad  and  favored  land. 

3.  Eddyism  is  another  absurd  and  irrational  development 
m  this  country.    One  hardly  knows  what  to  say  about  this 
system.     Its  very  existence  is  an  anachronism  in  this  age 
and  an  absurdity  in  this  land.    The  woman  who  poses  as 
Its  founder  baffles  psychological  diagnosis,  and  the  book  of 
which  she  IS  the  author,  and  which  forms  the  basis  of  the 
system  that  bears  her  name,  does  violence  to  reason  and 
common  sense.     The  working  of  this  system  gives  rise  to 
much  that  IS  ridiculous.    In  practical  effect,  it  is  an  Ameri- 
can reproduction  of  Buddhistic  pessimism,  with  much  less 
to  commend  it  than  its  Oriental  original.    There  are  some 
things  which  can  be  best  laughed  into  oblivion,  and  this 
IS  surely  one  of  them. 

4.  Dorvieism  is  perhaps  tiie  crowning  absunlitv  of  these 
erratic  schemes.  It  is.  i„,lee.l.  so  absurd  that  i^t  scarcely 
deserves  mention  in  these  pages.  The  man.  the  movement 
and  his  methods  bear  witness  to  his  cunning  and  resource' 
and  his  apparent  success  is  a  sad  commentary  („,  the  readi- 
ness of  many  people  to  l,e  deceived.  Kis  mothods  also 
ieave  the  impression  that  some  people  like  all  the  more  to 


^V 


584 


APOLOGETICS. 


be  fooled  when  they  have  to  pay  handsomely  for  it.  But 
his  case  is  not  an  entirely  new  thing  under  the  sun,  for 
ever  since  the  days  of  the  Egyptian  magicians,  and  the 
time  of  Simon  Magus,  the  world  has  had  such  deceivers, 
and  a  credulous  company  ready  to  be  deceived.  It  may  be 
that  the  problem  of  evil  and  of  Satanic  agency  has  its  illus- 
tration in  such  cases  as  these.  Let  alone,  they  will  die  of 
inanition. 

5.  Secularism  is  a  scheme  of  human  affairs  which  de- 
serves much  more  respectable  mention.  It  consists  in  a 
general  view  of  this  life,  which  refuses  to  allow  any  refer- 
ence to  the  life  which  is  to  come  to  enter  into  its  interpre- 
tation. It  makes  this  life  and  its  duties  the  main  matter 
for  the  human  race,  and  it  gives  a  controlling  place  to  the 
ordinary  affairs  of  this  world  in  the  regard  of  men.  It 
always  ignores  what  we  call  religion  and  its  sanctions,  and 
it  sometimes  goes  so  far  as  to  openly  assail  Christianity. 
At  times  it  is  willing  to  speak  of  the  religion  of  humanity, 
but  such  religion  is  entirely  secular.  Christianity  is  only 
one  form  of  superstition,  is  largely  oth?r-worldly,  and  not 
necessary  for  the  well-being  of  men  in  this  life. 

Secularism  is  usually  to  be  associated,  as  an  inference, 
with  atheism,  materialism,  agnosticism  or  positivism. 
Hence,  it  assumes  different  types.  In  most  cases  it  seems 
to  have  a  natural  kinship  with  positivism,  which  practically 
denies  or  ignores  the  proper  theistic  basis  of  Christianity. 
As  a  practical  scheme,  it  can  be  most  naturally  discussed 
in  the  third  main  division  of  this  treatise.  Its  theoretic 
basis  has  already  been  examined,  mainly  under  positivism. 
All  we  say  now  is  that  Christianity  is  not  merely  an  other- 
world  religion.  It  pertains  to  both  worlds,  teaching  us 
how  to  live  here,  that  we  may  fulfil  our  end  in  this  life, 
and  be  meet  for  the  world  which  is  to  come  Secularism 
entirely  misconceives  Christianity  in  this  respect. 

6.  Socialism  is  another  modern  scheme  to  be  mentioned 
here.     It  has,  however,  its  ancient  counterpart  in  Plato's 


PESSIMISM.  ^g- 

'Republic,  and  its  mediaeval  aspect  in  More's  Utopia     But 
during  the  past  few  decades  it  has  had  its  fresh  and  formal 
advocacy.     It  appears  in  various  schemes  to  benefit  the 
human  race  in  their  civic,  social  and  economic  relations 
In  some  respects  it  resembles  secularism,  although  it  does 
not  formally  Ignore  or  reject  in  every  case  the  interests 
and  cla,ms  of  rehgion.    It  relates  mainly  to  the  affairs  of 
men  m  th.s  hfe,  and  it  pertains  to  the  ownership  and  use 
of  property  of  all  kinds  in  particular.     Its  negative  posi- 
tion .s  the  denial  of  all  individual  and  personal  rights  to 
property.    There  should  be  no  private  property  ownership 

houM  h"  "?  ^T"'"'"''  '"^  ''^'  '^^'  government  it 
.hould  be  used  and  managed  for  the  advantage  and  wel- 
fare of  the  whole  body  of  the  people  equally.  L^emment 
faX^^Vnd      ''  "'r'^  ^"'  telegraphies,  of  manu 

80C  ahsm.  It  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  destruction  of 
existmg  governments.  It  simply  argues  against  orivate 
ownership  of  all  the  productive  activitS  of  thrioprand 
advocates  government  ownership  of  all  these  things 

scheme  it  M  "'°  '  ^T'""'  '''''''  ^°^'^'  ^"^  «'=°"°'»»«= 
scheme,  ,t  belongs  properly  to  Applied  Apologetics,  and  its 

d.scuss.on  may  be  safely  remitted  to  the  third  ci:  ision  o 

or  m  r  :!  ^"  "^  "°"  ""^^"^  '^'  '^'^  --'-"  -ay 
or  may  not  be  an  ant-Christian  scheme.    Some  of  its  advo- 

ZT  ?'"  ?  '"  '"'''"y  ^'^'^  the  Christian  system,  but 
others  cla,m  that  their  scheme  is  really  a  return  to  primitive 
and  apostolic  Christianity. 

7.  Communism  is  closely  akin  to  socialism,  and  in  the 
popu  ar  mmd  ,s  not  always  distinguished  from  it.  Like 
ociahsm.  It  relates  to  the  ownership  and  use  of  property. 
It  sometimes  goes  further  than  socialism,  and  assails  exist- 
ing forms  of  civil  government.  Negatively,  it  agr«.5  with 
Sialism  m  arguing  against  private  ownership  of  property 


ft  •, , 

i 

St 


I 


586 


APOLOGETICS. 


but,  positively,  it  differs  with  socialism  in  holding  that  this 
ownership  should  be  lodged,  not  in  the  national  govern- 
ment, but  in  the  body  of  the  people.  They  should  hold  the 
property  of  the  community  in  common,  and  as  a  trust  for 
the  whole  people.  Hence,  the  name  communism,  which 
means  that  the  property  is  to  be  held  in  common.  In  its 
extreme  form,  communism  arrays  itself  against  all  civil 
government,  and  in  doing  so  comes  perilously  near  to  the 
ground  of  the  anarchist,  who  is  really  the  modern  sociai 
and  economic  Ishmaelite. 

It  is  evident  that  this  scheme  has  less  regard  for  law 
and  authority  than  socialism,  and  in  its  practical  working 
is  bound  to  be  entirely  impracticable.  But  a  proper  critical 
estimate  of  it  m-.y  be  reserved  till  we  reach  the  discussion 
of  Applied  Apologetics,  towards  the  end  of  this  treatise. 
We  pass  at  once  to  pessimism  and  the  problem  of  evil. 


II.  Pessimism:  Statement.    §  137. 

I.  The  term  pessimism  means  the  worst,  or  the  worst 
that  can  be.  In  the  discussion  of  theistic  problems,  it 
denotes  that  dreary  system  which  lays  stress  upon  the 
misery  and  misfortune  of  finite  existence,  especially  of 
those  forms  of  it  which  are  conscious,  and  hence  capable 
of  pain  or  suffering.  It  is  that  strange  doctrine  which 
argues  that  the  very  fact  of  existence  is  itself  an  evil,  and 
that  it  is  better  for  finite  forms  of  being  not  to  be.  It 
raises  the  question  whether  life  is  worth  living,  and  argues 
against  the  worth  of  life  as  a  form  ot  finite  conscious  exist- 
ence, wherein  pain  far  outweighs  pleasure.  With  an  accent 
of  its  own,  it  declares,  concerning  human  life,  that  it  is 
vanity  of  vanities.  With  its  ear  open  to  the  cries  of  pain, 
and  its  eye  closed  to  the  better  aspects  of  life,  it  pronounces 
life  a  failure,  and  is  ready  to  declare  that  self-destruction 
is  a  virtue.  This  remarkable  view  has  had  its  advocates 
in  both  ancient  and  modern  times. 


PESSIMISM. 


587 


■    2.  In  ancient  times  there  was  a  latent  pessimism  in  the 
duahsm  which  widely  prevailed.    Dualism  asserts  the  reality 
in  the  universe  of  two  eternal  principles,  one  good  and  the 
other  evil;   one  conducive  to  happiness,  the  other  leading 
to  pain.    As  these  two  principles  are  eternal  and  in  constant 
warfare,  there  is  no  hope  of  either  triumphing  over  the 
other.    Good  can  never  get  the  victory  over  evil,  and  pain 
must  ever  mark  the  sphere  of  existing  things.    The  effect 
of  such  a  doctrine  is  to  beget  a  hopelessness  which  gradually 
deepens  mto  despair,  and  leads  on  to  pessimism.     In  most 
of  the  pagan  mythologies  there  are  tinges  of  this  view 
But  in  Zoroastrianism  without  the  Christian  system,  and 
m  Gnosticism  within  it,  we  find  typical  dualism  whose 
truitage  is  pessimism  and  asceticism. 

But  it  is  in  Buddhism  that  we  find  in  ancient  times  a 
definite  pessimistic  doctrine;  and  this  system  continues  to 
the  present  day,  and  is  still  dominant  over  the  lives  of 
millions  of  the  human  race.     The  germs  of  this  system 
are    found    in    the   ascetici:  n    of    Brahmanism.    and    its 
phtophical  basis  is  Hindoo  pantheism.     According  to 
Buddhism,  there  is  pain  and  anguish  everywhere  in  human 
lite     This  pam  is  an  evil  which  is  inseparably  associated 
with  the  fact  of  finite  existence.     The  Kharma,  or  law  of 
consequences,  implies  this.     The  only  way  to  end  sorrow 
and  suffering,  pain  and  anguish,  is  to  cau.^e  the  fact  of 
conscious  finite  existence  to  cease  to  be.     This  endin-  of 
existence  is  the  highest  virtue  for  m.n.  and  it  is  to  be 
effected  by  the  Dharma,  or  the  moral  pathway  which  leads 
to  hmvna.     The  Nirvana  state  is  not  necessarily  annihi- 
lation of  essential  being,  but  it  is  rather  the  destruction  of 
conscious  finite  being,  and  with  this  the  ending  of  pain 
and  suffering  in  the  individual  life.     Thi.  form  of  nes- 
sumsm  regards  existence  in  this  life  as  an  evil,  and  it  makes 
the  ending  of  ,t  the  goal  of  the  highest  virtue.     The  sad 
and  burdened  condition  of  the  Oriental  million,  provided 
a  suitable  soil  fur  this  doctrine  of  despair,  and  its  fearful 


f  i\ 


!  V 


I 


'I  I 
III 


S88 


APOLOGETICS. 


fruitage  appears  in  the  abject  hopelessness  of  these  millions. 
With  them  life  is  not  worth  living. 

3.  Li  modern  times  there  have  been  certain  very  strange 
developments  of  pessimism  as  a  formal  philosophy  of  finite 
existence,  especially  as  it  appears  in  human  life.  These 
have  arisen  in  recent  times  in  Germany,  where  there  has 
been  so  much  speculation  since  Kant's  day.  It  is  a  striking 
thing  to  observe  that  this  modem  pessimism  is  associated 
with  the  idealistic  pantheism  of  which  Hegel  is  really  the 
founder,  ju^c  as  ancient  pessimism  arose  in  India  in  con- 
nection with  the  theosophic  pantheism  of  the  Hindoos.  Is 
there  any  philosophical  kinship  between  pantheism,  with  its 
denial  of  personality,  and  pessimism,  which  regards  finite 
conscious  existence  as  an  evil  to  be  gotten  rid  of? 

Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann  are  the  names  which  repre- 
sent modern  pessimism.  The  former  makes  the  essence  of 
real  being  consist  in  will;  the  latter  discovers  it  in  what 
he  calls  the  unconscious.  But  the  will  of  Schopenhauer  is 
not  merely  volition;  it  is  rather  desire,  striving  or  energy 
of  any  kind.  It  is  the  secret  and  cause  of  the  development 
of  the  universe  in  all  its  stages,  and  when  human  will  is 
reached  the  conditions  of  pain  and  evil  are  presented.  On 
this  basis,  Schopenhauer  declares  that  this  world  is  the 
worst  possible,  and  that  life  is  not  worth  living.  There 
are  many  points  of  likeness  between  this  system  and 
Buddhism,  and  all  through  it  there  is  the  note  of  the  Cynic. 
Hartmann  places  the  essence  of  all  reality  in  the  unconscious, 
which  gradually  rises  through  various  grades  of  being  till 
the  stage  of  consciousness  is  attained ;  and  here,  again,  the 
conditions  of  hopeless  pain  and  misery  are  provided,  and 
existence  is  a  misfortune  from  which  men  would  gladly 
be  free;  and  the  only  way  to  mend  matters  is  to  end 
them. 

No  formal  criticism  of  pessimism  is  now  needed.  The 
defects  of  its  philosophic  basis  have  been  revealed  'n  the 
criticism  of  pantheism.    Any  system  which  denies  person^ 


PESSIMISM. 


589 


altty  to  the  ground  of  all  existence,  and  which  fails  to  ^ 
justice  to  the  dependent  reality  of  finite  things,  is  destined 
to  lead  to  erroneous  and  absurd  views  of  human  life;  and 
any  system  which  binds  all  its  parts  under  the  iron  law  of 
necessity,  and  refuses  any  numerical  distinction  between 
finite  things  and  their  infinite  ground  or  source,  is  bound 
to  mterpret  human  life  in  terms  of  despair.  Such  is  pan- 
theism; hence  pessimism. 

.11,^"/!  ^"^'^u^'  ^'^^'  P^^^''"'^'"'  while  it  has  some  plau- 
sible features  about  it,  certainly  exaggerates  the  elements 
of  pain  and  anguish  in  the  world  and  in  humanity.     It 

wh Lral!  ""T'"^  ""T  '"^'*'''''  *°  ''''  J°y  ^"d  happiness 
the  conditions  of  sentient  being  in  all  its  grades  in  the 

ZTr^L"  aI'  ^'^  n '"  '""^  ^'°°'">^  P'^*"-  ^-wn  by 
pessimism.     Above  all,  pessimism  overlooks  the  fact  that 

m^'lfZT't  'T^'"^  "^'""'^  ^'  ^°^'^'  ^"d  that  even 
pain  Itself  has  beneficent  results  for  the  forms  of  being 

that  are  the  subjects  of  it;  and,  in  like  manner,  pessimism 

ent  rely  .g^ores  the  fact  that  in  the  sphere  of  hVman  liS 

vlm'VT'''''  '■'''■""^^  '^'  ^^^"^y  °^  the  Christian 
system  a  redemptive  and  remedial  force  which  surely  cures 

As  this  r       'rf ""  '"^'  ^"'  "^'^"  "^«  worth  living. 

evlt  •  T  ""^'  "'  '°  '^'  ^'^"  °^  '^'  P^°blem  of 
ev  1  in  Its  deeper  moral  aspects,  the  discussion  may  now 
enter  upon  that  subject.  ^ 


:  &  : 


III.  The  Problem  of  Evil.    §  138. 

I.  The  cardinal  fact  which  is  involved  in  all  forms  of 
pessimism  is  that  of  ez>il.  With  this  fact  every  system  of 
philosophy  and  every  scheme  of  morals  has  to^eal  and 
all  forms  of  religion  find  it  necessary  to  give  a  place  to 
^me  aspect  of  this  sad  and  abnormal  fact.  This  fact'press  s 
hard  on  the  the.stic  theory,  which  holds  to  the  existence 
of  an  infinite  personal  God,  who  is  the  source,  the  ground 


i   II 


590 


APOLOGETICS. 


and  the  end  of  the  universe.  There  is  special  difficulty  in 
construing  the  fact  of  evil  in  harmony  with  the  goodness 
of  God  and  the  beneficence  of  his  rule  over  the  cosmos. 

All  forms  of  dualism  are  founded  upon  a  recognition  of 
the  fact  of  evil,  and  dualism  professes  to  give  its  best 
philosophy.  Gnosticism,  with  its  accompanying  asceticism, 
wrestled  with  the  same  persistent  fact  in  a  one-sided  way. 
In  the  theodicies  of  every  age  there  are  attempts,  more  or 
less  adequate,  to  solve  the  problem  or  harmonize  it  with 
the  theistic  conception  of  God  and  the  universe.  But  it  is 
only  in  the  Christian  system  that  we  have  its  solution,  and 
by  means  of  the  gospel  its  assured  remedy. 

2.  No  theistic  construction  of  the  relations  between  God 
and  his  creatures  can  be  insensible  to  the  fact  of  evil  in 
its  various  bearings.  Perhaps  much  current  theistic  philoso- 
phy and  moral  theory  have  failed  to  do  justice  to  the  facts 
of  evil  in  the  universe,  and  to  take  fully  into  account  the 
effects  of  sin  in  the  moral  order  of  the  world.  In  the  early 
chapters  of  this  treatise,  when  setting  in  clear  relief  the 
problem  of  Apologetics,  stress  was  there  laid  upon  the  fact 
that  evil  in  all  its  forms,  and  especially  as  moral  evil,  must 
be  taken  into  account  in  any  adequate  apologetical  scheme. 
The  fact  of  moral  evil  is  abnormal  in  the  universe,  yet 
it  must  be  allowed  for  in  any  adequate  theory  of  existing 
things. 

In  these  opening  chapters  it  was  also  indicated  that  it 
was  in  relation  to  this  abnormal  fact  that  the  essence  and 
power  of  the  Christian  system  appeared.  Christianity  was 
conceived  to  be  the  redeeming  activity  of  God  in  the  world. 
This  activity  is  operative,  first  of  all,  in  the  members  of 
the  human  race,  and  through  them  in  the  wider  area  of 
the  cosmos.  It  is  made  effective  through  Christ  by  the 
agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  it  has  been  operative  in 
various  ways  along  the  ages.  In  this  redeeming  and  re- 
newing activity  is  the  true  theodicy. 

3.  It  is  important  to  understand  precisely  what  is  meant 


PESSIMISM.  591 

by  the  fact  of  evil  in  the  world.  There  are  widely  different 
aspects  of  ,t,  and  some  writers  lay  stress  on  one  phase  of 
It,  and  some  on  another.     This  has  much  to  do  with  the 

tT^X'ies'"^"''""'  ^'"^"^^  ^°''  *•""  P'°'''""  '"  ^'^"'""* 
Some  lay  the  main  stress  on  the  physical  aspects  of  evil 
and  hence  make  much  of  bodily  pain  and  anguish  in  sen- 
tient bemgs  m  general,  and  on  the  sufferings  of  man  in 
particular.  The  cruder  conceptions  of  Buddhism,  and 
some  forms  of  asceticism,  are  to  be  noted  in  this  connec- 
tion. 

Others  incline  to  a  rather  metaphysical  view  of  the  nature 
of  ev,l.  and  conceive  it  as  defect,  or  privation,  or  as  good 
in  the  making.  This  almost  regards  evil  as  inherent  in 
finite  forms  of  being,  and  renders  it  difficult  to  connect  any 
moral  q.  j.ty  with  it.  Perhaps  Leibnitz  best  represents  this 
general  type  of  opinion ;  and  modem  evolution  has  its  points 
of  contact  here. 

Still  others  go  nearer  to  the  root  of  the  matter,  and 
regard  that  abnormal  fact  in  the  universe  which  is  usually 
called  evil  as  mainly  moral  in  its  nature.     As  such,  it  is 
somethmg  which  does  violence  to  the  moral  order  which 
s  established  in  the  universe;   and  since  this  moral  order 
IS  made  up  of  personal  moral  beings,  then  evil  must  be  a 
quality  of  the  states  and  acts  of  such  beings.     The  real 
nature  o   moral  evil  thus  appears.    It  is  essentially  a  quality 
of  moral  agents,  not  an  entity  of  any  kind.     Viewed  in 
relation  to  the  other  members  of  the  moral  order  it  may 
be  injury,  regarded  in  relation  to  the  law  of  that  order  it 
IS  Throng-doing,  and  described  in  relation  to  the  person  of 
the  moral  governor  it  is  sin.    It  is  only  when  this  deeper 
mora    view  of  the  evil  in  the  universe  is  taken  that  we 
rightly  conceive  of  it.    From  the  standpoint  of  moral  evil, 
both  physical  and  metaphysical  evil  can  be  construed;   but 
moral  evil  cannot  be  deduced  from  either  of  the  other 
aspects  of  it. 


592 


APOLOGETICS. 


4.  As  to  the  mystery  of  the  origin  of  evii,  not  much  need 
be  said.  It  is  a  mystery  before  which  we  must  bow  in 
silence  and  with  uncovered  head.  To  guard  against  error, 
we  may  say  that  evil  is  not  due  to  the  agency  of  God,  either 
directly  or  indirectly  exercised.  God  permits  it  and  con- 
trols it,  and  upholds  the  universe  within  whose  bounds  evil 
is  operative.  He  never  can  approve  of  it,  he  has  not  pre- 
vented it,  and  it  never  gets  beyond  his  hand.  It  may  be 
added  that  the  origin  of  moral  evil,  which  is  the  source 
of  all  other  aspects  of  evil,  is  to  be  discovered  in  the  mys- 
terious powers  of  the  free,  personal.  Unite,  mutable  agency 
of  moral  beings.  This  merely  indicates  the  sphere  in  which 
it  arises,  but  does  not  account  for  its  origin.  Some  are 
content  to  say  that,  in  the  very  fact  of  the  freedom  of  such 
agency,  the  possibility  of  self-will,  which  may  rise  to  dis- 
obedience, resides.  Why  God  did  not  keep  his  moral 
subjects  all  in  loyal  obedience  and  service  we  do  not  know; 
that  he  often  brings  good  out  of  evil  is  evident,  and  that 
all  things  are  working  together  for  the  largest  good  in  the 
end  we  may  be  sure. 

5.  It  is  not  necessary  to  say  much  concerning  the  various 
theoretical  solutions  of  the  problem  of  evil  thar.  have  been 
suggested.  We  are  concerned  rather  with  giving  the  fact 
of  evil  in  all  its  aspects  its  proper  place  in  the  view  of 
the  universe  which  we  present ;  and  over  against  this  we  lay 
stress  upon  the  fact  that,  in  the  redeeming  activity  of  God 
which  is  operative  in  the  universe  according  to  his  gracious 
purpose  in  Christ,  is  its  remedy  found.  This,  rather  than 
any  rational  theodicy,  is  the  best  attitude  to  take  towards 
the  awful  fact  of  evil,  which  otherwise  would  drape  the 
cosmos  forever  in  mourning,  and  drive  moral  beings  to 
the  abyss  of  despair. 

In  view  of  the  present  conditions  in  the  universe  of 
physical  and  moral  being,  we  discover  much  that  is 
chaotic.  In  brighter  hcv.  vit  may  cherish  a  hopeful 
optimism,  which  can  tun    :-    face  towards  a  better  day; 


mmk 


PESSIMISM, 
btit  in  gloomy  mommts  we  are  almost  forced  to  have  sn... 

« A  :or,t  He^trld  'Ja tT7  """  '"""-"^ 
h    food  t      '"  ''  ■■'""''  """•  •>'  '"  ^«l«n,ing^wer' 

Ha:\r ; -^"i:  'tSTsrxr"  "k'lrr""^ 

proposes  to  exhibif  tLl!  ^''^  '*^<^°"^  volume 

nature  and  absoCiivLl  as  ToT  /^  *"""^"'^"* 
religion  for  sinful  men  I'^hirV  .  "^  '"'^  redemptive 
the  task  of  interpreTg  ct  atr;rrertfort  '"  '"" 
types  of  modern  scientific  thought  to  L  °  ''^"°"' 

of  human  life    anri   tn\u  '        ^  P'^'''"«^  problems 

mar,  hfe.  and  to  the  evangelization  of  the  whole 


^94  APOLOGETICS. 

-world.  In  this  way  Christianity  may  receive  its  philo- 
sophical, historical  and  practical  vindication,  as  the  only 
adequate  religion  for  sinful  men. 

In  connection  with  Christian  Apologetics,  which  is  to  be 
the  theme  of  the  second  volume  of  this  treatise,  other  re- 
ligions than  Christianity  must  be  considered.  The  religious 
and  theistic  belief,  whose  autopistic  and  real  nature  has 
been  vindicated  in  this  volume,  has,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
expressed  itself  historically  in  many  diverse  forms.  Hence, 
the  various  religions  of  mankind  have  arisen. 

The  problem  of  the  relation  of  these  to  each  other  and 
to  Christianity  is  one  which  modern  Apologetics  is  bound 
to  consider.  The  real  unique  character  of  the  Christian 
system,  the  inner  principle  of  the  other  religious  systems, 
and  the  right  key  to  interpret  their  mutual  relations  must 
all  be  ascertained.  This  will  form  the  opening  topic  of  the 
second  volume,  and  a  proper  introduction  to  the  vindication 
of  Christianity  as  the  only  truly  redemptive  and  restoring 
religion  for  sinful  men. 


The  End  of  Volume  I. 


INDEX. 


Absolute,  the  idea  of  the,  291. 

an  adjective,  295. 
Activity,  divine  redeeming.  40. 
redeeming  in  Old  Testament,  41. 
redemptive,  of  God,  114 
AoNosnciSM,  statement  of,  521. 
^neral  explanation  of,  522. 
Its  main  advocates,  522. 
in  relation  to  Kant  and  Hamilton, 

522. 
several  types  of,  523. 
Its  theory  of  knowledge,  523. 
asserts  that  human  faculties  are  un- 
reliable, 525. 
and  epistemology,  526. 
denies  rational  theory  of  knowledge, 

520. 
and   relativity  of  knowledge.    527, 

as  an  antitheistic  theory,  528. 

in  relation  to  the  knowledge  of  God, 

.   528. 

IS  antitheistic  in  various  ways,  S20 

criticism  of,  531. 

Its  theory  of  knowledge  examined, 

532- 
its  charge  of  unreliable  human  fac- 

ulties  exaggerated,  532. 
inconsistent,  532. 

is  empiricism  in  its  theory  of  know- 
ledge, 533, 
rules  out  knowledge  of  phenomena 

as  well  as  of  noumena,  534. 
relativity  of   knowledge   does   not 

support,  534. 
as  antitheistic,  537. 
p.dmissions  made  to,  537. 
its  conception  of  God  at  fault.  538 
gives  small  place  to  belief,  539. 
kinship  between  man  and  God  re- 
futes, 539. 
cannot  account  for  religious  beliefs 

and  rites,  542. 
fails  to  explain  knowledge  of  God 

given  in  Bible,  543. 
its  results  similar  to  atheism,  544. 
Aim.  of  apologetics.  57. 
AiTioLOGicAL,  proof  for  the  existence 
of  God,  327. 


Anaxacoras,  reference  to,  116 
Ancestorism,  reference  to,  is8. 

and  Spencer  174. 

statement  of,  174. 

Spencer's  account  of,  175 

and  religious  belief,  175 

examination  of,  177. 

largely  hypothetical,  177. 

breaks  down  as  a  theory,  180 
ANIMISM,  seeks  to  account  for  reli- 
gion, 157. 

statement  of,  163. 

and  origin  of  religion,  164. 

examination  of,  166. 

psychological  difliculty  in,  167 
ANSELM.  and  origin  of  theistic  belief, 

and  the  ontotheistic  proof,  275  and 

2oI. 

"1?'"28"2  °^  ****  ontological  proof 

Antitheism,  reference  to,  ns 
defined,  434.  ^ 

Anthropological,  method  in  apolo- 
getics, 67.  *^ 
method  of  study  of  origin  of  reli- 
gion, 142. 
proof  for  the  existence  of  God.  410 
Apolooetics,  Its  scope,  38.  its  sphere, 
08  and  42,  momentous  questions 
37- 
its  underlying  conditions,  39. 
makes  a  place  for  Christianity,  40. 
vindicates  the  Christian  system,  40. 
task  given  to,  41.               '        >  -* 
task  varies  from  age  to  age  42 
service  now  enlarged,  43.      ' 
defends   Christianity   from  all   as- 
saults, 43. 
function  of,  29. 
spirit  of,  43. 
to  be  elevated,  44. 
to  be  impartial.  44. 
to  be  without  bigotry,  45. 
to  be  reverent.  45. 
must  be  practical,  46. 
should  be  courageous,  47. 
meaning  of  the  term,  48. 
usage  of  the  term,  4.,. 


f  ^1 

1<" 


*   I  I 


596 


INDEX. 


AFotoGincs — 
Greek  usage,  SO- 
New  T<  *    ment  usage,  50. 
patristic  use,  SO. 
scholastic,  51. 
modern,  51. 

the  definition  of,  52,  S3- 
defective  definitions,  53.  54- 
correct  definition  of,  56. 
the  aim  of,  57,  S8. 
defends  Christianity,  S7- 
vindicates  it  at  all  points,  58. 
refutes  opposing  systems,  59. 
nature  of  apologetical  service,  59. 
enters  into  controversy,  59. 
makes  exposition,  60. 
offers  criticism,  62. 
fundamental  described,  113. 
its  questions,  3S- 
its  place,  63. 
its  methods,  67. 

distribution  of  the  materials  of,  74- 
the  three  main  divisions  of,  74- 
and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  76. 
Aquinas,  50. 

AwsTOTLE,  and  theism,  116 
and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  306. 
and  cosmological  proof  for  exist- 
ence of  a  first  cause,  330. 
and  design,  361. 
Atheism,  an  antitheistic  theory,  435- 
of  two  sorts,  436.  j 

practical,  4.16. 
theoretical,  437- 
refutation  of,  439- 
is  unnatural,  439. 
is  inconsistent,  440. 
explains  nothing,  44'-  .  . 

when  it  tries  to  explain  it  is  illogi- 
cal, 441- 
must  prove  a  ne|ptive,  442- 
destroys  the  basis  of  morality  and 

social  fabric.  442. 
fails  to  satisfy  the  religious  instincts 
of  men,  444.  ,   ,.  •    • 

AccusTiNE,  and  the  origin  of  theistic 
belief,  246. 
and  the  theistic  proofs,  275. 
and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  307. 


Bacon,  448.  ,  ^  „, 

Bain,  and  the  moral  theory,  y^. 
Baumstark,  definition  of  apologetics 

*>>•  54-     .     ^      ,  .    .  -, 

Being,  pure  in  Greek  pantheism,  565. 
Belief,   and   knowledge   related,   96, 
104. 
nature  of,  97- 


Belief — 

and  faith,  97. 

used  in  wide  sense,  97. 

in  contrast  with  knowledge,  98. 

is  mediate  apprehension  of  truth  or 
reality,  98. 

and  knowledge  not  opposed,  100. 

grounds  of,  100. 

evidence  and,  100. 

objects  of,  105. 

in  matters  of  religion,  108. 

the  nature  of  religious,  126. 

factors  in  theistic,  131. 
I     natuie  of  theistic,  I3S- 

origin  of  theistic,  139- 
Berkeley,  on  truth,  93. 

and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  307. 
BiRAN,  and  causation,  323. 
Bossuet,  414. 

Bradlaugh,  437.  . 

Brahm,  i.n  Hindoo  pantheism,  504- 
Brahmanism,  and  theism,  117- 
Bridgewater  Treatises,  and  the  ar- 
gument from  design,  361. 
Bruce,   definition  of  apologetics  by, 

and  the  method  of  apologetics,  69. 

and  the  divisions  of  apologetics,  71. 

and  the  definition  of  theism,  1 19. 
Buckle,  414- 

Buddhism,  and  theism,  117. 
Butler,  allusion  to,  51. 

the  argument  for  immortality  by, 
496. 


Cairo,  reference  to,  67. 
on  evolution  of  religion,  186. 
and  idealistic  evolution,  209. 
and  Hegel,  213.  ,      , 

and  the  theistic  proofs.  265  and  276. 
and  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  291. 
Calderwood,  and  theistic  belief,  238. 

and  the  theistic  proofs,  276. 
Calvin,  reference  to.  651. 
and  the  origin  of  theistic  belief.  246. 
and  the  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God  from  the  history  of  mankind, 
411. 
Cause,  proof  of  a  first,  327. 

an  uncaused,  327. 
Causation,  proofs  from,  316. 
the  principle  of,  317 
an  exposition  of.  ,(i7. 
defective  views  of,  318. 
the  true  doctrine  of,  324. 
is  a  priori,  324.. 
involves  necessity,  324. 
implies  efficiency,  326. 


INDEX. 


Causation — 
includes  sufficient  reason,  326 
requires  an  uncaused  cause,  327 
the  thcistic  proofs  from,  2,2'7. 

Cave,  reference  to,  129. 
on  the  divisions  of  apologetics,  71. 

CeLSUS,  so.  r        o       vo,   ,  1. 

Chinese,  and  materialT"-..!    .u- 
Chalmers,  and  athei   -.  44^ 
Christlieb,  on  the  o  ,gin  of  thcistic 

belief,  246. 
Christianity,  everytl  ns?  or  nofhir* 
for  man,  37.  * 

has  its  face  towards  a  lofty  goai,  ^ 
a  redeemmg  activity,  40,  41. 
IS  to  be  defended  by  apologetics,  57. 
IS  vindicated  by  apologetics,  58,  100 
aehned  in  its  inner  principle,  114. 
fundamental  apologetics  brings  to 
threshold  of  historical,  593 
Chhistolocical,  as  a  method  in  apol- 
ogetics, 69. 
Clarke,  and  the  ontotheistic  proof, 

on  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of 
God,  300. 
Classification,  of  theories  as  to  the 
origin  of  religion,  142. 
of  the  theistic  proofs,  239. 
of  the  theories  of  causation,  318. 
"f  ..loral  theories,  385. 
jf  antitheistic  theories,  435. 
Clement,  50. 

Cocker,  and  the  origin  of  theistic  be- 
lief, 143,  229. 
and  the  criticism  of  revelation  to 
account  for  the  genesis  of  belief 
in  God,  233. 
Coleridge,  and  the  proof  for  the  ex- 
istence of  God  based  on  -ausa- 
tion,  340. 
CoMPARA~ivE  Religion,  gives  aid  in 
shaping  the  anthropological  proof 
for  the  existence  of  God  411 
and  universal  belief  in  God,  411 
Comparative  Theolocy,  a  reference 

to,  71. 
Comte,  and  positivism,  510. 

and  the  cmUms  of  positivism,  516. 
Communism,  statement  of,  586 

remarks  on,  586. 
Conscience,  nature  of,  83. 
the  psychical  basis  in  man  of  mo- 
rality, 388. 
is  ultimate  and  irreducible,  389 
theistic  arguments  based  on,  i8j. 
and  Kant's  criticism  of  the  theistic 
proofs,  428. 


597 


Controversy,  in  relation  to  apologet- 

^     'cs,  59. 

Cosmos,  and  God,  121. 
as  a  whole  the  basis  of  the  proof 
from  a  first  cause  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  328. 
God  the  ground  and  goal  of  the,  379 

Cosmology,   fundamental  apologetics 
supplies  a  theistic,  438. 

C:   mological,  method  in  apologetics, 

proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  260, 
335- 

the  principle  of  this  theistic  proof. 
236. 
Cousin,  and  theistic  belief,  236. 
Criticism,  in  apologetics,  61. 

of  causation  by  many,  317. 

by  Kant  of  the  theistic  proofs,  418. 

force  of  this,  419. 

examination  of  Kant's,  409. 

of  semi-materialism,  455. 

of  materialism  proper,  469. 

of  psychological  materialism,  489. 

of  agnosticism,  531. 

of  pantheism,  461. 
Cudworth,  and  the  theory  of  know- 

ledge,  307. 
Cyril,  50. 


Dabney,  reference  to,  65. 
Darwin,  reference  to.  37(5. 
Defence,  of  Christianity  by  apolonet- 

ics,  58. 
Definition,  of  apologetics,  55. 

of  theism,  117. 

has  three  things  in  it,  121. 
Deism,  some  explanations  of,  542. 

history  of,  546. 

and  rationalism,  546. 

statement  of,  548. 

asserts  the  existence  of  a  personal 
God  as  creator,  548. 

denies  the  immanence  of  God,  540. 

examination  of,  557. 

has  initial  difficulty,  551. 

must  explain  the  self-maintenance 
of  the  cosmos,  552. 

lays  too  much  stress  on  natural  law, 

separates   the  physical  and   moral 

too  widely,  553. 
has  difficulty  in  giving  a  place  to 

human  freedom,  SS5. 
leaves  no  place  for  the  pity  of  God. 

550. 
excludes  the  supernatural,  S56. 
Delitzsch,  reference  to,  65,  67. 


598 


INDEX. 


I}escartes,  and  innate  ideas,  88. 

on  the  theory  of  knowledge,  88. 

on  truth,  93. 

on  origin  of  theistic  belief,  211. 

on  idealism,  211. 

and  theistic  belief,  231. 

and  origin  of  belief  in  God,  239. 

statement  of  theistic  proofs  accord- 
ing to,  277.  . 

illustration  in  theistic  reasoning  by, 
280. 

and  tb :  idea  of  the  infinite,  291. 
Design,  ihe  theistic  proof  from  marks 
of,  360. 

Socrates  and,  361. 

Anaxagoras  and,  361. 

Niewentyt  and,  361. 

Bridgewater  Treatises  and,  361. 

the  true  nature  of,  365. 
DiMAN,  and  the  origin  of  theistic  be- 
lief, 368. 

and  the  theistic  proofs.  349- 
Divisions,  of  apologetics,  71. 
D(«NER,  reference  to,  65. 
DowiEiSM,  reference  to,  583. 
DuAUSM,  moral  conflict  in,  38. 

DUSTESOIECK,  64. 


Ebbard,  definition  of  apologetics  by, 

55- 
reference  to,  00. 
and  divisions  of  apologetics,  72. 
and  definition  of  theism,  119- 
and  fetichism,  152. 
and  Hegel  as  to  pantheism,    jO. 
and  the  origin  of  theistic  belief,  246. 
Eddyism,  allusion  to,  583. 
Edwakds,  and  apologetical  method,  67. 
Emanation,  in  the  Hindoo  panthe- 
ism, 565.  ,  ,  , 
Empiricism,  as  a  theory  of  know- 
ledge, 88, 
in  relation  to  absolute  truth,  93- 
and  positivism,  514. 
and  agnosticism,  525. 
Epicurus,  144,  460- 
£pisTEMOU>GY,  the  rational,  84. 
of  positivism,  514. 
of  agnosticism,  526. 
EuREMERisM,  as  a  theory  of  mythol- 
ogy, 176- 
and  Spencer  s  ancestonsm,  170. 
Eutaxiouxsy,  theistic  proof  based  on, 
348. 
Hicks  on,  349. 
Evidence,  the  ground  and  measure  of 
belief,  100. 
subjective,  100. 


Evidence— 

objective,  102. 

the  ground  of  persuasion  or  convic- 
tion, 103. 

the  several  branches  of,  100. 

is  the  foundation  of  history,  104. 
Evil,   is   abnormal   in  the   universe 
under  God's  hand,  38. 

a  terrible  fact  in  the  world,  40. 

the  background  and  condition  of 
redemption,  40.     . 

produces  an  age-long  moral  conflict, 

41. 

makes   the   service  of   apologetics 
necessary,  41. 

the  problem  of,  121. 

the  deeper  problem  of,  589. 

and  dualism,  589. 

theism  must  reckon  with,  589. 

moral  at  root,  590. 

Leibnitz  and  the  problem  of,  591. 

mystery  of  the  origin  of,  592. 

the  power  of  the  gospel  redeems 
from  the  power  of|  592. 

Christianity  recovers  from  the  mal- 
ady of,  593.  . 
Evolution,  some  explain  religion  by 
natural,  153. 

and  origin  of  theistic  belief,  209. 

idealistic  type  of,  211. 

and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  311. 

materialistic  phase  of,  497- 

general  explanation  of,  498. 

explanation  of  the  term,  500. 

some  description  of,  501. 

Spencer's  ontological  type  of,  501. 

matter    atomic    homogeneous    for, 

the  process  of  integration  of  matter 
in,  502. 

environment  and,  502. 

return  process  of,  504- 

examination  of  materialistic,  504. 

is  "^pen  to  objections  to  pure  m.-ite- 
.  i:'lism,  505. 

as  a  term  is  ambiguous,  505. 

cannot  begin  its  process,  506. 

cannot  direct  its  course,  506. 

fails  to  explain  order  and  design, 
life  and  mind,  507. 

Hegel's  system  of  idealistic,  567. 
Exegetics,  apologetics  and,  64. 
Exposition,  n  apologetics,  60. 

of  fetichism,  147. 

of  naturism,  158. 

of  animism,  163. 

of  spiritism,  169. 

of  ancestorism,  174. 


MHI 


1^ 


INDEX. 


Exposition — 

of  the  true  doctrine  concerning  the 
origin  oi  theistic  belief,  242 

of  the  psyciiical  theistic  proofs,  262. 

01  the  infinite  and  absolute,  243 

of  the  theistic  proof  from  the  prin- 
ciple of  intelligence  in  man,  310. 

Fairbairn,  70. 

Feeling    powers  of  the  human  soul 

in,  B2. 
Fetichism,  as  a  theory  of  the  origin 
of  theistic  belief.  146. 
the  meaning  of  the  term,  147 
application  of  the  term.  148. 
two  in  which  to  take.  148. 
origin  of  religion  explained  by,  149 
many  writers  criticise.  152 
assumes  to  be  the  first  form  of  re- 
hgion,  153. 

has   a    serious   psychological    diffi- 
culty, 154. 

Finality,  subjective  and  immanent, 
377- 
and  evolution,  378. 
and  intelligence,  379. 
FisKE,  and  ancestorism,  175. 
Flint,  on  theism,  120. 
on  definition  of  religion,  129 
and  the  idea  of  God,  201. 
criticised  as  to  his  views  concerning 
*"«  of'K'n  of  theistic  belief,  204. 
and  the  theistic  proofs.  276 
Force,   added   to  matter   bv   modem 
science,  465. 
conservation  of,  46^ 
transmutation  o' 
correlation  of,  .' 

the    dynamic    cc  of    force 

really  ideal,  479. 
Foster,  references  to,  65.  442. 

and  the  divisions  of  apologetics   72 
Foundation,     of     Christianity    'lies 
deeper  than  apologetics,  47. 


599 


God — 

the  existence  of,  249. 

proofs  for  the  existence  of,  259. 

statement  of  the  proofs  for  the  ex- 
istence of,  264. 

psychical  proofs  of,  262. 

causal  proofs  of,  328. 

moral  proofs  of,  379. 

pantheism  and  the  idea  of.  578. 
Good  theistic  argument  from  the,  40a. 

and  the  suntmum  bonum,  404. 

definition  of  the,  404. 

is  ethical  at  its  deepest  root.  405. 
Green,  and  idealistic  t solution,  209. 

and  the  theistic  proofs,  265. 

and  the  notion  of  the  infinite,  291. 

and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  307. 
Oueliux,  and  cosmic  progress.  340. 


Gassendi,  449. 

Gillespie,  and  the  proofs  for  the  ex- 

istence  of  God,  286. 
God,  theism  asserts  one,  121. 

how  are  we  to  conceive  of,  121. 

relation  between  th-  universe  and. 

revelation  from,  14, 
and  the  cosmos,  121. 
different  ideas  of.  '07. 
complex  is  the  noti'      of.  198 
Flint  and  the  idea  c     201. 
Hegel's  conception  of,  220. 


Hagenbach,  on  place  of  apologetics, 

Hamilton,  on  truth,  93. 

and  theistic  belief,  237. 

on  relation  of  soul  and  bodv,  78. 

and  the  idea  of  the  infinite  and  doc- 
trine  of  causation,  279. 
Hannell,  definition  of  apologetics  bv 

53.  «-       B  J. 

Hartmann,  and  pessimism,  588. 
Hegel,  and  origin  of  theistic  belief. 
211.  • 

and  idealistic  evolution,  211. 
the  philosophy  of,  211. 
relation  of  Spencer  and,  212. 
Caird  and  Hegel,  213. 
examination  of  the  theory  of  215 
criticism  of  the  fundamentarprirci- 

ple  of,  216. 
and  his  pantheistic  tendency,  219 
Ebrard  and,  220. 
and  pantheism  in  general,  567. 
Henotheism,    Muller's    doctrine   of. 
185. 
the  theor>'  explained.  189 
taken  to  explain  the  rise  of  religion, 

defective  historically,  192. 

is  inconsistent.  193. 

has  serious  psychological  difficulty, 
„     193. 

Heraclitus,  allusion  to,  93. 
Herder,  389. 

Hicks,  and  theistic  proofs,  349. 
History,   proof  of  the  existence  of 
God  fiom,  409. 

statement  of  the  theistic  import  of. 
413.  ' 

the  problem  made  by,  415. 


6oo 


INDEX. 


History — 

the  solution  of  the  problem,  415. 

hand  of  God  in,  416. 
Historical,  method  in  apologetics,  69. 

preparation  for  Christianity,  71- 

method  of  study  concerning  reli- 
gion, 213 

and  materialism,  448. 
HoBBES,  and  moral  theory,  386. 
Hodge,  reference  to,  65. 

and  origin  of  theistic  belief,  245. 
Holy  Spirit,  the  agent  in  redemption, 

70. 
Homiletics,  in  relation  to  apologetics, 

64. 
Hypothesis,  ability  to  make  the  the- 
istic, 137. 

of  a  first  cause,  330. 

of  an  infinite  regress  of  causes,  332. 

of  an  uncaused  or  first  cause  suffi- 
cient, 333. 

Immortality,  of  the  human  soul,  493. 

Butler's  argument  for,  496. 
Inference,  theory  to  account  for  the 
genesis  of  religion,  195. 
a  logical  process  of  some  sort,  196. 
statement  of  the  theory  of,  I97- 
t'leory  examined,  201. 
i  .imediate,  ao6. 
Infidelity,  same  as  deism,  508. 
applied  to  Saracens,  508. 
denies  supernatural  in  religion,  sr^. 
Infinite,  Muller's  doctrine  of,  185. 
the  philosophy  of  the,  186. 
the  mathematical  and  metaphysical, 

192. 
as  unconscious  reason,  213. 
the  correct  idea  of  the,  291. 
Plato  and  Aristotle  and  the,  291. 
as  an  adjective,  295. 
theistic  import  of  the,  298. 
as  mathematical,  metaphysical  and 
dynamical,  301. 
Innate  ideas,  135. 
Intelligence,  the  principle  of,  305. 
the  theistic  significance  of  human 
intelligence,  305. 
Intuitionalism,  and  the  theory  of 
knowledge,  88. 
and  truth,  93. 

important  for  apologetics,  94. 
and  the  idea  of  God,  202. 
and  the  origin  of  theistic  belief,  241. 


Jacobi,  and  theistic  belief,  237. 
Janet,  and  the  proof  for  the  existence 
of  God  from  design,  367. 


Jesus  Christ,  the  peerless  personage, 
61. 
the  redeeming  activity  of  God  is  by, 

70- 

mediates  the  redemption  which  is  in 

Christianity,  114. 
and  supernatural  revelation,  224. 
the  central  figure  and  key  of  human 
history,  416. 
Jevons,  and  fetichism,  152. 
Justin  Martyr,  and  his  apologetical 
service,  50. 

Kant,  on  the  theory  of  knowledge,  88. 
on  truth,  93. 

on  idealistic  evolution.  211. 
and  theistic  belief,  237. 
criticism  of  theistic  proofs  by,  274. 
on  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  291. 
and  the   philosophy  of  causation, 

330- 

Knowledge,  the  theory  of,  77. 

the  powers  of  tl  ^  humar  mind  in, 
81. 

misconception  a'    -i,  80. 

the  various  modes  of,  84. 

the  two  main  theories  of,  85. 

the  genesis  of,  88. 

objects  of,  90. 

the  deeper  nature  of,  91. 

the  tests  of  true,  91. 

as  self-evident,  91. 

as  necessary,  91. 

as  universal,  92. 

is  direct  apprehension  of  truth  or 
reality,  92. 

belief  in  relation  to,  96. 

theistic    import    of   human   know- 
ledge, 305- 

and  agnosticism,  525. 

relativity  oi,  526. 
Kostlin,  129. 
KuYPER,  21,  28,  65,  129. 

Lang,  and  fetichism,  152. 
Lance,  and  materialism,  446,  448- 
Lr.  Bkosse,  and  fetichism,  152. 
Lechler,  definition  of  apologetics  by, 

54- 
Leibnitz,  on  truth,  93. 
and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  307. 
and  causation,  324,  336. 
and  sufficient  reason,  326. 
Locke,  on  the  theory  of  knowledge, 
88. 
and  materialism,  450. 
Lubbock,  and  universal  belief  in  God, 
410. 


INDEX. 


€ox 


LuTHASin',  on  theism,  120. 
on  th€  origin  of  theistic  belief,  205. 
and  the  place  of  revelation  in  the- 
istic belief.  228. 
on  the  true  doctrine  of  the  origin  of 

theistic  belief,  246. 
and  the  ontology  of  theism,  252. 
and  the  theistic  proofs,  265. 

Manifestation,  in  the  Greek  panthe- 

ism,  565. 
Mansel,  and  theistic  belief,  238. 
and  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  291. 
Maktineau,  128. 

Materiausm,  of  Democritus  and  Epi- 
curus, 291. 
and  causation,  318. 
and  teleology,  376. 
is  opposed  to  theism,  435. 
semi,  445. 
history  of,  445. 
in  China  and  India,  446. 
among  the  Greeks,  446. 
Socrates  and  Plato  against,  447. 
in  mediaeval  times,  4^^. 
in  modem  times,  448. 
main  representatives  of,  450. 
the  pure  type  of,  459. 
history  of  pure,  460. 
statement  of  ancient,  461. 
additions  by  moderns  to,  464. 
endows  matter  with  germinal  life 

and  mind,  467. 
criticism  of,  469. 
does  not  give  a  unitary  principle  for 

the  universe,  470. 
is   unscientific   in  several   respects, 

472. 
cannot  prove  that  matter  is  eternal, 

476. 
cannot  show  that  matter  is  neces- 
sarily before  mind,  477. 
cannot  prove  the  indestructibility  of 

matter,  479. 
cannot  be  consistent  with  its  em- 
pirical theory  of  knowledge,  480. 
cannot  explain  force,  480. 
fails  to  account  for  order  and  de- 

sign,  481. 
helpless    to   account    for    life   and 

mind,  482. 
psychological  type  of,  484. 
Matter,    is   not   necessarily    eternal, 

the  atomic  conception  of,  479. 

is  really  ideal,  479. 
McCosH,  363. 
MiTHoo,  of  apologetics,  67. 


Method — 
as  descriptive,  historical  and  psy- 
chological, 69. 
of  inquiry  in  regard  to  the  origin  o£ 
religion,  141. 
MiLEY,  reference  to,  65. 
Mill,  on  truth,  93. 
and  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  291. 
and  causation,  319. 
Milton,  Paradise  Lost  used  to  illus- 
trate the  theistic  ar~ume.it  from 
order,  357. 
Modification,   in  the  pantheism  of 

Spinoza,  666. 
Monotheism,  and  naturism,  162. 
and  ancestorism,  175. 
and  henotheism,  189. 
and  the  theistic  proofs,  249. 
and  Christianity,  592. 
Mormonism,  statement  of,  583. 
MoRALTTY,  the  theistic  argument  from. 
382. 
several  proofs  based  on,  383. 
theories  of,  385. 
and  evolution,  387. 
is  ultimate  and  irreducible,  388. 
MuLLER,  and  fetichism,  149. 
and  henotheism,  183. 
on  the  origin  of  religion,  183. 
definition  of  religion  by,  184. 
has  a  peculiar  theory  of  the  origin 

of  religion,  185. 
has  a  defective  empirical  philoso- 
phy, 191. 
and  the  philosophy  of  the  infinite, 
291. 

Naturism,  seeks  to  explain  religion. 
158. 
statement  of,  158. 

accounts  for  origin  of  religion,  159. 
gives  a  mythical  view  of  nature,  i6a 
examination  of,  161. 
open  to  various  objections,  162. 
has   a   serious   psychological    diffi- 
culty, 162. 

NiEWENTYT,  362. 

Note,  introductor> ,  19. 


Objects,  of  knowledge,  90. 

of  belief,  105. 

belief  rests  on  various.  105,  108. 

tangible,  semi-tangible  and  intangi- 
ble, 187. 
Obligation,  as  a  factor  in  moral  the- 

.   ory,  386. 

IS  .absolutely  binding,  389. 

the  theistic  proof  from  moral,  395. 


in 

m 


i 


?■ 


6o2 


INDEX. 


OBUGAnON— 

explanation  of  the  theistic  proof 

based  on,  396. 
solution  of  the  problem  presented 

by  moral,  399. 
man  finds  himself  under,  399. 
leads  out  and  up  to  God  as  trans- 
cendent, 401. 
Ontology,  of  theism,  249. 
the  task  undertaken  by  theism  in 

relation  to,  251. 
theistic  import  of,  433. 
Ontological,  proof  for  the  existence 

of  God,  260. 
general  estimate  of  the  proof  known 

as  the,  287. 
OitOBit,  chance  cannot  explain  cosmic, 

356. 
immanent,  357. 
implies  intelligence,  358. 
limits  of  the  theistic  proof  from, 

359-  .    , 

is  moral  as  well  as  physical,  392. 
theistic  postulate  solves  the  problem 

of  both  kinds  of,  393. 

Vaimy,  allusion  to  his  service  to  na- 
tural theology,  52. 
apologetical  method  of,  69. 
and  theism,  116. 

and  the  theistic  proof  from  design, 
361. 
Pantheism,  and  oriental  theosophy, 

117- 

i?  attractive  to  some  minds,  119. 

a  statement  of,  558. 

the  history  of,  559. 

in  Hindoo  theosophy,  559. 

in  Greek  philosophy,  559. 

in  modern  times,  560. 

in  the  philosophy  of  Spinoza.  560. 

in  the  Hegelian  philosophy,  560. 

a  general  descrijrt'on  of,  561. 

is  always  monisT,  561. 

derives  finite  things  from  a  monis- 
tic ground,  561. 

discovers  the  principle  of  the  deri- 
vation of  finite  things  in  the 
monistic  ground,  563. 

and  the  idea  of  God,  563. 

the  four  historic  types  of,  564. 

the  Hindoo,  S64. 

the  Greek,  565. 

Spinoza's,  566. 

Hegel's,  566. 

criticism  of,  569. 

defective  on  philosophical  grounds, 
570. 


Pantbeisu— 
does  not  after  all  give  a  unitary 

principle,  572. 
fails  to  explain  finite  things,  573. 
gives  no  proper  place  for  the  facts 

of  consciousness,  573. 
gives  no  good  basis  for  personality, 

574- 

theism  far  better  than,  574. 

defective  on  moral  grounds,  575. 

destroys  the  basis  for  moral  distinc- 
tions, 575. 

robs  God  as  the  monistic  ground  of 
freedom,  576. 

leaves  no  freedom  in  the  creature, 
576. 

would  have  bad  moral  results,  578. 

fails  utterly  on  religious  grounds, 
578. 

gives  a  defective  idea  of  God,  578. 

assumes  a  wrong  relation  between 
God  and  man,  579. 

affords    no    proper    philosophical 
ground  for  the  facts  of  Christi- 
anity, 580. 
Pascal,  51. 
■"atton,  and  Hegel's  theism,  214. 

on  the  origin  of  theistic  belief,  246. 

on    the   ontotheistic    reasoning   of 
Anselm,  283. 
Pelt,  reference  to,  65. 
Pessimism,  some  discussion  of,  581. 

statement  of,  586. 

history  of,  .S87. 

and  Hindooism,  587. 

modern  types  of,  588. 

and  pantheism,  5^. 
Pfleiderer,  reference  to,  67. 

and  fetichism,  152. 

and  naturism,  159. 

and  the  theistic  proofs,  276. 
Philosophy,  of  religion,  115. 

of  the  infinite,  i8b. 

the  common  sense,  289. 

of  the  unconditioned,  290. 

of  the  infinite  and  absolute,  291. 

of  knowledge,  306. 

of  causation,  317. 

of  cosmic  order,  350. 

of  history,  404. 

of  positivism,  511. 
Place,  of  apologetics  in  the  theologi- 
cal sciences,  63. 
Planck,   allusion   to   his    views   on 

place  of  apologetics,  52. 
Plato,  reference  to,  93. 

and  theism,  116. 

and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  306. 


mmm 


ISiBiiiiM 


INDEX. 


Polytheism,  reference  to,  ii6. 
in  relation  to  henotheism  and  mono- 
theism, 189. 
and  fetichism,  149. 
Positivism,   general    description   of, 
S09. 
of  Comte  and  Lewes,  510. 
statement  of  the  main  points  in,  511. 
and  evolution,  512. 
has  its  own  psychology,  514. 
and  empiricism,  514. 
the  three  stages  of  human  progress 

according  to  positivism,  514. 
an  examination  of,  517. 
has  a  defective  psychology,  517. 
weak  philosophical  basis,  517. 
its  philosophy  of  human  progress 

false  to  history,  518. 
is  little  better  than  materialism,  519. 
leaves  deep  pressing  questions  un- 
answered, 520. 
Predicates,  power  to  make  theistic. 
_     137. 

Principle,  in  man  a  spiritual,  Tj. 
powers  of  the  spiritual,  79. 
of  intelligence  as  theistic,  304. 
of  the  cosmo-theistic  proof,  333. 
of  the  teleotheistic  proof,  375. 
Problem,  of  the  aitio-theistic  proof, 
327- 
solution  of  the,  330. 
of  the  cosmo-theistic  proof,  341. 
solution  of  the,  344, 
of  the  eutaxiotheistic  proof,  352 
illustrations  of  the,  353. 
solution  of  the,  355. 
of  the  teleo-theistic  proof,  369. 
illustrations  of  the,  370. 
solution  of  the,  375. 
of  the  ortho-theistic  proof,  389. 
the  solution  of  the,  391. 
the    theistic    postulate    solves 

392. 
of  thi  agatho-theistic  proof,  395. 
the  solution  of  the,  395. 
the   theistic   hypothesis   solves   the 
problem,  407. 
Proof,  of  the  existence  of  God,  264. 
psychical  theistic  proofs,  259. 
theistic  belief  gives  autopistic,  260. 
the  onto-theistic,  274. 
from  cosmic  origin,  316. 
from  cosmic  progress,  335. 
from  cosmic  order,  347. 
from  comic  design,  360. 
the  moral  theistic,  382. 
Psychology,  an  error  in,  79. 
classification  in.  81. 


603 


the^ 


Psychology— 

empirical  in  contrast  with  the  ra- 
tional, 87. 

of  theism,  125. 

of  causation,  324. 
Psychological  iviATERiAusM,  a  state- 
ment of,  485. 

asserts  that  man  has  no  soul,  486. 

explains  mental  facts  from  matter 
highly  organized,  486. 

denies  immortality  to  man,  488. 

criticism  of,  488. 

common  traditions  of  men  against. 
489- 

brain  and  conditions  of  causation 
against,  491. 

personal  identity  refutes,  492. 

freedom  of  man  entirely  destroys, 
493- 

QuADRATus,  allusion  to  his  apologeti- 
cal  work,  50. 


Rationalism,  and  deism,  546. 
explanation  of,  548. 
asserts  that  the  light  of  nature  suffi- 
cient for  religion,  550. 
excludes  the  supernatural,  556. 
Rawlinson,  reference  to,  129. 
Reason,  in  Hegel's  pantheism  is  un- 
conscious, 565. 
Reformation,  and  apologetics.  52. 
Religion,  powers  of  man  involved  in, 
83. 
conception  of  the  Christian,  114. 
philosophy  of,  115. 
the  Jewish,  127. 
the  Mohammedan,  127. 
various  writers  give  different  defi- 
nitions of,  127. 
accepted  definitions  of,  130. 
the  origin  of,  140. 
theories  as  to  the  origin  of,  143. 
the  skeptical  theory,  146. 
fetichism  and  the  crigin  of,  146. 
Spencer  and  the  genesis  of,  174. 
Muller  and  the  beginnings  of,  184. 
reasoning  and,  195. 
Hegelian  doctrine  as  to  the  genesis 

of,  211. 
revelation  and  origin  of,  222. 
the  true  doctrine  of  the  origin  of  re- 
ligion, 241. 
Revelation,  of  man's  capacity  t ,  re- 
ceive,  137. 
m  theistic  belief  the   function  of, 

232. 

definition  of,  222. 


604 


INDEX. 


Revelation — 

God  and,  233. 

used  in  three  different  senses,  323. 

and  the  Holy  Scriptures,  224. 

determination  of  the  idea  of,  225. 

the  origin  of  belief  in  God  by,  227. 

examination  of  the  theory  of,  230. 

theism  the  basis  of  supernatural, 
114. 
Reville,  an'^  natunsm,  159. 

RiTSCHL,  I3(^ 

RoYCE,  and  the  theistic  proofs,  365. 
and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  307. 

Sacb,  on  the  definition  of  apologetics, 

54- 
Saussaye  on  definition  of  religion, 

129. 
Schelukg,  and  the  origin  of  theistic 

belief,  236. 
Schleiermacher,  on  the  definition  of 

apologetics,  53,  127. 
reference  to,  66,  132. 
and  the  theistic  belief,  237. 
ScHOPENHAUEB,   and   his   pessimism, 

S88. 

SCBURMAN,  71. 

Scripture,  and  the  belief  in  God,  272. 

SCBOUDE,  288. 

Secularism,  statement  of,  583. 

relation  to  positivism,  584. 
Semi-materialism,    a    statement   of 

451- 

Stoic  type  of,  452. 

Platonic  type  of,  453. 

Hegelian  aspect  of,  433. 

criticism  of,  455. 
Shedd,  reference  to,  65. 

and  the  theistic  proofs,  276. 
Smith,  H.  B.,  definition  of  apologet- 
ics by,  55. 

apologetic  method  of,  70. 

divisions  of  apologetics  by,  72. 

..nd  theistic  belief.  136. 

on  the  genesis  of  theistic  belief,  205, 
245- 
Socialism,  description  of,  584. 

remarks  on,  584. 
Socrates,  allusion  to,  49, 

and  theism,  116. 

and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  306. 
SoLinoN,  of  the  problem  of  cosmic 
progress,  344. 

of  the  jff'AAfm  of  cosmic  order,  355. 

of  the  pt'Mem  of  cosmic  design, 
363. 
Sophists,  reference  to,  93. 

and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  306. 


Soul,  of  man  distinct  from  his  body, 

77- 

different  from  the  body,  78. 

and  body  very  closely  related,  78. 
Spencer,  Herbert,  and  fetichism,  153. 

and  ancestorism,  174. 

and  Hegel,  213. 

and  the  philosophy  of  the  infinite, 
291. 

and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  311. 

and  the  doctrine  of  causation,  322. 
Spinoza,  on  the  idea  of  the  infinite 
and  absolute,  291. 

and  pantheism,  533. 
Sphere,  of  apologetics,  38. 
Spirit,  of  apologetics,  43. 

Holy  Spirit  administers  redemption 
in  Christianity,  114. 
Spiritism,  reference  to,  158. 

statement  of,  169. 

and  the  origin  of  theistic  belief,  170. 

examination  of  the  theory  of,  173. 
Spiritualism,  statement  of,  582. 

remarks  on,  582. 
Strong,  reference  to,  65. 
Substance,  in  the  pantheism  of  Spi- 
noza, 566. 
Summary,  of  theism,  429. 

Teleology,  has  a  large  place  in  specu- 
lation, 289. 
the  principle  of,  363. 
what  is?  365. 
relation  of  causation  to  teleology, 

365. 
relation  of  analogy  to,  366. 
and  materialism,  376. 
and  chance  or  fate,  376. 
subjective,  377. 
immanent,  378. 
and  intelligence,  379. 
Teleological  proof  for  the  existence 

of  God,  -00. 
Theism,  the  phik>sophical  basis  ot 

Christianity,  114. 
is  opposed  to  deism  and  pantheism, 

114. 
the  task  of,  ii5- 
The  meaning  and  scope  of,  116. 
derivation  of  the  term,  116. 
two  senses  of,  116. 
in  the  technical  sense,  117. 
definition  of,  119. 
Tulloch  on,  120. 
Luthardt,  120. 
Miley  on,  120. 
Flint  on,  120. 
Orr  on,  120. 


kfiiUiii 


INDEX. 


Thbsu— 

the  service  of,  121. 
the  divisions  of,  132. 
as  subjective  and  objective,  122. 
the  psychology  cf,  123. 
the  ontology  of,  123. 
the  contents  of,  130. 
precise  nature  of,  13s. 
the  origin  af,  139. 
and  the  explanation  of,  151. 
some  general  conclusions  on,  430. 
THEiSTic  Belief,  true  doctrine  of  the 
origin  of,  234. 
.-ivolves  an  epistemology,  235. 
some  partial  views  of,  216. 
statement  of  the  t.  je  doctrine  of. 

241. 
exposition  of,  242. 
confirmation  of  the  true  doctrine  of. 
^    245.  ', 

THEISTIC   Proofs,    relations  of  the. 
^254. 

the  order  of  the,  257. 
Descartes  and  the,  257. 
a  priori  and  a  posteriori  views  of. 
259. 

classification  of  the,  259. 
ontological,  cosraological  and  teleo- 

logical,  260. 
psychical  views  of  the,  262. 
autopistic  or  self-evidencing,  262. 
vindication  of  the  autopistic  nature 

of,  269. 
Cartesian  views  of  the,  277. 
Anselmian  views  of  the,  281. 
Theology,  relation  of  apologetics  to, 
OS- 
fundamental,  71 
natural,  71. 
romparative,  71. 


605 


Theology— 

biblical,  71. 

theism  supplies  a  natural,  431. 
THiOLOGiCAL,  method  in  apologetics, 

Theosophy,  the  oriental  type  of.  117, 
Thoknwell  on  the  origin  of  belief  in 

God,  246. 
Teuth,  what  is?  93. 

the  sophistical  view  as  to,  93 

Socratic  doctrine  of,  93. 

true  doctrine  of,  94. 
Tulloch,  on  theism,  120. 

TUBBEHN,   52. 

Tyloh,  and  fetichism,  152. 
and  animism,  163. 

Utility,  and  the  basis  of  absolute  ob- 
ligation, 386. 

Vico,  414. 

Von  Dsey,  on  the  definition  of  apolo- 
getics, 53. 

Waitz,  and  fetichism,  140. 
Warfield,  66. 

Watson,  and  the  origin  of  theistic  be- 
lief, 228. 

and  primitive  revelation.  228. 

his  theory  of  theistic  origin  exam- 
ined, 229. 

and  the  theistic  proofs,  265. 
Weissman,  375. 
Will,  as  a  capacity  in  man,  82. 
WUNDT,  and  causation,  319. 

Xenophon,  allusion  to,  49. 

Zoroastrianism,  in  relation  to  the- 
ism and  dualism,  117. 


